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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,
CANBERRA.~~

Ⓡ 181/4/4. ↙

Le Problème des
Réfugiés Arabes
de Palestine

Administration de l'Information
Le Caire (R.A.U.) - 1962

"Nous croyons que les droits du peuple arabe de Palestine doivent être récupérés. Plus d'un million d'Arabes ont été expulsés de leur pays. Ils doivent rentrer en possession de leurs terres. Tel est très succinctement notre point de vue basé sur le droit et la justice.

"....Nous avons déclaré à la conférence de Bandung et à toutes les conférences que nous voulons l'exécution des résolutions des Nations Unies. Quelle a été l'attitude du gouvernement israélien ? Il a refusé avec obstination l'exécution de l'une quelconque de ces résolutions.... Evidemment il y a là un problème, un danger et une menace constante"

Gamal Abdel Nasser
(Interview du Président à la T.V.
américaine "Columbia" - 26 Août 1961)

AVANT-PROPOS

La question des réfugiés arabes de Palestine est une tragédie qui dure depuis 13 ans et si les opinions sont divergentes à son sujet c'est parce qu'elles sont influencées par l'appartenance politique, les intérêts stratégiques ou économiques, le credo religieux etc... Les uns considèrent le problème comme humanitaire avant tout, parce qu'il s'agit d'injustice et de droits bafoués et qu'ils veulent le traiter sur le plan humain; les autres l'envisagent plutôt sous l'angle économique et font ce raisonnement : le territoire palestinien, du point de vue économique, ne pouvant suffire aux Arabes et aux Juifs à la fois, l'élément arabe a été évincé pour permettre aux immigrants juifs d'assurer leur gagne-pain. C'est, d'ailleurs, dans cet ordre d'idées que les Nations Unies ont essayé, en dernière analyse, de résoudre le problème en élaborant les grands projets du Sinai, de la Jordanie, etc., afin de permettre au secteur économique des différents pays arabes du Moyen-Orient d'absorber ce flot immense de déracinés.

Nous pensons, quant à nous, que le problème est avant tout politique, les deux aspects humanitaire et économique n'étant que le corollaire et la résultante de l'aspect politique.

Les Juifs voulaient, en effet, créer en Palestine même et pas ailleurs, une civilisation hébraïque qui leur est propre. Ayant chassé et spolié les Arabes pour faire place aux centaines de milliers de nouveaux venus, une grave perturbation économique du pays devait s'ensuivre; pour les malheureux réfugiés arabes c'était la misère à bref délai.

Nous allons essayer, dans les pages qui suivent, d'examiner aussi objectivement que possible, les divers aspects du problème et les différentes solutions proposées. Nous espérons que cette étude contribuera à apporter quelques lumières sur ce problème, pour le plus grand profit de la vérité.

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LIVRE I
COMMENT EST NE LE PROBLEME
DES REFUGES ARABES

CHAPITRE I

I — Le rôle du Sionisme dans la question des réfugiés arabes.

Il suffit, pour savoir exactement quel a été le rôle du Sionisme dans la question des réfugiés arabes, d'étudier comment a évolué la question de la création du foyer national juif en Palestine.

Il convient de souligner pour commencer que le problème de ces réfugiés, né en 1948, n'est que l'aboutissement d'une longue suite de manœuvres sionistes poursuivies inlassablement depuis de longues années.

Quand les Juifs envisagèrent de retourner en Palestine il n'entraîna nullement dans leur plan de chasser les Arabes de leurs foyers en ce pays. Cette idée ne leur vint que plus tard quand ce côté mystique et spirituel de ce vœu pieux s'accompagna d'un aspect politique.

Un de leurs leaders, Israël Zangwill, n'a-t-il pas dit : « La Palestine est une patrie sans peuple; il faut la donner au peuple sans patrie. Il échet pour les Juifs à l'avenir de faire la vie dure aux habitants arabes de la Palestine pour les contraindre à s'en aller ».

Dès lors une question se pose : « Depuis quand les Juifs ont-ils songé à retourner en Palestine ? » On peut rappeler à ce propos que c'est vers l'an 153 ap. J.-C. que près de 600.000 d'entre eux furent massacrés par les Romains, d'autres chassés du pays et le reste enmené en captivité à Rome. A partir de ce moment les Juifs se répandirent à travers le monde entier emportant dans leur cœur l'espoir de revenir un jour dans la terre promise. Dans leurs migrations voici les routes principales qu'ils suivirent :

- 1) Route Est-Ouest allant de Palestine à l'Est jusqu'en Irak, Egypte, Cyrénaïque, Maghreb, Espagne et Portugal.
 - 2) Route du Caucase puis de là en Russie, en Pologne.
- Une troisième route suivie fut celle de la Vallée du Rhin.
Ce sont ces réfugiés en Russie et en d'autres pays d'Europe qui,

bien des siècles plus tard, et par le truchement de leurs leaders Herzl, Weizmann et autres, jouèrent le rôle principal dans la création du Home national juif en Palestine.

Les Juifs vécurent ainsi depuis l'an 153 dispersés à travers le monde jusqu'au jour où leur fut concédée la fameuse Déclaration Balfour en 1917 (1). Durant tout ce temps, les liens spirituels entre les Juifs de la Diaspora et la Palestine continuèrent à se maintenir. Le vœu le plus cher de chaque Juif était de mourir en Terre Promise et en cas d'impossibilité il demandait, dans ses dernières volontés, qu'une fois mort on mit scus sa tête une poignée de la terre sacrée de Palestine.

Dans leur livre de préceptes religieux — le Talmud — les sages du peuple juif ont cherché à maintenir les liens des Juifs dispersés avec la Palestine. Ainsi il y est dit que le Juif qui quitte la Palestine n'a pas le droit d'obliger son épouse à l'accompagner et que si par contre un Juif retourne en Palestine et que son épouse refuse de le suivre il a le droit de la répudier. Parmi les vœux qu'échangeaient les Juifs entre eux à l'occasion des fêtes, il y avait inévitablement cette phrase :

«On se reverra l'an prochain à Jérusalem»...

Ainsi les Juifs ont vécu dispersés à travers le monde avec le secret espoir de faire un jour retour en Terre Promise. Et pour ne pas perdre contact entre eux et pour maintenir intacte l'idée du retour, ils vécurent en communautés fermées dans les différents pays qu'ils habitaient en maintenant leur mode de vie, leurs habitudes et leurs traditions.

Déjà depuis les premiers siècles de l'ère chrétienne au temps de César et plus tard sous les rois d'Espagne, les rois et les empereurs admettaient leur mode de vie et leurs habitudes de s'agglomérer et passèrent des traités avec eux (2). En Pologne aux 16e, 17e et 18e siècles ils avaient leur propre gouvernement central, en l'occurrence le Conseil Juif et en France, après la Révolution Française qui leur reconnut des droits égaux aux autres citoyens, ils continuèrent à vivre en groupements fermés. Même en Amérique ils s'arrangèrent pour avoir leurs propres écoles, leurs propres temples, leurs propres quartiers et quand de larges prérogatives leur furent accordées, les Juifs bien pensants et les traditionalistes eurent peur de perdre leur entité de peuple juif et leurs traditions ancestrales et ne demandèrent qu'une chose, c'est de

(1) Charles Mathews: *Palestine Mohammedan Holy Land*, p. XXIV.

(2) *Encyclopedia of Social Science*, Vol. 8, p. 391-395.

rester tels qu'ils étaient, en communauté fermée formant en somme un Etat dans l'Etat.

Il échet de signaler que depuis leur dispersion les Juifs ont toujours eu un double complexe : «le complexe de frustrations» et le «complexe de grandeurs», deux complexes en apparence contradictoires mais qui se complètent, l'un produisant l'autre. Complexe de frustration parce que vivant méprisés au milieu d'autres peuples dans les divers pays où ils avaient immigré. Un de leurs écrivains, Benisker, n'a-t-il pas dit : «Sommes-nous vraiment une nation vivant parmi les autres nations ? Où est la voix des Juifs dans le concert mondial ?...»

Avons-nous le droit d'émettre notre avis sur les problèmes qui nous concernent ?... Notre patrie aujourd'hui est en pays étranger où nous est refusé le droit de gagner notre pain et notre unité est devenue vagabondage. Notre désir de collaboration avec les autres peuples ne rencontre qu'hostilité non voilée envers tout ce qui est juif. Notre force est devenue aujourd'hui humilité et soumission et notre défense est dans la fuite. Quant à notre avenir c'est un secret enfoui sous terre... Quel pauvre rôle que celui que jouent les Juifs sur la scène du monde». Et Benisker d'ajouter :

«Le monde méprise les Juifs parce qu'ils ne constituent pas une nation vivante. Le remède à ce mal chronique est d'avoir une nationalité juive pour notre peuple vivant dans sa patrie». En cela, Benisker semble vouloir attribuer le «complexe de frustrations» dont nous avons parlé à une cause politique, à savoir l'absence de patrie. Conclusion : les Juifs ne seront libérés de ce complexe que lorsqu'ils auront une patrie et une nationalité.

En réaction contre le complexe de frustration, les Juifs portent en eux le «complexe de grandeurs». Ils s'efforcent de se convaincre qu'ils sont le peuple le plus avancé de la terre (1). Ne se sont-ils pas appelés le peuple élu de Dieu ?... Ce Dieu qui les a choisis parmi tous les autres peuples de la terre...

Pour se libérer de ces deux complexes et fuir les persécutions il n'y avait devant eux qu'une seule solution : leur retour en Terre Promise. C'est pourquoi ils prirent toutes les dispositions et profitèrent de toutes les occasions pour atteindre cet objectif.

Des persécutions, ils en subirent de la part des Byzantins, des

(1) *Encyclopedia Americana*, Vol. 16, p. 60.

Russes, des Espagnols — mais les pires de toutes furent celles subies sous le régime hitlérien. Toutefois, on ne saurait admettre les chiffres fantastiques, scientifi- quement enflés, avancés par Israël quant au nombre des victimes juives des Nazis en Europe.

Ainsi que nous venons de le voir, l'idée du foyer national juif était en marche depuis longtemps, mais pour en assurer la réalisation, il fallait unifier avant tout les points de vue des Juifs à travers le monde et maintenir le contact entre eux. C'est pourquoi un de leurs leaders, Herzl, convoqua un congrès juif à Bâle en 1897 (1). Le but de ce congrès a été ainsi défini par Herzl lui-même : « Nous nous sommes réunis ici pour poser la première pierre du Foyer qui rassemblera le peuple juif. Avant de se séparer, les congressistes votèrent la résolu- tion suivante :

« Le vœu des Juifs est d'établir un Foyer national pour le peuple juif qui soit reconnu officiellement. De cette façon le peuple juif sera à l'abri des persécutions — étant entendu que ce Foyer c'est la Pale- stine ».

Commentant cette résolution, Herzl déclara : « Je peux dire que j'ai reconstitué l'Etat Juif — que ceci soit fait dans cinq ans ou cin- quante ans, peu importe ».

Des congrès juifs ayant le même objectif furent tenus par la suite. Il s'agissait surtout de décider des meilleurs moyens à adopter pour coloniser la Palestine. Un double effort a été demandé : l'un d'ordre intérieur consistant à s'organiser, à se préparer pour la coloni- sation, et l'autre d'ordre extérieur visant à trouver une Puissance qui soit disposée à les appuyer et à les aider à réaliser leur vœu.

Ainsi une organisation ayant pour mission de recueillir les fonds et de coloniser la Palestine fut créée.

Nombre d'associations furent fondées à cet effet, notamment celle dénommée « The Lovers of Zion » ayant pour programme de répandre la langue hébraïque, de fonder des colonies juives agricoltres en Palestine, d'engager le plus grand nombre de Juifs à y immigrer, etc... (2) Les cotisations, les donations, les subventions ont constitué les fonds néces- saires. Les Juifs purent acheter des terres en Palestine sur une grande échelle.

(1) J. Denner : *The Republic of Israel*, p. 20-28.

(2) Sydney Fisher : *Social Forces in the Middle East*, p. 60-83.

Dans le domaine extérieur, les Sionistes se mirent en contact avec le Sultan de Turquie (1) et lui offrirent une énorme somme d'argent pour qu'il leur permit de coloniser la Palestine. Le Sultan leur permit de coloniser, dans l'Empire Ottoman, toute autre région que la Palestine — ce que voyant, les Sionistes renoncèrent à pousser plus avant leurs tractations avec lui.

Par la suite, il y eut la Grande Guerre de 1914. Le conflit s'éten- dit au Moyen-Orient et la compétition des Grandes Puissances dans cette partie du monde fut âpre. Les Juifs tâtaient le terrain pour savoir de quel côté il était plus profitable de se mettre, les uns optant pour l'Angleterre, les autres pour ses adversaires. Finalement, ce fut Weizmann qui trancha la question en se mettant carrément du côté de l'Angleterre. Celle-ci l'en récompensa en lui faisant le plus beau cadeau : la Déclaration Balfour.

Déjà auparavant, Weizmann s'était mis en contact tour à tour avec Mussolini (qui déclara ne pas être contre les Juifs), avec Lloyd George (qui le présenta à Herbert Samuel lequel devait devenir plus tard Haut-Commissaire anglais en Palestine) et enfin avec Léon Blum et autres ministres français qu'il gagna à sa cause, de sorte que quand, en Février 1919, eut lieu la Conférence de la Paix, la France était toute disposée à accepter le mandat anglais sur la Palestine et l'établissement d'un Foyer national juif en cette contrée.

Cinq Juifs assistèrent à la dite Conférence, qui purent expliquer à leur aise leur point de vue quant à la création de ce Foyer national juif.

C'est Weizmann donc, qui, avec la collaboration d'autres Sionistes influents, a pu, grâce à ses contacts, arracher la fameuse Déclaration Balfour que le Président Nasser a qualifiée de « commencement de la fin de la Palestine ».

Une fois la Déclaration Balfour obtenue, il fallait passer à la seconde étape qui consistait à trouver une Puissance qui se chargeât de mettre à exécution la promesse contenue dans cette Déclaration. Qui mieux que l'Angleterre, auteur de la Déclaration, pouvait jouer ce rôle ?

Weizmann, a, dans ses mémoires, décrit les efforts faits par les Juifs à la fin de la première guerre mondiale pour faire attribuer à

(1) Fannie Fern Andrews : *The Holy Land under mandate*, Vol. 1, p. 314.

l'Angleterre le mandat sur la Palestine. Entretiens, ils avaient adressé à la S.D.N. A Genève un memorandum comportant les points suivants :

- 1 — Reconnaissance du droit historique des Juifs sur la Palestine et leur appui pour le rétablissement de leur Foyer national en ce pays ;
- 2 — Que le pouvoir suprême en Palestine soit dévolu à la S.D.N. et que le mandat soit confié à l'Angleterre qui en sera responsable vis-à-vis de la S.D.N. ;
- 3 — Qu'au titre du mandat sur la Palestine soient ajoutées les clauses suivantes ainsi conçues :
 - a) La Palestine devra être mise, du point de vue administratif, politique et économique dans les conditions propres à l'établissement du Foyer national juif.
 - b) Pour y arriver, il y aura lieu :
 - D'encourager l'immigration juive et d'assurer l'établissement des Juifs dans le territoire palestinien, sous réserve de sauvegarder les droits actuels des habitants non-juifs ;
 - D'appuyer l'Agence Juive en Palestine et de par le monde entier, afin qu'elle puisse avoir le contrôle du Foyer national juif en ce pays.

En relisant l'histoire du mandat britannique sur la Palestine, il est facile de se rendre compte que l'Angleterre a ponctuellement exécuté les impératifs des Sionistes dont la politique consistait à rendre la Palestine juive et à chasser les Arabes de leurs foyers.

Notons qu'avant l'octroi du mandat à l'Angleterre, plusieurs tentatives avaient été faites par les Sionistes pour s'emparer de la Palestine, à savoir :

- En Août 1918 une commission sioniste mandatée par le gouvernement anglais, sous la présidence de Weizmann et accompagnée par le Major Ormsby-Gore (devenu par la suite Ministre des Colonies) visita la Palestine (1). Cette commission demanda à participer immédiatement à l'Administration de la Palestine alors que le nombre des Juifs qui s'y trouvaient alors ne dépassait pas les 6% de l'ensemble de la population. En même temps cette commission

(1) Akram Zaitar : La Cause Palestinienne, p. 49.

ordonnait l'entraînement d'un contingent militaire juif et mettait sur pied une organisation judiciaire indépendante pour les Juifs. Dès lors les Arabes commencèrent à se faire une idée de ce que leur réservait la Déclaration Balfour.

- En Février 1919, le Congrès Sioniste présentait à la Conférence de la Paix qui s'était ouverte à Versailles le 1er Janvier 1919, un mémorandum demandant l'établissement d'un Etat juif comprenant la Palestine, l'Est de la Jordanie et le Sud du Liban.
- Une Commission américaine (King-Crane) vint en Palestine et en Syrie pour enquêter sur place. Dans le rapport qu'elle présenta à la délégation américaine à la Conférence de la Paix de Versailles elle signalait que l'opinion générale en Syrie était unanimement d'accord pour réclamer l'indépendance et refuser catégoriquement un protectorat présenté sous forme de mandat. A propos de la Palestine, le rapport disait que le sionisme représentait une agression flagrante contre le droit du peuple de ce pays et une violation des principes proclamés par les Alliés et le Président Wilson. En fin de compte, le rapport demandait que fut limitée une fois pour toutes l'immigration juive en Palestine et que fut abandonnée l'idée de l'établissement d'un Foyer national juif en ce pays. Il est à signaler que ce rapport ne fut pas pris en considération par la Conférence de la Paix.
- L'Association Juive présenta au Conseil Allié une note portant sur le choix de la Grande-Bretagne pour lui confier le mandat sur la Palestine. Le Conseil supérieur allié réuni à San Remo en Avril 1920 ratifia ce choix. Il décida notamment de placer la Syrie et le Liban sous mandat français et l'Irak sous mandat anglais. Quant à la Palestine, elle fut effectivement placée sous mandat confié à l'Angleterre à la condition que celle-ci prit l'engagement d'assurer l'exécution de la Déclaration Balfour.
- Ce fut Weizmann qui surveilla la rédaction du texte du mandat avant sa soumission à la S.D.N. après que la Conférence de San Remo eut admis le principe même du mandat. Les Juifs d'Amérique avaient délégué à Londres à cet effet un certain Benjamin Cohen très habile dans la rédaction des textes. C'est lui qui en collaboration avec le secrétaire du Ministère du Foreign Office Anglais, rédigea le projet du texte du mandat lequel naturellement ne pouvait qu'être favorable à Israël, puisqu'il était conçu par un Juif.
- Le 24 Juillet 1922, la S.D.N. approuva le texte du mandat qui, en l'occurrence, était la reproduction quasi textuelle du mémoran-

dum qui avait été présenté par l'Assemblée Juive à la Conférence de la Paix en février 1919.

Ce sont là autant de faits qui témoignent de l'effort gigantesque déployé par les Juifs sur le plan extérieur d'abord pour obtenir la Déclaration Balfour et ensuite le mandat anglais sur la Palestine.

A ce point de notre exposé, il convient de répondre à la question suivante : pourquoi la Grande-Bretagne a-t-elle accepté de donner aux Juifs la Déclaration Balfour ?

Il ne fait aucun doute qu'en ce faisant l'Angleterre en escomptait un profit certain. Elle assurait ainsi la présence en Moyen-Orient d'une communauté qui lui est entièrement acquise, ayant regard sur le Canal de Suez et prête à protéger les bateaux anglais faisant la traversée du Canal en direction de l'Inde, joyau de la couronne britannique. En outre, le fait de faire cette déclaration en pleine guerre (1) ne pouvait que gagner à la cause de l'Angleterre les Juifs se trouvant dans les pays belligérants ennemis ainsi que les Juifs d'Amérique.

Par ailleurs, l'Angleterre ayant perçu les premières lueurs de la renaissance arabe en Moyen-Orient et le désir ardent des Arabes d'être indépendants, il lui fallait donc, dans cette partie du globe, trouver un point d'appui et se ménager une porte de sortie. Les Juifs, à qui l'Angleterre assurait un Home national en Palestine, étaient l'instrument tout indiqué de cette politique.

Une fois obtenue la Déclaration Balfour et le mandat sur la Palestine accordé à l'Angleterre à la Conférence de San Remo, les Juifs pouvaient aller de l'avant dans l'exécution de leur programme. Il leur fallait tout d'abord encourager coûte que coûte l'immigration juive et acquérir les terres des Arabes en Palestine — ce qui devait provoquer, par voie de conséquence, le drame des réfugiés arabes.

II — La création du Foyer national juif et ses répercussions sur le problème des réfugiés arabes.

Nous avons déjà dit que le choix de la Palestine par les Juifs a été la cause première du problème des réfugiés arabes.

Bien que les Juifs nient avoir inclus dans leur plan l'éviction des Arabes, il n'en reste pas moins que l'évolution des événements a amené la Déclaration Balfour, l'établissement de l'Etat d'Israël, la guerre entre les Arabes et les Juifs, l'éviction des Arabes par les bandes terroristes juives et enfin le problème des réfugiés chassés de leurs foyers.

(1) *The Economist* : 8 Avril 1961.

Etablir un Etat juif en Palestine c'était inévitablement provoquer tôt ou tard le drame des réfugiés arabes. Les promoteurs de l'établissement de l'Etat d'Israël n'avaient pas perdu de vue ce fait et certains d'entre eux ne se firent même pas faute de proclamer hautement l'éviction des Arabes. Voici, par exemple, ce que Smilansky a dit à ce sujet :

« Il faut que la Palestine devienne un Foyer pour le peuple juif. Il est possible de transférer les habitants arabes de Palestine dans les contrées arabes avoisinantes ».

Un autre leader, Alfred Mund, a déclaré à son tour :

« Le jour de la reconstruction du Temple est proche. J'emploierai le restant de mes jours à bâtir un temple grandiose à la place de la Mosquée d'Omar ».

D'autres déclarations sur le même thème furent émises, telle que : « Les Musulmans n'ont qu'à s'en aller vers une autre terre que celle-ci ».

En 1914, le nombre de Juifs en Palestine était d'environ 55.000. En 1946, il avait atteint près d'un demi-million dont un grand nombre avait subi un entraînement militaire dans les camps d'Europe.

Ce sont ces immigrants qui constituèrent les bandes les plus dangereuses en Palestine, telles que la Hagana et la bande Stern (1) qui s'employèrent à hâter l'éviction des Arabes, avant même la guerre de Palestine, par des massacres en masse comme ceux de Deir Yassin et autres. Ces massacres ne pouvaient que provoquer la peur et la panique parmi les Arabes et c'est pourquoi 250.000 d'entre eux avaient déjà, avant le début de la guerre de Palestine, fui leur patrie pour chercher refuge et protection dans les pays arabes voisins.

Parmi les immigrants juifs en Palestine, il y avait un certain nombre de capitalistes qui parvinrent, grâce à l'aide britannique, à accaparer les grands projets productifs tels que ceux de la production de l'énergie électrique, du Houle, de l'assèchement de la Mer Morte, de l'achat de milliers de feddans, alors que toute tentative arabe de mettre sur pied un projet d'investissement quelconque était systématiquement en but à des entraves sans nombre de la part de la puissance mandataire.

C'est ainsi que de grandes étendues de terre furent achetées dont entre autres, le vaste domaine de « Marj Ebn Amer » qui appartenait à

(1) Alfred Lilienthal : *There Goes Middle East*, p. 33.

la famille Surocki, les terres du Houlé, etc... La ligne de conduite adoptée était de chasser les Arabes de ces terres et de les remplacer par des immigrés juifs; de la sorte, les Arabes se trouvaient en chômage avec la faim pour perspective, alors que l'élément juif se renforçait de jour en jour. C'est justement cette politique qui devait faciliter par la suite le partage de la Palestine, car des régions entières étaient ainsi devenues propriété des Juifs avec une grosse majorité de population juive.

On peut dire que c'est également l'immigration juive en Palestine qui devait provoquer par la suite l'éviction des Anglais de cette contrée. En effet, les Anglais, devant cette immigration abusive, essayèrent de freiner le mouvement. Mais les Juifs réagirent et commencèrent à leur faire la guerre par le truchement de bandes armées.

Il ressort de ce que nous venons d'exposer que c'est bien l'immigration juive appuyée par les bandes terroristes israéliennes qui a donné naissance au problème des réfugiés arabes de Palestine.

C'est contre cette immigration que se soulevèrent les Arabes de Palestine en 1920 (révolte de Jérusalem), puis en 1921 (révolte de Jaffa), et en 1929 (révolte d'El Berak). C'est elle qui fut à l'origine de la grande révolte de Palestine de 1936 et finalement du grand conflit de 1948 qui devait avoir pour résultat de chasser de leurs foyers près d'un million d'Arabes.

Il ressort de ce que nous venons d'exposer que c'est bien l'immigration juive appuyée par les bandes terroristes israéliennes qui a donné naissance au problème des réfugiés arabes de Palestine.

Le processus suivi était le suivant : achat des terres des Arabes, envoi sur place d'immigrés juifs pour remplacer les Arabes sans terre et sans travail qui étaient ainsi contraints d'émigrer.

C'est ce qu'a décrit Weizmann (1) en ces termes :

« Pour réaliser le Home national juif il n'est qu'un seul moyen, à savoir : ajouter une exploitation agricole à une autre exploitation agricole et un immigrant à un autre immigrant jusqu'à ce que le Home soit définitivement constitué ».

Il faut dire que les bandes armées juives Hagana, Stern, Irgoun se chargèrent de hâter par la terreur et les massacres le processus d'éviction des Arabes.

(1) Mémoires de Weizmann, p. 10^e.

D'ailleurs, le fameux Jabotinsky a déclaré sans ambages : « La Palestine doit être aux Juifs; quant aux Arabes ils ont le désert. Le fait d'user de méthodes coulantes avec les Arabes pour arriver à éliminer le Home national juif et amener progressivement les Arabes à s'en aller, représente une politique lassante et qui peut durer indéfiniment. Aujourd'hui les Arabes savent très bien quels sont nos desirs et nos objectifs. Il est donc devenu nécessaire de les mettre devant le fait accompli et leur faire comprendre de vider les lieux et de s'en aller dans le désert ».

Il s'agissait donc de chasser les Arabes de Palestine. Le mandat britannique devait être un des moyens mis en oeuvre pour y arriver.

Voici, d'ailleurs, ce que dit Weizmann à ce sujet :

« Je ne trahis aucun secret en disant que nous nous sommes mis d'accord avec l'Angleterre pour qu'elle nous livre la Palestine débarrassée des Arabes avant la fin du mandat ».

Et voici ce qu'a dit le Juge Brandeis qui était adjoint du Président Wilson avant que le mandat sur la Palestine ne fut confié à l'Angleterre : « Le but de la demande des Juifs de faciliter l'immigration juive en Palestine tend à ce qu'ils arrivent un jour à y représenter la majorité; quant aux Arabes ils n'auront qu'à s'en aller dans le désert ».

En 1921, sous le régime du mandat anglais, la Commission « High-crofts » fut envoyée pour enquêter sur la situation en Palestine. A cette commission les Juifs déclarèrent que leur objectif était de devenir une majorité en Palestine, d'obtenir le désarmement des Arabes et le droit pour les Juifs de porter des armes pour se défendre et libérer leur patrie ancestrale ».

A ces déclarations, les journaux sionistes embolèrent le pas. Voici à titre d'exemple ce qu'écrivait le journal hébraïque « Doar Hayom » : « Les Juifs doivent purifier leur patrie des usurpateurs. Que les habitants musulmans de Palestine s'en aillent au Hedjaz ou dans le désert, quant aux habitants chrétiens, ils pourront émigrer au Liban ».

Tel a été le rôle joué par les Sionistes pour faire naître le problème des réfugiés arabes — problème provoqué par l'insistance des Juifs à fonder en Palestine même l'Etat d'Israël qui représentait pour eux un rêve ancestral. C'est à ce sujet que Nehru (1) a déclaré : « Les Juifs n'oublièrent jamais leur rêve d'établir un Etat à eux en terre de Jérusalem. C'est, dans leur conception, l'appel du passé qui les pousse vers cette région de la Palestine ».

(1) Swetiam El Emari: Les Problèmes du Moyen-Orient, p. 211.

CHAPITRE II

I — Le rôle de la Grande-Bretagne dans la question des réfugiés arabes.

La Grande-Bretagne a certainement la responsabilité la plus grande dans la question des réfugiés arabes. C'est elle qui a proclamé en faveur des Sionistes la Déclaration Balfour qui leur assurait un Foyer national juif en Palestine; c'est elle qui a accepté le mandat sur la Palestine afin de mener à bien l'exécution de la promesse faite dans la dite Déclaration et qui a nommé à cet effet Sir Herbert Samuel comme Haut-Commissaire en Palestine. Celui-ci, ainsi qu'on l'a vu, était un sioniste notoire qui, en collaboration avec Weizmann et d'autres chefs sionistes, a pu arriver à obtenir la dite Déclaration et à rendre juive la Palestine.

La Déclaration Balfour ayant été la source des événements qui ont contribué à créer le problème des réfugiés arabes, nous allons examiner les causes qui ont amené l'Angleterre à faire cette Déclaration.

Ainsi que nous l'avons vu, c'est en Novembre 1917 que l'Angleterre a rendu publique cette Déclaration, au moment même où Lénine prenait le pouvoir en Russie. C'est certainement une des plus étranges déclarations jamais faites par un gouvernement anglais, quand on considère les embûches et les complications qu'elle a occasionnées à l'Angleterre et les résultats néfastes qu'elle a engendrés.

L'Angleterre a donné cette Déclaration en contrepartie des services que lui avait rendus Weizmann et qui l'ont aidée à gagner la guerre, et parce qu'elle voulait gagner l'appui des Juifs d'Amérique et leur demander, entre autres aides, celle de financer ses opérations de guerre.

Il convient de signaler ici que deux tentatives avaient déjà été faites pour obtenir cette Déclaration : la première en Mars 1916, alors que Grey et Asquith étaient ministres dans le gouvernement anglais. A cette époque la Russie subissait défaite sur défaite et l'armée française était assiégée à Verdun. En Orient le Chérif de La Mecque n'avait pas encore levé l'étendard de la révolte contre les Turcs. Dans ces conditions l'Angleterre pensa entrer en contact avec le gouvernement français afin que soit faite, en faveur des Juifs, une déclaration

concernant la Palestine; de cette façon l'Angleterre s'assurait l'appui des Juifs du monde entier. Mais cette déclaration resta à l'état de projet.

Une seconde tentative fut faite au printemps de l'année 1917. C'était à l'époque où l'Angleterre était en compétition serrée avec la France et cherchait, grâce aux voix des Juifs, à s'implanter dans la partie méridionale de la Syrie. Mais cette fois encore, le gouvernement anglais abandonna le projet.

Nous arrivons ainsi en Novembre 1917. Les troupes anglaises pénètrent en Palestine alors que la Russie était aux abois et en pleine décomposition et que les Allemands avaient envoyé par le fond des millions de tonnes de navires anglais. D'autre part, les troupes américaines n'étaient pas encore rendues à pied d'œuvre dans les tranchées en Europe et la France était matériellement incapable d'entreprendre une vaste offensive.

Dans cette situation, on était généralement d'avis qu'il fallait coûte que coûte gagner la sympathie des Juifs d'Amérique, ce qui devait contribuer à redonner l'avantage aux Alliés et empêcher l'Allemagne de dégarnir le front oriental et d'améliorer son potentiel économique.

De son côté, Lloyd George, Premier ministre anglais, se souvint que les leaders sionistes avaient formellement promis — au cas où la Grande-Bretagne s'engagerait irrévocablement à faciliter aux Juifs l'établissement de leur Home national en Palestine — de déployer de leur côté tous leurs efforts afin de gagner les Juifs du monde entier à la cause alliée — ce qui fut fait. Dès lors, la Grande-Bretagne ne pouvait pas moins faire que d'honorer sa promesse et de rendre publique la Déclaration Balfour du 2 Novembre 1917.

Cette Déclaration fut faite sous forme de lettre adressée par Lord Balfour, ministre du Foreign Office, à Lord Rothschild. En voici la teneur : :

Nov. 2 1917
Foreign Office

"Mon cher Lord Rothschild,

Je suis heureux de vous communiquer au nom du Gouvernement de S.M. la déclaration suivante exprimant sa sympathie envers les aspirations juives sionistes — déclaration qui a été soumise au Conseil des ministres qui l'a approuvée :

"Le Gouvernement de S.M. envisage favorablement l'établissement en Palestine d'un 'Foyer national' juif (National Home). Il déploiera tous ses efforts pour faciliter la réalisation de cet objectif, étant entendu que rien ne sera fait qui puisse porter préjudice soit aux droits civils et religieux des communautés non-juives, soit aux droits et statuts politiques des Juifs résidant en tout autre pays".

Sincèrement vôtre

signé : Arthur James Balfour

II — La Déclaration Balfour

et le problème des réfugiés arabes.

1. — On peut considérer la Déclaration Balfour comme une mesure de caractère officiel qui par ricochet a donné naissance au problème des réfugiés arabes. Le fait de reconnaître l'existence d'un Foyer national juif et les mesures prises pour assurer sa réalisation ne pouvaient que mener à l'éviction des Arabes de Palestine.

2. — Bien qu'il ait été spécifié dans le texte de la Déclaration, ainsi que nous venons de le voir, que rien ne sera fait qui puisse porter préjudice aux communautés non-juives, il n'en reste pas moins que cette Déclaration portait en germe la dégradation même de cette clause. En fait les Juifs, pour établir leur Foyer national en terre de Palestine, n'ont pu moins faire que de chasser les Arabes et usurper leurs droits civils.

Les pertes subies par les Arabes s'élevaient à plusieurs centaines de millions de livres. Voici quelques chiffres :

A) Les autorités juives se sont emparées des terres et des immeubles des Arabes, évalués par les experts à près de 2 milliards de livres sterling et en ont disposé en toute propriété.

B) Sur les 370 nouvelles colonies juives établies en Palestine entre 1948 et 1953, 350 ont été érigées sur d'anciennes propriétés arabes.

C) Plus du tiers des habitants juifs de Palestine vivent sur les propriétés des Arabes et quelque 350.000, soit le quart des nouveaux immigrants, occupent dans les villes les maisons des Arabes.

D) Les Juifs se sont emparés de 12 villes arabes savoir : Jaffa, Haifa, Safd, El Iud, Ramalla, Tibériade, Bissane, Samah, Magdal, Bir Sheba, Chefa Anur — outre quelque 700 villages arabes dispersés à travers le territoire.

Comme on le voit, c'est la mise à exécution de la Déclaration Balfour qui par son incidence a entraîné ces pertes énormes subies par les Arabes.

3. — La Déclaration Balfour a engendré le mandat britannique sur la Palestine au cours duquel fut tissée la trame du complot sioniste si bien que quand vint la guerre de Palestine, les Juifs étaient fin prêts pour chasser les Arabes de leur pays.

Voici quelques statistiques (1) qui illustrent les diverses étapes de l'éviction des Arabes :

A) De Février jusqu'à la 33^{ème} semaine d'Avril 1948 le nombre de réfugiés arabes de Tibériade, Bissane, Deir Yassin, de Haifa et environ et de Nazareth s'élevait à 60.000.

B) Ce nombre a atteint 390.000 depuis le 23 Avril au 7 Mai 1948. Ces réfugiés étaient originaires des villes de Haifa, Jaffa, de la nouvelle Jérusalem, de Safd et de divers autres villages.

C) A la conclusion de l'armistice de Rhodes, pendant l'hiver 1949, le nombre des réfugiés se chiffrait à 940.000.

N'est-ce pas là une violation flagrante de la clause de la Déclaration Balfour garantissant les droits civils de la communauté non-juive, en l'occurrence la communauté arabe ?...

4. — Pour réaliser la Déclaration Balfour ne fallait-il pas ouvrir toutes grandes les portes de la Palestine aux immigrants juifs ?...

C'est Lloyd George qui, commentant la Déclaration Balfour, a dit à propos de l'immigration juive :

« Si les Juifs savent exploiter l'immigration et diriger leurs coreli-

(1) Ligue Arabe : "Les Réfugiés Palestiniens, Données et Statistiques", p. 15-16.

gionnaires vers la Palestine, ils pourraient devenir une majorité dans le pays au moment du referendum et arriver ainsi à y créer l'Etat Juifs.

Voici quelques chiffres qui illustrent l'ampleur de la vague d'immigrants juifs qui déferla sur la Palestine

A) Sous le régime du mandat (1), au cours des 10 premières années, 99.806 immigrants; durant les 7 années suivantes : 182.829. Pour les 10 années subséquentes le chiffre est de 122.796.

B) Au cours de la période allant du 15 Mai 1948 au 1er Janvier 1953, c'est-à-dire en l'espace de 5 ans, quelque 740.000 immigrants juifs — dont 377.251 provenant des pays arabes — entrèrent en Palestine.

Ce déferlement de Juifs de l'étranger ne pouvait pas ne pas provoquer l'éviction des Arabes et, partant, créer le problème des réfugiés.

Nous allons essayer de montrer, dans les lignes qui suivent, dans quelle mesure le mandat anglais allait favoriser la mainmise des Juifs sur la Palestine, et les incidences de ce mandat sur le problème des réfugiés.

1 — L'art. 2 du mandat stipule : La Puissance mandataire aura la responsabilité de mettre le pays dans les conditions politiques, administratives et économiques propres à assurer l'établissement du Foyer national juifs.

2 — L'art. 3 prévoit qu'une Agence juive adéquate sera reconnue comme organisme public pour dispenser aide et conseils à l'Administration de Palestine dans les questions économiques et sociales et tous autres domaines ayant une influence sur la création du Foyer national juif et sur les intérêts des Juifs en Palestine... La Fédération Juive sera reconnue comme Agence adéquate et elle aura — après avoir pris l'avis du Gouvernement de S.M. — à s'assurer l'aide de tous les Juifs en vue de l'établissement du Foyer national.

3 — L'Administration de Palestine aura — sans porter préjudice aux droits et statut des autres groupements ethniques — à encourager l'immigration des Juifs en Palestine et, en collaboration avec l'Agence Juive, à rassembler les Juifs sur les terres diverses dont

(1) Palestine's Economic Future, Pub. J.B. Hobman, p. 113.

celles du gouvernement et celles en friche non requises pour utilité publique.

4 — L'art. 7 stipule enfin : L'Administration de Palestine aura la responsabilité d'établir une loi sur la nationalité prévoyant certaines facilités pour l'acquisition de la nationalité palestinienne par les Juifs qui auront choisi la Palestine comme résidence permanente.

Enfin, le titre du mandat dispose que l'hébreu sera considéré comme langue officielle en Palestine au même titre que l'arabe et l'anglais...

A bien considérer ces divers textes, on se rend tout de suite compte qu'ils ont été élaborés dans le but de réaliser les vœux d'Israël et qu'ils prouvent, de surcroît, cette intention qui prévalait alors du fait de la nomination du Juif sioniste Sir Herbert Samuel comme Haut-Commissaire en Palestine. D'ailleurs, les Juifs l'appellèrent tout de suite «Notre Samuel» et ce fut lui le grand artisan de la mainmise juive sur la Palestine.

Nous venons de constater (1) que le mandat avait pour but de sauvegarder les intérêts des Juifs et réaliser leurs aspirations, bien qu'à cette époque les Juifs en Palestine ne représentaient qu'une petite minorité (7% environ contre 93% d'Arabes)...

Par ailleurs, ce mandat, de quelque façon qu'on le considère, convenait à la convention passée entre les Anglais et les Arabes. On sait qu'aux termes de cette convention l'Angleterre s'engageait à défendre l'indépendance de la Palestine comme partie de l'Etat arabe que les Anglais avaient promis de créer en contre-partie de la participation des Arabes dans la guerre contre les Turcs.

Cette convention était connue sous le nom de Convention Mac Mahon — Hussein.

C'est le mandat qui, en fait, représentait l'instrument d'exécution de la Déclaration Balfour et qui a pratiquement donné naissance au problème des réfugiés arabes.

Vient-on d'autres preuves de l'inféodation du mandat à la cause juive ?

Nous ne saurons trouver mieux que les propres paroles de Weizmann prononcées en 1948 :

(1) F.F. Andrews : The Holy Land under mandate, Vol. I, p. 72-155.

« Nous pouvons maintenant, dit-il, révéler cette vérité, à savoir qu'il y avait entre nous les Juifs sionistes et les grands responsables anglais, tels que Lloyd George et Balfour, un accord secret aux termes duquel l'Angleterre devait en 1934 nous livrer la Palestine libre de ses résidents arabes. »

Weizmann dit également : « Nous les Juifs sionistes, nous nous sommes toujours efforcés d'établir un Etat juif en Palestine. Nous avons, par le truchement de la S.D.N., donné mandat à l'Angleterre de gouverner ce pays. C'est nous qui avons remis provisoirement la Palestine entre les mains de l'Angleterre, ce n'est pas elle qui nous en a fait don par la suite. »

Le mandat, pour établir un Foyer national juif en Palestine, s'est appuyé sur le fait que des liens historiques rattachaient les Juifs à cette contrée, oubliant délibérément sans doute les liens qui **ont toujours** et sans interruption rattaché les Arabes à la Palestine. Il est historiquement démontré que la présence de ces derniers est indiscutablement antérieure à la présence des Juifs.

Voici ce que l'écrivain Emily Newton dit à ce propos : « ... En somme si les Juifs peuvent se prévaloir d'une présence (en Palestine) qui remonte à plusieurs centaines d'années, les Arabes eux peuvent se prévaloir de milliers d'années. A signaler que la présence juive a été interrompue depuis 1800 ans alors que les Arabes ont une présence permanente. Ce sont bien là les « liens » des Arabes et le « droit » des Arabes. »

III — Le mandat et la cause des réfugiés arabes.

Un rapport certain existe entre le mandat et le problème des réfugiés arabes, un rapport de cause à effet.

Examinons d'abord le texte du mandat; nous verrons ensuite de quelle façon l'Angleterre l'a exécuté.

L'art. 2 du mandat dispose que l'Angleterre prendra la responsabilité d'établir un Foyer national juif en Palestine. Or, pour y arriver et pour préparer le terrain, aux immigrants juifs déferlant par dizaines de milliers sur la Palestine et afin que ceux-ci puissent se retrouver entre eux avec leurs traditions et leurs coutumes, il était inéluctable que les Arabes, devenus des intrus, fussent évacués et chassés hors du pays. C'est ce qui s'est produit effectivement.

L'art. 3 prévoit la reconnaissance de l'Agence Juive comme conseil et collaboratrice de l'Administration... Les résultats ne devaient

pas se faire attendre. Sir Herbert Samuel, Haut-Commissaire, en collaboration étroite avec l'Agence Juive, entreprit de réaliser la moindre juive sur la Palestine et donner toute satisfaction aux ambitions sionistes. Ainsi l'éviction des Arabes a été complètement consommée.

L'art. 6 dispose que l'Angleterre facilitera l'immigration juive. Aussi les Anglais s'empresrent-ils jusqu'en 1948 d'ouvrir toutes grandes les portes de la Palestine aux flux incessants d'immigrants juifs en facilitant à ceux-ci l'obtention de la nationalité palestinienne.

Quand on sait qu'une grande partie de ces immigrants était constituée par des éléments jeunes (1) qui avaient subi un entraînement militaire en Allemagne, Italie, Autriche et dans les Etats de l'Est, on se rendra compte de la contribution précieuse qu'ils ont pu apporter à l'éviction des Arabes.

Voici encore une déclaration significative de Weizmann qui illustre l'esprit dans lequel était conçu et exécuté le mandat : « Ma mission a été en tout temps et en tout lieu de faire comprendre aux sionistes que la Déclaration Balfour n'est qu'un cadre que nous devons façonner par nos soins et nos efforts. Cette Déclaration représente tout simplement ce que nous voulons qu'elle soit et ce que nous entreprenons pour elle. »

Quant aux mesures pratiques prises par l'Angleterre pour assurer l'exécution des termes du mandat, on peut les résumer comme suit : faciliter aux Juifs l'immigration ainsi que l'achat des terres, protéger l'économie juive, armer les Juifs, leur accorder des concessions avantageuses telles que celle de la Mer Morte et celle de la production de l'énergie électrique etc... Grâce à ces mesures, l'Etat juif était créé et par voie de conséquence naissait le problème des réfugiés arabes.

Au sujet de l'achat des terres, toutes facilités furent données par l'Angleterre aux Juifs à cet effet ; ce fut d'abord l'achat du domaine de « Marj Ebn Amer », déjà cité, (quelque 250.000 dounams, représentant 13 villages), ce qui devait provoquer l'expulsion de 900 familles arabes remplacées par des colons juifs. Puis vint l'Organisation dirigée par Rotschild qui acquit de vastes superficies pour 15 millions de livres. Ensuite ce fut l'Organisation du « Keren Kayemet » (l'association du capital national juif) qui acheta jusqu'en 1944 quelque 860.000 dounams pour une valeur de 6 millions de livres.

(1) James Parlier : A History of Palestine, p. 224-238.

Quant à l'Organisation de «Keren Haisots» elle avait, jusqu'en 1945, acheté des terres pour quelque 20 millions de livres.

L'écrivain Emily Newton ⁽¹⁾, déjà citée, a très bien saisi le processus d'acquisition des terres par les Juifs et son but. «Les nouvelles colonies Juives, act-elle écrit, poursuivent un but politique qui tend à créer des Arabes sans terres».

C'est ainsi qu'en quelques années, 1 million de doumans étaient passés entre les mains des Juifs, étant bien entendu que ces terres étaient à jamais interdites aux Arabes qui ne pouvaient ni les prendre en location ni les cultiver.

Par la suite la Puissance mandataire promulguait une loi enlevant aux propriétaires de terres non résidents en Palestine le droit d'avoir la jouissance de leurs propriétés ⁽²⁾. C'est ainsi que plusieurs citoyens syriens à qui le Gouvernement Ottoman avait octroyé de larges étendues de terre en Palestine (laquelle faisait alors partie de la Syrie) furent contraints de céder leurs biens à vil prix.

Les terres domaniales de l'Etat et les terres en friche furent ensuite cédées aux organisations juives à un prix que l'on peut qualifier de nominal...

Des experts envoyés sur place, tels que Simpson, ont tous constaté cet accaparement par les Juifs des terres viables de Palestine, ne laissant d'autre alternative aux Arabes qu de vivre dans la misère ou de s'expatrier...

Nous venons de constater que c'est la Puissance mandataire qui a encouragé et facilité au maximum l'immigration juive en Palestine. Voici le texte d'une lettre adressée le 21 Décembre 1919 par le gouverneur militaire de Palestine à Lord Allenby :

«Mon cher Général,

Je vous envoie cette lettre par l'intermédiaire du Dr. Weizmann. Il est possible d'amener des immigrants en grand nombre sans provoquer des troubles à condition que cette opération se fasse sans ostentation... Je puis faire en sorte que ce pays absorbe 1 million d'habitants au lieu des 400.000 qu'il héberge actuellement».

(1) F. Emily Newton: Fifty years in Palestine, p. 147.

(2) M. Stewart Erskine: Palestine of the Arabs, p. 93-104.

Voici quelques chiffres ⁽¹⁾ relatifs aux é migrants juifs entrés en Palestine de 1920 à 1946 grâce aux facilités fournies par la Puissance mandataire :

De 1920 à 1929 = 99.206

De 1930 à 1936 = 182.839

De 1937 à 1946 = 122.796

soit au total quelque 400.000 Juifs, la plupart entraînés militairement en Europe et capables de se livrer à tous les travaux agricoles, industriels ou commerciaux. Pour arriver à ce résultat — et alors que les Arabes voyaient se dresser devant eux des obstacles sans nombre — toutes les facilités étaient fournies aux Juifs par la Puissance mandataire, y compris celle d'utiliser de faux permis d'immigration, de faux passeports, de faux actes de mariage et de naissance ainsi que la faculté d'entrer en Palestine comme touristes et d'y demeurer etc...

Voici ce que Mr. Van Reich, président de la Commission du mandat a dit à ce sujet : «Le gouvernement de Palestine autorise et facilite l'immigration des Juifs, alors qu'il crée toutes les difficultés possibles pour empêcher les non-Juifs de rentrer dans leur patrie».

IV — L'immigration juive et son incidence

sur le problème des réfugiés arabes.

Incidence majeure que celle de l'immigration juive en Palestine sur le problème des réfugiés arabes. De ces Juifs, en effet, entraînés militairement dans les camps d'Europe, furent formés les bandes de tueurs, telles que celle de Stern, celle de l'Irgoun, etc. Ce sont elles qui perpétrèrent, entre autre, le massacre de Deir Yassine qui provoqua la panique parmi les habitants arabes désarmés et hâta leur fuite du territoire. Une fois ceux-ci partis, ce furent les immigrants Juifs qui s'installèrent en maîtres à leur place et qui exploitèrent leurs terres ainsi que celles qui avaient été acquises par les diverses organisations juives, à telle enseigne que des dizaines de milliers d'Arabes, se trouvant sans terre et sans emploi, erraient au hasard et finissaient par se réfugier dans les pays avoisinants. Cet exode devait, d'ailleurs, se précipiter après l'établissement du Foyer national juif qui provoqua un nouvel afflux d'immigrants. Le potentiel industriel de la Palestine, grâce à la compléxité de la Puissance mandataire, étant désormais entièrement

(1) Palestine's Economic Future, Publ. D.B. Hotman, p. 160.

entre les mains des Juifs, le gagne-pain des Arabes devenait de plus en plus précaire et ceux-ci n'avaient alors d'autre alternative que de s'en aller.

V — La mainmise des Juifs sur l'industrie en Palestine.

A part les facilités accordées aux Juifs par l'Angleterre en ce qui concerne l'immigration et l'acquisition des terres, de grandes concessions dans le domaine économique leur furent consenties, telle la concession Rothenberg et celle de la Mer Morte.

La première accordait au Juif Rothenberg le droit de production de l'énergie électrique pour une période de 70 ans en utilisant le Jourdain, son bassin et ses affluents, le fleuve Yarmouk et ses affluents. Il pouvait également utiliser le lac de Tibériade comme bassin d'eau et construire, sur ses rives, stations et usines, de même qu'il pouvait exploiter le fleuve Aoué. Aucun autre que lui ne pouvait fournir le courant électrique dans toutes les villes de Palestine (excepté Jérusalem).

Ce fut Churchill lui-même qui soumit le projet aux Communes pour approbation et plaida chaudement en sa faveur en disant que c'était là un des facteurs de développement de la région. Mais ce qu'il n'a pas dit c'est que ce développement allait se réaliser au détriment des Arabes qui, ainsi que nous l'avons exposé, s'étaient constamment heurtés, pour les quelques projets industriels ou agricoles que certains groupements arabes avaient conçus, à la mauvaise volonté évidente de la part de l'Angleterre ou plutôt des dirigeants inféodés au sionisme que le gouvernement anglais avait envoyés en Palestine. Inutile d'ajouter que les travailleurs arabes, ouvriers ou autres, étaient systématiquement écartés des travaux concédés aux Juifs.

Quant à la concession de la Mer Morte, autre fief réservé aux Juifs, elle était également de grande importance, car elle permettait l'extraction, des eaux de cette mer, d'un million de tonnes de potasse annuellement pour une période de mille ans (1). La concession portait sur 75 ans. Des experts, dont la Dsac, Annie Homer, ont évalué les richesses de la Mer Morte à 14 milliards de livres et le Dr. Norton a estimé la valeur de la potasse contenue dans cette mer à quelques 500 millions de dollars.

(1) F. Emily Newton : *Fifty Years in Palestine*, p. 212-213.

Voici les déclarations d'un des membres de l'Agence Juive qu'a rapportées dans son numéro du 20 Février 1942 la revue «The Zionist Review» :

«Aujourd'hui, il y a en Palestine 1800 projets industriels qui ont coûté 14 millions de livres et qui donnent une production annuelle d'une valeur équivalant à ce montant. Quelque 45.000 Juifs, fils de ceux qui étaient dispersés à travers le monde, vivent aujourd'hui de ces industries. La Société des Potasses expédie le produit de son exploitation en Angleterre, en Tchécoslovaquie, en Autriche, aux Etats-Unis, en Inde, à Ceylan, en Chine, au Japon, au Canada».

Une troisième concession d'égale importance a été accordée aux Juifs : celle des terres d'El Houlé considérées parmi les plus riches de Palestine, ce qui a provoqué une nouvelle éviction des Arabes.

Ainsi la situation économique du pays fut contrôlée par les éléments juifs de la population. Il n'en fallut pas plus pour jeter les Arabes dans le cercle vicieux du chômage et de la pauvreté (1). Les ouvriers agricoles ainsi que les ouvriers industriels arabes étaient remplacés par la main-d'œuvre juive, et alors que le niveau de vie des Arabes était en baisse constante, celui des Juifs suivait une courbe ascendante du fait de leurs multiples projets industriels et de l'extension de leur domaine agricole.

Il ne faut pas s'étonner dans ces conditions qu'une fois la guerre venue en 1948, les Arabes se soient trouvés en état d'infériorité vis-à-vis des bandes juives bien entraînées... L'idée du partage que l'on caressait depuis longtemps et que les Arabes avaient catégoriquement refusée, pouvait maintenant être mise à exécution par la force, et l'Etat d'Israël pouvait enfin être reconnu.

En fait de partage, il écheta de rappeler pour mémoire que plusieurs projets avaient été mis en avant comme solution du litige qui allait en s'aggravant entre les Arabes et les Juifs. C'est ainsi qu'en Novembre 1936, une Commission royale fut envoyée en Palestine pour étudier le problème sur place. Dans le rapport qu'elle présenta alors, elle préconisait le partage de la Palestine entre les Arabes et les Juifs comme seul moyen de ramener la paix dans le pays. L'Etat arabe devait comprendre l'Est du Jourdain, les régions de Gaza, Bir Shéba, le désert du Néguev, Naplouse, la partie Est des régions de Tulkarem, Jenine, Bissane et la ville de Jaffa. L'Etat juif devait comporter les vilayets de Haifa et de Galilée, toute la plaine côtière depuis Asdoud jusqu'au Nord. En outre les villes de Tibériade, Safad, Haifa et St.

(1) James Porter : *A History of Palestine*, p. 302.

jean d'Acre devaient rester sous la juridiction de la puissance mandataire jusqu'à ce qu'elles soient annexées à l'Etat juif.

D'autres dispositions prévoyaient le paiement à l'Etat arabe, à titre de compensation, d'une subvention en espèces par l'Etat juif ainsi que d'une donation par le gouvernement anglais de deux millions de livres...

Ce projet rencontra de la part des Arabes une opposition violente qui culmina en une grande révolte. Cette opposition était motivée par plusieurs raisons pertinentes. Ainsi le nombre d'Arabes dans la partie attribuée aux Juifs était de 325.000, alors que les Juifs se trouvant dans la partie arabe étaient de 1350 seulement. En acceptant un échange de populations, les Arabes auraient vu leur territoire congestionné par un afflux énorme et imprévu de nouveaux arrivants, ce qui aurait provoqué incontestablement une crise économique dans leur secteur, alors que l'Etat juif soulagé de cette énorme population arabe et ne recevant que les 1350 Juifs du secteur arabe aurait eu amplement de la place pour accueillir quelques centaines de milliers d'immigrants juifs et leur assurer un niveau social et économique relativement élevé, sans compter que les Arabes qui auraient été déplacés du secteur juif possédaient quatre fois plus de terres que les Juifs, soit un excédent de quelque 3.250.000 dounams qui serait venu augmenter le patrimoine juif.

Enfin, un partage tel que celui préconisé était une nouvelle preuve de la détermination des Anglais de créer, des dépouilles des Arabes, l'Etat d'Israël, et donner ainsi naissance au problème des réfugiés.

Un autre projet de partage (1) avancé par les Anglais consistait à partager la Palestine en trois parties, à savoir :

- la partie Nord à maintenir sous mandat jusqu'à ce que l'accord soit fait entre Juifs et Arabes pour qu'elle devienne indépendante;
- la partie Sud, c'est-à-dire le Néguev, à maintenir également sous mandat parce qu'aucun des deux Etats n'aurait été à même de faire face aux dépenses énormes qu'aurait entraînées sa mise en valeur;
- quant à la partie centrale, elle aurait été divisée en un Etat arabe et un Etat juif laissant la région de Jérusalem sous mandat permanent.

(1) Royal Institute of International Affairs: Great Britain and Palestine, p. 194-197.

L'Etat arabe tel que conçu — surtout si on lui adjoignait la partie orientale de la région du Jourdain — n'était pas viable, parce que cet Etat aurait été incapable d'équilibrer ses recettes et ses dépenses et le fait de recevoir une subvention d'Israël ne pouvait être accepté par les Arabes parce qu'attentatoire à leur dignité, sans compter que cette subvention aurait été très aléatoire. Quant à la subvention de l'Angleterre, elle aurait nécessairement comporté un contrôle financier de la part des Anglais, ce qui aurait restreint l'indépendance de l'Etat arabe.

Quoi qu'il en soit, ce projet fut également jugé inacceptable et la Commission royale envoyée sur place ne put que constater son impuissance à arriver à une solution viable; elle convoqua les deux parties à tenir une conférence avec le gouvernement anglais à Londres.

VI — La Conférence de Londres en 1939.

Cette conférence s'ouvrit le 7 Février 1939. La proposition faite par l'Angleterre aux deux délégations arabe et juive comportait ce qui suit :

L'Angleterre reconnaissait en principe l'existence d'un gouvernement palestinien indépendant lié à elle par un traité garantissant ses intérêts militaires et économiques en Palestine. Toutefois, cette solution devait être précédée d'une période durant laquelle certaines mesures d'ordre constitutionnel devaient être prises afin d'amener progressivement quelques-uns des membres palestiniens du Conseil Exécutif qui devait être établi, à prendre charge d'un certain nombre d'administrations gouvernementales. Cette étape se serait étendue sur une période de dix ans. En outre des restrictions auraient été imposées à l'immigration et au transfert de la propriété foncière.

Ce projet fut rejeté par les deux parties et l'Angleterre déclara alors qu'en dépit de ce refus, elle était décidée à assurer l'exécution des plans qu'elle croyait utiles de mener à bonne fin. L'idée fut, toutefois, abandonnée et un nouveau projet fut conçu et soumis par la suite à la Conférence de Londres de 1946.

VII — La Conférence de Londres de 1946.

Cette Conférence tint ses assises du 10 Septembre au 2 Octobre 1946 et l'Angleterre y soumit son nouveau projet dénommé «Projet de régime fédéral» ou «Projet Morrison» du nom du vice-président du gouvernement travailliste d'alors. Ce projet comportait la division de la Palestine en 4 parties à savoir :

- 1 — la partie juive comprenant la plus grande partie des terres alors occupées par les Juifs;
- 2 — la région de Jérusalem comprenant cette ville, Bethléem ainsi que les terres avoisantes;
- 3 — le Néguev;
- 4 — la partie arabe comprenant tout le restant de la Palestine.

Les deux secteurs arabe et juif auraient joui du self-gouvernement, c'est-à-dire qu'ils auraient été dotés chacun d'un gouvernement local et d'un Conseil législatif et qu'il y aurait eu un gouvernement central dont le pouvoir se serait étendu aux deux secteurs en ce qui concerne la détaxe, les relations extérieures, les douanes et tout ce qui a un caractère général touchant l'ensemble de la Palestine. Toute décision du Conseil législatif aurait dû en, outre, pour être valable, recevoir l'approbation du Haut-Commissaire.

Les Arabes rejetèrent ce projet. Il était, en effet, en contradiction flagrante avec le Livre Blanc et comportait en outre la division de la Palestine. Ils soumièrent un contre-projet dont les grandes lignes peuvent se résumer comme suit :

- 1 — Proclamer la Palestine Etat unifié indépendant ;
 - 2 — Lui assurer un gouvernement démocratique en base d'une constitution à établir par une Assemblée Constituante élue ;
 - 3 — Former un gouvernement provisoire sous la présidence du Haut-Commissaire, composé de 7 Arabes et de 3 Juifs avec la garantie que les Juifs jouiront de leurs justes droits et que les droits des minorités seront sauvegardés ;
 - 4 — Arrêter l'immigration immédiatement et laisser au gouvernement indépendant à venir le soin d'en décider ;
 - 5 — Conclure un traité d'alliance entre le Gouvernement de Palestine et l'Angleterre ;
 - 6 — Des garanties à donner pour le respect des Lieux-Saints et la liberté de les visiter.
- La Conférence de Londres rejeta à son tour ce projet et en soumit un autre connu sous le nom de «Projet Bevin». Ce dernier ne s'écartait pas beaucoup du «Projet Morrison» précité avec cette seule différence qu'il rimposait pas le partage et était basé sur la prorogation du mandat pour une nouvelle période de 5 ans au cours de laquelle auraient

été établis un Gouvernement et des Conseils locaux arabes et juifs jouissant de l'indépendance interne. Une condition, toutefois, fut posée : l'immigration ne serait autorisée qu'exclusivement dans le secteur juif et limitée par la capacité d'absorption de ce secteur.

Les Arabes rejetèrent à nouveau ce projet en s'appuyant sur les deux arguments suivants :

- 1 — Eux seuls ont le droit de déterminer le sort de leur pays.
- 2 — Ils ne sont en aucune façon responsables des Juifs que l'on veut établir.

Ils se sont élevés dès lors contre la persistance de l'immigration juive, quel qu'en soit le nombre.

C'est donc sur un échec que prit fin la Conférence de Londres de 1946 ⁽¹⁾.

Par la suite, l'Angleterre conçut l'idée de mettre fin au mandat puisqu'elle avait réalisé le but visé, à savoir la création du Foyer national juif, et lorsque la Commission de l'O.N.U. chargée d'examiner la question palestinienne se réunit, le délégué britannique — qui était alors le ministre du Foreign Office — réaffirma l'intention de son gouvernement de quitter la Palestine et de ne pas chercher à imposer une solution dont ne voulaient ni les Arabes ni les Juifs.

Au moment du vote à l'Assemblée de la résolution sur le partage et sur l'envoi en Palestine d'une Commission chargée de prendre consigne de l'administration, le délégué anglais s'empressa d'annoncer que son gouvernement donnait son plein accord sur cette résolution et était tout disposé à en faciliter l'exécution. Une seconde mesure prise par le gouvernement anglais consista à reconnaître le nouvel Etat d'Israël. De cette façon l'Angleterre avait pleinement rempli sa mission envers les Juifs. Bien plus, les Arabes l'accusent d'avoir, au moment de l'évacuation de la Palestine, permis aux Juifs de s'emparer des dépôts de munitions anglais. En effet, c'est le 4 Avril 1948 qu'un détachement juif de la formation de l'Irgoun attaqua le campement anglais No. 80 dans le voisinage de la colonie juive de «Pardès Hama» et s'empara d'une grande quantité d'armes.

Par la suite, Menahem Begin devait écrire à ce sujet dans ses mémoires :

(1) Fisher and Kinsky : The Middle East in Crisis, p. 46.

« Les armes qui furent prises dans cette escarmouche firent sentir leur effet dans la bataille de Jaffa ».

Enfin, c'est l'Angleterre qui, dans la guerre arabo-juive en Palestine, fut une des premières à s'interposer pour arrêter l'élan des troupes arabes et demander une armistice — ce qui devait permettre aux Juifs de mieux se préparer pour reconquérir le terrain perdu.

Ce sont là autant de faits qui démontrent, à suffisance de preuves, le rôle décisif joué par l'Angleterre dans la question de Palestine et l'importance de ce rôle sur l'éclosion du douloureux problème des réfugiés arabes et de ses conséquences sur la politique de tout le Moyen-Orient

CHAPITRE III

I — Le rôle des Etats-Unis dans

la question des réfugiés arabes.

Les Etats-Unis ont joué un rôle marquant dans la création de l'Etat d'Israël et l'éclosion du problème des réfugiés arabes qui en a été le corollaire. On peut dire que ce rôle est complémentaire de celui joué par l'Angleterre au cours de son mandat sur la Palestine. Quant au mobile réel de l'action des Etats-Unis, il faut le chercher dans les millions de Sionistes qui habitent ce pays et qui ont une très grande influence sur le plan national et financier, surtout après que les Sionistes eurent transporté leurs activités d'Angleterre en Amérique pour hâter l'avènement de l'Etat d'Israël.

Une question se pose : pourquoi l'activité sioniste s'est-elle déplacée vers les Etats-Unis ?

Pour plusieurs raisons dont les suivantes :

1 — L'Angleterre avait mis un frein à la grande immigration juive en Palestine et avait publié un Livre Blanc où elle démontrait le danger qu'aurait comporté cette immigration sur l'économie et la situation intérieure du pays. Elle avait été amenée à prendre ces mesures sous la pression très justifiée des Arabes pour parer au grand danger menaçant leur existence dans leur patrie.

S'étant retournés vers les Etats-Unis qui s'étaient décidés à apporter leur concours dans la question de Palestine et qui avaient à cette époque leur mot à dire, les Sionistes parvinrent à obtenir du Président Truman un permis d'immigration en Palestine pour 100.000 Juifs...

2 — L'Angleterre s'était liée aux Etats Arabes par des promesses découlant d'un certain nombre de traités qui restreignaient sa liberté de mouvements vis-à-vis l'immigration juive, alors que les Etats-Unis n'avaient pas d'engagements de cette nature et pouvaient agir plus librement.

Les scrupules de l'Angleterre à ce sujet avaient été exposés par le Premier ministre britannique Attlee au président Truman dans les entretiens qu'ils avaient eus ensemble et au cours desquels Attlee avait fait valoir les résolutions prises par les Etats arabes⁽¹⁾ au cours de la

(1) John and David Kinche : A Clash of Destinies, p. 47.

conférence d'Inchass, laquelle avait rejeté les recommandations de la Commission anglo-américaine et celle de Bloudan.

3 — Les Sionistes ont eu beau jeu de faire vibrer la fibre sentimentale des Américains en exploitant les persécutions des Juifs par les Nazis (1) et en les amenant ainsi à apporter leur concours à l'établissement d'un Foyer pour ces persécutés en Palestine.

Voici ce qu'on peut lire dans le rapport de la Commission anglo-américaine déjà citée :

«... Depuis la fin de la guerre, très peu a été fait pour transférer les Juifs échappés aux persécutions nazies dans d'autres pays où ils pourraient s'établir. Nous ne connaissons pas de pays plus adapté que la Palestine pour absorber dans un proche avenir ces personnes sans foyer. Nous sommes sûrs que le gouvernement des Etats-Unis, qui a manifesté un grand intérêt pour ce problème, apportera vigoureusement et généreusement son concours à l'Angleterre pour la réalisation de cet objectif.

4 — Les Sionistes ont, par ailleurs, su exploiter à fond le côté spirituel et religieux du caractère américain ; ils ont insisté sur le fait que Juifs et Chrétiens en Amérique s'étaient vus contraints d'y immigrer en grand nombre à cause des persécutions subies en Europe. Les citations de la Bible étaient faites à propos pour témoigner de l'inévitabilité du retour à Jérusalem des Juifs dispersés et du rétablissement du royaume d'Israël.

Une pareille propagande ne pouvait pas ne pas faire avoir ses effets sur les responsables américains. C'est ainsi que l'on a pu voir le premier ambassadeur américain en Israël, James Mc Donald, commenter tous les chapitres de son livre « My mission in Israel » par des citations de la Bible qu'il appliquait aux temps présents pour justifier l'avènement de l'Etat d'Israël.

5 — Les Juifs ont porté leurs efforts vers l'Amérique à cause de l'influence des Sionistes sur la vie publique et sur les élections américaines. Les voix des Juifs pouvaient faire pencher la balance en faveur de l'un ou l'autre candidat républicain ou démocrate, de sorte que les deux partis américains recherchaient avec empressement la clientèle électorale des Juifs.

En 1946, des élections se déroulèrent à New-York pour le poste de gouverneur et pour un siège de sénateur de cette ville. La compétition était serrée entre les candidats Herbert Lehman et James Mead du parti démocrate et Irving Ives et Thomas Dewey du parti républicain.

(2) Arthur Meier : *The Rise of Modern America*, p. 412-413.

Le Président Truman craignait alors que le parti républicain n'exploitât les négociations qui se déroulaient à cette époque entre le gouvernement britannique et les représentants des Etats arabes et ne publiât un manifeste appuyant les Sionistes, ce qui lui aurait permis de gagner les votes des Juifs et de triompher ainsi dans la compétition — s'empressa de publier le 4 Octobre 1946 une déclaration aux termes de laquelle il se disait prêt à accueillir favorablement la proposition de l'Agence Juive consistant à fonder un Etat juif ayant pleine liberté en ce qui concerne son économie et l'immigration dans son territoire, et à donner immédiatement autorisation à 100.000 Juifs d'entrer en Palestine sans opposition de l'Angleterre.

Ainsi les relations étaient des plus cordiales entre les Sionistes et le parti démocrate américain au pouvoir et l'argent juif coulait à flots dans les caisses du parti. En contrepartie, toutes les demandes sionistes étaient satisfaites...

Quand le fameux sioniste Menahem Begin voulut visiter les Etats-Unis, le ministère des Affaires Etrangères américain, à la suite de rapports parvenus du Bureau du Moyen-Orient, voulut lui en interdire l'accès, mais aussitôt une note secrète parvenait du Président Truman pour qu'entrée libre lui fût accordée en dépit de toutes les objections. Le secret de ce comportement réside dans le fait qu'à cette époque la bataille électorale était à son paroxysme et que chacun des deux partis essayait par tous les moyens de gagner les voix juives...

II — Les efforts des Présidents des Etats-Unis en faveur d'Israël.

1 — Déjà depuis le Président Wilson, le mouvement sioniste trouvait grand appui aux Etats-Unis. Cet appui s'accroissait sous les Présidents Roosevelt et Truman et l'idée du Foyer national juif en Palestine prenait corps et entrait dans la voie de la réalisation.

Lorsque le gouvernement britannique en 1918 rendit publique la Déclaration Balfour, celle-ci avait déjà obtenu l'approbation des Alliés et l'encouragement du gouvernement américain (1). Cette Déclaration fut incorporée dans le traité de paix avec l'appui du Président Wilson qui déclara alors que la Déclaration serait mise à exécution. Depuis lors, les Etats-Unis s'employèrent à la réalisation de cet objectif et furent les premiers à appuyer l'octroi du mandat à la Grande-Bretagne. En 1947, ils donnèrent leur consentement au partage de la Palestine.

(1) Fisher and Krensky : *The Middle East in Crisis*, p. 83.

2 — Pour ce qui est du Président Roosevelt, il exprimait ses sentiments envers les Sionistes sans ambages. Ainsi il adressa, en date du 19 Octobre 1938, une lettre au sénateur Tiding dans laquelle il disait :

« J'ai, à plus d'une reprise, manifesté mes bons sentiments en ce qui concerne la fondation d'un Foyer national juif en Palestine. Malgré les troubles qui ont secoué le pays ces derniers temps, je sens une grande joie et une grande satisfaction de voir le progrès accompli par les Juifs vers cet objectif. J'ai informé le gouvernement britannique — qui a acquisé — de ne prendre aucune mesure concernant la Palestine sans nous en aviser au préalable ».

Lors d'une cérémonie organisée par les Juifs, pour célébrer l'anniversaire de la Déclaration Balfour, voici ce que Roosevelt écrivit dans un message envoyé à cette occasion à Stephen Weise (1) : « Je vous prie de vouloir bien transmettre aux sieurs et dames réunis à Washington, mes meilleurs vœux. Le peuple américain, épris de liberté, observe avec la plus grande attention et la plus grande sympathie les efforts des Juifs pour renouer les liens avec leur ancienne patrie et faire revivre la culture juive à l'endroit même qui, il y a plusieurs siècles, fut le centre de propagation de cette culture à travers le monde. Les Juifs américains sont fiers de participer à ce grand effort et je suis très heureux de vous adresser mes cordiales félicitations et mes plus vives salutations ».

Lorsqu'en 1939, la Grande-Bretagne publia le Livre Blanc, le Président Roosevelt n'y trouvant pas de quoi satisfaire les vœux des Sionistes, fit en date du 16 Mars 1944, la déclaration suivante :

« Le gouvernement américain n'a pas donné son accord sur le Livre Blanc publié en 1939 par la Grande-Bretagne. Le Président est heureux de voir qu'aujourd'hui les portes de la Palestine sont ouvertes aux émigrants Juifs et lorsque, par la suite, des décisions seront prises, satisfaction sera donnée à ceux qui préconisent l'établissement d'un Foyer national juif en Palestine — lequel vœu a toute la sympathie tant du gouvernement que du peuple américain ».

D'un autre côté, pour apaiser l'excitation des Arabes et endormir leurs soupçons, Roosevelt envoyait au Roi Séoud un message (2) disant notamment :

« ... Votre Majesté se rappelle sans doute que lors de notre dernier entretien, je Vous ai donné l'assurance qu'en ma qualité de Chef de

(1) Roosevelt : *The Public Papers and Addresses*, p. 91.
(2) S. Flagg : *Diplomatic History of U.S.A.*, p. 898.

l'exécutif de ce gouvernement, je n'entreprendrai aucune action qui soit hostile envers le peuple arabe ».

De telles paroles étaient manifestement en contradiction avec les agissements passés ou à venir du Président Roosevelt.

3 — Quand Truman succéda à Roosevelt, une note lui fut soumise relatant les efforts faits par ce dernier pour appuyer l'établissement du Foyer national juif en Palestine et le danger qu'un tel comportement pouvait présenter pour les intérêts américains. Truman s'empressa, néanmoins, d'appuyer le point de vue de son prédécesseur et de déclarer :

« J'ai pris connaissance de la politique suivie par Roosevelt dans la question de Palestine et me suis rendu compte de l'effort qu'il a déployé à cet effet. J'ai pris la décision de poursuivre l'exécution de sa politique ».

Dans les entretiens de Postdam avec Churchill, le Président Truman s'efforça de plaider la cause du Foyer national juif (1). Dans le mémorandum qu'il remit à son interlocuteur, on y lit notamment :

« Le peuple américain porte grand intérêt au problème palestinien et désapprouve énergiquement les obstacles créés par l'Angleterre pour freiner l'immigration juive en Palestine, tel que cela ressort du Livre Blanc publié en 1939. Le peuple américain demande que soit facilitée l'immigration des Juifs qui ont beaucoup souffert des persécutions nazies. Je connais vos sentiments quant à la question de l'installation des Juifs en Palestine et cela m'encourage à vous demander de lever l'embargo sur l'immigration juive en Palestine et d'en donner l'autorisation le plus tôt possible ».

Par la suite, c'est-à-dire en date du 10 Décembre 1945, une Commission anglo-américaine fut formée. Elle se rendit en Europe et en Orient pour étudier la situation des Juifs dans ces régions. Voici les propositions contenues dans son rapport :

- A) Autorisation à accorder pour l'entrée immédiate de 100.000 Juifs en Palestine, cette contrée étant la seule susceptible de rassembler un si grand nombre de Juifs.
- B) Maintien d'un équilibre harmonieux entre les deux communautés arabe et juive pour entrayer toute prépondérance de l'une sur l'autre.
- C) Protection du système gouvernemental qui sera établi en Palestine par des garanties de caractère international afin de sauvegarder les

(1) H. Truman : *Mémoires* Vol. 11, p. 135

intérêts des Chrétiens, des Musulmans et des Juifs, et les habitants devront jouir du self-gouvernement le plus étendu qui s'accorde avec les principes proclamés.

Siôt reçu ce rapport, Truman s'empresse d'adresser à Mr. Attlee, alors Premier ministre de Grande-Bretagne, une lettre par laquelle il lui demandait de hâter l'exécution des recommandations contenues dans ce rapport et de soumettre celles-ci aux Arabes et aux Juifs pour connaître leur point de vue à leur sujet. Truman proposait, en outre, d'envoyer au besoin quelques détachements de l'armée américaine pour assurer, éventuellement par la force, l'exécution de ces recommandations. Pour terminer, Truman demandait le partage de la Palestine et la création de l'Etat d'Israël.

Le roi Séoud, voyant la tournure que prenaient les événements, envoya en date du 15 Octobre 1946, un message à Truman où il était dit notamment :

«Je suis surpris des informations parues dernièrement, vous attribuant une déclaration aux termes de laquelle vous appuyez les Juifs en Palestine de même que l'immigration juive en ce pays, contrairement aux engagements pris antérieurement».

A ce message, Truman répondit en date du 28 Octobre 1946, en ces termes :

«Le gouvernement ainsi que le peuple des Etats-Unis ont, depuis la fin de la 1ère guerre mondiale, appuyé le fait du Foyer national juif en Palestine, lequel ne s'est pas complètement réalisé à ce jour. Il est donc naturel que mon gouvernement encourage l'entrée en Palestine d'un grand nombre de Juifs dispersés à travers l'Europe, non seulement pour qu'ils y trouvent un asile, mais aussi pour qu'ils puissent, grâce à leurs dons naturels et à leurs efforts, y édifier leur Foyer national. J'ai toujours la conviction — partagée par un nombre imposant de citoyens de ce pays — que la meilleure contribution à l'allègement du fardeau des Juifs qui ont survécu, c'est de permettre à au moins 100.000 Juifs d'entrer le plus rapidement possible en Palestine.

«Je tiens, par ailleurs, à souligner que mon insistance à demander l'acceptation de ce grand nombre de Juifs en Palestine et à hâter la solution du problème palestinien ne doit en aucun cas être interprétée comme un geste d'inimitié envers les peuples arabes. Au contraire, mes sentiments envers les Arabes, au moment où je faisais les déclarations dont il s'agit, étaient empreints de la plus grande cordialité».

Le Congrès, de son côté, appuyait entièrement Truman et c'est

40

par un vote unanime que le 19 Décembre 1945, il approuvait la politique de Truman concernant la question palestinienne.

Il y a lieu de noter que les deux partis, républicain et démocrate, publièrent chacun une déclaration pour appuyer, encore une fois, la politique pro-juive du gouvernement américain.

Par la suite, et conformément à la note adressée en date du 1er Avril 1947 à l'O.N.U. par la Grande-Bretagne appuyée par le gouvernement américain — l'Assemblée Générale de cette Organisation se réunit à la date fixée à New-York (1) et adopta une résolution portant constitution d'une Commission formée parmi les membres de l'O.N.U. et qui serait chargée de se livrer à une enquête sur la question de Palestine et de présenter son rapport à la prochaine Assemblée de l'O.N.U. à sa session de Septembre 1947.

Craignant que l'Union Soviétique ne fasse partie de cette Commission et n'en profite pour s'immiscer dans les affaires du Moyen-Orient, l'Amérique s'arrangea pour qu'aucune des Grandes Puissances n'en fasse partie. Finalement, la Commission fut formée des 11 Etats suivants : Australie, Canada, Tchécoslovaquie, Guatemala, Inde, Iran, Hollande, Pérou, Suède, Uruguay et Yougoslavie.

Il va de soi que les Juifs s'employèrent, dès la formation de cette Commission, à user de toute leur influence pour faire pencher la balance de leur côté.

Entre le 26 Mai et le 31 Août 1947, cette Commission se déplaça entre Lake Success, Jérusalem, Beyrouth et Genève et tint 12 réunions publiques et 36 à huis-clos.

Dans le rapport qu'elle présenta à l'O.N.U., la Commission passa en revue les propositions faites par les Arabes et celles avancées par les Juifs et exposa ensuite ses propres suggestions qui se résument comme suit :

«Les Palestiniens demandent qu'il soit mis fin immédiatement au mandat britannique sur leur pays et que soit constitué un gouvernement démocratique indépendant. Ils se basent sur le droit — à eux garanti ainsi qu'aux autres peuples par la Charte des N.U. — de choisir leur propre forme de gouvernement, ainsi que sur les diverses promesses et assurances qui leur ont été faites, et aux termes desquelles le fait par la puissance mandataire de permettre l'immigration juive en Palestine ne saurait en aucune façon porter atteinte à leurs droits naturels.

«Les Juifs, de leur côté, demandent l'établissement d'un Etat juif

(1) David and Cheever : Organising for Peace, p. 444.

en Palestine qui ouvrirent ses portes aux émigrants juifs provenant de tous les pays, se basant sur ce qu'ils appellent les liens religieux et historiques qui relient les Juifs à la Palestine et sur le droit d'y établir un Foyer national juif, tel que reconnu par la Déclaration Balfour de 1917 et par le titre du mandat anglais sur la Palestine établi par la S.D.N. à l'issue de la 1^{ère} guerre mondiale. Ils justifient leurs arguments par la nécessité de trouver un asile pour tous les Juifs dispersés en Europe et de leur fournir les moyens de recommencer une nouvelle vie en Palestine».

Pour ce qui est des propositions de la Commission, il convient de signaler qu'elles n'émanaient pas de l'unanimité des membres qui la composaient. C'est ainsi que la majorité avait proposé de partager la Palestine entre les Arabes et les Juifs et que les deux Etats qui seraient ainsi formés seraient unis par des liens fédéraux. Un régime international avait été prévu pour la capitale de ces deux Etats. Quant à la minorité, elle avait proposé que soit créé un seul Etat palestinien sur une base fédérale.

Cette divergence d'opinions devait anéantir l'Assemblée Générale de l'O.N.U., qui s'était tenue le 3 Septembre 1947, à proposer la constitution d'une nouvelle Commission ayant pour mission d'examiner les deux propositions avancées par la 1^{ère} Commission.

Malgré tous les efforts faits par les Etats-Unis et les représentants officiels des Juifs, la proposition de partage de la Palestine n'obtint lors du vote au sein de la Commission spéciale, qu'une majorité provisoire (1) soit 25 voix favorables, alors que les 32 autres pays avaient voté contre ou s'étaient abstenus ou bien encore étaient absents au moment du scrutin. Devant ce résultat, les Sionistes eurent nettement l'impression qu'il leur serait impossible désormais de faire pression sur les membres de l'Assemblée Générale de l'O.N.U. pour obtenir une approbation officielle de caractère international au projet de partage de la Palestine.

Il est intéressant de signaler à ce propos que même parmi les Etats qui avaient voté le partage, beaucoup ne s'y étaient résignés que parce qu'ils le considéraient comme un moindre mal.

Ainsi, la Suède, qui avait fait partie de la 1^{ère} Commission d'enquête, expliqua ainsi son vote :

«Il est dans le projet des points faibles ainsi que de graves lacunes; la Suède, toutefois, l'appuie pour cette simple raison que si une

(1) Don Peretz: Israel and the Palestine Arabs, p. 5-6.

décision n'intervient pas au sujet de la Palestine, les conséquences en seraient encore plus graves.

Le délégué du Canada déclara, à son tour, qu'il s'agit de trouver asile en Palestine à quelque 700.000 Juifs qui, eux et leurs corréligionnaires, sont attachés à cette terre pour la raison qu'elle fut une fois au moins par le passé leur pays. Sans ces circonstances spéciales, ajouta-t-il, la thèse des Arabes aurait été inattaquable, et le Canada appuierait le partage bien à contre-cœur et avec beaucoup d'appréhensions.

Le délégué de la Belgique fit enfin les mêmes réserves : «Nous ne sommes nullement convaincus que ce projet soit tout à fait équitable et doutons fort qu'il soit pratique; bien au contraire, nous craignons qu'il ne comporte de grands dangers, mais y a-t-il une autre solution?... Nous avons devant nous la solution que l'on nous propose ou pas de solution du tout, c'est-à-dire en fait de nouvelles difficultés en vue ou peut-être encore l'anarchie. Nous ne pouvons pas nous permettre d'en prendre la responsabilité, aussi nous votons avec la majorité pour le projet».

Le 26 Novembre 1947 était le jour fixé par l'Assemblée Générale pour le scrutin sur le projet de partage. Il fut renvoyé de 48 heures à cause des festivités du Thanksgiving Day. Ce délai fut mis à profit par les Etats-Unis pour battre le rappel des voix et recourir à certaines interventions auprès de pays hésitants ou qui s'étaient abstenus lors du vote à la Commission spéciale. Tel fut le cas des Philippines dont le délégué, le général Carlos Romulo, s'était abstenue et avait même attaqué le projet de partage. Il fut immédiatement rappelé et remplacé par un autre délégué qui, lui, vota pour le partage.

Mêmes interventions auprès des délégués du Siam, de Haïti, de Libéria, du Luxembourg et d'autres Etats qui finirent tous par donner leurs voix en faveur du partage.

Par ailleurs, 26 sénateurs américains signèrent une dépêche commune par laquelle ils demandèrent à 13 Etats ayant des liens d'intérêts avec les Etats-Unis de voter en faveur du projet. En même temps, on apprenait que David Naples, qui était alors conseiller du Président des Etats-Unis pour les affaires des minorités, s'était mis en contact avec les pays de l'Amérique du Sud pour les engager, contre certaines promesses, à émettre également un vote favorable.

On sut de même que Bernard Baroukh, l'ami personnel du Président Truman, avait été chargé de contacter les Français pour leur rappeler qu'il y avait le Projet Marshall pour l'aide américaine —

aide dont la France avait alors grand besoin — et qu'ils pourraient bien en être privés s'ils s'avisait de voter contre le projet. ... Et combien d'autres pressions, comportant des menaces à peine voilées, par nombre des personnalités influentes, hommes d'affaires, hommes de loi, etc...

La manœuvre était tellement flagrante que le «New York Post» ne put s'empêcher de remarquer dans son numéro du 30 Novembre 1947 :

«Depuis le Président Truman jusqu'au bas de l'échelle administrative, les Américains se sont employés à faire pression dans tous les domaines pour faire triompher la décision relative au partage... ce qui devait amener Gromyko, représentant de l'U.R.S.S., à faire remarquer avec ironie qu'il était depuis le début, partisan du partage et qu'il n'avait pas besoin, lui, de recourir à toutes ces manœuvres pour recueillir des votes favorables...»

Est-il besoin après cela de donner d'autres preuves de l'influence exercée par les Etats-Unis sur nombre d'Etats pour les amener, parfois à leur corps défendant, à entériner le partage inique de la Palestine ?...

Tel fut le rôle des Etats-Unis pour faire triompher la thèse du partage en faveur des Sionistes. Mais ce n'était là qu'une première étape qui devait être suivie d'une seconde consistant à assurer la reconnaissance d'Israël comme Etat...

Il arriva, à un moment donné, que le Chef de la délégation américaine à l'O.N.U., Mr. Austin, annonça à l'improviste un changement dans la politique de son gouvernement et que l'idée du partage avait été abandonnée pour un projet de mandat. Weizmann s'empressa alors de publier dans la presse une déclaration disant notamment que tout en se rendant compte des difficultés du partage, il se devait de signaler que le fait d'y renoncer présentait de plus grands dangers et serait un coup mortel porté au prestige de l'O.N.U. «L'intérêt de l'Amérique, dit-il, exige le renforcement, non l'affaiblissement, de l'O.N.U.. Je suis sûr du courage et de la force de résistance des Juifs en Palestine qui demandent seulement au monde civilisé de ne pas les laisser exposés aux campagnes de calomnies et de destructions dont se rendent coupables les forces du mal des pays arabes. Ce que le monde civilisé a de mieux à faire, c'est de faire comprendre aux Arabes qu'il est impossible d'empêcher la fondation du royaume juif».

Austin avait donc annoncé un changement dans la politique américaine et demandé que soit suspendue l'exécution du partage, et que

soit convoquée l'Assemblée Générale de l'O.N.U. à une réunion spéciale en vue de donner son accord à l'établissement d'une tutelle sur la Palestine à partir de la fin du mandat britannique, soit le 15 Mai 1948.

Un tel changement de politique ne convenait pas à Weizmann qui déclara que l'idée de tutelle n'était ni pratique ni objective et que les Juifs la rejetteraient certainement, car cette tutelle serait vouée à un échec certain pour les mêmes raisons qui avaient fait échouer le mandat britannique. Truman, de son côté, soutenait à fond le projet de partage.

Bref, les Sionistes manœuvrèrent si bien que quand l'Assemblée Générale se réunit l'atmosphère avait changé (1). Le délégué de la Nouvelle-Zélande déclara qu'il fallait respecter la résolution du partage. Il fut suivi et appuyé successivement par les délégués de l'Australie, de l'Europe Orientale, par Trigue Lie, Secrétaire Général de l'O.N.U., et par tant d'autres. Accords et appuis se suivirent à un rythme accéléré et la presse américaine et mondiale emboîta le pas.

Mais alors surgit une autre difficulté qui devait ajourner encore une fois le projet de partage : c'est l'idée d'une armistice à intervenir entre les Arabes et les Juifs, basé sur les points suivants :

Cessez-le-feu, pas de décision politique à prendre entretemps, arrêt de l'immigration juive pour quelques mois. Par ailleurs, les Juifs devaient s'abstenir — conformément à la résolution de l'O.N.U. du 29 Novembre 1947 — de proclamer l'avènement de leur royaume en Palestine. Les Juifs qualifièrent cette résolution de tentative pour empêcher l'établissement de l'Etat d'Israël. Commentant ces dispositions, Weizmann souligna entre autre que toute velléité de recul de la part des Juifs ne pouvait être qu'un suicide... «L'indépendance, dit-il, ne se donne pas, il faut la prendre et puis la défendre».

Voici ce qu'en date du 13 Mai 1948, Weizmann écrivit au Président Truman :

«Mon cher Président,

«Il ne faut pas que les événements de ces derniers mois fassent oublier le grand mérite qui vous revient dans l'instauration de l'Etat d'Israël — cet Etat qui contribuera grandement à résoudre le problème mondial des Juifs et qui sera en même temps un facteur de progrès et de paix dans le Moyen-Orient.

(1) Mémoires de Weizmann, p. 146.

«Le peuple juif va inéluctablement vers la solution prévue par la résolution de partage et demain — 14 Mai — dès que le mandat britannique arrivera à son terme, c'est l'Etat juif qui prendra la responsabilité du maintien de l'ordre à l'intérieur et de la défense de ses frontières contre toute agression du dehors.

«Nous devons en finir avec les recherches de nouvelles solutions et nous en tenir à la solution mise sur pied par l'O.N.U. grâce à l'intervention des Etats-Unis. Ce que nous souhaitons maintenant c'est la reconnaissance par l'Amérique de notre Etat quand il sera proclamé demain».

Au jour prévu du 14 Mai, Truman et ses conseillers étaient en contact permanent pour suivre le développement de la situation en Palestine, alors que l'O.N.U. n'avait ni infirmé ni confirmé sa résolution du 29 Novembre 1947 portant ajournement de la proclamation de l'Etat d'Israël.

Egalement en ce même jour, le Conseil élu des Juifs tenait une séance solennelle à Tel-Aviv pour proclamer l'indépendance de l'Etat Juif à partir du moment où prenait fin le mandat britannique sur la Palestine.

A Lake Success, au cours de la réunion des Nations Unies, Gibson, délégué des Etats-Unis, se leva et donna lecture de la déclaration suivante :

«Il est parvenu à la connaissance du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis qu'en Palestine a été proclamée l'instauration d'un Etat Juif. Le Gouvernement provisoire de cet Etat a demandé à être reconnu. Ceci étant, le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis reconnaît que ce gouvernement provisoire est l'autorité légale de l'Etat d'Israël».

Weizmann commenta cet exposé historique en disant que non seulement il était une preuve de la maturité de l'esprit politique américain, mais qu'il était encore le plus beau couronnement de la longue suite d'efforts faits par l'Amérique pour réaliser les aspirations sionistes.

De ce qui précède, il ressort à l'évidence que l'Amérique a joué un rôle des plus importants pour encourager l'exode en masse des Juifs en Palestine et réaliser le partage de cette contrée en vue de l'ins-

tauration de l'Etat d'Israël avec, pour conséquence, les événements que l'on sait et qui devaient provoquer le problème dramatique des réfugiés arabes de Palestine.



A propos des événements de Palestine, on ne peut s'empêcher de signaler que l'impérialisme en profita pour semer le discord entre les Etats arabes qui avaient fait front contre Israël. On pense non sans regret que s'il y avait eu cohésion et coopération entre ces Etats, le cours de l'Histoire aurait certainement pris une autre tournure et l'on n'aurait pas eu à déplorer le maintien sans solution jusqu'aujourd'hui, du douloureux problème des réfugiés arabes.



L I V R E I I

LES EFFETS DU PROBLEME DES REFUGIES SUR LE MOYEN-ORIENT ET LES RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES

CHAPITRE I

I — L'incidence du problème des réfugiés arabes sur les réfugiés eux-mêmes.

Il va de soi que ce sont les réfugiés eux-mêmes qui ont subi en premier lieu et le plus lourdement les effets du problème qui nous occupe. Ils ont perdu ce qu'ils avaient de plus cher, leur patrie, et leurs biens. Ils ont été dispersés aux quatre points du monde, et les liens de famille se sont relâchés. Comme conséquence de ce bouleversement, leur niveau économique a été gravement compromis et la pauvreté a été le lot de tous. Le nivellement des classes s'est fait dans la misère générale. L'Organisation de l'UNRWA s'est occupée d'eux, c'est vrai, mais l'insuffisance des ressources mises à sa disposition ne lui a pas permis d'accomplir sa mission de façon optimale — d'où déficience marquée dans la nourriture et l'habillement. Etant sous-alimentés, les réfugiés sont naturellement plus vulnérables à la maladie.

Les liens familiaux se sont relâchés, avons-nous dit; très souvent ils se sont rompus. On a pu ainsi voir le mari en Israël, la femme en Jordanie et les enfants à Gaza. Du fait de la misère, les caractères se sont aigris et des désaccords entre les membres d'une même famille sont chose commune. Le respect des enfants pour les parents — qui était un dogme sacré dans la famille palestinienne — s'est affaibli et les mœurs, du fait de la promiscuité constante dans les tentes, se sont beaucoup relâchées. On a eu à déplorer à ce sujet des drames pénibles...

Le réfugié sous sa tente, parce que malheureux et inoccupé, pense à ses problèmes, à la cause de son pays et aux Etats qui ont oeuvré pour provoquer le drame qui l'a amené là.

Au point de vue économique, ainsi que nous l'avons dit, on en est au niveau le plus bas, car la grande majorité des réfugiés a, en s'enfuyant, tout abandonné en Palestine et ceux qui avaient pu emporter de l'argent avec eux, l'ont dépensé au cours de ces années d'exil, de sorte qu'aujourd'hui la question des différences de classes ne se pose plus...

48

On se demande souvent quel est le nombre des réfugiés arabes. Il est très malaisé de répondre avec exactitude à cette question pour plusieurs raisons, parmi lesquelles, la réticence des réfugiés eux-mêmes dans les déclarations de l'état civil faite par exemple à l'UNRWA. Les naissances sont régulièrement enregistrées, mais il n'en est pas de même des décès, car ces déclarations ont leur incidence sur les cartes de secours délivrées par la dite Organisation à chaque famille suivant le nombre de ses membres. Ces pratiques s'expliquent par l'extrême misère où se débattaient les réfugiés.

Voici quelques chiffres sur le nombre de réfugiés arabes tirés des statistiques données par l'UNRWA (1) :

Année 1951	Année 1955	Année 1960
879.667	905.976	1.016.004

Toutefois, ces chiffres sont contestés par l'«Organisation Supérieure Arabe pour les Palestiniens» dans le livre qu'elle a publié — et ce, pour plusieurs raisons dont celles-ci :

1 — L'UNRWA ne porte dans ses registres que les réfugiés à qui elle sert des secours alors qu'il existe un nombre non négligeable de réfugiés qui n'énargent pas au fonds de secours de cette Organisation.

2 — Des centaines de familles qui ont fui la Palestine ont émigré dans des pays autres que les pays arabes : en Ethiopie, en Asie, en Afrique. Naturellement, ces familles ne figurent pas sur les registres de l'Organisation.

3 — Du fait des déplacements des réfugiés entre les différents pays arabes, il est difficile de fixer leur nombre exact dans telle contrée ou telle autre.

Par ailleurs, l'appellation de réfugié a été donnée par l'UNRWA à celui qui a perdu ses sources de revenu comme conséquence de la guerre de Palestine et qui résidait dans ce pays deux ans avant les événements. Or, il est des réfugiés qui, à la suite de ces événements, avaient fui les grandes villes de Palestine où ils résidaient et où ils avaient leurs biens et leur gagne-pain et n'ont pu y retourner par la suite à cause de l'occupation de ces villes par les Juifs. Tous ces éléments se trouvent en Palestine, mais sont des déracinés et sont en fait des réfugiés.

D'après les données qu'elle possède, l'Organisation Supérieure pour

(1) Rapport en français de l'UNRWA de 1960, p. 15.

les Palestiniens qui a son siège au Caire, est en mesure d'évaluer le nombre de réfugiés à près de 1.100.000.

II — Le problème du logement.

Un des graves problèmes que posent les réfugiés est celui de leur logement.

Certaines voix malveillantes disent, à tort d'ailleurs, que ce sont les Etats arabes qui cherchent à laisser à la face du monde le drame provoqué par la résolution de partage de la Palestine. Ces Etats, disent encore ces voix, pensent que le fait de résoudre le problème du logement de ces réfugiés et de faire rentrer ceux-ci dans le circuit économique normal ne peut qu'affaiblir la cause palestinienne devant la conscience universelle et rien alors ne sera fait pour y apporter une véritable solution.

Ceux qui ont eu l'occasion de voir les campements de ces réfugiés, peuvent seuls se faire une idée de la grande misère de ces désertés, dormant souvent à même le sol dont l'humidité pénètre leur pauvre corps et quand, en hiver, surviennent des pluies torrentielles, c'est le désastre. Les tentes sont alors transformées en bourbiers où l'on patauge, où l'on tremble de froid et cela met longtemps à sécher, car c'est l'hiver et les pluies ne cessent pas. Par ailleurs, aucun moyen de chauffage, car il n'est pas délivré aux réfugiés de rations de pétrole et le soir ils vivent dans l'obscurité. On ne s'étonnera pas dans ces conditions de voir toutes sortes de maladies attaquer ces corps anémiés.

La R.A.U. qui, comme on sait, contrôle le secteur de Gaza, a toujours plaidé, par esprit d'humanité, pour le logement des réfugiés dans des constructions adéquates.

III — L'enseignement.

L'UNRWA est parvenue à assurer aux réfugiés palestiniens un certain niveau d'enseignement des plus rudimentaires qui se donnait sous des tentes.

L'enseignement dispensé comporte les six cycles suivants ⁽¹⁾ :

- 1) Enseignement primaire
- 2) " " secondaire
- 3) " " universitaire
- 4) Entraînement professionnel
- 5) Education de base
- 6) Entraînement du corps enseignant

⁽¹⁾ *Clyde Eagleton: Annual Rev. of the U.N. Aff., 1955, p. 79.*

Le pourcentage d'élèves ayant accédé à l'enseignement secondaire a augmenté et atteint 15% de l'ensemble des élèves de l'enseignement primaire. En R.A.U., cette proportion a atteint 21,4%, alors qu'en Jordanie elle a reculé à 12,4%.

Par ailleurs, aux élèves doués de l'enseignement secondaire des bourses ont été accordées pour les Facultés suivantes : agriculture, lettres, commerce, odontologie, pharmacie, sciences, études vétérinaires. Ces bourses au nombre de 369 ont été réparties comme suit entre les divers pays :

Gaza	Jordanie	Liban	Syrie
97	156	73	43

Dans les deux centres d'entraînement professionnel de Kalandia (Jordanie) et de Gaza, un grand nombre de métiers sont enseignés : construction, commerce, dessin, travaux électriques, mécanique, radio, autos, fonderie, etc...

La R.A.U. ayant réalisé toute l'utilité de cet enseignement, l'a développé sur une large échelle dans les domaines agricole, industriel et commercial en vue de réaliser de façon optimale son programme d'industrialisation.

Pour en revenir à l'enseignement de base mentionné ci-dessus, il convient de signaler qu'il consiste avant tout à combattre l'analphabétisme parmi les réfugiés et à enseigner les travaux féminins aux femmes et aux jeunes filles. On a pu également enseigner à un certain nombre de réfugiés, outre la langue arabe, la langue anglaise.

Il n'est peut-être pas sans intérêt d'indiquer succinctement ce qui a été fait dans ce domaine dans le secteur de Gaza.

Des centres d'enseignement de base au nombre de 18 ont été inaugurés en Avril 1954, dont moitié pour les hommes et moitié pour les femmes. Ces centres ont été établis dans les écoles des réfugiés dans les divers campements qui s'échelonnent le long du secteur de Gaza.

Les objectifs de ces centres sont les suivants :

- 1 — Relever le niveau culturel des réfugiés en leur apprenant à lire et à écrire ainsi que les autres matières de base dans l'enseignement, tels que la comptabilité, les préceptes religieux etc., et en développant leurs connaissances générales par les conférences, la radio, les journaux et revues, les films, etc...

ments essentiels dans l'alimentation humaine — parce que l'UNRWA a un budget limité. Que ne fait-elle des économies par exemple sur le chapitre des émoluments somptueux qu'elle reçoit ainsi en mesure de fournir une alimentation un peu plus consistante à ces malheureux.

V — Le problème sanitaire.

Au point de vue sanitaire, il importe de signaler que des efforts ont été faits en faveur des réfugiés et l'UNRWA a installé un certain nombre de centres médicaux dans les divers campements. Toutefois, ces centres sont insuffisants de même que le nombre des médecins en charge. Il ressort, en effet, des statistiques établies par la dite Organisation, qu'il y a un médecin pour chaque 11.381 réfugiés enregistrés, une assistante pour chaque 4818 et une infirmière pour chaque 11.038. Si l'on compte les réfugiés non enregistrés, cette proportion est encore plus réduite, alors que la moyenne normale pour les médecins par exemple est d'un médecin par 1000 individus.

Prenons par exemple un campement-type comme celui d'El Karama en Jordanie qui abrite 25.000 réfugiés provenant de 114 villages palestiniens. La section ophtalmologique reçoit journellement quelque 300 malades et elle n'a qu'une seule infirmière. Il en est de même de la clinique dentaire où le médecin se rend une fois par semaine...

Parfois, le médecin a une clinique privée payante, mais comme les réfugiés sont pauvres, très peu d'entre eux peuvent se permettre le luxe de s'y faire soigner.

A signaler également que dans le dit campement d'El Karama, il n'existe pas de salle isolée pour les maladies contagieuses, de sorte que beaucoup de ces malades restent chez eux et exposent les membres de leur famille à la contagion ou bien sont soignés à l'hôpital côte à côte avec des malades ordinaires, ce qui comporte de gros risques.

Il est incontestable que l'UNRWA a beaucoup fait en faveur des réfugiés mais il n'en demeure pas moins que ce qui a été accompli dans le domaine de la nourriture, du logement et de la santé, n'est pas à la mesure du problème que l'on affronte. Il s'agit ici de maintenir en vie des centaines de milliers de réfugiés dont la patrie a été usurpée et qui ont tout perdu. Le problème est avant tout humain et si un effort plus grand n'est pas fait, la situation qui en résulterait pour les réfugiés serait désastreuse et le seul bénéficiaire en serait Israël...

53

2 — Relève le niveau économique de ceux qui suivent ces cours en leur apprenant de nouveaux métiers et en leur inculquant les principes de certaines professions libérales qui sont de nature à assurer un gagne-pain, telles que le commerce, le tricotage, la cordonnerie, etc...

3 — Relève le niveau sanitaire de l'individu et des groupements en leur relançant des notions d'hygiène et de propreté.

4 — Apprendre aux femmes les notions d'art ménager et de puériculture ainsi que certains métiers manuels susceptibles de les aider à atteindre un meilleur niveau familial, tels que la couture, la broderie, les travaux d'aiguille, etc.

5 — Occuper les loisirs des membres de ces centres de façon agréable et utile par les sports et autres.

6 — Renforcer les liens sociaux entre les divers membres afin qu'ils forment une grande famille et n'aient pas cette sensation de précarité et d'isolement.

III — Alimentation et hygiène.

A part le problème de l'enregistrement adéquat des réfugiés et celui du logement, il y a celui de l'alimentation.

Le nombre de calories fournies à chaque réfugié est de 45.630 par mois, soit quelques 1500 calories par jour — ce qui est manifestement de loin inférieur au minimum requis — soit 2500 calories — pour maintenir une personne normale en bonne condition physique. Ceci étant, les réfugiés sous-alimentés sont affaiblis et incapables de lutter efficacement contre les maladies de toutes sortes auxquelles ils sont exposés.

Réalisant les effets désastreux de cette sous-alimentation, l'UNRWA décida d'augmenter, à partir du 1er juillet 1956, la ration alimentaire quotidienne de base des femmes enceintes ou allaitant leur enfant à concurrence de 500 calories dont bénéficieraient quelque 27.000 femmes. De même fut augmentée la ration des réfugiés non hospitalisés atteints de tuberculose.

L'UNRWA a d'ailleurs elle-même reconnu, dans son rapport pour les années 1955/56/57, cette carence alimentaire en l'attribuant, toutefois, au manque de fonds. Or, il est incontestable que l'alimentation est une nécessité primordiale et il est inconcevable que les réfugiés soient privés, par exemple, de légumes frais, de viande ou de volaille — éléments

52

VI — Les biens des réfugiés arabes bloqués en Palestine.

Un des aspects du problème des réfugiés arabes c'est l'abandon de leurs biens meubles et immeubles en Palestine. Ces biens représentent une valeur considérable ainsi qu'on le verra plus loin.

En 1950, le gouvernement israélien promulgua une loi dite « loi des absents » aux termes de laquelle étaient considérés comme absents tous ceux qui étaient sujets des pays suivants : Egypte, Syrie, Liban, Royaume Séoudite, Royaume Hachémite, Jordanie, Irak et Yémen, vivant dans ces divers pays ou bien en terre de Palestine non-juive ou bien ceux qui, à la date du 29 Novembre 1947, avaient la nationalité palestinienne mais ont quitté la Palestine sans autorisation — de même que les sociétés dont la moitié des membres et la moitié du capital se trouvaient hors de Palestine. Bref tous ceux qui possédaient des biens en Israël étaient considérés comme propriétaires absents tombant sous le coup de la dite loi. Pour tous ces propriétaires, un séquestre avait été nommé avec des pouvoirs très étendus lui permettant même de vendre les biens séquestrés et d'en verser le prix au service gouvernemental chargé de l'établissement des immigrants juifs en Palestine. Ces ventes étaient faites, à l'Organisation de la Réforme au prix officiel établi par le gouvernement et qui était naturellement de beaucoup inférieur à la valeur réelle des biens. En outre, du prix obtenu était déduite une taxe de 4% en faveur de l'Etat (laquelle taxe n'était pas prélevée sur la vente des biens juifs.

Voici, par exemple, ce qu'on peut lire dans le rapport du séquestre publié dans la brochure de l'Agence Juive du 25 Mai 1951 : sur le revenu des locations il était prélevé 35 à 40% pour les améliorations, 25% du solde pour les impôts, 12 à 13% pour les frais d'administration, 10 à 12% pour la bonification de différentes régions.

En 1952 une autre loi était promulguée dite « loi de l'appropriation des terres », aux termes de laquelle de grandes étendues de terre appartenant aux Arabes étaient expropriées sous le couvert de l'utilité publique, de l'urbanisation, de la défense, etc.

C'est ainsi que des dizaines de villages arabes furent détruits de même que de nombreuses maisons, propriété des Arabes dans les nouveaux villages et dans les villes de Haïfa, Safad, Tibériade, Ramleh, Magdal, etc... sous le prétexte de l'alignement, de l'amélioration, de la construction des routes...

En 1953, une autre loi était promulguée aux termes de laquelle

54

toute propriété non exploitée effectivement et par le propriétaire lui-même était, suivant arrêté du ministre des Finances, déclarée propriété de l'Etat et enregistrée d'office au nom de l'Organisation de l'Urbanisme et de la Reconstruction, sans que les tribunaux puissent intervenir de façon quelconque.

Les experts ont pu évaluer les biens des Arabes en Palestine à près de 2 milliards de L.S. ainsi repartis (1) :

Millions
en L.S.

100	— terrains cultivés en agrumes y compris les dépendances (bâtiments, machines, moteurs, etc.).
1	— terrains cultivés en bananes.
275	— terrains plantés d'oliviers et autres arbres.
30	— excellentes terres arables.
220	— terrains mi-agricoles et prairies.
1100	— immeubles, constructions et propriétés dans les villes et les villages.
200	— biens meubles (meubles, espèces, bijoux, marchandises, etc.).
6	— dépôts et comptes des Arabes bloqués dans les banques.
1	— montants bloqués des compagnies d'assurance.

soit 1933 millions de L.S. au total.

Il convient, en outre, de faire entrer en ligne de compte :

- 1) Les avoirs sterling revenant à la Palestine et qui furent bloqués par le gouvernement anglais en date du 22 Février 1948.
- 2) Les droits et propriétés qui appartenaient au gouvernement du Mandat, compris dans les régions occupées par les Juifs, furent cédés à Israël et le 1er Mai 1950, le gouvernement britannique accepta d'ouvrir un compte sous la rubrique « Compte d'Israël » alimenté par les avoirs palestiniens — et, en vertu d'un second accord de Janvier 1951, le dit gouvernement donnait son acquiescement au déblocage de 14 millions de L.S. de ce compte en faveur d'Israël.

La Commission de Conciliation essaya, de son côté, d'obtenir le déblocage d'un million de livres en faveur des réfugiés arabes, mais le gouvernement israélien mit comme condition que cette somme fût versée

(1) Dr. Jacques Khoury : La Palestine, p. 198.

individuellement entre les mains des réfugiés qui se trouvaient en Palestine jusqu'au 29 Novembre 1947 et qui l'avaient quittée à la date limite du 1er Septembre 1949 — ce qui revenait à dire que tous ceux — et ils sont nombreux — qui ont quitté la Palestine postérieurement à cette dernière date étaient ainsi privés du bénéfice de ce déblocage — comme aussi en étaient privés les établissements financiers, sociétés de biens, faïssance et coopératives dont les fonds étaient en majeure partie arabes. De plus, le gouvernement d'Israël exigeait le prélèvement, sur les fonds déblocqués de 25% au titre des frais du séquestre israélien et 10% pour emprunts d'Etat...

Le caractère illogique et arbitraire de toutes ces lois et de toutes ces prétentions est tellement flagrant qu'il est superflu de vouloir les réfuter point par point. Un seul exemple suffit : comment le gouvernement israélien peut-il considérer les réfugiés arabes comme absents alors qu'en réalité ils sont empêchés par ce gouvernement même de revenir dans leurs foyers et de reprendre possession de ce qui leur appartient?...

Il ressort de ce qui précède que le problème des réfugiés arabes — malgré les signaux rendus par l'UNRWA, les associations charitables, les services sociaux des gouvernements amis — est de plus en plus éloigné de sa solution et que les souffrances de ces malheureux déracinés deviennent de plus en plus effroyables.

Rappelons que par suite de certains abus dans la délivrance des cartes de secours et de l'impossibilité d'organiser l'enregistrement de manière adéquate des réfugiés, tous les enfants nés postérieurement à 1951 n'ont pas été portés sur les registres de l'UNRWA et ne reçoivent, par conséquent, aucun secours.

CHAPITRE II

I — L'incidence du problème des réfugiés arabes sur la Jordanie.

On peut dire que c'est la Jordanie qui a subi le plus fortement l'incidence du problème des réfugiés, parce que c'est elle qui héberge la moitié environ de l'ensemble de ces réfugiés. Les milliers d'émigrés palestiniens qui ont un niveau intellectuel, politique, économique et social plus élevé que celui des bédouins qui vivaient alors à l'Est du Jourdain ne pouvaient que faire sentir leurs effets sur la population autochtone.

Par ailleurs, la Jordanie, après avoir englobé la région à l'Ouest du Jourdain où vivaient quelque 400.000 Palestiniens, a vu son territoire s'étendre de façon inespérée et sa population tripler. Mais ces réfugiés, qu'ont-ils apporté à la Jordanie ? Ils ont apporté avec eux la haine et l'esprit de vengeance tant contre les Anglais qui avaient contribué à provoquer le désastre qui les a emportés que contre le Roi Abdalla qui avait étendu les limites de son royaume en annexant une partie de la Palestine, leur patrie.

Un tel esprit ne pouvait que faire sentir ses effets sur les élections qui se déroulaient en Jordanie et, par voie de conséquence, sur la politique du Roi Abdalla qui se trouva tout à coup en face d'une forte opposition. C'est justement cette opposition qui devait, par la suite, amener l'éviction de Glubb Pacha et empêcher la Jordanie d'entrer dans le Pacte de Baghdad.

II — La paix avec Israël.

Voici comment les événements se déroulèrent en ce qui concerne la paix avec Israël. Le Roi Abdalla était disposé à reconnaître le fait accompli au sujet d'Israël qui, disait-il, avait été fondé pour durer. Entre autres conditions pour la paix avec Israël (1), le Roi Abdalla réclamait la région de Ramleh et Ramallah, l'autorisation aux réfugiés arabes de retourner dans leurs villes et villages d'Israël, un passage vers la Méditerranée à travers les villes de Birseba et Gaza, une zone franche dans le port de Jaffa etc... En contrepartie, le Roi Abdalla accordait aux Israéliens un port franc à Akaba (étant entendu que cette ville serait incluse dans le territoire arabe de la Jordanie), le droit de passage vers le centre d'exploitation de la potasse de la Mer Morte et quelques autres concessions.

Les Juifs, comme prévu, refusèrent la plupart des conditions du Roi Abdalla. Malgré cela, ce dernier essaya de conclure avec Israël un traité de non-agression pour 5 ans. Pour y arriver, il chercha l'appui de la Grande-Bretagne et des Etats-Unis qui s'empressèrent de le lui accorder. L'ambassadeur américain en Jordanie se mit aussitôt en contact avec Mr. Nox Helm, ministre du Cabinet anglais, qui était venu expressément de Londres à Amman à cet effet.

Tout se serait passé pour le mieux pour le Roi Abdalla, n'était-ce l'opposition éternelle tant du peuple jordanien à l'intérieur que des Etats arabes à l'extérieur. L'Egypte avait alors présenté une proposition pour l'exclusion du Roi Abdalla de la Ligue Arabe au cas où il persisterait à conclure une paix séparée avec Israël... Et c'est ainsi que les tentatives du Roi Abdalla se soldèrent finalement par un échec.

Loin de se décourager, il pensa à un autre projet qui lui tenait à cœur et qui devait lui permettre d'étendre les frontières de son royaume; c'était le projet de la Grande Syrie. Il était convaincu que la situation qui prévalait alors en Syrie était propice à la réalisation de son plan. C'est à cet effet qu'il entreprit son voyage en Turquie, en Irak et en Espagne en vue de poser les bases de l'«Alliance de la Méditerranée».

En 1946, alors que les Etats arabes étaient occupés à unifier leurs points de vue et serrer leurs rangs pour trouver une solution valable au problème palestinien, le Roi Abdalla pensa que le moment était venu d'agir et d'annexer immédiatement la Syrie. Mais le Parlement syrien veillait. Réuni en session spéciale, il proclama son attachement au régime républicain et son refus de s'unir, sous quelque forme que ce soit, à la Jordanie qui, contrairement à la Syrie démocratique, était un Etat semi-indépendant et soumis au régime du pouvoir personnel du roi.

La Ligue Arabe, de son côté, s'opposa formellement à cet autre projet du Roi Abdalla, sachant pertinemment bien que c'était là en réalité un projet anglais avancé par le fétal sujet de S.M. britannique.

A l'intérieur du pays, les partis d'opposition, recrutés surtout dans les rangs des Palestiniens et des réfugiés, étaient de plus en plus actifs, car ils avaient maintenant un programme et des objectifs avant l'appui du peuple. Le Roi Abdalla mort, les milieux impérialistes qui n'hésiterent pas à déclarer ouvertement que l'équilibre des forces était

(1) J. Mc Donald : *My Mission in Israel*, p. 182.

déjà rompu en Moyen-Orient. Quant aux milieux de l'O.N.U., ils eurent la conviction que l'élément modérateur dans le monde arabe avait disparu avec le Roi Abdalla.

L'influence de l'élément palestinien dans la conduite des affaires de l'Etat jordanien se fit sentir de façon particulière dans la question du Pacte de Baghdad et dans celle du renvoi de Glubb Pacha.

Sous cette pression populaire, la question du Pacte de Baghdad était définitivement enterrée.

Pour Glubb Pacha, également, ce fut l'opposition irréductible de la masse des Palestiniens et des réfugiés qui l'empêcha de mettre à exécution son plan consistant à s'emparer d'Amman, à renverser le Roi Hussein et à exercer le pouvoir en Jordanie par la force. Le jour fixé pour son coup d'Etat, les officiers libres, dont un grand nombre étaient d'origine palestinienne, mirent Glubb Pacha hors d'état de nuire et le Roi Hussein lui signifia son renvoi... Un sentiment de soulagement envahit les milieux nationalistes, particulièrement en Egypte où le Président Nasser fut le premier à féliciter le Roi Hussein pour son geste patriotique.

Voici une déclaration de Glubb Pacha (1) qui ne fait, en quelque sorte, que confirmer l'incidence des réfugiés arabes sur la structure de l'Etat jordanien :

«La Jordanie était petite et ses habitants étaient au nombre de 30.000, la plupart appartenant à la classe moyenne. Son armée était constituée par 800 soldats. Amman était un village de quelques centaines d'habitants.

(1) *Life* - Avril 1966, p. 145.

CHAPITRE III

I — Le problème des réfugiés arabes et ses incidences sur la R.A.U.

Le problème des réfugiés arabes de Palestine a certainement fait sentir ses effets sur la politique intérieure et extérieure de la R.A.U. La Révolution Égyptienne, elle-même, n'a été que le contre-coup de la guerre de Palestine, car les officiers libres s'étaient alors rendus compte que les causes réelles de la défaite devaient être cherchées en Égypte et qu'il fallait de toute urgence se débarrasser du roi et des autres supports de l'impérialisme.

Ce fait a été nettement souligné par le Président Nasser dans le discours qu'il avait prononcé au Club des Officiers au Caire en date du 6 janvier 1955 : « Nous avons été victimes de la catastrophe de Palestine et avons perdu la puissance et la dignité; c'est justement pourquoi nous avons fait la Révolution ».

Dans le domaine extérieur également, la question de Palestine a eu une influence marquante sur la politique étrangère de la R.A.U. Ainsi nos relations avec les États-Unis ont été influencées par l'attitude adoptée par ce dernier pays vis-à-vis d'Israël et par les droits spoliés des réfugiés arabes.

C'est également du fait de la question des réfugiés que nombre d'incidents de frontières ont été provoqués par les Israéliens, notamment l'agression de Gaza de 1955. En 1956, c'était l'agression tripartite et l'attaque en masse contre le village de Tawafik. L'intention d'Israël était d'imposer par la force la paix aux Arabes.

La question du Canal de Suez est, elle aussi, une des conséquences du conflit de Palestine. La R.A.U., que l'insurrection par Israël des droits de réfugiés arabes ne pouvait laisser indifférente, a décidé que tout navire israélien et toute marchandise en provenance ou à destination d'Israël qui traverserait le Canal seraient confisqués et le prix en serait récupéré au profit des ayants-droit arabes de Palestine.

II — Les incidences du problème des réfugiés sur la politique étrangère de la R.A.U.

On peut dire que chaque homme a un penchant, un sentiment d'attachement pour telle ou telle cause, pour tel ou tel objet : les uns

60

pour la science, les autres, pour l'argent, d'autres pour la famille etc. La tendance marquante du Président Nasser est pour la promotion de la politique du monde arabe et plus particulièrement pour la solution de certains de ses problèmes, tels que celui de la Palestine et des réfugiés arabes. C'est ce sentiment qui dicte les plans, la politique et la philosophie du Président. Il n'y pas un seul de ses discours où il n'est pas fait mention du problème palestinien. Il n'est pas de pourparlers, de traités entre la R.A.U. et les États d'Asie et d'Afrique qui ne se réfèrent pas à la cause palestinienne. Dans toutes les Conférences internationales, depuis Bandoëng, et dans les Assemblées de l'O.N.U., la R.A.U. n'a cessé de plaider la cause des malheureux réfugiés de Palestine.

Faut-il rappeler les entretiens du Président avec S.M. Zaher Shah, roi d'Afghanistan ? Voici ce qu'on peut lire dans le parag. VI du communiqué conjoint publié alors :

« Les deux parties affirment que le fait de continuer à priver les Arabes de Palestine de leurs droits légitimes et à les empêcher de retourner dans leur patrie et de rentrer en possession de leurs biens, constitue un danger imminent qui menace la sécurité et la paix en Moyen-Orient. C'est pourquoi les deux parties proclament leur appui total au peuple de Palestine pour qu'il recouvre tous ses droits conformément aux résolutions des N.U. qui ne doivent pas hésiter à lui venir en aide jusqu'à complète réalisation de cet objectif ».

Il en a été de même dans les entretiens qui se sont déroulés entre le Président Nasser et le Président Abboud du Soudan.

Il en a été également ainsi lorsque le Président Nasser visita l'Inde et le Pakistan, et qu'il déclara, à l'issue de sa visite, que « le gouvernement de l'Inde a manifesté avec nous, dans le communiqué commun, son appui aux droits du peuple palestinien, comme l'a fait également le gouvernement du Pakistan ».

La question des réfugiés et leurs droits légitimes ont également été évoqués dans les entretiens entre le Président Nasser et feu le roi Mohammed V du Maroc et a fait l'objet d'un parag. spécial dans le communiqué publié à cette occasion.

Enfin dans les entretiens du Président avec le Président Modibo Keita du Mali — de même que dans les entretiens avec Mgr. Makarius de Chypre, les droits des réfugiés ont été affirmés avec force.

Faut-il rappeler encore les différentes Conférences internationales : Bandoëng, Casablanca, Conférence des Peuples Afro-asiatiques, etc...

61

qui, toutes, ont proclamé les droits inaliénables du peuple de Palestine et la nécessité de hâter son retour dans sa Patrie ?...

Pour en revenir à l'incidence de la question palestinienne sur les relations de la R.A.U. avec les Etats-Unis, il échet de signaler que les Juifs dans ce dernier pays forment une communauté puissante et riche dont on tient compte dans les élections présidentielles. En échange de leurs voix, les Président et avec eux le Congrès ont, en toutes circonstances, accordé leur appui aux ambitions sionistes. Dans ces conditions, comment les relations R.A.U.—Etats-Unis peuvent-elles être empreintes de sérénité ?... La R.A.U. estime que la question d'Israël est une pièce maîtresse dans le jeu compliqué de la politique arabe en Moyen-Orient. Elle estime que sa responsabilité est engagée vis-à-vis d'un million de réfugiés arabes chassés de leurs foyers. Si l'Amérique jette le poids de son influence dans la balance en faveur des Juifs c'est-à-dire d'Israël, comment les Etats arabes et notamment la R.A.U. peuvent-ils qualifier pareille attitude ?...

Faut-il rappeler toutes les étapes de l'appui constant prodigué par les Etats-Unis à Israël ?

Les Etats-Unis n'épargnent aucun effort pour aider financièrement Israël. Avec les fonds qu'il reçoit, Israël achète des armes et se renforce militairement et économiquement. Les événements de l'agression tripartite de 1956 sont encore dans toutes les mémoires. Se sentant suffisamment fort, Israël pensa que le moment était venu de porter par surprise, d'accord avec ses deux alliés, un coup mortel à l'Egypte afin d'imposer sa paix aux Etats arabes, de forcer le libre passage du Canal de Suez, lever le blocus arabe, comme premier pas vers l'hégémonie israélienne longtemps rêvée : un Etat juif s'étendant du Nil à l'Euphrate. Le cours des événements devait, toutefois, lui réserver une amère déception.

Il est dès lors démontré que les Etats-Unis financent généreusement Israël alors qu'ils font preuve de réticence quand il s'agit de secondariser les projets des Arabes. Faut-il revenir sur la question du financement du Haut-Barrage et les conditions draconiennes — y compris un traité de paix avec Israël — posées alors par les Etats-Unis pour nous accorder un prêt d'un montant total de 70 millions de dollars, laquelle offre fut d'ailleurs retirée par la suite ?...

Voici, par contre, quelques chiffres concernant les sommes que l'Amérique verse à Israël. Le don annuel que les Etats-Unis offrent à Israël est de l'ordre de 30 à 50 millions de dollars, l'assistance techni-

que varie entre 6 et 14 millions par an et les fournitures gratuites prélevées sur le surplus des stocks d'approvisionnement sont de l'ordre de 7 millions de dollars. Quant aux capitaux américains investis en Israël ils sont de l'ordre de 314 millions de dollars. En date du 12 juillet 1955 la Bank of America accordait à Israël un emprunt de 20 millions de dollars. Enfin la collecte faite par les Juifs aux Etats-Unis a rapporté quelque 3 milliards de dollars...

Pour en revenir à la question du passage des navires et des marchandises israéliennes à travers le Canal de Suez, il est un point important qu'on ne saurait passer sous silence, à savoir que jusqu'aujourd'hui la R.A.U. n'a conclu avec Israël (en 1949) qu'une armistice, d'ailleurs très précaire, du fait des agressions répétées d'Israël contre nos lignes : Gaza, Sabha et l'agression majeure de 1956, puis plus tard l'attaque contre le village d'El Tawafik en 1960, malgré la présence des troupes de la F.U.N.U. Israël continue donc à être notre ennemi et celui des Arabes et ne cache même pas ses ambitions expansionnistes. Ben Gourion n'a-t-il pas déclaré ouvertement au Knesset qu'il espérait conquérir la presqu'île du Sinai ?... Et les résolutions de l'O.N.U. imposant à Israël la réintégration des Arabes chassés de leurs foyers en Palestine et l'indemnisation de ceux qui ne voudraient pas y retourner, qu'en a-t-on fait ? Rien. Le droit des gens, le droit des peuples sont-ils, par hasard, au seul profit d'Israël ?... On ne peut concevoir pareille aberration.

Le Canal de Suez appartient à la R.A.U. qui a à ses frontières un ennemi retors et rusé qui la guette et avec qui elle est toujours en état de belligérance. Que doit-elle faire dans ces conditions ? Doit-elle laisser cet ennemi importer et exporter à sa guise à travers cette voie d'eau, s'enrichir et s'armer pour, en fin de compte, lui porter un coup mortel ?

Il est intéressant de rappeler à ce sujet les déclarations faites par le Président Nasser à la délégation des journalistes allemands qui l'interrogeait au sujet des deux bateaux l'«Inge Toft» et le «Stipalia», retenus à Port-Saïd parce que transportant des marchandises pour le compte d'Israël.

«Nous avons déjà proclamé, a déclaré le Président, notre attitude au sujet de la navigation à travers le Canal de Suez... Notre détermination à empêcher les navires et les marchandises d'Israël de traverser le Canal n'est pas un des aspects de la liberté de navigation, mais plutôt un des aspects du conflit palestinien. Depuis 1948 à ce jour, les N.U. ont voté plusieurs résolutions concernant la situation prévalant entre les Arabes et Israël. Or, Israël a constamment refusé de faire honneur à ses obligations et d'exécuter n'importe laquelle des dites résolutions

entre autres celle relative au retour des réfugiés arabes dans leur patrie et à leur indemnisation...

«Il s'ensuit donc que nos relations avec Israël sont en partie conditionnées par le problème des réfugiés arabes, tant en ce qui concerne la conclusion de la paix avec Israël qu'en ce qui concerne la liberté de passage pour les Israéliens, etc.»

Israël est pleinement convaincu que la paix avec les Arabes est irréalisable tant qu'existera un leader comme Abdel Nasser. C'est ce qu'a exprimé Moussa Dayan, dans une déclaration faite à l'envoyé de la United Press : «L'espoir, dit-il, d'un accord pour une paix entre les Arabes et Israël qui réglerait la situation au Moyen-Orient restera lointain tant que le Président Nasser continuera à agir sur la scène mondiale».

C'est encore à cause de la question palestinienne et celle des réfugiés arabes qui en est la conséquence, que la R.A.U. a refusé de faire partie des pactes et des alliances malgré la pression exercée par l'Angleterre et l'Amérique. Les hommes qui ont fait la Révolution de 1952 et renversé l'ancien régime corrompu savaient, en effet, à suffisance de preuves, le rôle que ces deux Puissances avaient joué en faveur d'Israël et la mesure dans laquelle elles avaient contribué à la défaite des Arabes, rendant ainsi plus aigu encore le problème des Arabes chassés de leurs foyers et dispersés de par le monde.

C'est également à cause de la question palestinienne que l'Égypte — après le refus des Occidentaux de lui fournir des armes et après l'agression israélienne du 18 Février 1955 contre Gaza qui fit de nombreuses victimes parmi les réfugiés — accéléra le renforcement de son armée et s'empessa de conclure l'achat des armes tchécoslovaques dont elle avait un besoin pressant pour parer à toute nouvelle agression. C'est ce renforcement de l'armée de la R.A.U. par les armes et les méthodes les plus modernes qui inquiète aujourd'hui Israël et le tient en respect...

C'est enfin pour la sauvegarde des intérêts arabes et la dignité de ceux qui les défendent que la R.A.U. a été amenée à rompre ses relations avec le Chah d'Iran, qui à un moment crucial pour les États arabes, reconnaissait solennellement l'État d'Israël et faisait avec lui échange d'ambassadeurs.

Cet aperçu succinct démontre l'importance de la question des réfugiés arabes de Palestine sur la R.A.U. dans le domaine tant intérieur qu'extérieur.

CHAPITRE IV

1 — Le problème des réfugiés et ses incidences sur Israël.

Ce problème des réfugiés arabes a des incidences certaines sur Israël, car ces réfugiés sont la manifestation vivante et douloureuse de la cause palestinienne dont les États arabes ont assumé la charge. C'est donc aux États arabes qu'Israël doit, désormais, faire face et rendre des comptes.

Ces réfugiés disséminés autour d'Israël représentent un cercle effrayant de haine et de désir de vengeance qui l'enserme de toutes parts. C'est pourquoi Israël a pensé sérieusement à se protéger contre les conséquences prévisibles de cet état de choses et dans ce but :

1 — il a fait appel aux grandes puissances impérialistes : Angleterre, France, États-Unis pour qu'elles lui accordent leur protection ; ces Puissances ont publié la fameuse «déclaration tripartite» par laquelle elles se sont engagées à protéger les frontières d'Israël — c'est-à-dire du pays qu'Israël a usurpé — contre toute attaque du dehors ;

2 — il a promulgué la loi du retour qui donne droit à tout Juif de réintégrer Israël et de participer à sa reconstruction, ce qui a eu pour résultat d'ouvrir toutes grandes les portes du pays à une multitude de gens, venus de toutes les parties du monde, pour remplacer les réfugiés arabes et assurer la défense du nouvel État ;

3 — il a eu soin de mettre son économie sur le pied de guerre et a, à cet effet, mobilisé toutes ses possibilités matérielles pour sa défense, de manière à être prêt en cas de conflit ;

4 — il a fait appel aux États-Unis qui, sans hésiter, lui ont fourni une aide matérielle et technique de grande envergure qui lui a permis de faire front au blocus économique arabe.

Pour ce qui a trait à l'immigration juive en Israël, il convient de signaler que les villes et les villages ayant été vidés de leur élément arabe, la situation était propice pour les Juifs qui voulaient fonder un État bien à eux, ayant sa propre philosophie, sa propre langue, sa propre civilisation hébraïque. C'est à cet effet que fut promulguée, en date du 5 Juillet 1950, la «loi du retour» déjà citée (1), qui donnait toutes facilités aux Juifs de se rendre en Palestine ou leur était garantie une vie stable.

Au cours de la période 1919-1949, les Juifs immigrés en Palestine ont atteint quelque 800.000 dont 85% venant d'Europe. Or, sur ce nombre, près de 230.000 sont entrés en Palestine durant la seule période de Mai 1948 à Octobre 1949, c'est-à-dire à la même période qui vit la fuite de près d'un million d'Arabes d'Israël et de la Palestine occupée. Ces chiffres ressortent, d'ailleurs, de l'annuaire officiel d'Israël de l'année 1953-1954.

Ces immigrants juifs arrivaient des camps d'entraînement disséminés un peu partout en Allemagne, en Italie, en Autriche, dans les pays de l'Europe Orientale. Ils étaient pour la plupart de jeunes, ayant rompu toute attache avec leur pays d'origine et disposés, à n'importe quel prix, à reconstruire Israël et à redorer son blason.

Parmi ces immigrants, il y avait des capitalistes qui s'offrirent pour financer les nouvelles industries et des travailleurs qualifiés (47%) qui constituèrent la classe moyenne en Israël. Ces techniciens, par rapport au nombre total d'habitants, représentent une proportion de 1/37, ce qui est un phénomène propre à l'Europe plutôt qu'au Moyen-Orient si l'on songe qu'en Iran, par exemple, il n'y a qu'un médecin par 37.000 habitants.

Mais ces Juifs venus d'Europe et d'Amérique ont apporté avec eux en Israël les us et coutumes et la civilisation du monde qu'ils ont quitté, alors que les Juifs d'Orient sont venus avec les habitudes, les traditions et la manière de vivre des Orientaux. Aussi on a pu voir des Juifs profondément religieux installés à côté de Juifs athées originaires des pays d'Europe. Cet amalgame de peuples différents présentant tant de contrastes ne pouvait que provoquer des malentendus et des différends qui devaient nécessairement faire sentir leurs effets sur la situation interne du pays.

C'est de ces immigrants également qu'ont été formées les bandes subversives de l'Irgoun, Stern, Haganah et les divers partis politiques. Ces partis, malgré les différences de doctrine qui les divisent, sont tous d'accord sur un point : la nécessité d'encourager l'immigration juive en Israël, en dépit de la pénurie alimentaire et la capacité limitée de l'économie du pays. Les dirigeants israéliens n'ont-ils pas déclaré que les fonds qu'ils collectent ne sont pas destinés à améliorer la situation alimentaire du pays, mais à promouvoir l'industrie et l'agriculture et, partant, à consolider l'économie nationale ?

Il ne faut pas oublier que pour Israël l'individu n'existe pas ; c'est

(1) Donald Toff, *International Migrations*, p. 278

l'Etat seul qui compte et c'est au profit de cet Etat que l'individu doit renoncer à ses habitudes, à son bien-être et à son confort acquis dans son pays d'origine pour mener une vie empreinte d'austérité. Il doit, en outre, s'affilier à l'un des partis politiques existants, tels que le «Mapai» qui a 45 sièges au Knesset, le parti du Sionisme Général qui a 20 sièges, le «Mapam», parti de gauche dont les membres, bien que non communistes, sont inbus des principes du communisme... Tous ces partis s'accrochent dans le refus formel de réintégrer les réfugiés arabes en Israël et dans leur ambition d'étendre les frontières d'Israël du Nil à l'Euphrate.

Les dirigeants israéliens eux-mêmes ne cachent pas ces ambitions qui sont affirmées à maintes reprises dans leurs déclarations.

Voici ce que Ben Gourion, Président du Conseil des ministres d'Israël, déclarait en Décembre 1958 :

«Nos dernières victoires militaires ne sont que le prélude à nos objectifs à longue échéance. C'est au peuple à sonner le rappel de ses forces vives afin d'atteindre ces objectifs. Préparez-vous donc pour mettre la dernière main à l'édification de l'Etat d'Israël et pour y amener tous les Juifs de la terre, réalisant ainsi les préceptes de la Torah».

De son côté, Menahem Begin a déclaré :

«Israël en son état actuel ne représente que le 1/5 de ce que doit être le pays de nos pères. Il nous faut donc œuvrer pour libérer les 4/5 restants».

Le danger permanent pour les Arabes, c'est la continuité de l'immigration afin d'amener en Israël tous les Juifs dispersés à travers le monde. Or, comme la situation économique en ce pays ne permet pas d'absorber un si grand nombre d'individus, Israël s'efforce de s'emparer de certains Etats arabes voisins et d'imposer sa paix aux Arabes. C'est à ce prix qu'Israël peut survivre. L'agression de 1956 contre l'Egypte n'est qu'un exemple des intentions expansionnistes que nourrit Israël à l'égard du monde arabe.

II — Les forces militaires d'Israël.

On peut dire que les forces militaires actuelles d'Israël sont en quelque sorte conditionnées par le problème non résolu jusqu'ici des réfugiés arabes de Palestine.

En effet, lorsqu'Israël eut chassé de leurs foyers ces centaines de milliers d'Arabes et refusé de les réintégrer, et qu'il s'empara d'un territoire bien au-delà de ce que lui avait fixé l'O.N.U. Il fut contraint de faire de son peuple un peuple de guerriers, comme l'a, d'ailleurs, avoué le Chef d'Etat-Major de l'armée israélienne à Tel-Aviv en Novembre 1951 :

« Un Etat entouré d'ennemis sur ses frontières, avait-il déclaré, est obligé de créer un peuple guerrier et de considérer tout citoyen, homme ou femme, en état de porter les armes comme un soldat sur le champ de batailles ».

Ben Gourion a déclaré à son tour : « Nous sommes exposés à une lutte violente. Notre devoir est de bien comprendre l'état d'âme de notre adversaire qui est un peuple de même nature que le reste du genre humain. Or, il serait illogique de croire que 30 ou 40 millions d'Arabes puissent accepter d'être réduits à merci par 700.000 Juifs ».

Imbus de ces idées, les dirigeants d'Israël ont mobilisé tous ceux en état de porter les armes de la manière suivante :

1 — Mobilisation des jeunes avant-gardistes c'est-à-dire des jeunes gens qui ont déjà subi un entraînement militaire très poussé dans les camps d'Europe. Leur tâche consiste surtout à garder les frontières et à empêcher l'infiltration des réfugiés arabes ou la pénétration des troupes arabes. Ces formations campent le long de la frontière israélienne limitrophe aux pays arabes.

2 — A part ces formations, il y a l'armée régulière formée de tous les citoyens en état de porter les armes, tant hommes que femmes, avec un régime spécial pour chacun des deux sexes.

3 — Des formations spéciales : la « Gadenah » et la « Nahal » qui font suivre aux femmes entre 15 et 17 ans pour la première et 17 et 19 ans pour la seconde un entraînement militaire, en les familiarisant avec la vie des soldats.

Pour ajouter à l'efficacité de ces forces militaires un « Conseil scientifique » fut créé en 1950, pour étudier les moyens propres à augmenter le potentiel d'Israël dans tous les domaines. Les Juifs pensent que leur victoire sur les Arabes en Palestine est due moins à l'armée israélienne qu'à l'activité de ce Conseil.

Une autre force qui apporte à Israël un appui efficace, c'est le sionisme mondial avec son appareil parfaitement mis au point qui, à travers ses diverses formations : Congrès Mondial Juif, Agence Juive, Caisses nationales juives (Keren Kayemet, Keren Hayssod), a permis la création de l'Etat d'Israël et assure maintenant sa survie.

III — L'Economie d'Israël.

Sur l'économie israélienne également la question des réfugiés ara-

bes a fait sentir ses effets. Les Etats arabes ont établi un blocus économique contre Israël et ont refusé de conclure avec lui, ainsi que l'avait proposé Bernadotte, des traités économiques. De ce fait, Israël a énormément souffert dans son économie, et a été contraint de recourir aux expédients, surtout aux aumônes et aux emprunts de l'étranger (1).

Le blocus économique et l'interdiction par la R.A.U. du passage des marchandises et navires israéliens à travers le Canal de Suez l'ont obligé d'importer de pays éloignés les matières premières nécessaires à son industrie. Par ailleurs, les salaires des ouvriers, par suite du coût exorbitant de la vie en Israël, sont élevés, sans compter que la pénurie de pétrole et des moyens de transport sont autant de difficultés pour Israël de produire à des prix de concurrence.

Pour rompre le blocus qui l'enserme et parer à ses effets dangereux, Israël a employé divers moyens, à savoir :

1 — Il a sollicité l'appui des Etats-Unis qui, répondant à son appel, lui ont accordé une importante subvention lui permettant de récupérer en partie les pertes subies du fait du blocus.

2 — Il a conclu avec l'Allemagne Fédérale le fameux Accord sur les Réparations portant sur 715 millions de dollars, soit l'équivalent de 460 millions de tonnes de marchandises qui sont venues au secours de l'économie israélienne.

3 — Il a conclu des traités de commerce (2) avec certains pays du Moyen-Orient, notamment avec la Turquie qui compte une puissante colonie juive et qui n'a pas de traités avec les pays arabes, sans compter qu'elle est entièrement acquise au camp occidental.

Avec les Etats-Unis, l'Angleterre, la France, la Suisse, la Belgique, la Yougoslavie, la Russie, l'Italie, etc., Israël a également conclu divers traités de commerce, mais sans pour autant atténuer sa crise économique qui est chronique, du fait que ce pays emploie une grande partie de ses revenus dans les armements et que ses exportations sont toujours inférieures à ses importations — d'où une balance commerciale constamment déficitaire. Le président de la Fédération des Industries d'Israël a déclaré à ce propos : « Il ne saurait y avoir de véritable indépendance économique pour Israël sans exportation. Si les exportations n'augmentent pas, il y aura plus de chômage et il sera plus difficile d'absorber

(1) Ligue Arab. Etude sur le commerce exté-leur d'Israël, p. 2-5

(2) B. Lenczowski : The Middle East in World Affairs, p. 345

un plus grand nombre d'immigrants, et partout, nous aurons encore plus besoin d'oboles et d'intervention étrangères.

Enfin avec certains Etats africains et grâce à l'appui des anciennes puissances occupantes, des traités de commerce avantageux ont pu être conclus par Israël, ce qui lui permit de gagner plusieurs dizaines de millions de dollars. Ainsi, en 1960, avec la Fédération du Mali et au l'intervention du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères français, un accord a été conclu, grâce auquel Tel-Aviv a pu ouvrir un consulat israélien à Dakar. Par la suite, en janvier 1961, d'autres accords ont été conclus dans le domaine technique, culturel, agricole, industriel, des communications, de l'aviation, etc...

Pour encourager la pénétration de ses marchandises en Afrique, Israël a créé des lignes de navigation avec l'Afrique Orientale et Occidentale, dont la ligne de l'«Etoile Noire». Avec l'Ethiopie, le Congo, le Mozambique, l'Afrique du Sud, des accords ont été également conclus.

Pour en revenir aux Etats-Unis, signalons qu'ils ont fourni à Israël en fait de dons et d'emprunts plus que tout ce qui a été accordé à l'ensemble des Etats arabes. Voici quelques chiffres éloquentes : Pour la période de 1945 à 1955, les Etats-Unis ont accordé à titre d'assistance (1) :

à l'Egypte	: 30 millions de dollars
à la Jordanie	: 25 »
à Israël	: 370 »

De l'Import and Export Bank, deux pays arabes — l'Egypte et l'Arabie Saoudite — ont obtenu à titre d'aide 47 millions de dollars au total, alors qu'Israël en a reçu 135 millions.

Quoiqu'il en soit, un fait est certain, c'est que l'économie israélienne aurait été plus équilibrée si Israël avait pu écouler ses produits dans les pays arabes voisins. Le problème des réfugiés arabes et toute la question palestinienne étant encore jusqu'aujourd'hui sans solution, le blocus demeure, causant en grande partie les crises économiques qui secouent Israël.

IV — Les frontières actuelles d'Israël.

Comme conséquence de la guerre de Palestine et de la reprise des hostilités après le premier armistice, les Juifs s'emparèrent de nombreux

(1) The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 1, Mar. 1959 p. 12

ses régions habitées par les Arabes et chassèrent ceux-ci de leurs foyers après les avoir dépouillés. C'est ainsi qu'ils s'installèrent à El Lod et à El Ramleh, deux villes paisibles soumise par la terreur et qu'ils y perpétrèrent toutes sortes d'atrocités, ce qui obligea les habitants à fuir précipitamment dans les pays arabes voisins. Par la suite, les troupes irakiennes évacuèrent Ras El Ein et Marj Ben Amer, et l'armée de la libération arabe quitta la partie Nord-Ouest et la partie centrale de la Galilée, ce qui permit aux Juifs de s'emparer de Safad et de Nazareth. Puis les Juifs envahirent le Néguev, à l'exception de la région de Gaza et de Khan Younés, et occupèrent la partie située autour du Golfe d'Akaba, du côté du Néguev, empêchant ainsi tout contact terrestre entre les forces égyptiennes et jordaniennes. Poursuivant leur avance, les Juifs s'emparèrent de la partie sise hors du mur de Jérusalem et de la plupart des villes et villages de la Galilée. Aux Arabes, il ne resta que 1/5 seulement de la superficie de la Palestine, les autres 4/5 ayant été occupés par les Juifs qui spolièrent les Arabes de leurs propriétés. L'Etat d'Israël ayant été constitué avec les dépouilles des Arabes de Palestine, ses frontières actuelles sont intimement liées au problème des réfugiés arabes.

Par ailleurs, il convient de signaler que le tracé de la ligne d'armistice a été imposé de façon arbitraire aux Arabes (il s'agissait de faire vite pour mettre fin aux combats), aussi les Juifs ne se font pas faute de la violer. Le no man's land dans certains endroits est tellement étroit que l'on peut facilement voir du côté arabe ce qui se passe dans les maisons juives de l'autre côté du fil barbelé étendu entre les deux zones. Tout au long de la route Jérusalem-Bethléem, on peut voir la ligne de chemin de fer juive traverser les villages arabes. A Jérusalem dans le secteur arabe, les Juifs possèdent la Hadassa et l'Université Hébraïque et l'on peut voir chaque semaine une caravane juive traverser le centre arabe de la ville, en passant par la fameuse porte de Mandelbaum, pour aller ravitailler ces deux Institutions juives.

En ce qui concerne les incidents de frontières qui se produisent continuellement entre Arabes et Juifs, il va sans dire que les Juifs sont coutumiers de cette violation des lignes d'armistice et des conditions fixées pour l'arrêt des hostilités. On n'a pas oublié l'incident provoqué par l'infiltration des soldats israéliens dans le secteur arabe de Jérusalem du côté de l'Université Hébraïque et de la Hadassa. Ayant été surpris par une patrouille jordannienne, ils furent trouvés porteurs de 1000 cartouches de fusil Stern, de 12 obus de mortier, de 24 grenades à main, de capsules pour faire sauter les mines. A la suite d'une courte

escarmouche avec les Jordaniens, les soldats israéliens abandonnèrent leur chargement et prirent la fuite.

De même, en date du 4 Juin 1952, lors du passage de la caravane israélienne vers l'Université Hébraïque et la Hadassa sous le contrôle de la Commission d'Armistice, on s'aperçut que les barils, qui normalement devaient contenir les vivres destinés aux Juifs de la Hadassa, étaient remplis de matières explosives. Ayant été surpris en flagrant délit, les soldats israéliens attaquèrent le siège de la Commission d'Armistice et emportèrent par la force les barils saisis. Ce fut là une preuve de plus de l'intention arrêtée d'Israël de transformer les sudsits établissements juifs en une forteresse israélienne sur le Mont des Oliviers qui domine toute la partie arabe de Jérusalem.

Des statistiques établies, il ressort qu'entre 1949 et 1954, les forces israéliennes ont violé la frontière jordanienne 357 fois, ce qui a amené naturellement plusieurs ripostes de la part des forces jordanienues.

Des incidents de frontières, très nombreux, ont également eu lieu entre les troupes israéliennes et les patrouilles des autres pays arabes voisins. On se rappelle la fameuse attaque du 12 Décembre 1955 contre la Syrie, qui fit 50 morts et un grand nombre de blessés.

Contre l'Egypte également, de nombreuses agressions israéliennes furent perpétrées. On peut citer la grande attaque contre Gaza en 1955 qui fit 38 morts et 31 blessés arabes. Le 31 Août de la même année, ce fut l'attaque contre Khan Younés qui fit quelque 40 victimes entre tués et blessés parmi les réfugiés arabes.

Ces agressions avaient, entre autres mobiles, celui de pouvoir imposer par la force la paix aux Arabes. C'est d'ailleurs ce que Mr. Edon a souligné dans ses mémoires en parlant de l'attaque contre Suez. L'idée d'Israël était d'arriver à obliger les pays arabes à absorber et à intégrer dans leur économie les centaines de milliers de réfugiés palestiniens se trouvant chez eux afin de mettre fin, une fois pour toutes, à la tension qui sévit dans cette partie du monde et qui, tout en menaçant les intérêts de l'Occident, ouvre la voie au communisme.

Israël, a en outre, recouru aux attaques frontalières pour créer des incidents et retenir ainsi l'attention des Occidentaux, ses protecteurs, qui pensent que cet Etat facitice est, en Moyen-Orient, la sentinelle avancée qui mène le bon combat pour sauvegarder leurs intérêts.

CHAPITRE V

I — Le problème des réfugiés arabes et ses incidences sur les deux blocs Est et Ouest.

Les liens de sang, et de la race ont été le facteur déterminant qui a amené les Etats arabes à se dresser en masse pour défendre la cause de la Palestine et adopter sans hésitation le problème des réfugiés arabes comme étant le leur. Ils n'oublient pas non plus qu'Israël les menace tous.

Leur politique vis-à-vis des deux blocs Est et Ouest s'en est ressentie et c'est surtout à la lumière de l'attitude de chacun des deux blocs à l'égard de la question palestinienne et de celle des réfugiés que les Arabes ont apporté les correctifs nécessaires à leur ligne de conduite dans le domaine des relations internationales.

Que le Moyen-Orient intéresse grandement tant les pays du bloc oriental que ceux de l'Ouest, la chose ne fait aucun doute. Car il y a les intérêts stratégiques, les intérêts pétroliers et autres.

Entre le bloc de l'Est et Israël, un certain doute a toujours plané sur leurs relations, du fait que la Russie n'a jamais cessé de considérer Israël comme la créature de l'impérialisme anglais et américain en Moyen-Orient. Ce doute devint une certitude et les relations avec Israël commencèrent à se détériorer à la suite du succès du parti de Ben Gourion aux élections israéliennes. A cette époque-là, la Russie accusa ouvertement Ben Gourion d'être l'agent de l'Occident et exprima sa conviction que l'aide américaine accordée à Israël n'était qu'un moyen détourné pour établir en ce pays des bases stratégiques dirigées contre elle. Elle prit alors position contre Israël et interdit l'émigration vers ce pays des Juifs vivant sur son territoire et dans les autres Etats du bloc de l'Est.

Les protestations et les contre-protestations qui se succédèrent entre la Russie et Israël aboutirent à la rupture des relations diplomatiques entre les deux pays.

Telle a été en résumé l'attitude de la Russie vis-à-vis d'Israël, attitude faite tantôt d'appui et tantôt d'hostilité suivant les implications de la politique russe en Moyen-Orient et les rapports de la Russie avec les puissances occidentales.

Pour ce qui est des rapports du camp occidental avec Israël, voici

comment les choses se présentent. On connaît, à suffisance de preuves, la publication de la Déclaration Balfour, comment, à travers le mandat sur la Palestine que lui avait été confié, l'Angleterre a assuré la création de l'Etat d'Israël. Les Juifs n'avaient-ils pas déclaré que la création de l'Etat d'Israël ne pourrait que servir les intérêts anglais en Palestine ?

Quant aux Etats-Unis, on ne peut s'empêcher de penser que ce sont eux qui ont fortement appuyé Israël dans la question du partage de la Palestine et dans la proclamation de la reconnaissance de l'Etat d'Israël (1). Ce sont eux qui ont assuré sa survie par les dons et les subventions de toutes sortes qu'ils lui ont largement prodigués.

Par ailleurs, le bloc occidental voit dans l'armée israélienne une force importante sur laquelle il peut compter dans ce coin névralgique du Moyen-Orient et dans la position géographique d'Israël, un point stratégique fort utile : voisinage du Canal de Suez, existence d'aérodromes pouvant servir, en cas de besoin, à atteindre et ravitailler la Turquie et l'Iran et éventuellement être utilisés comme points d'appui pour une offensive contre la Russie (surtout si des bases atomiques y sont établies), voie de communication rapide avec le Nord et l'Est de l'Afrique etc... Il est vrai que du fait de son appui à Israël, l'Occident a beaucoup perdu du côté des Arabes et affaibli sa position dans les pays arabes. Malgré cela, cet appui continue sans que l'Occident se rende compte que chaque jour qui passe amène avec lui de nouvelles pertes.

Conséquemment à la question palestinienne et au drame latent des réfugiés, les Etats arabes ont ouvert les yeux sur cette vérité qu'il leur faut à tout prix, pour rester libres et maîtres de leurs destinées, combattre l'impérialisme et le communisme qui représente un autre danger. Quant à Israël il se rend parfaitement compte qu'il n'y aura jamais de paix avec les Arabes tant que les résolutions de l'O.N.U. concernant les réfugiés de Palestine n'auront pas été mises à exécution et que ceux-ci n'auront pas récupéré leurs justes droits.

(1) I. Spector The Soviet Union and Muslim World, p. 140

LIVRE III LES MOYENS DE RESOUDRE LE PROBLEME DES REFUGIES

1 — L'O.N.U.

Depuis que le problème des réfugiés arabes de Palestine a été posé, le Moyen-Orient a été considéré comme un point névralgique de tension politique. Pour essayer de parer aux effets néfastes qu'implique ce problème quatre organisations internationales œuvrent sans répit : la Commission de conciliation, la Commission de l'armistice, l'UNRWA et la FUNU (police internationale).

Lorsqu'à l'O.N.U. fut débattue la question des réfugiés arabes quatre tendances (1) se sont manifestées : la première est celle des pays ennemis du communisme, qui ont des intérêts en Moyen-Orient et à qui il importe d'en finir avec ce problème au plus tôt; la deuxième est celle des réfugiés eux-mêmes qui sont décidés à réintégrer leur patrie coûte que coûte; la troisième est représentée par Israël qui set d'accord avec les pays Occidentaux pour ramener rapidement la paix en Moyen-Orient, mais sans rien sacrifier; la quatrième est représentée par le bloc de l'Est hostile au camp occidental et qui cherche, à travers le problème des réfugiés, à porter atteinte aux puissances de ce camp.

A la Commission de conciliation, il est apparu dès le début que la pierre d'achoppement était la question du retour et du rélogement des réfugiés, malgré la résolution adoptée à la 3e Session de l'O.N.U. en date du 11 Décembre 1948 sub. No. 194. Cette résolution disposait notamment : «Il a été considéré comme indispensable de permettre à ceux des réfugiés qui le voudront de réintégrer leurs foyers dans le plus bref délai pour vivre en paix avec leurs voisins. Des indemnités devront, par ailleurs, être versées pour les biens de ceux qui ne voudront pas retourner chez eux».

A cette Commission de Conciliation, l'O.N.U. avait fixé la mission suivante :

1 — Oeuvrer en vue de faciliter la réintégration des réfugiés dans leurs

(1) The Economist 29-10-49, p. 953

foyers, leur réinstallation et le versement des indemnités adéquates.

2 — Prendre les dispositions nécessaires afin de développer l'économie de la région et s'attendre à cet effet avec les Etats intéressés.

3 — Mettre sur pied un régime international permanent en ce qui concerne les Lieux-Saints et fournir des garanties suffisantes pour que soient assurés la protection des Lieux-Saints et l'accès à ces Lieux.

Pour mener à bien sa tâche, la Commission tint trois conférences : celle de Beyrouth du 21 Mars au 5 Avril 1949, celle de Lausanne du 9 Avril au 8 Juin 1949, celle de Paris du 9 Juin au 15 Septembre 1949.

Des rapports furent ensuite présentés par la Commission.

Dans le premier de ces rapports, la Commission relate les tentatives faites en vue d'amener les divers Etats intéressés à entrer en négociations directes pour trouver une solution définitive au conflit.

Dans le second rapport, relatif à la Conférence de Beyrouth, la Commission relève ce qui suit :

- A) Les Arabes demandèrent : que la question des réfugiés figurât en tête de l'ordre du jour de la conférence, et que l'on s'assurât d'abord qu'Israël est bien disposé à acquiescer aux décisions qui seraient prises par la Commission à cet effet.
- B) Les Arabes déclarèrent que la minorité arabe en Israël ne jouit ni de la sécurité ni des droits des minorités prévus par la loi sur le partage de la Palestine.
- C) Les Arabes signalèrent qu'Israël a gelé les avoirs des Arabes et a disposé de leurs propriétés.
- D) Les Arabes acceptèrent l'internationalisation de Jérusalem à la condition que l'ONU. prit l'engagement d'en maintenir le statut.

Les délégués arabes à cette Conférence demandèrent à la Commission d'entrer en contact avec Israël afin de connaître son opinion quant à ces divers points.

A la Commission qui s'était rendue en Israël à cet effet, Ben Gourion déclara, en date du 7 Avril 1949, ce qui suit : « Le retour des réfugiés est impossible parce qu'ils ne pourront pas vivre en paix avec nous ». Puis il expliqua que le problème des réfugiés ne saurait être traité séparément, mais doit faire partie de son contexte général dans des négociations.

tions de paix embrassant le conflit palestinien dans son ensemble. Quant à la question de l'internationalisation, Ben Gourion déclara qu'Israël accepterait l'internationalisation des Lieux-Saints seulement, mais pas celle de Jérusalem.

Dans son troisième rapport relatif à la Conférence de Lausanne, la Commission reconnaît avoir échoué dans sa tentative d'amener les parties adverses à entrer en négociations directes entre elles et d'obtenir l'acquiescement d'Israël à la réintégration des réfugiés arabes dans leurs foyers ou celui des Arabes pour l'installation permanente des réfugiés sur leur territoire.

Le quatrième rapport se rapportait à la Conférence de Paris au cours de laquelle furent discutées notamment les questions suivantes :

- A) Proposition faite par la Commission aux termes de laquelle les deux parties, Israël et les Arabes, renonceraient mutuellement à demander réparations pour les dégâts subis du fait de la guerre de Palestine.
- B) Acceptation par Israël d'indemniser ceux des réfugiés qui ne voudraient pas retourner dans leurs foyers en base des estimations établies par la Commission.
- C) Acceptation par Israël de réintégrer un nombre limité de réfugiés etc...

Bien que la Commission eut échoué dans sa tâche consistant à mener à bonne fin l'ordre du jour établi pour chacune des trois Conférences, il n'en resta pas moins qu'un léger progrès fut réalisé. Ainsi la Commission a pu obtenir : 1) le retour en territoire israélien de certains membres dispersés des familles vivant en Israël ; 2) le déblocage par Israël des avoirs arabes détenus dans les banques israéliennes et la remise de ces fonds à leurs propriétaires.

Par ailleurs, la Commission prit la décision de mander la Mission Clapp en Moyen-Orient afin d'y étudier les conditions économiques qui y prévalent et chercher à les développer.

Enfin **last but not least**, la Commission a dévoilé au grand jour le véritable pensée d'Israël, à savoir :

- 1 — Israël nie absolument avoir provoqué le problème des réfugiés arabes.
- 2 — Il soutient que la solution de ce problème est de les réinstaller ailleurs qu'en Israël.

3 — Il déclare être disposé à indemniser les réfugiés à la condition qu'ils ne recourent pas en Israël.

Les mêmes résultats obtenus par la Commission dans la tâche qui lui avait été confiée devaient amener certains Etats ayant à leur tête la Russie, à demander la suppression de cette Commission. La Russie, notamment, accusait cette Commission d'avoir été constituée dans l'unique but d'exécuter les ordres de Washington, et que c'était pour cette raison qu'elle a été incapable de servir la cause de la paix en Moyen-Orient ou d'apporter une solution quelconque au problème palestinien.

Par contre, les Etats-Unis, l'Angleterre, la France, le Chili et la Bolivie se sont élevés contre ces accusations et déclaré que l'O.N.U. ne pouvait jamais accomplir sa mission en Palestine si elle n'était pas représentée sur place par cette Commission.

Les Arabes, de leur côté, accusèrent la Commission de partialité en faveur d'Israël, surtout que parmi ses membres il y avait le délégué des Etats-Unis qui ont créé Israël. Ils accusèrent aussi Israël de boycotter les décisions de la Commission qui ne cadrent pas avec sa politique, visant en premier lieu, ainsi qu'on l'a vu, à refuser énergiquement de réintégrer les réfugiés dans leurs foyers.

Parmi les grands projets établis par l'UNRWA on peut citer celui du Sinai, ceux de Jordanie etc. Il s'agit là de projets de longue haleine, sans compter les petits projets individuels qui visent à permettre au réfugié de gagner sa vie et qui consistent, par exemple, à leur donner un lopin de terre et quelques moutons ou bien à leur ouvrir un magasin de commerce. Mais ces projets ne profitent qu'à un petit nombre de réfugiés.

L'O.N.U. s'est bien rendu compte que les réfugiés veulent et cherchent du travail, mais le gros du problème est qu'il n'y a pas de travaux qui puissent les occuper, surtout dans les régions pauvres, telles que la Jordanie et Gaza. On a pu tout de même procurer un travail non permanent à quelque 35.000 réfugiés et l'UNRWA en emploie près de 6.000. Mais tout cela ne représente que peu de choses par rapport à l'ampleur du problème.

Par ailleurs, l'UNRWA a bien précisé que les projets économiques qu'elle met sur pied ne sauraient en rien porter atteinte aux droits des réfugiés et que puisque ceux-ci cherchent du travail, ces projets sont le meilleur moyen pour leur en procurer. Cette solution a, toutefois, ses partisans et ses détracteurs.

Aussi, au cours de la réunion de la Commission politique de l'O.N.U., le délégué américain commentant les projets proposés, déclara qu'ils offrent, pour un grand nombre de réfugiés, une occasion d'améliorer leur niveau de vie et d'assurer la stabilité à quelque 150.000 familles, sans compter que les grands projets profiteront également aux Etats arabes hébergeant les réfugiés. Au délégué américain, El Choukairi répondit (1) : « Le développement économique de nos pays en de notre propre ressort et ne relève de personne autre que nous. Ce développement, toutefois, est une chose et le droit des réfugiés à retourner dans leurs foyers en est une autre. Mon pays pourra accepter le projet Johnston, comme il pourra le refuser, mais dans l'un comme dans l'autre cas la question des réfugiés devra demeurer indépendante et conserver son propre cachet ».

Il est certes impensable pour les Arabes que les projets en question aboutissent à l'installation permanente des réfugiés dans les pays qui les hébergent et leur incorporation à l'économie nationale, de sorte que leurs droits, tels que solennellement reconnus par l'O.N.U., seront finalement perdus et leur cause enterrée.

Mais ce qui est en tout cas certain, c'est que de jour en jour, la pression devient plus forte pour amener l'UNRWA à liquider ses activités et à transférer la charge qui lui a été confiée aux divers Etats arabes qui ont donné asile aux réfugiés. Or, à cette tendance, les pays arabes sont fortement opposés, car ils ont l'impression qu'une fois que les travaux des secours aux réfugiés leur seront transférés, les donations et les subventions iront en s'amenuisant et que ce sont eux qui finalement supporteront la charge très lourde de l'entretien des réfugiés. Ils considèrent aussi cette autre éventualité qu'au cas où l'O.N.U. continuerait à verser les fonds des secours entre leurs mains, ils seraient obligés d'accepter les projets de la dite Organisation pour le relasement des réfugiés dans leur territoire sous peine de se voir privés des fonds en question.

L'UNRWA, pour sa part, a pris ses dispositions pour diminuer ses charges. C'est ainsi qu'en 1954, sous prétexte que certains réfugiés étaient inscrits dans plus d'un centre et qu'ils déclaraient les naissances survenues, mais rarement leurs morts, quelque 45.000 noms de réfugiés furent supprimés en 1954 sur les registres des secours et près de 55.000 l'année suivante. C'est là une mesure arbitraire, étant donné que l'UNRWA a considéré les réfugiés qui ne résidaient pas dans les campements comme n'ayant pas droit aux secours car, dit-elle, ou ils sont

(1) C. Bagleton - Annual Rev. of U.N. Affairs 1955-56, P. 75

morts ou bien ils ont trouvé ailleurs un travail rémunéré qui les dispense des secours. La vérité est qu'un certain nombre de réfugiés quittent leur campement momentanément pour s'adonner, dans d'autres régions, à certains travaux saisonniers qui leur procurent quelques revenus de fonds, comme aussi il en est qui, fuyant les rigueurs de l'hiver — en Jordanie par exemple — s'en vont vers des régions plus élémentes, telles que Jéricho. Il s'ensuit donc que les statistiques établies dans ces conditions par l'UNRWA sont loin d'être exactes.

Par ailleurs, cet organisme, toujours dans le but de réduire ses charges, a établi un barème pour supprimer tout ou partie des secours accordés d'après l'importance des rentrées du réfugié. Ainsi au réfugié dont le revenu mensuel est de 75 à 99 Livres Syriennes, il est supprimé 4 unités et la totalité des secours est supprimé pour celui dont le revenu est de 125 L.S. et au-delà. Ce barème s'applique tout aussi bien aux réfugiés vivant dans les campements qu'à ceux qui vivent dans les villes. Le but de l'UNRWA, en ce faisant, est de pouvoir graduellement se désintéresser du réfugié qui devra ainsi s'arranger pour se suffire à lui-même. Le seul droit qu'il aura conservé est celui relatif au retour dans ses foyers et à l'indemnité.

Un autre projet de l'UNRWA pour amener les réfugiés à desserrer leur étreinte autour d'Israël, consistait à les faire émigrer pour qu'ils gagnent, sous d'autres cieux, leur pain quotidien et cessent ainsi de s'occuper de la cause palestinienne. C'est ainsi que des plans avaient été établis pour l'émigration de 100.000 réfugiés de Gaza et de 40.000 du Liban vers l'Irak, le Nord de la Syrie, la Libye, etc. A ce projet, les réfugiés se montrèrent récalcitrants, mais l'Amérique l'appuya et pour lui donner un commencement d'exécution, accepta de recevoir 2000 réfugiés. D'autres accords furent de même établis notamment avec l'Australie, le Canada, le Brésil. Avec la Libye, l'accord prévoyait l'immigration en ce pays de 2000 familles de réfugiés pour y séjourner et travailler. En contrepartie, le gouvernement libyen recevait une somme de 2.500.000 dollars à la condition qu'il s'engageât à garantir un travail à ces réfugiés. Jusqu'en 1955, 175 familles avaient immigré en Libye. Quant aux autres pays arabes, ils veulent bien contribuer à procurer, en l'état actuel des choses, aide et soulagement aux malheureux réfugiés — la R.A.U. l'a déjà fait dans le secteur de Gaza — mais ils ne pourraient en toute équité procurer du travail et faire profiter ces réfugiés des grands projets modernes entrepris ou à entreprendre, tels que ceux de la R.A.U. et de la Jordanie, et priver leurs nationaux, dont le nombre est en constante augmentation, de leur gagne-pain.

80

Quoi qu'il en soit, les Etats arabes ont fait l'andré expérience des agissements de l'O.N.U. en ce qui concerne la cause palestinienne. Ils sont donc excusables de vouloir quelque suspicion à son endroit.

Faut-il rappeler toutes les étapes par lesquelles a passé la double Déclaration Balfour, guerre de Palestine, perte des biens des Arabes, prises à l'O.N.U. à l'émigration de l'Occident et des Etats-Unis favorables à Israël, n'ont-elles pas été entachées de partialité flagrante en faveur de cet Etat artificiel ? Faut-il rappeler la décision du Président Truman approuvant l'immigration en Palestine, indépendamment au partage, de 100.000 Juifs ? Faut-il souligner, une fois encore, la carence de l'O.N.U. à faire respecter ses décisions relatives à la réintégration et à l'indemnisation des réfugiés ? Nous avons déjà vu de quelle façon l'UNRWA cherche à en finir avec le problème palestinien et celui des réfugiés en reclassant ces derniers dans les pays arabes qui leur ont donné asile. Au sein même de l'UNRWA, on peut constater la discrimination entre les postes confiés aux fonctionnaires étrangers et ceux de leurs collègues arabes et aussi l'écart énorme entre les émoluments que touchent les uns et les autres.

En ce qui concerne les secours distribués aux réfugiés arabes, il a été constaté qu'ils ne représentent que les 60% de leurs besoins essentiels en fait de nourriture et autre, alors que pour les réfugiés coréens, par exemple, des sommes beaucoup plus importantes per capita sont allouées...

Un fait est malheureusement certain, c'est que par suite de ces agissements, les réfugiés arabes et les Etats qui leur donnent asile ont fini par perdre confiance en l'O.N.U., en ses projets et en sa capacité de faire respecter ses décisions relatives à la Palestine. Dans ces conditions, peut-on sincèrement en vouloir aux Arabes d'avoir aujourd'hui la conviction qu'ils doivent compter sur eux-mêmes et prendre, dans le domaine économique et militaire, les mesures adéquates à cet effet ?

II — La solution du problème des réfugiés

telle que l'envisagent Israël et les Etats arabes.

Israël estime que ce sont les Etats arabes qui ont provoqué le problème des réfugiés arabes (1), que le retour de ceux-ci en territoire

(1) Trygve Lie : In the cause of peace, P. 103-104

81

israélien est impossible et que les pays arabes sont tous désignés pour leur installation permanente.

Israël rappelle à ce propos le communiqué publié par la Ligue Arabe en date du 17 Décembre 1947 à la suite de la réunion tenue au Caire et par lequel la Ligue déplorait le partage proposé et déclarait que les Etats arabes prendront toutes les dispositions adéquates en vue d'empêcher, par la force si nécessaire, la mise à exécution de la décision inique prise par l'O.N.U., et de sauvegarder en Terre Sainte les normes de la justice et de l'égalité. Israël rappelle qu'à la date du 18 Octobre 1947, la Commission militaire de la Ligue Arabe réunie à Damas avait pris, conséquemment à la décision de l'Angleterre de se retirer de Palestine, des résolutions recommandant :

- a) que soit hâté l'entraînement des volontaires et leur armement ;
- b) que les Etats arabes massent leurs armées régulières à la frontière palestinienne ;
- c) que soit fourni aux Arabes de Palestine un minimum de 10.000 fusils, des mitrailleuses, des grenades à main, de matières explosives etc. ;
- d) que soit mis à la disposition de la Commission militaire un minimum d'un million de dinars pour financer les forces palestiniennes, etc...

Enfin Israël fait état de la proclamation publiée par les gouvernements arabes en date du 15 Mars 1948, lors de la mise en marche des armées arabes, et par laquelle ces Etats déclaraient :

« Les gouvernements des Etats arabes considèrent qu'ils sont contraints d'intervenir en Palestine simplement pour aider ses habitants à rétablir la paix et la sécurité ainsi que le règne de la justice et de la loi en leur pays — et empêcher que le sang ne soit répandu ».

Si les Arabes ont quitté la Palestine, dit encore Israël, c'est pour répondre à l'appel de leurs chefs qui voulaient avoir accès libre en territoire palestinien afin de rejeter les Juifs à la mer.

A toutes ces assertions, les Arabes répondent que la faute revient avant tout à Israël et aux Etats étrangers qui lui ont prodigué leur appui.

En fait, les germes du conflit palestinien remontent à des dizaines

d'années (la Déclaration Balfour) et ce conflit a été le fruit des efforts déployés par les Juifs, avec l'appui de l'Angleterre, de l'Amérique et des Nations Unies, en vue de créer leur Foyer national en Palestine arabe.

A ce propos, les Arabes rappellent :

- 1 — Que depuis l'aube du mouvement sioniste en 1881 (1) les chefs de ce mouvement ont déclaré ouvertement :

« La Palestine doit devenir la patrie du peuple juif. La population arabe de Palestine peut être transférée en pays arabes voisins qui sont vastes et peu peuplés ». Rappelons à nouveau ce que, depuis plus d'un demi-siècle, Israël Zangwill avait dit à ce propos : « La Palestine est une patrie sans peuple, il faut qu'elle soit donnée au peuple sans patrie. Le devoir des Juifs à l'avenir est d'être nettement hostiles sans patrie. Palestine afin de les obliger à s'en aller ».

- 2 — Que la politique d'Israël a toujours eu pour objectif de créer un Etat israélien s'étendant du Nil à l'Euphrate et l'expression « Foyer national juif » insérée dans la Déclaration Balfour, a été abusivement interprétée comme signifiant « Etat juif ». C'est pour y parvenir que les portes de la Palestine furent ouvertes toutes grandes à l'immigration juive, que l'Angleterre et l'Amérique ont magistralement manœuvré afin que soit reconnu l'Etat d'Israël au moment même où les bandes Stern et Irgoun faisaient régner la terreur sur la population arabe obligée de fuir et de s'expatrier.

- 3 — Que l'agression israélienne est antérieure à l'entrée des troupes arabes en Palestine — agression qui s'était traduite notamment par le massacre de Deir Yassine qui précipita la fuite de la population arabe si bien que vers le mi-Mai 1948, il y avait déjà 250.000 réfugiés arabes ayant fui le territoire palestinien.

Pour donner une idée de ce que fut ce carnage, il suffit de citer ce qu'ont écrit à ce sujet les Juifs eux-mêmes. Voici par exemple ce que Menahem Begin souligne dans son livre « La Révolte » : « Les Arabes ont commencé à fuir, pris de panique, même avant d'être entrés en contact avec les forces juives (1) ». Celles-ci pénétrèrent dans la région de Haïfa « comme un couteau dans du beurre ». Les Arabes fuyaient éperdus en criant : « Deir Yassine ! Deir Yassine ! » si bien qu'à Safad au Nord de la Palestine après 6 heures il n'y avait plus un seul de ses 14.000 habitants ».

(1) Ligue Arabe: Log Réfugiés Palestiniens - Données et statistiques, P. 7

Voici, par ailleurs, ce que Glubb Pacha, qui n'avait pas cessé de blâmer les dirigeants arabes, a été obligé de reconnaître : « Les Israéliens ont, avant et après le mandat, profité de toutes les occasions possibles pour se débarrasser des Arabes qui étaient restés dans les régions données à Israël... Par la suite, au cours du conflit armé, les Juifs occupèrent nombre de villes et de villages arabes faisant partie de la région attribuée aux Arabes en base du projet de partage. Dans beaucoup de cas, la population civile fut chassée par les soldats israéliens ou bien il lui fut accordé une demi-heure pour quitter ses foyers. Dans certains cas, les Israéliens s'étaient emparé de tous les moyens de transport de sorte que les habitants furent obligés d'abandonner leur mobilier, leurs biens, leurs maisons ».

Dire que les Arabes de Palestine ont éniégué uniquement à l'infatigation de leurs leaders est une insulte à la vérité. Ainsi que nous l'avons déjà signalé avant le début du conflit armé, quelque 250.000 Arabes avaient fui devant les atrocités des bandes Stern, Irgoun, Zvai Louni. Si les armées arabes sont entrées en Palestine, c'est justement pour sauver ceux de leurs frères restés en Palestine d'un anéantissement certain.

Il est donc de toute évidence que la responsabilité du problème des réfugiés arabes retombe sur Israël seul solidement avec ses alliés impérialistes. Le rapt de la Palestine, ainsi que nous l'avons vu, était déjà en gestation des dizaines d'années avant le conflit palestinien en offrit une occasion propice aux Sionistes de réaliser leurs ambitions se débarrassant de l'élément arabe pour faire place à leurs coreligionnaires des quatre coins du monde.

Nous traiterons, dans les pages suivantes, des points de vue des Arabes et d'Israël en ce qui concerne la réintégration des réfugiés, les indemnités et les propriétés arabes confisquées.

III — Les réfugiés et leur retour dans leurs foyers.

Sous la pression de l'ONU, et de diverses organisations internationales, Israël finit par accepter le retour des réfugiés, mais sous certaines conditions dont l'annexion de Gaza, l'échange de populations et le rassemblement des familles dispersées. Mais il devait en fin de compte revenir sur sa décision et refuser catégoriquement de réintégrer les réfugiés. Ce qui est encore plus déconcertant, c'est qu'Israël se

(1) A. Lilienthal: *There Goes the Middle East*, p. 33

prévalait de la décision même de l'ONU, pour refuser la réintégration des réfugiés en prétendant que « la résolution demande la réintégration des réfugiés, portant en eux la haine et l'esprit de vengeance et il n'est pas logique dans ces conditions, qu'ils puissent demeurer calmes et vivre paisiblement ».

A l'ONU, le délégué israélien, Abba Eban, essaya de démontre la haine des Arabes pour Israël en citant certaines déclarations du Président du Conseil de Syrie qui avait dit notamment : « Israël est l'ennemi déclaré de la Syrie et nous ne serons jamais tranquilles tant que cet ennemi occupera les Lieux-Saints au centre du monde arabe », et Abba Eban d'ajouter : « Peut-on après cela logiquement croire qu'Israël acceptera la réintégration des Arabes en terre d'Israël ? ».

Lors d'une visite de Mr. Labrousse, directeur de l'UNRWA, aux campements des réfugiés (1), il eut l'occasion d'entrer en contact avec les responsables juifs qui lui manifestèrent leur crainte du fait du retour des réfugiés qu'il d'après eux, ne pouvaient constituer qu'une cinquième colonne fort dangereuse pour la sécurité d'Israël.

Par ailleurs, Israël refuse la réintégration des Arabes pour éviter, dit-il, la présence sur son territoire de deux groupes ethniques tellement dissimilaires quant à la religion, la langue, la culture et les traditions; sans compter qu'en Israël les plans tracés tendent à établir une civilisation de caractère hébraïque dans une société hébraïque et que dans ces conditions la présence d'un élément arabe ne saurait se concilier avec cet objectif...

Enfin Israël prétend que du fait de la destruction des villes et des villages au cours du conflit armé en Palestine, il n'est plus de maisons disponibles pour y loger les réfugiés arabes. Certains quartiers trop alimés ou trop vétustes ont été rasés au sol dans un but d'assainissement et d'urbanisme, alors que dans d'autres les quelques maisons encore habitables ont été cédées aux immigrants juifs sans abri.

Ces prétextes inconsistants provoquèrent des réactions même parmi ceux qui soutenaient Israël. C'est ainsi que l'Amérique menaça Israël de modifier sa politique à son endroit et, en Mai 1947, le Président Truman adressa au gouvernement israélien une note énergique par laquelle il lui demandait d'admettre la réintégration de 200.000 réfugiés. A cette note, Ben Gourion répondit que tant que la paix n'était pas

(1) Fisher - Kribsky: *Middle East in Crisis*, p. 52

signée avec les Arabes il n'y avait aucune possibilité d'autoriser le retour en Israël d'un grand nombre de réfugiés. «Les Etats-Unis, disait, sont un Etat fort, alors qu'Israël est petit et faible. Accepter en ce moment les réfugiés signifierait tout simplement la fin d'Israël surtout que les Etats arabes entouraient notre pays d'un cercle de haine qui menait de provoquer un second conflit armé».

Les Etats arabes, de leur côté, ne se firent pas faute de répondre aux assertions fallacieuses d'Israël, en soutenant que la présence de deux groupes ethniques (1) a toujours existé en Palestine et que les deux communautés arabe et juive ont constamment vécu côte à côte en bonne harmonie. Les dissensions et malentendus ne s'installèrent en ce pays qu'à la suite de l'intervention d'éléments étrangers. On peut même dire qu'il y avait plus d'harmonie et de compatibilité entre les deux éléments de la population qu'entre les Juifs palestiniens et leurs congénitaires, très dissemblables, venus du dehors.

Quant à dire que les réfugiés, une fois réintégrés, pourraient être une menace pour la sécurité publique et constituer une cinquième colonne en Israël, ce ne sont là qu'assertions gratuites et sans aucun fondement. C'est plutôt le contraire qui est vrai à preuve les massacres répétés d'Arabes pacifiques par les bandes de terroristes juifs. Rappelons seulement la tragédie sanglante, déjà citée, de Deir Yassine. Si, par ailleurs, il est une minorité ethnique soumise continuellement aux exactions et persécutions de toutes sortes, c'est bien la minorité arabe en Israël.

Pour répondre enfin à l'assertion d'Israël qu'il n'y a pas de maisons disponibles pour loger les réfugiés, il suffit de citer le rapport même du gouvernement israélien présenté en Mars 1949 à la Commission de conciliation. Voici ce qu'on peut y lire : «Les Arabes possédaient des maisons modernes à Jérusalem, Jaffa, Haïfa, Ramleh et autres villes de Palestine. Ces maisons ont été données aux immigrants juifs et l'on peut voir aujourd'hui El Katamoun, qui était jadis le véritable quartier arabe de Jérusalem, habité maintenant par les immigrants juifs qui occupent également les quartiers modernes de Jaffa, Haïfa, etc.».

Pour en revenir maintenant à la seconde alternative, à savoir l'acceptation par Israël de réintégrer les réfugiés, rappelons que cette acceptation était conditionnelle. Il s'agissait pour Israël d'annexer le sec-

(1) Year Book of the U.N. 1950, P. 330

teur de Gaza (1) avec ceux qui y vivaient soit 200.000 réfugiés outre subvention internationale. En outre Israël réclamait en retour une

Il s'agissait surtout à ce moment-là de répondre au désir de Foster Dulles qui demandait avec insistance que l'on pourvût à l'installation d'une aide américaine substantielle.

A cette proposition d'Israël, les Arabes ne purent que répondre par un refus, d'autant plus qu'à ce moment-là l'Assemblée Générale de l'O.N.U. était du côté des Arabes et pressait la Commission de conciliation de prendre les dispositions nécessaires pour le rapatriement de 200.000 réfugiés en Israël, sans l'annexion de Gaza.

Par la suite, à la Conférence de Louvain (2) la proposition suivante fut avancée : la Palestine arabe absorberait 30.000 réfugiés et les Etats arabes 480.000 au cas où Israël accepterait de recevoir 100.000 réfugiés en l'espace d'une année. A cette proposition Israël fit valoir les nombreuses difficultés, notamment d'ordre pratique et économique, qui entraveraient sa mise à exécution. Le délégué israélien à la dite Conférence souleva tant d'objections et posa tant de conditions que finalement rien ne fut fait.

Voici, pour mémoire, les commentaires du «New-York Times» à ce propos : «Israël cherche, à travers son acceptation de rapatrier quelques réfugiés, à obtenir un emprunt de 100 millions de dollars alors que, tout compte fait, le nombre des réfugiés acceptés est bien minime par rapport à tous ceux qui demandent à être rapatriés».

De leur côté, les journaux et les partis israéliens firent campagne pour faire échouer le projet. Voici ce qu'a écrit par exemple le journal «Haaretz» : Nous ne pouvons pas reculer le cadran de l'horloge. Il faut que nous nous pénétrions bien de cette idée qu'il n'est pas de possibilité pour les réfugiés de vivre parmi nous».

Au Knesset des leaders, comme Bernstein et Menahem Begin, soutinrent la même thèse et accusèrent le gouvernement israélien de faiblesse vis-à-vis de la pression américaine.

Ainsi donc, le projet fut abandonné, comme furent abandonnés

(1) Facts on File, June 1949, P. 194

(2) Thickness: A Survey of Resettlement Possibilities, P. 33

par la suite plusieurs autres projets à cause des prétentions excessives d'Israël et de sa mauvaise volonté.

Pour ce qui est maintenant de la prétention d'Israël de voir établir Israël et de sa mauvaise volonté.

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Reste maintenant la question des indemnités dues, en base de la résolution de l'O.N.U., aux réfugiés ne voulant pas être rapatriés.

Cette question a également fait couler beaucoup d'encre, mais comme prévu, sans résultat. Au cours de la période 1948/1952, et malgré la pression de l'Angleterre et de l'Amérique, Israël refusa obstinément de payer une indemnité quelconque sous le prétexte que par le fait du paiement elle reconnaîtrait automatiquement sa culpabilité comme pays agresseur. Les dirigeants israéliens allèrent même jusqu'à réclamer pour eux des indemnités pour le préjudice causé par les Arabes à Israël. Voici comment Moussa Sharett expliqua son point de vue : « Israël n'est nullement responsable de tout ce qui est survenu aux Arabes ; bien plus, Israël réclame des dommages-intérêts pour les pertes matérielles et en vies humaines subies par suite de l'agression des Etats arabes ». A son tour, Menahem Begin déclara : « Nous demandons des dommages-intérêts pour les pertes subies par Israël par le fait des Arabes au cours de la guerre de Palestine. Qu'après cela les Arabes présentent leurs demandes d'indemnités, ils verront qu'en fin de compte il ne leur reste rien à réclamer ».

Toutefois, sous la pression de Bernadotte, de l'Assemblée Générale des N.U. et même de certains partis en Israël, comme le parti « Haïrouts » Israël finit par accepter de verser les indemnités mais, pour se dégager de toute accusation de culpabilité, il donna à ces indemnités le nom de « donations », en somme une espèce de secours aux Arabes, non le prix d'une faute.

A cet effet, la Commission de conciliation forma un comité composé d'Arabes et de Juifs pour dresser un inventaire des propriétés arabes pour lesquelles les indemnités devaient être versées. A ce comité

fuèrent adjoints des membres neutres et certains experts arabes qui avaient vécu en Palestine. C'est alors qu'Israël commença à discuter et à arguer sur les indemnités proposées : d'abord sur la valeur des propriétés et le quantum de la somme à payer, puis sur le rapport entre les indemnités à verser et la paix dans la région, sur les modalités du paiement. Ces indemnités devaient-elles être versées en espèces ou indirectement à chaque réfugié ? ... Autant de questions, autant de différends. Puis ce fut le tour des partis politiques israéliens : Mapai, Makhad, D'après eux, aucune indemnité ne devait être versée, l'indemnité, sous les conditions suivantes :

- 1 — Faire entrer en ligne de compte les pertes subies par Israël comme suite à l'attaque des pays arabes;
- 2 — Ne verser aucune indemnité avant la conclusion d'un traité de paix avec les Arabes;
- 3 — Installer les réfugiés dans les pays arabes loin des frontières d'Israël;
- 4 — Abandon en faveur d'Israël de Gaza qui devra être évacuée par les réfugiés.

Ces recommandations devaient influencer grandement la politique du gouvernement israélien concernant les indemnités et contribuer à faire échouer toutes les tentatives faites par la Commission de conciliation — surtout après la Conférence tenue à Paris — pour arriver à un arrangement entre les deux parties. D'un côté, les Israéliens insistaient auprès de la Commission pour faire entrer en ligne de compte les réparations qu'Israël estimait devoir réclamer aux Arabes pour les dégâts causés par l'attaque des armées arabes. De leur côté les Arabes refusèrent les propositions de la Commission pour la raison que l'estimation faite par celle-ci des propriétés arabes était de beaucoup inférieure à leur valeur réelle qui était 20 fois supérieure. Par ailleurs, les Arabes ne pouvaient admettre la thèse d'Israël suivant laquelle par le fait même du paiement des indemnités, l'affaire palestinienne était automatiquement réglée. En fait, la résolution de l'O.N.U. comportait deux éléments inséparables : le rapatriement des réfugiés et l'indemnisation de ceux qui ne voudraient pas retourner. Le fait de payer les indemnités ne saurait en aucun cas libérer Israël de l'obligation de rapatrier les réfugiés.

Encore une fois, il y avait de la part d'Israël mauvaise foi flagrante. Les tractations entre Arabes et Israéliens ne pouvaient mener à aucun résultat et le douloureux problème des réfugiés devait rester sans solution.

L'AVENIR DES REFUGIES ARABES

On se pose souvent cette question : les Etats intéressés ont-ils vraiment le désir d'arriver à une solution du problème des réfugiés arabes ?

Les Etats arabes veulent que soit résolu le problème des réfugiés parce que c'est une plaie saignante au flanc du monde arabe qui en prend soin, désormais et qui veut en assurer la guérison, sans compter que la persistance de ce problème est pour les Arabes un rappel douloureux des événements qui ont amené, envers et contre eux, le rapt de la Palestine arabe par un Etat qui venait à peine de naître. Cet Etat, aux ambitions, a d'autres ambitions, car il rêve d'étendre son empire du Nil à l'Euphrate. Si une solution intervient et qu'Israël retourne à ses frontières, telles que fixées par les N.U. et que les réfugiés sont rapatriés, les choses prendront une autre tournure et les Etats arabes pourront, dans le calme, œuvrer pour la paix sans cesser d'être vigilants et forts afin d'empêcher toute velléité d'Israël de se livrer à de nouvelles aventures.

Il importe enfin à l'Angleterre et aux Etats-Unis que soit résolu le problème des réfugiés, car ils ont tous deux le plus grand intérêt à ce que le calme règne dans cette partie du monde et que leur influence ne continue pas à s'effriter de jour en jour du fait de leur incapacité à amener la solution adéquate au dit problème. Ajoutez à cela que du fait de la misère des réfugiés, les théories communistes trouvent un terrain favorable. Est-ce donc à un tel résultat que l'on voudrait aboutir ?

D'aucuns disent que ce conflit sera peut-être résolu le jour où l'on arrivera à constituer un gouvernement mondial où toutes les nations se confondraient ; mais ceci demeure un espoir trop lointain. D'autres pensent que c'est par une guerre décisive entre les Arabes et Israël que la solution sera trouvée une fois pour toutes. A cette dernière opinion on peut répondre que c'est là une solution contraire aux principes de l'O.N.U. qui rejettent la guerre et préconisent l'emploi des voies pacifiques pour résoudre les conflits... Or, on sait que les Arabes sont partisans de ces principes et c'est pourquoi dans la question de Palestine ils s'en tiennent aux décisions prises par l'O.N.U. et qui ont été approuvées tant par les Etats inféodés que ceux non inféodés à Israël. La solution cherchée réside donc tout simplement dans l'exécution de ces décisions...

Aujourd'hui les Etats arabes sont en général beaucoup plus forts qu'auparavant. La R.A.U. ne menace personne et a en maintes cir-

constances prouvé son amour pour la paix. On ne peut toutefois lui reprocher, de vouloir, si elle est attaquée, de se défendre et de défendre l'arabisme.

Certes, les Arabes sont pour une solution garantissant les droits de nos frères par le sang et la race qui continuent à souffrir de la plus criante injustice de l'histoire. Que vont-ils devenir et quel sera leur sort ?...

Trois éventualités se présentent :

- 1 — Les choses demeurent en l'état.
- 2 — Les réfugiés s'établissent définitivement dans les pays arabes.
- 3 — Rapatriement de ceux qui le demandent et indemnisation de ceux qui ne désirent pas retourner.

La première éventualité, qui n'est pas une solution, rencontre une vive opposition. Les Arabes, avec une impatience de plus en plus marquée, la considèrent comme un état de fait malheureux et provisoire, en attendant que soit mise à exécution la résolution de l'O.N.U. prévoyant rapatriement ou indemnité.

D'ailleurs, les Etats arabes ne cessent à toutes les assemblées de l'O.N.U. de rappeler avec force cet impératif.

A Israël, non plus, ni aux puissances qui ont des intérêts en Moyen-Orient (telles que les Etats-Unis et l'Angleterre) la situation actuelle ne saurait convenir. A Israël, parce que c'est un stimulant permanent, à ses frontières, au nationalisme arabe exacerbé et dont les conséquences sont imprévisibles. Aux puissances telles que l'Angleterre, les Etats-Unis etc., cette situation ne saurait convenir non plus car elle menace leurs intérêts en Moyen-Orient, sans compter les risques de contamination des réfugiés par les théories communistes qui trouvent là un terrain favorable parce que justement il y a de la misère.

Il s'ensuit donc que la situation actuelle ne peut s'éterniser. Quant aux deux autres éventualités, installation définitive des réfugiés dans les pays arabes qui leur donnent asile actuellement, ou bien rapatriement des réfugiés et indemnisation de ceux qui ne veulent pas retourner, les amis d'Israël, partisans de la première de ces deux éventualités, disent que l'Histoire nous apprend que rarement des réfugiés qui ont fui en masse un pays par suite de bouleversements politiques y sont retournés. Ils citent le cas de la Russie, de l'Allemagne de l'Est, de la Corée, de la Hongrie, des Européens qui ont fui en Amérique... Partout, ajoutent-

ils, ces réfugiés ont fini par s'installer dans les pays qui les ont accueillis et en sont devenus des citoyens. Le cas des réfugiés arabes de Palestine est, en revanche, tout différent. Les partisans de cette théorie, ils doivent s'en rendre compte, ne sont pas les seuls à avoir raison. Les partisans de la théorie opposée, qui soutiennent que les réfugiés arabes de Palestine ne doivent pas être considérés comme des citoyens, ont également raison. Il est certain que c'est là un déni de justice qui a surtout fait du mal aux réfugiés arabes de Palestine. Il est certain également que les réfugiés arabes de Palestine ne doivent pas être considérés comme des citoyens. Il est certain que les réfugiés arabes de Palestine ne doivent pas être considérés comme des citoyens. Il est certain que les réfugiés arabes de Palestine ne doivent pas être considérés comme des citoyens.

Les Etats arabes eux, sont opposés à cette conception pour la raison simple qu'elle entierre purement et simplement la cause palestinienne. Pour eux, ce n'est pas un tel résultat qu'ils visent après tant d'années de lutte et de souffrance ?... La plupart des Etats arabes ne pensent pas, et c'est pourquoi certains conservent leur nationalité palestinienne et ne soient pas absorbés par la nation qui les abrite. C'est pour la même raison que ceux du Sinaï et de la Jordanie, projets qui visaient l'O.N.U., tels que ceux du Sinaï et de la Jordanie, projets qui visaient tout simplement, par un détour, à escamoter la cause palestinienne et à absorber les réfugiés.

Venons-en maintenant à la 3^e éventualité du rapatriement des réfugiés, et dont nous sommes de chauds partisans, car c'est elle qui cadre avec la justice et la logique et qui a été votée par l'O.N.U., dans sa 3^e Session du 11 Décembre 1948. Nous rappelons son foyer en Palestine cette décision, tout réfugié voulant réintégrer son pays en paix avec ses droits était autorisé à le faire sous la seule condition qu'il vive en paix avec ses voisins. Cette décision n'a jamais été rapportée et, parce qu'elle est l'expression de l'équité et du bon sens, les Arabes s'y tiennent fermement et ont jusqu'ici refusé d'envisager toute autre solution. A ce propos, le Président Nasser a déclaré à l'occasion du 9^e anniversaire de la Révolution, le 23 Juillet 1961, ce qui suit : « Nous continuons à croire avec force, en le droit du peuple de Palestine à son pays, à sa terre, à sa patrie ».

Telle est la position des Arabes, malgré toutes les objections et les allégations fallacieuses d'Israël.

Il faut d'abord qu'ils soient solidaires et qu'ils œuvrent pour gagner l'appui des puissances étrangères à leur cause. On sait combien est précieux, surtout dans les instances internationales, d'avoir le plus de voix possibles avec soi pour défendre une juste cause. Un grand pas, d'ailleurs, a été fait à ce sujet dans les Conférences de Bandoeng, Afrique, Asie, etc. pour amener la cohésion et la solidarité entre les peuples d'ailleurs, d'Asie et d'ailleurs. Par ailleurs, la visite du Président

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Nasser aux Etats-Unis et le retentissement qu'elle a provoqué a contrecouru les efforts de l'Occident pour améliorer encore davantage le prestige des Arabes.

Il est un point qu'il importe de prendre en *sérieuse considération* : il s'agit de l'état physique et moral de cette masse de réfugiés arabes. Alors que les immigrants juifs qui, en Israël, sont venus remplacer les réfugiés arabes, jouissent d'un standard de vie relativement élevé, nous voyons par contre les réfugiés débilés et démoralisés en proie aux maladies de toutes sortes. Il faut, autant que faire se peut, remédier à cet état de choses; il faut, de cette masse de réfugiés, qui aujourd'hui est un handicap, constituer une force qui ait son mot à dire et œuvre avec profit pour le triomphe de la cause qui est en même temps celle de tous les Arabes.

La R.A.U. a dans ce sens déployé de grands efforts, des années durant, pour arriver à un résultat pratique en faveur des réfugiés. Elle a tout d'abord tenu à maintenir coûte que coûte l'entité palestinienne; elle a dans, le secteur de Gaza, mis sur pied le projet Anar pour le plus grand profit des réfugiés; elle a répandu l'enseignement, surtout l'enseignement technique et pratique, parmi eux, afin de leur permettre de trouver un gagne-pain honorable qui les dispense de recourir à la charité de l'UNRWA et autres organisations internationales. Aux jeunes Palestiniens instruits dans ses écoles, elle a donné des postes de responsabilité dans l'administration du secteur de Gaza. La flamme patriotique est toujours vivace parmi eux. En résumé, il convient de signaler, simplement pour mémoire, que le montant dépensé annuellement par la R.A.U. au profit des réfugiés est de l'ordre de 2 millions et demi de L.E.

Par ailleurs, pour renforcer encore davantage la position des Arabes, il faut qu'il y ait entre eux cohésion et solidarité — deux conditions indispensables que l'on ne devrait jamais perdre de vue tant qu'il s'agit de faire face à Israël...

Avec de la bonne volonté et de solides atouts en mains, les Arabes s'agit de faire face à Israël...

doivent pouvoir envisager les choses sous un angle différent du passé. Leur espoir dans la réussite — dans un monde où des choses fantastiques s'accomplissent à un rythme accéléré — ne doit plus du tout être qu'un rêve chimérique.

Confiants en leur bon droit et avec l'aide de Dieu, ils doivent laisser couronner leur destin et voir enfin le succès couronner leurs efforts.

90

CONCLUSION

Dans les pages qui précèdent, nous avons essayé de donner un aperçu des divers aspects de la tragédie des réfugiés arabes de Palestine. Nous avons exposé les diverses phases par lesquelles a passé ce problème, les différentes solutions préconisées et celle que la R.A.U. et les peuples arabes avec elle, estiment la seule **valable** parce que basée sur le bon sens et l'équité, à savoir le rapatriement des réfugiés et l'indemnisation de ceux d'entre eux qui ne voudraient pas réintégrer leurs foyers.

La plus haute instance internationale qui a proposé et patronné cette solution aura-t-elle le courage et voudra-t-elle prendre les moyens adéquats pour en assurer enfin l'exécution, même si cette solution n'a pas l'heur de plaire à Israël ?... Si des décisions de l'O.N.U., les Etats s'avisent de n'accepter que celles qui leur conviennent et de rejeter celles qui ne leur sont pas favorables, où irions-nous ?... Ce serait à nouveau, dans le domaine international, le règne de l'arbitraire et de la force brutale, et le monde serait livré sans merci aux impérialismes de la jungle.

Parce que le monde est arrivé à un stade avancé de civilisation qu'il veut conserver et parce que les nations craignent que la voix du canon et la déflagration des bombes atomiques n'étouffent à jamais la voix de la raison, elles se sont groupées et se sont coalisées au sein de l'Organisation internationale la plus haute à qui elles ont donné mandat de juger et d'arbitrer leurs litiges et leurs différends.

C'est justement pourquoi, dans la question de Palestine, les Etats arabes s'en tiennent à la décision rendue par cette Organisation suprême.

Pour la partie récalcitrante, parce qu'ayant été condamnée, il y a des mesures de coercition qu'il ne faut pas hésiter à prendre. C'est alors et alors seulement que l'O.N.U. pourra conserver son prestige et poursuivre efficacement la mission dont elle est investie. C'est à elle qu'il appartient, de ne pas, par une carence impardonnable, pousser à bout les peuples victimes de l'injustice et les forcer à chercher dans un geste désespéré le remède à leurs maux.

S O M M A I R E

	Page
I — AVANT-PROPOS	5
II — LIVRE I : COMMENT EST NE LE PROBLEME DES REFUGIES ARABES :	7
Chapitres	
1 — Le rôle du Sionisme dans la question des réfugiés arabes	7
— La création du Foyer National Juif et ses répercussions sur le problème des réfugiés	14
2 — Le rôle de la Grande-Bretagne dans la question des réfugiés arabes	18
— La Déclaration Balfour et le problème des réfugiés arabes	20
— Le mandat et la cause des réfugiés arabes	24
— L'immigration juive et son incidence sur le problème des réfugiés	24
— La mainmise des Juifs sur l'industrie en Palestine	28
3 — Le rôle des Etats-Unis dans la question des réfugiés arabes	55
— Les efforts des Présidents des Etats-Unis en faveur d'Israël	37
III — LIVRE II : LES EFFETS DU PROBLEME DES REFUGIES SUR LE MOYEN-ORIENT ET SUR LES RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES :	48
Chapitres	
1 — L'incidence du problème des réfugiés arabes sur les réfugiés eux-mêmes	48
— Le problème du logement	50
— L'enseignement	50

	Page
— Alimentation et hygiène	52
— Les biens des réfugiés arabes bloqués en Palestine	54
2 — L'incidence du problème des réfugiés arabes sur la Jordanie	57
— La paix avec Israël	57
3 — Le problème des réfugiés arabes et son incidence sur la R.A.U.	60
— L'incidence du problème des réfugiés sur la politique étrangère de la R.A.U.	60
4 — Le problème des réfugiés et son incidence sur Israël	65
— Les forces militaires d'Israël	67
— L'économie d'Israël	69
— Les frontières actuelles d'Israël	70
5 — Le problème des réfugiés arabes et son incidence sur les deux blocs Est et Ouest	73
IV — LIVRE III : LES MOYENS DE RESOUDRE LE PROBLEME DES REFUGIES	75
Chapitres	
1 — L'O.N.U.	75
2 — La solution des réfugiés telle que l'envisagent Israël et les Pays arabes	81
3 — Les réfugiés et leur retour dans leurs foyers	84
V — L'AVENIR DES REFUGIES ARABES	90
VI — CONCLUSION	94

181 / 4 / 4

PT. NO. III

FILE CLOSED

THIS PART OPENED ON JULY 61

THIS PART CLOSED ON MAY 64

SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE ON FILE PT IV

4859/63

181/4/4 268
C O N F I D E N T I A L

File No. 214/10/10/2

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Record of Conversation with The Prime Minister, Mr. Zul-Fikar Sabry, and the
on 22nd May, 1964. U.A.R. Ambassador & Mr. Shoeir
Officers Present Mr. J.R. Rowland

MAIN SUBJECTS (S):

At the Prime Minister's invitation, Mr. Sabry expounded the Arab case on the Jordan Waters dispute, in much the same terms as he had done to the Minister.

2. He said that all the Arab States, even though they might differ on other matters, agreed about the threat posed by Israel's diversion of the Jordan Waters. This would increase the salinity of the remaining waters and threaten agriculture further downstream; but more important, it was designed to enable Israel to bring in large numbers of new settlers (he mentioned the figure of one million) into the Negev. Even if the view were taken that Israel was a legitimate state (and this of course was not the Arab view) Israel had no right to the Negev, which had not been assigned to it by the 1949 armistice agreement, but had the status under that agreement of a "frontier area".

3. The Arabs had no objection to the Jewish people of Palestine, who in the 1920's numbered only 5% of the population: they regarded these people as Arabs of Jewish faith, living in lands which had of course been Arab for centuries. But the Zionist movement and the creation of Israel had led to the introduction of large numbers of foreign Jews who had no connection with Palestine or its original inhabitants. The Israelis claimed that they had Biblical authority for Israel to occupy all the land from the Nile to the Euphrates. They had even had this phrase inscribed on their Parliament until 1956, when it had been removed as being too provocative. In response to the Prime Minister's questions, Mr. Sabry confirmed that the Arabs regarded Israel as intending to expand at the expense of its neighbours; he said that the Israelis regarded themselves as enjoying a historical right to all the places mentioned in the Bible as being part of ancient Israel.

4. To meet this threat, the Arab heads of state had agreed on a plan to divert the headwaters of the Jordan before they reached Israel. The Arabs had no war-like intentions; since 1949 they had not been responsible for any attacks against Israel, as was shown by the fact that Israel and not the Arab states had been found responsible by the Security Council for all the incidents brought before

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Report prepared by *J. R. Rowland*
(J. R. Rowland)

C O N F I D E N T I A L

367
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-2-

it since that time. But the Israelis had responded to decisions of the Arab heads of states by threatening aggressive action. Such action would, of course, be met by force. The Prime Minister asked whether Israel would not be heavily outnumbered in such an event: Mr. Sabry recalled that in 1956 Sinai had been "swarming with Mystere fighters" and that Israel had had assistance from French and British bases.

5. The Prime Minister asked if the Arab intention was to cut off the water from Israel. Mr. Sabry made no clear reply but referred to the question of the waters as merely part of the wider problem of Palestine, another aspect of which was the refugee question. Asked how the Arab states thought the waters' question might be solved, he said that it could only be settled as part of the whole Palestine question. Asked what solution the Arabs envisaged for the Palestine question, he said that this was essentially a matter for the million Arab refugees; there had been suggestions for a congress of these refugees to ascertain their wishes. Though the sixteen Arab Governments had their own ideas, they did not wish to impose them on the refugees.

6. Asked about the Johnston Plan, Mr. Sabry insisted that it had never been accepted by either side. Asked if, apart from the political objections which the Arab states might feel to it, as implying acceptance of Israel, it had not been judged a reasonable plan, Mr. Sabry said that it allotted too much water to Israel. He added that Israel now intended to take more water from the Jordan than the Johnston Plan provided.

7. Mr. Sabry entered into a long dissertation about Zionism and the aggressive nature of Israel, describing Zionism as a kind of international movement designed to gather together the Jews into Israel, despite its lack of natural resources; and to put pressure on Jews abroad to support and finance Israel - often against their will. To his remarks about the dual loyalty of Zionist Jews, the Prime Minister replied by referring to the Scots and Hibernian societies in Australia, membership of which in no way detracted from the Australian loyalties of their members; and indicated that we had no reason to complain of the loyalty to Australia of our Jewish community.

8. After some more discussion on this theme, the Prime Minister indicated that he believed that an agreed division of the waters was essential; after all, if the intention was to cut off the water supply of Israel, life would, to say the least, be made very uncomfortable for that country. He asked whether the processes of international arbitration were in deadlock; it was confirmed that they were. He mentioned the long drawn out litigation between his own Scottish ancestors and their neighbours about their respective rights to the waters of the Tay.

9. Finally the Prime Minister told Mr. Sabry that his account of the Arab case had been illuminating and had given the Prime Minister a new insight into the mental background of the problem.

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File No. 214/10/10/2

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Record of Conversation between: The Minister and Mr. Zul-Fikar Sabry

on 21st May, 1964

Officers Present: U.A.R. Ambassador
Mr. Shoieir
Mr. Rowland

MAIN SUBJECTS (S):
(i) Jordan Waters
(ii) U.A.R./Australian Relations
(iii) The U.A.R.'s World Position

Jordan Waters

The Minister said he had had a Note from the U.A.R. Embassy describing the purpose of Mr. Sabry's visit as being to present the resolutions adopted by the Arab Kings and Heads of State at their meeting in January, 1964; he invited Mr. Sabry to speak.

2. Mr. Sabry explained at some length and in relatively moderate terms the Arab case with respect to the Jordan Waters dispute in particular and to Israel in general.

3. He said that Israel itself was an illegal creation occupying the Arab homeland; as such, all Arab countries were united in their opposition to it. But even if one were to take a different view of its legitimacy, the Israeli projects for the diversion of the Jordan Waters were contrary to international law. Israel intended to divert these waters in a way which would harm its neighbours, and would lead to the settlement and irrigation of the Negev, which - under the Armistice Agreement of 1949, which was the only instrument to which both Israel and the Arab states were parties - had not been assigned to Israel.

4. The Israelis claimed biblical authority for the notion of an Israel which would stretch from the Nile to the Euphrates; until 1956 a phrase to this effect had even been inscribed over the door of the Israel Parliament. But they had no right to such an area. They persisted in trying to settle the demilitarized zones; they had expelled Palestine Arabs now numbering a million. Mr. Sabry suggested that the Arabs bore no grudge against the Jews from Arab lands, whom they regarded as brothers; he recalled that the Arabs were descended from one of the two sons of Abraham and the Jews from the other. But they were very strongly opposed to the Zionists and the Eastern European Jews, who were foreigners to Palestine, and who were being brought in in large numbers.

5. The Arab Kings and Heads of State had met to decide how to deal with the Jewish project to divert the Jordan Waters. They had decided upon counter-measures entailing the diversion for irrigation in Syria, Lebanon and

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Jordan of the streams forming the headwaters of the Jordan. This, he implied, was a measure of self-protection. Contrary to press reports and Israeli propaganda, they did not intend to resort to force or to wage war against Israel; they had never engaged in warlike activity against Israel since 1949; he depicted the fedayeen raids and similar activities as being the work of local farmers deprived of their traditional land and seeking food, or of young Palestine Arabs expressing natural indignation; and said that the blame in every case that had come before the Security Council had been found to be with Israel. But Israel had said that it would treat the Arab plans for water diversion as a casus belli and had threatened aggressive action to frustrate them.

6. The Minister asked about the Johnston Plan, which he understood entailed a proposal for the equitable diversion of the waters. Mr. Sabry said that this plan had been rejected by both sides, and implied that it was a dead letter.

7. The Minister asked whether the United Nations had ever pronounced itself upon the question: Mr. Sabry said it had only done so on one occasion when it had forbidden Israel to divert waters in the demilitarised zone.

8. The Minister asked whether Israel and the Arab states would be prepared to respect a judgement of the International Court on the problem. Mr. Sabry replied that Israel had always refused to go to the Court. In any case, they had already begun to divert the water and had sunk a great deal of money in their project; they were unlikely to submit it to arbitration.

9. The Minister asked whether Mr. Sabry could see any prospect at all of international arbitration. Mr. Sabry said that he could not.

10. The Minister asked whether the Arabs now had in mind some United Nations action: Mr. Sabry was negative, though somewhat non-committal.

11. The Minister asked what solution the Arab Government saw to the question; how was it to be settled? was unilateral action a suitable means? Mr. Sabry replied that the Israelis had already taken unilateral action; admittedly the Arab action might also be so described, but they could not help that. They were not putting forward proposals for settlement, but were seeking to explain their case so that foreign governments would understand that there were two sides to the question, and that the Israeli case, which received so much more currency than the Arab one, was not the only story. The Minister said that we would certainly be prepared to study the matter. We enjoyed good relations with both Israel and the Arab States.

U.A.R./Australian Relations

12. The Minister asked whether there were any outstanding problems between the U.A.R. and Australia. Mr. Sabry said there were not. He went on to suggest that we might be able to increase our trade: the U.A.R. particularly wanted to increase its trade in manufactured products, especially cotton goods, rather than raw materials. The Minister remarked that Australia itself was trying to increase its cotton production.

CONFIDENTIAL

364
CONFIDENTIAL

-3-

The U.A.R.'s World Position

13. The Minister asked Mr. Sabry about the U.A.R.'s position, as both an African and a Middle Eastern country: in which direction did its principal interest lie? Mr. Sabry said that it belonged to both regions; "we are complex people". It had long-standing and close ties with the other Northern African countries, and also of course with the Arab world: indeed, the Arab language was a link even stronger than Islam, so that Egyptians felt closer to Lebanese (one-half of whom were Christians) than to Turks, Indonesians or Pakistanis.

14. The Minister said that President Nasser was an important figure on the world scene: how did he get on with the other leaders of Africa, like Nkrumah, who perhaps wished to be pre-eminent in Africa? Mr. Sabry replied that Nasser did not want to be a "big man"; he had very good relations with the African leaders like Nkrumah, Modibo Keita, Haile Selassie and Sekou Toure. (Possibly by accident, Mr. Sabry did not mention Ben Bella).

15. The Minister wished Mr. Sabry a pleasant stay in Canberra.

CONFIDENTIAL

181/4/4 363

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ARAB/ISRAEL RELATIONS

20/5/64

1. General

The Arab States do not recognise Israel and still maintain that a state of war exists between themselves and Israel. President Nasser in a press interview earlier this year said he believed war with Israel to be "inevitable". In the short term, however, it is believed that Nasser will not initiate a conflict; he seems well aware that Israel is at present stronger militarily than the U.A.R., and has made plain his dislike of Syrian "adventurism", presumably because this could lead to an open war in which the U.A.R. would have to carry the main burden.

The Arabs have pursued their anti-Israel policy by the following means:

- (i) the boycott on trade with Israel, and refusal to allow Israeli-bound shipping to pass through the Suez Canal;
- (ii) border raids on Israel by neighbouring states, especially Syria. (The Arabs vie with each other in demonstrations of hostility towards Israel, although recently most of this has been displayed by Syria, while the U.A.R. is comparatively quiet);
- (iii) military preparations, and the formation of anti-Israel military unions. (Israel is much concerned over the U.A.R.'s employment of German scientists on weapons development).

2. Arab Refugees

There are, at present, about 1,000,000 Arab refugees, most of whom are dependent on the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, to which Australia is a contributor. Of these 500,000 are in Jordan (one-third of the population) and the remainder in the Gaza Strip, Syria and the Lebanon.

On 11th December, 1948, the General Assembly adopted a resolution 194(III) which, inter alia, established the Conciliation Commission for Palestine and resolved that the refugees could either return to their homes or be compensated for loss of property should they choose not to return.

Since then, the Arab nations have been trying to bring about repatriation of the refugees, but Israel has called for a direct negotiation between the parties in order to reach an agreed solution. Israel has defined its policy as "not a single refugee but a solution of the refugee problem in the Arab States". It maintains that it would be quite impossible to implement a policy of large scale repatriation since most of the former Arab property is occupied and being used by Jewish immigrants.

In 1962 Mr. Joseph E. Johnson, the Special Representative of the U.N. Palestine Conciliation Commission prepared a scheme of settlement based on the exercise of individual preference of refugees on a voluntary basis. Johnson was convinced that in fact, when it came to the choice, few Arabs would wish to return to Israel. While

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Richard
Bryce
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on 21/4/62

362
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-2-

Israel would not accept his proposals, Johnson felt the Arabs could be persuaded to acquiesce. In the face of Israeli opposition Johnson resigned and no further action has been taken on his proposals. The problem therefore remains unresolved.

4. Australian Policy

Recent Australian policy has paid much regard to the views of the United States, which is by far the largest financial contributor to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency - to which Australia has also contributed substantial sums. United States policy has been to work by "quiet diplomacy" in an attempt to avoid violent verbal conflict between the Arabs and Israel in the organs of the United Nations. The United States has therefore been very cold towards any resolution which is not likely to be acceptable to both sides, or which does not advance the prospects of a long-term resolution. They regard the Israeli-supported drafts calling for bilateral negotiation as falling into this group.

Australian policy may be said to rest on the following points:

- (a) Since the continuance of the problem is a danger to peace in the Middle East, and contributing countries cannot be expected to support the refugees indefinitely, we do not wish the United Nations to take any action likely to prejudice any proposals embodying some genuine prospect of a solution;
- (b) As the principal contributor the United States should have our support; and
- (c) No useful purpose can be served by the Assembly's adopting resolutions known in advance to be totally unacceptable.

CONFIDENTIAL

361
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914/1

U.N. CONSIDERATION OF PALESTINE REFUGEES

The Australian policy to the question of Arab refugees has in the past three years been based partly on a strong regard for the views of the United States, which is by far the largest financial contributor to the United Nations relief work for the refugees. Australia has therefore been ready to give considerable attention to United States requests for Australian co-operation with their voting position. United States policy has been to work by "quiet diplomacy" in an attempt to avoid violent verbal conflict between the Arabs and Israel in the organs of the United Nations. The United States has therefore been very cold towards any resolution which is not likely to be acceptable to both sides, or which does not advance the prospects of a long-term resolution. They regard the Israeli-supported drafts calling for bilateral negotiation as falling into this group.

Australia came closest to supporting the United States position, out of the past three years, in 1962, when Mr. Hood spoke in fairly precise support of United States policy. Australia in 1962 supported the United States resolution which noted that it be recorded that no substantive progress had been made with the reintegration of refugees.

In both the 1962 and 1963 sessions, no vote was taken on a draft resolution which had Israeli support calling on the Arabs and the Israelis to renew bilateral negotiations. In 1961, on the other hand, this resolution was pressed to a vote, and was defeated. At the last minute, under considerable Israeli pressure, Australia voted in favour of it, thereby departing from the United States position.

In 1963, Australia did not speak at all on the Palestine refugees item, and voted in favour of the United States resolution, which in its wording was somewhat more favourable to the Arab than to the Israeli position on the subject of refugees. As indicated above, the Israel-supported resolution was not pressed to a vote, but the Minister for External Affairs had directed that if it were to be put to the vote, Australia should support it. There is no indication on file of the reasons for the Minister's decision, which differed from the Department's recommendation, which was for abstention. The Israeli Government was not told of the Australian decision.

It is not easy to give any precise indication of current Australian policy, without a renewed approach to the Minister. A ~~quite~~ frank statement of the issues involved is contained in telegram No. 1018 sent to New York on 12th December, 1962 (copy attached). Experience appears quite plainly to indicate that it is not possible to isolate the problem of refugees from the general problem of the future of Israel, on which for years both sides have taken a rigid attitude from which they have not dared to retract. The most recent example of the failure of an attempt to mediate the issue was the non-publication in 1962 of the "Johnson plan", the tentative proposals of Dr. Joseph Johnson, which (although generally known) were never formally published because they were unacceptable to both the Israelis and the Arabs and it was felt that their publication would merely lead to another bitter wrangle in the United Nations. *Australia's 1962 refusal, therefore, did not mention the Plan.*

J.H. Brook.
18th May, 1964.

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Entire from British Documents Middle East. April 1964

181/4 360

Arab Refugee Problem

181/4

23. The recent General Assembly debate on the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine Report served only to illustrate once again difficulties in the way of any settlement of the refugee problem. The principal contributors to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees emphasised their concern at the rising cost of the Agency's relief programme by insisting on cutting their contribution to relief by 5% at the last Pledging Conference, the saving being added to the contribution for education. The new Commissioner-General, Dr. Michelmore, has already taken steps which will result in short-term economies. He does not, however, expect to be in a position to undertake the thorough rectification of the ration rolls which the major contributors feel to be necessary until he has had time to make a full study of the problem. The decision of the Arab Summit to establish a "Palestine entity" (the nature of which is still in flux) under the Saudi Arabian Al Shuqairi, is unlikely to make the Commissioner-General's task any easier, or to assist in the achievement of a long term settlement.

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181/4/399
SECRET

16. I have referred rather generally in earlier paragraphs to the Palestinian refugees. (See paragraph e of the departmental memorandum already mentioned). They are, of course, the main political problem and I would guess that in their distress and frustration, and their bitterness at their experiences, they looked generally to Nasser, or perhaps to Nasser's image, for a way out and a return home. Hawking Nasser's portrait is a conspicuous activity in the streets of Jerusalem. I heard nothing of the movement of Arab nationalists, or of the Ba'ath, although both exist underground: as you perhaps know, while it is not forbidden to belong to a political party, parties are not themselves permitted officially and there are no political groupings in parliament. Undoubtedly there is very active opposition to the Jordanian monarchy among the refugees. But equally, many refugees have identified themselves with Jordan and some have prospered spectacularly. Some have become millionaires. Others, foremost among them the famous Musa Alami, head of the Arab Development Scheme at Jericho, where he has reclaimed 2000 acres of desert country for cultivation and trains 200 orphan boys a year in the Schemes' technical college, have given an example of civic concern on a scale I've met nowhere else in the Middle East. (I spent a day at this interesting establishment, talking to the director and his staff and it provided a useful complementary experience to my official talks and enquiries in Amman). I concluded that it would be an over-simplification to lump all the refugees as opposed to the Jordanian government, but it is obvious, and indeed natural, that any refugee population should be disgruntled and provide ready material for subversion. I am sure that the Palestinian refugees are substantially a dangerous element.

17. I asked the prime minister, Sherif Husein, whether he envisaged the West Bank of the Jordan being included in the "Palestine entity". He hedged. He claimed that the Palestine entity was a theoretical concept, a sort of political grouping without territorial implications, and he said that it would in no way affect Jordanian sovereignty. In the first annex to this despatch I have recorded what I took down as his exact words. The point seems to be that the Jordan Government has felt compelled to go along with the "Palestine Entity" decision, but is hoping that in practice this will come to no more than a sort of loose rally of the Palestinian refugee population which does not affect present territorial boundaries or sovereignty. King Husein's own remarks on the subject should not, perhaps be taken too literally. He is impulsive and often unthinking and he may be quite unaware what he is committing himself to. We shall know more about this when the Palestine meeting called by Shukeiry meets in Jerusalem on May 14th next. As the Department has itself pointed out, however, any suggestion of the West Bank coming under Nasser's direct influence would invite Israeli intervention. (F)

*Excerpt of
despatch
Nov. 9/26/4/64
Jedda
207/4/*

181/4/4 358
SECRET

Enclosure No. 3 to Cairo Despatch No. 1 of 26th April, 1964.

THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROBLEMS IN JORDAN
CONVERSATION WITH MR. T.W. HOLLAND,
HEAD OF UNWRA

Mr. Holland described how UNWRA was keeping about half a million people alive in Jordan, by providing food and clothing and, where possible, shelter. Its role had come to be regarded as fixed and immutable, and there was perhaps something to be said for this interpretation, for reasons he would give later; nevertheless it was not a desirable conclusion, because it should have been UNWRA's aim to liquidate the problem of the Palestine refugees and its own role with it. At present there were some 400,000 people "on rations"; 165,000 children were not on rations, and 50,000 people were regarded as in the "end stage" where they were to cease being of UNWRA concern at all (i.e. they were rehabilitated, or had been transferred, or otherwise gone off the lists). The liquidation was so unimportant however in relation to the continuing task, and in relation to the new mouths being added because of refugee births, that the overall problem was if anything gradually growing.

UNWRA had by now become part of normal Jordanian national life, because it was an important contributor to the national economy. The goods it imported for rations, even where these were sold and went on the market, were imported cheaply and provided alternatives to those for which foreign exchange would have to be found. At least \$1 M a year was spent on importing blankets; 50,000 tons of flour was imported without cost to Jordan; 50,000 persons were kept fully employed. This and the rest represented a massive injection of foreign aid. There was also UNWRA's contribution to housing, which, although it had to be disguised for political reasons, was making funds available to a national Jordanian housing programme. For all these reasons a termination of UNWRA activities could have disastrous consequences from Jordan's point of view.

Holland spoke of the nominal Jordanian reluctance to see the refugees' situation changed. There was always a row whenever the rolls were questioned: theoretically the refugee population must remain the same until it returned to its homes in Palestine; equally there must be no exit permits. But in fact, while face was saved Arab-wise, the Jordanian authorities encouraged housing loans, did not object to changes in the ration rolls, and allowed people accepted for settlement elsewhere (Kuwait, Sudan, even Australia) to leave the country.

Holland then returned to his first argument, that a term must be put to UNWRA. He believed that if it were made clear now that it would wind up by, say, 1968, a great deal of good would result.

*Full despatch
207/2/1.*

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357

SECRET

181/4/4 356
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MIDDLE EAST (GENERAL)

December 20, 1963

Section 1

THE DEBATE ON UNRWA IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Sir Patrick Dean to Mr. R. A. Butler. (Received December 20)

SUMMARY

The Arabs placed themselves in a favourable tactical position by securing precedence for their comparatively moderate resolution. In view of their hostility to the United States draft, it seemed at one stage unlikely that the solution of the previous year could be obtained when the Arab and Israeli inspired resolutions were withdrawn to leave the American draft alone in the field. After much negotiation this was, however, achieved. On the substance of the problem the United Nations is back to where it was at the end of 1961 (paragraphs 1-3).

2. The debate will not have helped the refugees themselves. Their prospects of leaving the refugee camps are no better and perhaps slightly worse than before (paragraph 4).

3. The most important factor in this year's debate was the report of the Conciliation Commission for Palestine which referred to a series of "quiet talks" between the United States and the parties concerned. It was surprising that the Americans did not foresee the repercussions which this phrase would create. The Arab States concerned denied that the talks had taken place on the basis described and became convinced that the Americans were attempting to weaken the force of paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (111) with the intention of settling the refugee problem on a different basis. It was significant that the Arabs were able to persuade the United States Government, against great Israeli pressure—and this at the beginning of an election year—to agree to amend their resolution (paragraphs 5-7).

4. Mr. Shukairy addressed the committee for a total of nearly nine hours. Most of his venom was directed against the United States. While the Arabs were tireless in their congratulations to him, many clearly wondered in private whether he had done their cause any good (paragraph 8).

5. The Arabs handled the French Africans very ineptly and relations between the two groups became very bad (paragraph 9).

6. It is hard to see how the Conciliation Commission can now proceed. The lesson from this year's debate is that the United States need to make up their minds early on what they want to achieve, and this implies consultation and preparation well in advance with their allies (paragraphs 10-11).

(No. 34. Confidential UKMIS to the UN,
and Guard) New York,

Sir, December 17, 1963.

The annual debate on the report of
the Commissioner-General of UNRWA

formally ended with the passage of the
United States draft resolution through the
General Assembly on the 3rd of December
with a majority of 82 votes in its favour.
Israel voted against and there were 14

CONFIDENTIAL—GUARD

19808—566 302—5

abstentions. In effect this annual and disagreeable contest between the Arab States and Israel had been concluded a fortnight earlier in the Special Political Committee when the American draft passed with a similar majority and the two resolutions inspired by the Arabs and Israelis respectively were finally withdrawn. You have already received detailed reports on the course of the debate, and also a series of telegrams setting out the various stages of the tactical situation. I do not, therefore, propose to describe in this despatch the sequence of events. It may be of greater interest if I offer a few observations on the outcome.

2. As I reported at the time the Arab delegations had placed themselves in a favourable tactical position by persuading their supporters—the delegations of Afghanistan, Indonesia and Pakistan—to table a comparatively moderate resolution for which, largely owing to the partiality of the committee's chairman, they secured precedence over the United States draft. In view of the extreme hostility which the Arabs showed to the American draft and the initial reluctance on the part of the Americans to modify it in order to meet their demands, it seemed unlikely at one stage that the committee would be able to follow a procedure similar to that adopted last year when the United States draft was left alone in the field and its two rivals from the Arab and Israeli camps respectively were withdrawn. After a great deal of hard work by the United States mission however and with a major concession to the Arabs in the form of an amendment to the paragraph relating to the terms of reference to the Palestine Conciliation Commission, this conclusion was in the end achieved once again. It is significant that in spite of American sensitivity towards Israeli pressure at the beginning of an election year, they nevertheless felt bound to respond to Arab pressure and to agree that the Conciliation Commission must be asked clearly and without equivocation to implement paragraph 11 of General Assembly Resolution 194 (111). The final scene of the debate was thus similar to last year. The American draft resolution was passed with a handsome majority; appeals (prepared in advance) were made to the sponsors of the other resolutions to withdraw; there was an artificial suspension of the meeting on the pretence of allowing consultation among the sponsors; and in the

end the two resolutions were withdrawn, though with fairly bad grace by the African sponsors of that resolution calling for direct negotiation between the Governments concerned.

3. On the substance of the problem the United Nations is back to where it was at the end of 1961. Demands for the setting up of a custodian for Arab property on the one hand and for direct negotiations between the Governments concerned on the other were again abandoned; and the Conciliation Commission is again instructed to implement paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (111). Looking back after this year's debate the United States mission admit that they now cannot understand how they succeeded in breaking away from this formula last year even to the small extent which they did.

4. As regards the refugees themselves, their chance of freeing themselves from the refugee camps, are now no better and perhaps slightly worse than before. It seems to be generally agreed that the "quiet talks" with Israel had resulted in a willingness to accept a limited number of refugees in Israel. While the Israeli Government would no doubt have expected to obtain something in return this would probably have been something short of a general settlement. The present debate in the United Nations and the change forced on the Americans by the Arabs will have left the Israelis more stubborn and more on the defensive at any rate for the time being. On reflection they may come to the conclusion that they did not come out of the debate too badly, but at the moment they are very bitter against the Americans and are saying that the return to the letter of paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (111) has jeopardised all chances of further discussions on the repatriation of some of these refugees, who may wish to return to Israel. For their part the Arabs will be very wary in the immediate future of any more talks with the Americans. They were forced to deny in public that these had taken place at any rate on the basis alleged by the Americans and they too for the time being will be very firm in their determination that the refugees must be repatriated *in toto* or not at all.

5. This brings me to the one factor which influenced this year's debate more than anything else. This was the wording of the report of the Conciliation Commission for

CONFIDENTIAL—GUARD

Palestine, and in particular its paragraph 2. The sentences in question read:

"Taking into account the Commission's intensive efforts during the past year, the United States suggested that, as a member of the Commission, it might initiate a series of 'quiet talks' with the parties concerned—Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic, and the United Arab Republic. It was proposed that the five Governments concerned should be approached at a high level and without preconditions as to the nature of the eventual solution of the problem. The Commission agreed to this approach and has been kept generally informed of the progress of these talks with the Arab and Israeli leaders during the past spring and summer."

I understand that a member of the Secretariat connected with the work of the Conciliation Commission warned its members, the United States, France and Turkey that a report in these terms would cause a violent reaction on the part of the Arab Governments, particularly if the text or at least its outline was not shown to the Arab representatives in advance. The United States representatives on the Commission and presumably the State Department, felt confident enough to ignore this warning. It is surprising that with their considerable experience in dealing with the Arabs, the French and Turkish members of the Commission were also persuaded to go ahead. In the event the Commission's report was produced at the last minute on the day before the debate began, thereby increasing Arab suspicions. It provoked an immediate and bitter reaction from the representatives of Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the U.A.R. The representatives of these countries denied—many of them on more than one occasion—that any talks had taken place on the basis described, and later on in the debate they circulated a formal letter to this effect. The combination of the wording of the Commission's report and of the United States draft resolution persuaded the Arabs that it was the United States' policy to depart from the letter of paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (111) and to attempt to settle the refugees problem on a different basis. This basis, they suspected (and accurately enough) was a mixture of repatriation, compensation and reintegration in the Arab world. The wording of the report also occasioned very hard words about the Commission itself. It was sarcastically

referred to as a "failure" rather than a "progress" report and proposals were made in several of the speeches by the Arab delegates for an alteration in the composition of the Commission. These proposals were however never formally tabled and the Commission continues for another year as it is.

6. At this stage in the debate, the Arabs were staunchly united against the United States and were apparently determined to force the resolution tabled by Afghanistan, Indonesia and Pakistan to a vote and to fight the American draft resolution with all means in their power. The Americans were then driven to the conclusion that they must make a move to satisfy the Arabs and as I have already said it was significant that the United States Government felt able to do this against the great Israeli pressure, which was mounting in Washington and New York.

7. Once the Americans had decided to meet the Arabs over paragraph 11 their task became much easier and they did not have too much difficulty in resisting Arab demands for the inclusion of some reference to the protection of Arab property in their resolution. The fact was of course that by this time the Arabs had achieved what they wanted in the form of a small but significant advance in their favour. They do not expect to gain much out of this annual debate and on this occasion they had been seen, through their efforts, to force the United States to an amendment of their own draft. This alone they considered moderately satisfactory and adequate for their public opinion.

8. This despatch would not be complete without a word about the performance of the Palestine-Arab delegation and in particular of Mr. Shukairy. Various demands were made, usually by the representative of Syria, to inflate the status under which Mr. Shukairy was heard. In spite of the partiality of the Roumanian chairman of the committee for the Arab cause these demands were on the whole frustrated. Mr. Shukairy as chairman of the delegation addressed the committee on three occasions for a total of nearly nine hours. Most of what he had said had been heard in the committee many times before when he had spoken in his previous capacities as representative of Syria and then of Saudi Arabia. His stamina and his flow of words have not diminished over the

years. Most of his venom was directed against the United States, though with inevitable references to Great Britain's historical role in the problem of the refugees. After Mr. Shukaiky's second statement, the representative of the United States briefly exercised his right to reply, to object to the abusive tone and substance of his speech, but said that he would not dignify Mr. Shukaiky with a detailed reply. This shot apparently went home since in his third speech Mr. Shukaiky almost pleaded for a response, claiming that he was a man of dignity and should therefore be dignified with at least some attention. Though the Arabs were tireless in their congratulations to him, many of them clearly wondered in private whether he was doing their cause any good, and the Jordanian Ambassador in particular was only waiting for the day when the Palestine-Arab delegation would depart and leave him in peace.

9. A side issue of the debate was the inept handling of the Africans by the Arabs. The Israelis have made a point of cultivating the countries of West Africa in particular, and have a wide measure of support and sympathy there. Nine French African countries, together with Sierra Leone were among the sponsors of the resolution calling for direct negotiations between the Governments concerned. Liberia subsequently joined them. The Arabs attempted to intimidate the African representatives by appealing to them as fellow members of the same continent and by threatening them with unspecified consequences after they refused to withdraw their resolution. No friends of theirs they maintained could entertain such an unfriendly proposal. These tactics in which the representatives of Syria and Algeria took the lead merely made the French Africans more obstinate. The representative of the Central African Republic said that he and his colleagues objected to being

spoken to like children; that the Arabs should know that they had minds of their own and a certain political awareness; and that it was their policy to believe that disputes and disagreements should be settled by negotiation. The representative of Liberia in the same afternoon flung back at the Arabs everything from the Bible to the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity. There is no doubt that relations between these two groups are never very good and are not improved by the tactlessness of the Arabs which plays into the hands of the Israelis. The exception to this is the delegation of the U.A.R. who, while active behind the scenes, are careful in their public statements, and show a diplomatic finesse which the other Arab delegations lack.

10. For the future, it is very hard to see how the Conciliation Commission is now to proceed or how it is to achieve anything. It is I believe realistic to expect that we will be faced with much the same sort of deadlock next year. The mandate of UNRWA will however be up for renewal and as a result the main attention will be focused on that.

11. A lesson which is to be drawn from this year's debate is that the United States need to make up their minds early on what they want to achieve and how they are to achieve it. This implies consultations in advance and some preparation with their friends. It is clearly an impossibility to devise a resolution which is satisfactory both to the Arabs and to the Israelis, but it prevents a great deal of uncertainty if the United States can work out the terms of their resolution and table it early in the debate. Circumstances may of course change between now and then, but if there are no significant developments I hope that this point can be put to the State Department before the XIXth Session.

I have, &c.

PATRICK DEAN.

CONFIDENTIAL—GUARD

3 35A

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

JW

I.9239

FROM:

Dated: 18th March, 1964,
1541
Rec'd: 19th March, 1964,
0437

Australian Embassy,
CAIRO.

49

CONFIDENTIAL.

I returned from Jordan last night.

2. I think visit was well worthwhile. I had several interviews with Prime Minister and with other leaders and with most Heads of Mission and Head of U.N.R.W.A.
3. Political situation is hard to assess because there are really no political elements at all, simply the King and his selection of Ministers who represent various personal followings. There were rumours that Sharif Hussein's Government is to resign (British Ambassador has advised Hussein to do this because of King's cavalier treatment of Cabinet), but these may be premature. Everything will depend on how far King can progress in his new role of loyal association with Nasser. King himself is said to be in a state of euphoria over this but Ministers are sceptical where not openly cynical.
4. Although Jordanians hope for support of cost to their existing forces from £15 million arabic military fund, more realistic service commanders expect Jordan's share will be in kind, for example, obsolescent (Crusader Ø) tanks and Hawker Hunter fighters from the U.A.R. This is likely to result in an increase of the Army's strength, because new units must be found to absorb equipment offered. King himself has spoken of proposing a whole new division, including an armoured brigade to be stationed on the west bank. Prime Minister regards this as a provocation to Israelis that they would not accept.
5. Palestinians, whether refugees or not, are most politically active force and could cause trouble at any time. They are said on the whole to be anti-monarchist rather than anti-Hussein. Shukeiry is energetically whipping them into an integral movement. The Prime Minister, however, who called Shukeiry a charlatan, seems to believe "Palestine Ø" threat to Jordan can be water.
6. Plans for Jordan waters, according to the Americans, include a scheme costing £stg.200 million for diversion of Yarmuk upstream from Maqarin. The American Embassy estimates that, apart from the prohibitive cost, which King Hussein has wholly failed to comprehend, the scheme would not harm Israel

...2/

353

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

JW

2.

I.9239

because it would divert only 80 M.C.M.

7. Full report follows by dispatch. Certain specific items dealt with in my immediately following telegram.

Stuart.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE
P.M.'s

IMMIGRATION

(Ø corrupt group)

19th March, 1964.

SEC FAS(1,2,4) AS(3) AS(JIC) S&SEA DL INT UN PACAM AMSP
C&P EAMEC E AFME@ INF MT

ACCRA CAPETOWN DAR-ES-SALAAM LAGOS LONDON NEW YORK(UN)
TEL AVIV WASHINGTON

Foreign Policy - Arab Refugees

181/4/4 F 352
On 2nd December, the Foreign Minister, Mrs. Meir, spoke in the Knesset about the recent United Nations General Assembly's debate on the Arab refugee problem. Mrs. Meir said that the United States had assumed a grave responsibility in reviving once again paragraph 11 of the Assembly's 1948 resolution calling for repatriation to Israel of all those refugees who wish to return and compensation for those who did not. Israel would never, Mrs. Meir said, negotiate on the basis of paragraph 11.

On 3rd December, at the close of its debate on the question, the Knesset, by a vote of 46-32, adopted a resolution which "takes cognizance of her (the Minister's) declaration that the Government of Israel will not conduct negotiations in the matter of the Arab refugees on the basis of paragraph 11 of the United Nations resolution 194 (III) of 1948". Unlike the Knesset resolutions of 1961 and 1962 the present one did not state that "the Arab refugees should not be returned to Israel territory and that the sole solution to the problem is their resettlement in the Arab States".

Relations with Germany

The Chancellor of the German Federal Republic, Professor Erhard, is reported to have said on 3rd December that he did not favour the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel "for the time being". He said that Germany had to bear in mind that by recognizing Israel she might favour the establishment of diplomatic relations between Arab countries and East Germany. "The question is not whether we should establish (with Israel) diplomatic relations, but when", said the Chancellor. Professor Erhard's statement has been widely criticized in the press here.

German Scientists in Egypt

It was announced on 12th December that the Cabinet of the German Federal Republic had decided to amend passport regulations in order to prevent West Germans from working abroad on the development of weapons of mass destruction. The Minister for the Interior had been instructed to meet with the leaders of the three parties to draft amendments and put them into effect as soon as possible.

Changes in the Army Command

On 1st January, General Zvi Tsur was succeeded by General Itzhak Rabin as Chief of Staff of the Israel Defence Forces.

General Rabin, 41, was born in Jerusalem. He joined the Palmah in 1940 and in 1948 he commanded Palmah's Har-El Battalion which was in charge of getting supplies through to besieged Jerusalem and fought critical battles in the Capital and the Corridor.

Cut in Military Service Period.

On 15th December, the Cabinet approved a plan to shorten the period of national military service for both men and women. Men in future will serve for two years and two months rather than for two and a half years; women for twenty months rather than two years. The reason for the cut was the increase in the number of eighteen-year old Israelis and the Government has stated that it will

Tel Aviv Security I
22.1.64

181/4/0 351

181-12

ALGIERS, DEC. 30 (UPI)--AMR CHOUKIRI, ARAB LEADER OF THE
+LIBERATION OF PALESTINE+ MOVEMENT AND PALESTINE DELEGATE TO THE
ARAB LEAGUE, ARRIVED HERE TODAY FROM TRIPOLI.

HE SAID HE WAS ON A TOUR OF ARAB STATES TO ASK THAT THE QUESTION
OF ARAB REFUGEES IN PALESTINE BE BROUGHT UP DURING THE JAN. 13
ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCE CALLED TO CONSIDER THE QUESTION OF
ISRAEL'S PLAN TO DIVERT THE JORDAN RIVER.

701:15A

181/4/0

181/4/4 350
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

MT

I.33587

FROM:

DATED: 3RD DECEMBER, 1963
2100

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS,
NEW YORK,

REC'D: 4TH DECEMBER, 1963
2125

UN1760.

UNCLASSIFIED.

PALESTINE REFUGEES.

PLENARY TODAY ADOPTED RESOLUTION FROM SPECIAL POLITICAL
COMMITTEE BY 82 (AUSTRALIA) - 1 (ISRAEL) - 14 (FRENCH AFRICANS
SOME CENTRAL AMERICANS).

2. ISRAEL REQUESTED SEPARATE VOTE ON OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 4
WHICH WAS ADOPTED 79 (AUSTRALIA) - 1 (ISRAEL) - 18 (AS ABOVE
WITH PORTUGAL PHILIPPINES NIGERIA NEPAL LIBERIA BURMA)

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT IMMIGRATION
A.G.'s DEPT
TREASURY
P.M.'s

5TH NOVEMBER, 1963

SEC FAS(1)(2)(4) AS(3) AS(JIC) LA S&SEA DL INT
UN@ PACAM AMSP EA EAMEC E AFMB@ INF ER CR
CAIRO TEL AVIV

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

349

181/4/4

MEH

O. 26799

TO:

Sent: 29th November, 1963
1355

Australian Embassy,
TEL AVIV.

153. RESTRICTED. PRIORITY.

Palestine Refugees.

Your 165.

You are probably aware that "direct negotiations" resolution was not taken to vote and United States resolution along lines of last year's resolution, with some modification to meet Arab position, was adopted.

Memorandum follows.

MIN. & DEPT E.A. (914/1)
P.M's

29th November, 1963

SEC FAS(1,2,4) AS(3) AS(JIC) S&SEA DL INT UN PACAM
AMSP EAMEC E AFME INF
CAIRO LONDON NEW YORK(UN) WASHINGTON

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

348/

CONFIDENTIAL

JW

I,32318

FROM:

Dated: 21st November, 1963,
1115
Rec'd: 22nd November, 1963,
1015

Australian Embassy,
TEL AVIV.

165 CONFIDENTIAL. PRIORITY.

Arab Debate.

Please pass U.N. New York.

According to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel Delegation, New York, has reported that Australia is now taking the attitude of support for resolution looking to direct negotiations on this matter testing previous approach from here. I would be very glad if I could know the position in last 24 hours. Considerable feeling has been worked up here against alleged charge of stand on the part of the United States yesterday. The Prime Minister delivered what is described as "sharp protest" to American Ambassador (against participation in Ø) attempts at compromise on draft resolutions before relevant General Assembly committee.

Hood.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE
P.M.'s

(Ø possible meaning
of corrupt groups)

22nd November, 1963.

*Mr. Langford
When you reply to Tel Aviv,
could we have a copy pls.
HJ*

SEC FAS(1,2,4) AS(3) AS(JIC) S&SEA DL INT UN EACAM AMSP
EAMEC E AFME INF

CAIRO LONDON NEW YORK(UN) WASHINGTON

Mr. Lee

Please ensure Hood is informed

27/11

CONFIDENTIAL

GMO

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

181/4/0

347

FROM:

Dated: 20th November, 1963.
1725

Australian High Commission,
OTTAWA.

Rec'd: 21st November, 1963.

296. CONFIDENTIAL.

Repeated to Washington, U.N. New York 117.

Special Political Committee - Palestine Refugees.

Your 396.

Substance of Message passed to Canadians.

External Affairs advise that Canada will support
American Resolution.

Martin has given Delegation some discretion to decide
whether to support or abstain on Resolution calling for Direct
Negotiations.

Decision will depend on final form of Resolutions as
tabled.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
P.M's

21st November, 1963.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SEC FAS(1,2,4) AS(3) AS(JIC) LA S&SEA DL INT UN@ PACAM
AMSP EAMEC E AFME INF

181/4/4

JERUSALEM, NOV. 21 (UPI)--ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER LEVI ESHKOL DELIVERED A STRONG PROTEST TO U.S. AMBASSADOR WALWORTH BARBOUR YESTERDAY ON CHANGES IN AN AMERICAN PROPOSAL FOR ARAB REFUGEES WHICH IS EXPECTED TO BE TABLED AT THE UNITED NATIONS TODAY OR TOMORROW.

INFORMED SOURCES SAID ISRAEL WAS ANGRY BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES KEPT HER IN THE DARK WHEN IT CHANGED ITS PROPOSAL FROM AN EXPRESSION OF REGRET AT NON-IMPLEMENTATION OF PARAGRAPH 11 OF THE 1948 U.N. ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION TO A DIRECT CALL FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTION.

PARAGRAPH 11 OF THE RESOLUTION CALLS FOR REPATRIATION OR COMPENSATION FOR ARAB REFUGEES EXCLUDED FROM ISRAEL IN 1948.

ISRAEL SEES THE AMERICAN MOVE AS KNUCKLING UNDER TO ARAB PRESSURE, THE SOURCES SAID.

(ABV IS UPI-198)

345

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

MEH

O. 26101

TO:

Sent: 21st November, 1963
1400

Australian Embassy,
CAIRO

217. CONFIDENTIAL.

Your telegram 236.

Immigration in past twelve months have received applications from many persons in Jordan wishing to migrate to Australia. Most of the applicants described themselves as Jordanian nationals.

2. Main purpose of Law's visit is to obtain information on general applicant group, and at the same time to gather information on Jordan as a possible source of good-type unassisted migrants.

3. Immigration agree that Law should make enquiries discreetly to avoid giving any impression that Australia is taking initiative of reducing the Palestine refugee problem particularly in view of likely Arab hostile reaction.

4. We were asked early this year by Johnson (former director of U.N.R.W.A.) whether Australia would be willing to contribute towards a solution of the Palestine refugee problem e.g. by taking a few skilled refugees as migrants. Our reply was that we would find it difficult to take such action at present time.

MIN. & DEPT E.A. (181/4/4)
MIN. & DEPT IMMIGRATION
P.M's DEPT
P.M's

21st November, 1963

SEC FAS(1,2,4) AS(3) AS(JIC) DL INT UN PACAM AMSP
EAMEC E AFME@ INF

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

344
181/4/4

MH

I.32155

FROM:

DATED: 20TH NOVEMBER, 1963.
0203

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED
NATIONS,
NEW YORK.

REC.'D: 21ST NOVEMBER, 1963.
1245

UN1681.

UNCLASSIFIED.

PRIORITY.

SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE.

PALESTINE ARAB REFUGEES.

U.S. TODAY SUBMITTED L.98/REV.1 WHICH DIFFERED FROM L.98
BY SUBSTITUTING FOR PARA.4 OF THE LATTER THE FOLLOWING:

'4. CALLS ON THE UNITED NATIONS CONCILIATION COMMISSION
FOR PALESTINE TO CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF PARAGRAPH 11 OF RESOLUTION 194 (111).

2. L.99 AND L.100 WERE SUBSEQUENTLY NOT PRESSED TO A VOTE
BY THEIR RESPECTIVE GROUPS OF SPONSORS.

3. ON A ROLL CALL VOTE, PARA.4 OF L.98/REV.1 WAS ADOPTED
75 (US, UK, CANADA, N.Z., AUSTRALIA) - 1 (ISRAEL) - 20.
L.98/REV.1 AS A WHOLE WAS ADOPTED 83 (US, UK, CANADA,
N.Z., AUSTRALIA) - 1 (ISRAEL) - 12.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
P.M.'S.

21ST NOVEMBER, 1963.

SEC FAS(1,2,4) AS(3) LA S&SEA M DL INT UNQ PACAM AMSP EAMEC
E INF AFME
CAIRO TEL AVIV

343
181/4/4

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

JT

I.31870

FROM:

DATED: 18TH NOVEMBER, 1963.

1720

REC'D: 19TH NOVEMBER, 1963.

0845

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS,
NEW YORK.

UN1653 UNCLASSIFIED. PRIORITY.

SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE - PALESTINE REFUGEES.

SPEAKERS AT MORNING MEETING INCLUDED JORDAN (FOREIGN MINISTER), TURKEY, SYRIA AND ITALY.

WITH ONLY SHUKAIRY (PALESTINE ARAB SPOKESMAN) AND AUSTRALIA LISTED TO SPEAK IN THE GENERAL DEBATE, THE AFTERNOON MEETING WAS CANCELLED.

2. JORDAN ASSERTED THAT U.S. DRAFT RESOLUTION (L.98) WOULD " CONTRIBUTE TO INSTABILITY AND INSECURITY AND, IN ALL PROBABILITY, TO AN OPEN CONFLICT" AND CALLED ON U. S. TO WITHDRAW ITS DRAFT RESOLUTION AND SUPPORT THE THREE POWERS DRAFT RESOLUTION (L.99).

JORDAN SAID IT WAS CLEAR TO EVERYONE THAT, LIKE ISRAEL, THE U.S. WAS SEEKING THE SOLUTION OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM BY SETTLEMENT OF THE BULK OF THE REFUGEES IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES.

JORDAN SAID IT WAS NOW SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING WHETHER ANY USEFUL PURPOSE COULD BE SERVED BY ITS CONTINUING TO DEAL WITH THE CONCILIATION COMMISSION AND WHETHER IT OUGHT NOT TO COMMEND FOR CONSIDERATION THE TERMINATION OF THE TERM OF OFFICE OF THE PRESENT MEMBERS OF THE CONCILIATION COMMISSION AND THE APPOINTMENT OF NEW MEMBERS "DEDICATED TO THE CAUSE OF THE UNITED NATIONS".

JORDAN REITERATED THE GENERAL ARAB VIEW THAT ISRAEL HAS NO SOVEREIGNTY IN ANY PART OF THE AREA OF PALESTINE IT NOW OCCUPIES, THAT ISRAEL'S STATUS THERE WAS THAT OF A "MILITARY OCCUPANT" THAT HAD INVADDED TERRITORY NOT BELONGING TO IT, THAT A STATE OF WAR STILL EXISTED BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARABS, AND THAT U.N. SHOULD APPLY ECONOMIC IF NOT MILITARY SANCTIONS TO ISRAEL.

3. SYRIA DENIED THAT PALESTINE QUESTION WAS SUI GENERIS AND PRESSED THE COMMON ARAB AND EXTREME ANTI COLONIALIST VIEW THAT THE ZIONISTS HAD NO BETTER CLAIM TO ANY PART OF PALESTINE THAN HAD THE AFRIKARNERS TO SOUTH WEST AFRICA. IN SOUTH WEST AFRICA AND IN PALESTINE, NATIONS HAD BEEN DEPRIVED OF THEIR NATIONAL TERRITORY.

4. ITALY AND TURKEY SPOKE BUT DID NOT DISCLOSE HOW THEY WOULD VOTE ON THE DRAFT RESOLUTIONS.

.../2

C. 2nd Eq.

10. 2. 7.



18/12/11

3A2

CONFIDENTIAL

Commonwealth Relations Office

3A1

181/4/4

With the Compliments
of

E. Uris

AIR MAIL)

H.C.)

H.C.)

H.C.)

ACTING H.C.)

(BY AIR MAIL)

19th November 1963)

29.11.63

British High Commission
Canberra

Canberra, Wellington, Karachi, Colombo,
Nicosia, Freetown, Dar es Salaam,
Mombasa and Salisbury.

19th November 18th.

R A Q

Following is assessment of political situation in Iraq at noon today.

2. Early on 18th November Baghdad Radio broadcast proclamations by President Aref ordering the armed forces, including the air force, to take control of Baghdad. The National Guard was declared dissolved and ordered to lay down its arms. Aref named himself as head of a new Revolutionary Council to be composed of the armed forces with extraordinary powers for one year. Brigadier Tikriti, the Air Force Commander, was mentioned as Deputy Commander-in-Chief. Measures against "the rebels of 13th November" presumably the Ba'ath supporters of Saadi, were also announced.

3. A curfew was imposed throughout Iraq and the frontiers closed. In Baghdad itself there was firing from all parts and reports of fighting in certain districts. Later in the morning the city was quieter, though with sporadic firing and the armed forces appeared to be in control.

4. The U.A.R. Minister of Guidance has issued a statement implying approval of recent events in Iraq and warning against outside interference. The Syrian Government on the other hand is reported to have denounced Aref's take-over and declared its support for the movement of 13th November (i.e. the Saadi faction). However the Syrians have now suspended their hostile broadcasts against President Aref and there are signs that they may prefer not to sever links with Baghdad.

5. One of the underlying causes of the coup may have been Army resentment at the growing disarray in the ranks of the Ba'ath party and the failure of the Government to control the National/

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

341

Outward Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office

181/4/4

TO: OTTAWA }
CANBERRA } (BY AIR MAIL)
WELLINGTON }
DELHI }
KARACHI (ACTING H.C.) }
COLOMBO }
ACCRA (ACTING H.C.) }
KUALA LUMPUR }
LAGOS (ACTING H.C.) }
NICOSIA }
FREETOWN } (BY AIR MAIL)
DAR ES SALAAM (ACTING H.C.) }
KINGSTON }
PORT OF SPAIN }
KAMPALA }
SALISBURY }

(Sent 23.38 hours 19th November 1963)

CYPHER

W. No. 625 CONFIDENTIAL

Air Mail to Ottawa, Canberra, Wellington, Karachi, Colombo, Accra, Kuala Lumpur, Lagos, Nicosia, Freetown, Dar es Salaam, Kingston, Port of Spain, Kampala and Salisbury.

My W. No. 331 Saving of November 18th.

I R A Q

Following is assessment of political situation in Iraq at noon today.

2. Early on 18th November Baghdad Radio broadcast proclamations by President Aref ordering the armed forces, including the air force, to take control of Baghdad. The National Guard was declared dissolved and ordered to lay down its arms. Aref named himself as head of a new Revolutionary Council to be composed of the armed forces with extraordinary powers for one year. Brigadier Tikriti, the Air Force Commander, was mentioned as Deputy Commander-in-Chief. Measures against "the rebels of 13th November" presumably the Ba'ath supporters of Saadi, were also announced.
3. A curfew was imposed throughout Iraq and the frontiers closed. In Baghdad itself there was firing from all parts and reports of fighting in certain districts. Later in the morning the city was quieter, though with sporadic firing and the armed forces appeared to be in control.
4. The U.A.R. Minister of Guidance has issued a statement implying approval of recent events in Iraq and warning against outside interference. The Syrian Government on the other hand is reported to have denounced Aref's take-over and declared its support for the movement of 13th November (i.e. the Saadi faction). However the Syrians have now suspended their hostile broadcasts against President Aref and there are signs that they may prefer not to sever links with Baghdad.
5. One of the underlying causes of the coup may have been Army resentment at the growing disarray in the ranks of the Ba'ath party and the failure of the Government to control the National/

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

National Guard (a pro-Saadi force), particularly after the events of 13th November. Another factor may have been resentment at interference in Iraqi internal affairs by the International Ba'ath leaders, Aflaq and Hafez, both foreigners and one a Christian. It is still too early to form an accurate estimate of the strength of Aref's support though he probably has the backing of the bulk of the armed forces. He may also have the support of the moderate Ba'athists though there has so far been no mention of the Ba'ath Party in the recent radio announcements. He himself has always been sympathetic to Nasser and his regime will probably be backed by pro-Nasser elements.

(To Ottawa, Canberra, Wellington and Salisbury)

6. You may inform Commonwealth authorities.

(To remaining addressees)

7. You may draw on the above in conversation with Commonwealth authorities.

(To Delhi only)

8. Your telegram No. 3258 of 18th November. You may inform Iraq Embassy of contents of above.

Copy to:-

D. II

C.R.O.

Mr. Sullivan

Foreign Office

Mr. Marsden

C.A.O.

Registry (4)

Dublin

U.K. Embassy Washington

Mr. O.G. Forster

U.K. Mission to U.N. New York

Mr. J.A. Scott

Nairobi

Mr. H.S.H. Stanley

Ottawa (6)
Canberra (6)
Wellington (4)
Karachi (4)
Colombo (4)
Accra (3)
Kuala Lumpur (4)
Lagos (8)
Nicosia (4)
Freetown (4)
Dar es Salaam (4)
Kingston (5)
Port of Spain (5)
Kampala (4)
Salisbury (4)

WESTERN AND MIDDLE EAST DEPT.
ME.45/33/1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

340

Outward Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office

TO: OTTAWA
CANBERRA
WELLINGTON
DELHI
KARACHI (ACTING H.C.)
COLOMBO
ACCRA (ACTING H.C.)
KUALA LUMPUR
LAGOS (ACTING H.C.)
NICOSIA
FREETOWN
DAR ES SALAAM (ACTING H.C.)
KINGSTON
PORT OF SPAIN
KAMPALA
SALISBURY

(Dated 18th November 1963)

W. No. 331 SAVING CONFIDENTIAL

POLITICAL SITUATION IN IRAQ

Following is background to present political manoeuvring in Iraq.

It appears that on the night of 11th-12th November, Al-Bakr, the Prime Minister and leader of the moderate Ba'athists, had Ali-Salih as Saadi, Deputy Prime Minister and leader of the extremist group, deported with four close associates to Spain.

2. On 13th November pro-Saadi extremists in Baghdad tried unsuccessfully to reverse the situation by force. But a curfew was imposed and the Defence Minister broadcast an appeal for unity, which was followed by messages of support from all five regional commanders.

3. Saadi's deportation provoked the Baghdad Ba'ath Party into pressing Government to call in leaders of International Ba'ath to help solve the crisis. Aflaq, Secretary-General of the International Ba'ath, General Hafez, Syrian leader and General Jadid, Syrian Chief of Staff, met with the Iraq Government and members of the Baghdad Ba'ath Party. Following this Hazem Jawad, Acting Minister of Interior and Talib Hussein, Foreign Minister, both prominent moderates, were deported to Beirut.

4. Thus a temporary compromise was reached with the leading extremists and moderates in exile with Al-Bakr still in control as Prime Minister. So far the dispute seems confined to the Party: but the situation generally is very unstable and the relationship between groups within the Ba'ath party is not clear.

5. Differences between the moderates and the extremists in the Ba'ath turn on external policy: the extremists are more anti-Nasser and inclined to a Iraqi-Syrian union. But also differences of personality and internal policy exist particularly over the rate of socialisation.

Ottawa/

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

(Ottawa, Canberra, Wellington and Salisbury)

6. You may inform Commonwealth authorities.

(Remaining addressees)

7. As situation remains confused, the above is for your background information only.

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Lee
 This was put to the
 Minister - with some additions
 by teleprinter 18/11.
 18/11/4
 18th November, 1963.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY - (UNRWA) ITEM ON PALESTINE REFUGEES

THE MINISTER:

The Special Political Committee is at present discussing the Commissioner-General's report on U.N.R.W.A.

2. The usual accusations and counter-accusations are being hurled at each other by Israel and other Arab States, and the usual question has arisen of what sort of resolution should be passed to provide for the continuance of U.N.R.W.A. for another year.

2. There are two draft resolutions before the Committee, and a third in prospect. They are, in order of priority in the voting:

(A) A three-power (Afghanistan, Indonesia, Pakistan) resolution, which would -

- (i) express deep regret that the repatriation and compensation of refugees had not been effected;
- (ii) note with regret the lack of progress achieved by the Palestine Conciliation Commission;
- (iii) direct the Palestine Conciliation Commission "to make further efforts regarding measures for the protection of property, property rights and interests of refugees."

(B) An American resolution, which would -

- (i) note with deep regret that the repatriation or compensation of refugees had not been effected;
- (ii) renew the request to the Palestine Conciliation Commission to continue its efforts to find a way to achieve progress on the Palestine-Arab refugee problem;
- (iii) urge non-contributing Governments to contribute to U.N.R.W.A. and contributing Governments to consider increasing their contributions.

(C) A resolution, to be sponsored by a group mainly of Africans, with a couple of Europeans and Latin Americans (about 20 in all), which would simply "renew the appeal to the Governments concerned to undertake direct negotiations, with the assistance of the P.C.C. with a view to finding an agreed solution to the question of the Arab Refugees".

4. The 3-power resolution represents the move by the Arabs' friends (three Muslim countries), and its third paragraph is strongly objected to by the Israelis

CONFIDENTIAL

338
CONFIDENTIAL

2.

on the grounds that it constitutes interference in Israel's domestic affairs. The American resolution is the same as that adopted last year, with the addition of the appeal for more funds. The 20-power resolution is put in by Israel's friends, and is strongly opposed by the Arabs. The Americans failed in an attempt to secure priority for their resolution.

5. Last year the Arab-inspired and Israel-inspired resolutions were finally withdrawn, leaving the field to the American resolution. The Americans exerted strong pressure to achieve this result, and we supported them by indicating that we would not support either competing resolution. In his statement the Australian representative said that the Australian Government could not support either resolution because it felt it would be unhelpful for the General Assembly to adopt resolutions which it was known in advance would be totally rejected by one of the sides.

6. The brief approved by you said that the Australian delegation should join with other delegations in heading off resolutions, from either side, which would not contribute towards a settlement, or help the refugees. The delegation has indicated that it proposes to vote for the American resolution (reserving however its position on additional contributions by contributing Governments), and to abstain on the other two resolutions.

7. It is recommended that the delegation's proposal be approved.

8. It is further recommended that in his statement the Australian representative, as well as indicating Australia's intention to maintain its present contribution (£90,000) to U.N.R.W.A., should urge that Governments not presently contributing should do so, in order to alleviate the Agency's acute financial problems, and should express again our hope that both sides will adopt a realistic and responsible approach to the refugees' problem and will not seek to frustrate a just solution for political purposes. We might also sound a warning that countries like Australia might not be prepared to support U.N.R.W.A. indefinitely, although this may cut little ice in view of the lack of an acceptable alternative. The Australian statement is scheduled either for today (Monday) or tomorrow (Tuesday), depending on the receipt of instructions.

9. For your information, the Prime Minister has received a letter from Mr. Ashkanasy, Q.C., asking about Australia's position on the Israeli-inspired direct negotiations resolution and on the subject of the treatment of Jews in the Soviet Union. A reply is being drafted.

10. The texts of the three resolutions are being sent separately.

(Patrick Shaw)
First Assistant Secretary,
Division II.

UNITED NATIONS BRANCH:
W.K. Flanagan:

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

MT

I.32028

FROM:

DATED: 19TH NOVEMBER, 1963
2115

REC'D: 20TH NOVEMBER, 1963
1249

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS,
NEW YORK.

UN1672. UNCLASSIFIED. PRIORITY.

SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE - PALESTINE REFUGEES.

MOST OF TODAY WAS DEVOTED TO SHUKAIRY'S FINAL ADDRESS ON
BEHALF OF PALESTINE ARABS.

ON BEHALF OF A GROUP OF 18 SPONSORS, CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
TODAY INTRODUCED THE "DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS" DRAFT RESOLUTION (L.100).
GENERAL DEBATE CONCLUDED THIS EVENING AND DEBATE ON THE THREE
DRAFT RESOLUTIONS OPENS TOMORROW, WHEN VOTING WILL PROBABLY TAKE
PLACE.

AUSTRALIA HAS NOT SPOKEN.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
P.M.'s

20TH NOVEMBER, 1963.

SEC FAS(1)(2)(4) AS(3) AS(JIC) LA S&SEA UN@ PACAM
AMSP C&P EAMEC E AFME INF CR

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

MT

I.32051

FROM,

DATED: 19TH NOVEMBER, 1963
2135
REC'D: 20TH NOVEMBER, 1963
1330

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS,
NEW YORK.

UN1673. CONFIDENTIAL. PRIORITY.

SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE - PALESTINE REFUGEES.

YOUR 1096 AND OUR 1672.

I INFORMED PLIMPTON WHO IS HANDLING THIS ISSUE FOR UNITED STATES OF THE MINISTER'S INSTRUCTIONS BUT HE RESERVED HIS REACTION, PENDING THE OUTCOME OF THE EFFORTS THE UNITED STATES IS MAKING TO HAVE BOTH THE "DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS" (L.100) AND THE THREE-POWER (L.99) DRAFT RESOLUTIONS WITHDRAWN.
IF THIS UNITED STATES EFFORT FAILS, PLIMPTON MAY PRESS US TO ABSTAIN ON L.100 BUT THIS HAS NOT YET HAPPENED.

2. THE ISRAELIS ARE SAID TO BE HOLDING OUT FOR A VOTE ON L.100 AND THE ARABS TO BE INSISTING ON THE AMENDMENT OF UNITED STATES DRAFT RESOLUTION (L.98) TO ACCOMMODATE TO A GREATER EXTENT THE ARAB VIEWPOINT.

3. CANADIAN DELEGATION HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED PERSONALLY BY MARTIN TO VOTE FOR L.98 AND L.100 BUT HAVE ASKED HIM TO LET THEM ABSTAIN ON L.100 IF IT SHOULD BE PUT TO THE VOTE.

4. NEW ZEALAND DELEGATION HAS FIRM INSTRUCTIONS FROM THEIR PRIME MINISTER TO VOTE FOR EACH OF THE THREE DRAFT RESOLUTIONS.

HAY.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
P.M.'s

20TH NOVEMBER, 1963

SEC FAS(1)(2)(4) AS(3) AS(JIC) LA S&SEA DL INT
UN@ PACAM AMSF EAMEC E AFME INF
CAIRO LONDON TEL AVIV WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

181/4/4

ISW.

0.25961.

TO:

Sent: 19th November, 1963.
2100.

Australian Mission to
United Nations,
NEW YORK....1096.

REPEATED:

Australian High Commission,
OTTAWA....396.

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON....2945 (for information).

Australian High Commission,
WELLINGTON....SAV.98.

Australian Embassy,
TEL AVIV....SAV.26.

Australian Embassy,
CAIRO....SAV.29.

CONFIDENTIAL. IMMEDIATE.

For Hay.

Your UN1654. Special Political Committee -
Palestine Refugees.

Minister's instructions are to support both the American resolution and the resolution calling for "direct negotiations" and to abstain in the three-power draft resolution.

2. Minister would like you to see Adlai Stevenson and explain that we have firm reasons for wishing to support the "direct negotiations" resolution and express hope that they will understand our position.

3. United States opposition to Canadian vote for the "direct negotiations" resolution is presumably based, inter alia, on American internal political considerations. If Canadians maintain position previously reported by you, that is of support both for American draft and "direct negotiations" draft you should do likewise.

4. If, however, Americans consider that their position on this issue would be seriously jeopardised by support

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CONFIDENTIAL

334
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

ISW.

- 2 -

0.25961.

for "direct negotiations" resolution, and in those circumstances, Canadians agree to abstain on that resolution, you should do likewise.

5. We are informing New Zealanders of our proposed support for the "direct negotiations" resolution in the hope that Australia, Canada and New Zealand could adopt similar attitude.

6. In circumstances we do not see need for Australian statement in debate. It is, however, left to your discretion as to whether or not you make an explanation of voting and if so, whether before or after.

7. In the event that you explain our attitude towards the "direct negotiations" draft resolution it should be on short general lines that such action would be in conformity with Charter principles. In the event that you explain support for American resolution you might while indicating Australia's intention to maintain its present contribution to U.N.R.W.A. urge governments not at present contributing to do so in order to alleviate the Agency's acute financial problems, and express our hope again that both sides will adopt a realistic and responsible approach to the refugee problem and will not seek to frustrate a just solution for political purposes.

FOR OTTAWA.

Please convey gist of above to Canadian authorities urgently as vote is likely to be taken 19th November.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
P.M.'s

20th November, 1963.

SEC FAS(1,2,4) AS(3) LA UN@ ER CR PACAM EAMEC AFME
INF DL C&P ADMIN AS(JIC)

333
CONFIDENTIAL

THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY

CAIRO

CONFIDENTIAL

Your Telegram 236.

PRIME MINISTER'S DEPT.
IMMIGRATION DEPT.

1. Immigration in past twelve months have received applications from many persons in Jordan wishing to migrate to Australia. Most of the applicants described themselves as Jordanian nationals.


2. Main purpose of Law's visit is to obtain information on general applicant group, and at the same time to gather information on Jordan as a possible source of good-type unassisted migrants.

3. Immigration agree that Law should make enquiries discreetly to avoid giving any impression that Australia is taking initiative of reducing the Palestine refugee problem particularly in view of likely Arab hostile reaction.

4. We were asked early this year by Johnson (former director of U.N.R.W.A.) whether Australia would be willing to contribute towards a solution of the Palestine refugee problem e.g. by taking a few skilled refugees as migrants. Our reply was that we would find it difficult to take such action at present time.

See paper 21/11

be



181/4/4
CONFIDENTIAL

21/11/63

INWARD CABLEGRAM

332

181/4/4

181/4/4

MH

I.31763

FROM:

Dated: 16th November, 1963.
1509Australian Embassy,
CAIRO.Rec'd: 17th November, 1963.
0831236. CONFIDENTIAL.

Law, Immigration Officer here, has been instructed by his department to visit Jordan on 29th November to investigate:

- (a) European migration from that country, and
 - (b) Incidentally, to obtain certain information about possible migration of Palestine refugees.
2. (b) of above presents a dilemma. Although Law proposes only to obtain information from executive and other discreet sources in Amman, it seems a pity for him to get that far without his assessing refugee material at first hand or discussing its technical qualifications with U.N.W.R.A. officials. Political delicacy, however, of Law's showing public interest in this question may prevent him doing so.
3. I would appreciate advise on your current thinking about refugee migration and suggest this be communicated also to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. ~~Heed~~ and I recently discussed a ~~the idea~~ of reducing Palestine refugee problem by siphoning off some of the younger and more skilled Palestinians of whom there are high reports. We both realize, however, that this is likely to provoke lively Arab hostility unless carefully handled. Moreover, present time is perhaps least opportune to contemplate initiative.
4. Law is reporting along similar lines to his department after discussion with me. It may not be possible for him in the light of your consideration of supporters more than informing himself indirectly on this question during the current visit, but your views on the general principles involved would nevertheless be valuable before he goes to Jordan.

Stuart.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT IMMIGRATION
P.M.'S.

Ø Corrupt groups.
Repeat being obtained.
17th November, 1963.

SEC FAS(1,2,4) AS(3) AS(JIC) DL INT PACAM AMSP EAMEC E
INF AFME@

Make: ① Make sure Immigration are aware that question of Palestine Refugees is under discussion in UN. ② Consider desirability of admitting a few Arabs as something to be quoted when we are defending our Migration Policy. Discuss with UN, INF, CFP etc.

CONFIDENTIAL

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

331

181/4/4

JW

AMENDED COPY

I.31569

FROM:

Dated: 14th November, 1963,
1850
Rec'd: 15th November, 1963,
1638

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK.

UN1633 UNCLASSIFIED.

Special Political Committee - Palestine Refugees.

Speaking at length on behalf of "the Palestine Arab Delegation", Shukairy strongly attacked the refusal of the United States to compel Israel to comply with United Nations resolutions, and Zionist influence on United States policy and tactics, and declared the United States not qualified to remain a member of the Conciliation Commission for Palestine. Shukairy assailed continuing discrimination by Israel against Christians and Moslems on religious and racial grounds and affirmed right of Palestine Arabs to Palestine as their homeland. A great part of this speech was designed to win support for operative paragraph 3 of the Three-Power (Afghan) Draft Resolution (A/SPC/L.99).

2. United States delegation accused Shukairy of "many misrepresentations" and declined to reply to them.

3. India, Guinea and Tunisia took the Arab line in the debate today.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
P.M.'s

(* Amendment)

18th November, 1963.

SEC FAS(1,2,4) AS(3) AS(JIC) LA S&SEA DL INT UN@ PACAM
EAMEC E AFME INF CR AM&SP
CAIRO TEL AVIV

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

330
181/4/4

MT

I.31748

FROM.

DATED. 15TH NOVEMBER, 1963
2200

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS,
NEW YORK.

REC'D. 16TH NOVEMBER, 1963
2053

UN1645.

UNCLASSIFIED.

SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE - PALESTINE REFUGEES.

SPEAKERS TODAY INCLUDED BULGARIA, LIBERIA, KUWAIT, GREECE, ISRAEL, CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC, INDONESIA AND ARABS REPLYING TO ISRAEL.

2. IN COURSE OF GENERAL ATTACK ON ARABS, ISRAEL (MRS. GOLDA MEIR) SAID ARAB THESIS REGARDING PARAGRAPH 11 OF RESOLUTION 194 (III) APPEARED TO BE ROUGHLY AS FOLLOWS -

- (A) ISRAEL HAS NO RIGHT TO EXIST, AND MUST BE DESTROYED,
- (B) ARAB REFUGEES ARE RIGHTFUL OWNERS OF THE COUNTRY,
- (C) IF REPATRIATED, THEY WILL TRY TO DESTROY ISRAEL FROM WITHIN,
- (D) AS GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL WAS NOT THE LAWFUL GOVERNMENT OF THE COUNTRY, ARAB STATES HAD NOTHING TO DISCUSS WITH IT, NOT EVEN FUTURE OF THE REFUGEES,
- (E) NEVERTHELESS ISRAEL HAD TO OPEN ITS BORDERS TO THE REFUGEES,
- (F) TASK OF PALESTINE CONCILIATION COMMISSION WAS TO IMPLEMENT ARAB VERSION OF PARAGRAPH 11.

MRS MEIR REITERATED ISRAEL'S WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE ARAB GOVERNMENT THE REFUGEE PROBLEM AS A SEPARATE ISSUE OR IN THE CONTEXT OF AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT.

ISRAEL ALSO INDICATED THAT PARAGRAPH THREE OF THE THREE-POWER DRAFT RESOLUTION WAS TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE.

3. CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC FORESHADOWED A DRAFT RESOLUTION CALLING FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS.

IRAQ SAID ITS PRESENTATION WOULD BE AN AFFRONT TO ARABS.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT IMMIGRATION
A.G.'s DEPT
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE
TREASURY
P.M.'s

17TH NOVEMBER, 1963

SEC FAS(1)(2)(4) AS(3) AS(JIC) LA S&SEA M&I M DL INT
UN@ PACAM AMSP EA EAMEC E AFME@ INF ER CR
CAIRO TEL AVIV

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

MT

I.31724

FROM:

DATED, 15TH NOVEMBER, 1963
1520

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS,
NEW YORK.

REC'D, 16TH NOVEMBER, 1963
1900

UN1644. CONFIDENTIAL.

SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE - PALESTINE REFUGEES.

DRAFT RESOLUTION (OUR NO.1645, PARAGRAPH 3) ON DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WILL, ACCORDING TO ISRAELIS, BE PRESENTED ON MONDAY.

COSPONSORS WILL PROBABLY INCLUDE LUXEMBOURG AND ICELAND IN ADDITION TO THOSE INDICATED IN OUR 1631.

THE DRAFT RESOLUTION IS LIKELY TO CONSIST ONLY OF FOLLOWING -

"THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

"RENEWS ITS APPEAL TO THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED TO UNDERTAKE DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS, WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THE P.C.C. IF THEY SO DESIRE, WITH A VIEW TO FINDING AN AGREED SOLUTION TO THE QUESTION OF THE ARAB REFUGEES".

2. THE THREE RESOLUTIONS COULD BE VOTED ON NEXT TUESDAY.

AS MANY DELEGATIONS ARE AWAITING INSTRUCTIONS, LIKELY RESULTS ARE HARD TO PREDICT, BUT IT IS POSSIBLE THAT ALL THREE WILL OBTAIN SIMPLE MAJORITIES.

AMONG FRIENDLY DELEGATIONS, NEW ZEALAND WILL VOTE FOR AMERICAN DRAFT AND ABSTAIN ON OTHER TWO.

BRITISH DELEGATION ALSO FAVOURS THIS COURSE.

CANADIANS THINK THEIR INSTRUCTIONS MAY BE TO VOTE FOR BOTH AMERICAN AND DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS RESOLUTIONS AND ABSTAIN ON THREE-POWER RESOLUTION.

UNITED STATES DELEGATION IS CONSIDERING RECOMMENDING TO STATE DEPARTMENT THAT UNITED STATES VOTE AGAINST "DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS" RESOLUTION AND THE THREE-POWER RESOLUTION.

MOST LATINS MAY ADOPT NEUTRAL POSTURE, AND SOME MAY EVEN ABSTAIN ON ALL THREE RESOLUTIONS.

3. AS A NEGATIVE VOTE BY AUSTRALIA ON EITHER OR BOTH OF THE THREE-POWER AND "DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS" RESOLUTIONS WOULD BE CERTAIN TO GIVE OFFENCE TO THE ARABS AND ISRAELIS RESPECTIVELY, WE RECOMMEND THAT WE SHOULD ABSTAIN ON BOTH THESE RESOLUTIONS.

4. WE PROPOSE TO VOTE FOR THE AMERICAN DRAFT WHILE MAKING SUITABLE RESERVATION WITH REGARD TO PARAGRAPH 5 (INCREASED CONTRIBUTIONS TO U.N.R.W.A.) FROM ALREADY CONTRIBUTING GOVERNMENTS).

5. GLAD OF ADVICE.

WE ARE LISTED TO SPEAK ON MONDAY OR TUESDAY, AT THE END OF THE GENERAL DEBATE.

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

328
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM₂^{1.31724}

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT IMMIGRATION
A.G.'s DEPT
TREASURY
P.M.'s

17TH NOVEMBER, 1963

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SEC FAS(1)(2)(4) AS(3) AS(JIC) LA S&SEA M DL INT
UN@ PACAM AMSP EA EAMEC E AFME ER CR INF
CAIRO TEL AVIV

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

JW

I.31565

FROM:

DATED: 14TH NOVEMBER, 1963,
1835
REC'D: 15TH NOVEMBER, 1963,
1609

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS,
NEW YORK.

UN1631 CONFIDENTIAL.

SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE - PALESTINE REFUGEES.

OUR 1618, PARAGRAPH 2.
ISRAELI RESOLUTION IS LIKELY TO BE PRESENTED TOMORROW.
ISRAELIS HAVE TOLD ARGENTINIANS THAT THERE WILL BE
OVER TWENTY COSPONSORS, INCLUDING SIXTEEN AFRICANS
(ESSENTIALLY THE BRAZZAVILLE GROUP), AT LEAST TWO LATIN
AMERICANS (GUATEMALA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND POSSIBLY
HAITI) AND PROBABLY TWO EUROPEANS (DENMARK AND NETHERLANDS).

2. REFERENCE PARAGRAPH 4 OF OUR 1618, U.A.R. DELEGATION
TOLD US IN CONFIDENCE TODAY THAT ARABS WILL NOT PRESS
QUESTION OF SHUKAIRY'S DESCRIPTION TO A VOTE.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
P.M.'s

16TH NOVEMBER, 1963.

SEC FAS(1,2,4) AS(3) AS(JIC) LA S&SEA DL INT UNO PACAM
AMSP EAMEC E AFME INF CR

CAIRO TEL AVIV

327
181/4/4
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

326

181/4/4

JPH

I.31569.

DATED: 14TH NOVEMBER, 1963.

1850.

REC'D: 15TH NOVEMBER, 1963.

1638.

FROM:

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS,
NEW YORK.

UN1633.

UNCLASSIFIED.

SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE - PALESTINE REFUGEES.

SPEAKING AT LENGTH ON BEHALF OF "THE PALESTINE ARAB DELEGATION", SHUKAIRY STRONGLY ATTACKED THE REFUSAL OF THE UNITED STATES TO COMPEL ISRAEL TO COMPLY WITH UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS, AND ZIONIST INFLUENCE ON UNITED STATES POLICY AND TACTICS, AND DECLARED THE UNITED STATES NOT QUALIFIED TO REMAIN A MEMBER OF THE CONCILIATION COMMISSION FOR PALESTINE.

SHUKAIRY ASSAILED CONTINUING DISCRIMINATION BY ISRAEL AGAINST CHRISTIANS AND EASTERNS ON RELIGIOUS AND RACIAL GROUNDS AND AFFIRMED RIGHT OF PALESTINE ARABS TO PALESTINE AS THEIR HOMELAND.

A GREAT PART OF THIS SPEECH WAS DESIGNED TO WIN SUPPORT FOR OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE THREE-POWER (AFGHAN) DRAFT RESOLUTION (A/SPC/L.99.)

2. UNITED STATES DELEGATION ACCUSED SHUKAIRY OF "MANY MISREPRESENTATIONS" AND DECLINED TO REPLY TO THEM.
3. INDIA GUINEA AND TUNISIA TOOK THE ARAB LINE IN THE DEBATE TODAY.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
P.M.'s

16TH NOVEMBER, 1963.

SEC FAS(1,2,4) AS(3) AS(JIC) LA S&SEA DL INT UN@
PACAM EAMEC E AFME INF CR AM&SP
CAIRO TEL AVIV.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

I.31537

181/4/4 325

DATED: 14TH NOVEMBER, 1963.

FROM:

INWARD CABLEGRAM

REC'D: 15TH NOVEMBER, 1963.
1034

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS,
NEW YORK.

UN1617. UNCLASSIFIED.

SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE - PALESTINE REFUGEES.

SPEAKERS TODAY INCLUDED LEBANON, U.S.S.R. AND NEW ZEALAND. LEBANON READ OUT A LETTER ADDRESSED TO CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEE BY REPRESENTATIVES OF U.A.R., LEBANON, SYRIA AND JORDAN, DRAWING ATTENTION TO 'INCORRECT STATEMENTS' IN CONCILIATION COMMISSION REPORT (A/5545) PARTICULARLY THE SECTION DEALING WITH THE 'QUIET TALKS' THE UNITED STATES IS STATED IN THE REPORT AS HAVING INITIATED WITH THE FIVE GOVERNMENTS DIRECTLY CONCERNED.

2. NEW ZEALAND EMPHASIZED HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS OF PROBLEM. PRAISED THE WORK OF U.N.R.W.A.--. URGED DIRECT CONTACT BETWEEN PARTIES CONCERNED AND CONTINUANCE OF EFFORTS OF P.C.C.--. SUGGESTED THAT THE ACTUAL WISHES OF THE REFUGEES WITH REGARD TO REPATRIATION OR COMPENSATION BE ASCERTAINED; AND EXHORTED ARAB COUNTRIES TO STOP 'WISHING ISRAEL OUT OF EXISTENCE'. SYRIA THEREUPON ATTACKED NEW ZEALAND SPEECH.

3. THE MEETING DETERIORATED INTO ANOTHER PROLONGED PROCEDURAL WRANGLE THIS TIME CONCERNED WITH THE DESCRIPTION OF SHUKAIRY IN THE HEADING OF DOCUMENT A/SPC/90.

THE ARABS ARGUED THAT SHUKAIRY SHOULD BE DESCRIBED AS 'CHAIRMAN OF THE PALESTINE ARAB DELEGATION' RATHER THAN AS THE 'SPOKESMAN OF THE GROUP MENTIONED IN DOCUMENT A/SPC/89'.

BUNCHE (SECRETARIAT) INTERVENED DURING DEBATE TO DEFEND PRESENT DESCRIPTION AS AN ACCURATE REPRODUCTION OF CHAIRMAN'S DESCRIPTION OF SHUKAIRY ON 4TH NOVEMBER WHEN DECISION WAS TAKEN TO HEAR HIM.

ARABS DID NOT PRESS FOR VOTE BUT RESERVED RIGHT TO RAISE MATTER AGAIN.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
P.M's.

15TH NOVEMBER, 1963.

SEC FAS(1.2.4) AS(3) AS(JIC) LA S&SEA DL INT UN@ PACAM
AMSP EAMEC E AFME INF CR
CAIRO TEL AVIV

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

0.25427

DW

Sent: 13th November, 1963.
1945

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK.

1061. CONFIDENTIAL. PRIORITY.

Your 1598, 1611, 1612, 1613, 1614.

Special Political Committee - Palestine Refugees.

We feel brief Australian statement is desirable, particularly in light of tabling of draft resolutions by United States and 3-power group.

2. Paragraph 6. 7 and 8 of brief are relevant.

3. Specific reference should be made to:-

(a) Australian contributions over many years to U.N.R.W.A;
(For your information, there is no possibility of an Australian contribution in convertible funds this year.)

(b) Our concern that an eventual satisfactory solution to the problem should be found;

(c) The need for other Government and private contributions to U.N.R.W.A.

4. With regard to draft resolutions, we would not wish to co-sponsor United States resolution (for general reasons, as well as difficulty with call for increased contributions), but you should express Australian support while reserving position on further contribution by contributing Governments. Our inclination would be to abstain on three-power resolution if this is put to the vote first, but we would like to know intentions of friendly Governments and whether amendments to meet Israeli objections are likely.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.(914/1)
P.M.'s

14th November, 1963.

SEC FAS(1.2.4) AS(3) AS(JIC) LA S&SEA DL INT UN PACAM AMSP
EAMEC@ E AFME INF ER CR
TEL AVIV GENEVA WASHINGTON LONDON

323

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

181/4/4

CONFIDENTIAL

MB.

I.31441.

FROM:

DATED: 13TH NOVEMBER, 1963.
1900.AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO
UNITED NATIONS,
NEW YORK.REC'D: 14TH NOVEMBER, 1963.
2200.

UN.1618

CONFIDENTIAL.SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE - PALESTINE REFUGEES

AS OVER TWENTY SPEAKERS REMAIN TO BE HEARD IN THE GENERAL DEBATE IT IS UNLIKELY THAT RESOLUTIONS WILL COME TO A VOTE BEFORE TUESDAY OF NEXT WEEK.

2. IT NOW APPEARS ALMOST CERTAIN THAT ISRAELIS WILL INTRODUCE A THIRD RESOLUTION WITH A 'DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS' FLAVOUR.

MRS MEYER TOLD LATIN AMERICANS YESTERDAY EVENING THAT ISRAEL DISLIKED BOTH THE DRAFTS SO FAR SUBMITTED, AND WOULD THEREFORE SUBMIT ONE OF ITS OWN.

IF ISRAEL GOES AHEAD, AFGHAN AND ISRAELI DRAFTS MIGHT CANCEL EACH OTHER OUT, LEAVING THE UNITED STATES RESOLUTION AS THE SOLE PROPOSAL TO BE VOTED ON.

3. PENDING DEVELOPMENTS, FRIENDLY DELEGATIONS HAVE NOT AS YET ADOPTED FIRM POSITIONS ON AFGHAN AND UNITED STATES DRAFTS, ALTHOUGH BRITISH FEEL IT MIGHT BE DIFFICULT NOT TO VOTE FOR AFGHAN DRAFT IF IT COMES TO VOTE.

ON THE OTHER HAND, CANADIANS SEE DIFFICULTIES IN PARAGRAPHS 2 WHICH GIVES RESTRICTIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTIONS OF P.C.C., AND 3, DEALING WITH PROPERTY RIGHTS.

4. REFERENCE PARAGRAPH 3 OF OUR 1617, IT WAS CLEAR THAT ARABS DID NOT PRESS MATTER OF SHUKAIRY'S DESCRIPTION TO A VOTE TODAY SIMPLY BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT CONFIDENT OF WINNING.

CONFIDENTIAL

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE
P.M.'s

14TH NOVEMBER, 1963.

SEC FAS(1, 2, 4) AS(3) AS(JIC) S&SEA DL INT UN PACAM
AMSP EAMEC E AFME INF
CAIRO TEL AVIV

INWARD CABLEGRAM

GMO

181/4/4 322
1131304

FROM:

SENT: 12TH NOVEMBER, 1963.
2135AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS,
NEW YORK.REC'D: 13TH NOVEMBER, 1963.
1613.

UN1612 UNCLASSIFIED PRIORITY

SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE - PALESTINE REFUGEES.

OUR 1611, PARAGRAPH 2.

AFTER RECALLING PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS, DRAFT RESOLUTION
OF AFGHANISTAN INDONESIA AND PAKISTAN READS -
BEGINS -"NOTING THE ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER-GENERAL
OF UNRWA COVERING THE PERIOD FROM 1ST JULY 1962 TO 30
JUNE 1963 -

"1. EXPRESSES ITS DEEP REGRET THAT REPATRIATION AND
COMPENSATION OF THE REFUGEES, AS PROVIDED FOR IN PARAGRAPH
11 OF RESOLUTION 194 (III) HAS NOT BEEN EFFECTED AND THAT
THEREFORE THE SITUATION OF THE REFUGEES CONTINUES TO BE
A MATTER OF SERIOUS CONCERN,

2. NOTES WITH DEEP REGRET THAT THE UNITED NATIONS
CONCILIATION COMMISSION HAS NOT MADE PROGRESS IN CARRYING
OUT THE TASK ENTRUSTED TO IT IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF GENERAL
ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 1456 (XIV) AND URGES THE COMMISSION
TO MAKE SERIOUS EFFORTS TO SECURE THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF PARAGRAPH 11 OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 194
(III) AND REPORT THEREON NOT LATER THAN 15TH OCTOBER, 1964,

3. DIRECTS THE UNITED NATIONS CONCILIATION COMMISSION
FOR PALESTINE TO MAKE FURTHER EFFORTS REGARDING MEASURES
FOR THE PROTECTION OF PROPERTY, PROPERTY RIGHT AND
INTERESTS OF REFUGEES,

4. EXPRESSES ITS THANKS TO THE COMMISSIONER-GENERAL AND
HIS STAFF OF THE AGENCY FOR THEIR CONTINUED FAITHFUL EFFORTS
TO CARRY OUT THE MANDATE OF THE AGENCY AND TO THE
SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AND PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS FOR THEIR
VALUABLE AND CONTINUING WORK IN ASSISTING THE REFUGEES, AND

5. EXPRESSES ITS SINCERE APPRECIATION TO DR. JOHN DAVIS,
ON THE OCCASION OF HIS RESIGNATION AS COMMISSIONER-
GENERAL OF UNRWA, FOR HIS EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION
OF THE AGENCY DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS AND FOR HIS
DEDICATED SERVICE TO THE WELFARE OF THE REFUGEES".

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE
P.M.'s

13TH NOVEMBER, 1963.

GMO

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

181/4/4
321
I.31807

FROM:

SENT: 12TH NOVEMBER, 1963.
2120

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS,
NEW YORK.

REC'D: 13TH NOVEMBER, 1963.
1650

UN1611 UNCLASSIFIED PRIORITY

SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE - PALESTINE REFUGEES.

MOROCCO PAKISTAN MAURITANIA ALGERIA AND MALI WERE AMONG
TODAY'S SPEAKERS.

ALGERIA CONDEMNED PALESTINE CONCILIATION COMMISSION
AS UNREPRESENTATIVE OF THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT COUNTRIES OF
AFRICA AND ASIA AND CALLED FOR A RENEWAL OF THE STRUGGLE
FOR THE LIBERATION OF THEIR HOMELAND BY PALESTINE ARABS.

MUSLIM DELEGATIONS REFER TO PETITIONERS AS "THE PALESTINE
DELEGATION".

2. AFGHANISTAN WITH PAKISTAN AND INDONESIA INTRODUCED
INTO THE COMMITTEE THE DRAFT RESOLUTION IN OUR NO.1612.

3. UNITED STATES HAD EARLIER HANDED DRAFT RESOLUTION
IN OUR NO.1613 TO THE SECRETARIAT.

AFTER A LONG PROCEDURAL WRANGLE AND A ROLL CALL
VOTE 38 - 18 (UNITED STATES) - 37 (AUSTRALIA, CANADA) THE
CHAIRMAN'S RULING THAT AFGHAN DRAFT HAD PRIORITY WITH RESPECT
TO TIME OF SUBMISSION (CF RULE 132) WAS UPHELD.

4. AFGHAN DRAFT WILL APPARENTLY NOW BE PUT TO THE
VOTE FIRST.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE
P.M.'s

SEC FAS(1,2,4) AS(3) AS(JIC) LA S&SEA DL INT UN@
PACAM AMSP EAMEC E AFME INF

CAIRO LONDON TEL AVIV WELLINGTON

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

320
181/4/4

MB.

I.31306.

FROM:

DATED: 12TH NOVEMBER, 1963.
2145.

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO
UNITED NATIONS,
NEW YORK..

REC'D: 13TH NOVEMBER, 1963.
1642.

UN.1613.

UNCLASSIFIED.

PRIORITY.

SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE.

OUR 1611, PARAGRAPH 3.

AFTER RECALLING EARLIER RESOLUTIONS, UNITED STATES
DRAFT RESOLUTION READS -

'NOTING THE ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER
GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR
PALESTINE REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST, COVERING THE
PERIOD FROM 1ST JULY 1962 TO 30TH JUNE 1963 (A/55-3),

NOTING WITH DEEP REGRET THAT THE REPATRIATION OR
COMPENSATION OF THE REFUGEES AS PROVIDED FOR IN PARAGRAPH
11 OF RESOLUTION 194 (III) HAS NOT BEEN EFFECTED, THAT
NO SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN THE PROGRAMME
ENDORSED IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF RESOLUTION 513 (VI) FOR THE
REINTEGRATION OF REFUGEES EITHER BY REPATRIATION OR RE-
SETTLEMENT AND THAT, THEREFORE THE SITUATION OF THE REFUGEES
CONTINUES TO BE A MATTER OF SERIOUS CONCERN,

1. EXPRESSES ITS SINCERE APPRECIATION TO DR JOHN H. DAVIS,
ON THE OCCASION OF HIS RESIGNATION AS COMMISSIONER GENERAL
OF THE UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR
PALESTINE REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST, FOR HIS EFFICIENT
ADMINISTRATION OF THE AGENCY DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS,
AND FOR HIS DEDICATED SERVICE TO THE WELFARE OF THE
REFUGEES,

2. EXPRESSES ITS THANKS TO THE STAFF OF THE AGENCY
FOR THEIR CONTINUED FAITHFUL EFFORTS TO PROVIDE ESSENTIAL
SERVICES FOR THE PALESTINE REFUGEES AND TO THE
SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AND PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS FOR
THEIR VALUABLE WORK IN ASSISTING THE REFUGEES,

3. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO PROVIDE THE STAFF
AND FACILITIES THAT THE UNITED NATIONS CONCILIATION COMMISSION
FOR PALESTINE MAY REQUIRE IN CARRYING ON ITS WORK,

...../2

3A

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

MB.

- 2 -

I.31306.

4. RENEWS ITS REQUEST TO THE UNITED NATIONS CONCILIATION COMMISSION FOR PALESTINE, CONTAINED IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2 OF RESOLUTION 1856 (XVII) WHICH EXPRESSED ITS THANKS TO THE UNITED NATIONS CONCILIATION COMMISSION FOR PALESTINE FOR ITS EFFORTS TO FIND A WAY TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS ON THE PALESTINE ARAB REFUGEE PROBLEM PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 11 OF RESOLUTION 194 (III), AND REQUESTED THE COMMISSION TO CONTINUE ITS ENDEAVOURS WITH THE PARTIES CONCERNED.

5. AGAIN DIRECTS ATTENTION TO THE PRECARIOUS FINANCIAL POSITION OF THE UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST AND URGES NON CONTRIBUTING GOVERNMENTS TO CONTRIBUTE AND CONTRIBUTING GOVERNMENTS TO CONSIDER INCREASING THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS SO THAT THE AGENCY CAN CARRY OUT ITS ESSENTIAL PROGRAMMES".

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE
P.M.'s

13TH NOVEMBER, 1963.

SEC FAS(1, 2, 4) AS(3) AS(JIC) S&SEA DL INT UN@
PACAM AMSP EAMEC E AFME INF
CAIRO LONDON TEL AVIV WASHINGTON

181/4/4 318
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM 131293

JT

DATED: 12TH NOVEMBER, 1963.
2200

FROM:

REC'D: 13TH NOVEMBER, 1963.
1545

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS,
NEW YORK.

UN1614 CONFIDENTIAL. PRIORITY.

SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE - PALESTINE REFUGEES.

AS A RESULT OF THE FAILURE OF UNITED STATES AND ISRAELI TACTICS TODAY, THE COMMITTEE HAS NOW BEFORE IT TWO DRAFT RESOLUTIONS OF A FAIRLY MODERATE CHARACTER.

HOWEVER, THE AFGHAN DRAFT RESOLUTION, WHICH WAS OBVIOUSLY PROMPTED BY THE ARABS WILL BE PUT TO THE VOTE BEFORE THE UNITED STATES DRAFT RESOLUTION, WHICH IS ACCEPTABLE TO BRITAIN AND ISRAEL.

2. THE UNITED STATES HAS ASKED US TO COSPONSOR THEIR DRAFT BUT TO THE EXTENT THAT THEIR PARAGRAPH 5 "URGES CONTRIBUTING GOVERNMENTS TO CONSIDER INCREASING THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS" IT APPEARS TO BE INCONSISTENT WITH THE AUSTRALIAN BRIEF.

3. THE AFGHAN DRAFT WOULD HAVE THE ASSEMBLY DIRECT THE CONCILIATION COMMISSION TO MAKE FURTHER EFFORTS TO ARRANGE FOR THE PROTECTION OF REFUGEE PROPERTY, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND INTERESTS.

THE ISRAELIS TODAY HANDED TO US A STATEMENT OF THEIR STRONG OBJECTION TO ANY PROPOSALS FOR UNITED NATIONS INTERVENTION WITH REGARD TO PRIVATE CLAIMS TO PROPERTY WITHIN THE TERRITORY OF A SOVEREIGN MEMBER STATE.

4. THE CLIMATE OF THE COMMITTEE IS SUCH THAT NO PRACTICABLE INITIATIVE MAY BE TAKEN BY AUSTRALIA TO AMEND EITHER OF THESE TWO FACE-SAVING FORMULAS.

THE UNITED STATES DRAFT WILL BE AS UNACCEPTABLE TO THE ARABS AS THE AFGHAN DRAFT WILL BE TO THE ISRAELIS AND THE UNITED STATES.

YOU MAY EVEN CARE TO CONSIDER INSTRUCTING US TO ABSTAIN ON BOTH DRAFT RESOLUTIONS AS WHOLES.
REQUEST ADVICE.

5. AS AN ACTIVE ZIONIST, MR E. LAMM OF 5 WOOTTON GROVE, CAULFIELD HAS BEEN MAKING REPRESENTATIONS TO US TODAY AGAINST ANY UNITED NATIONS INTERVENTION WITH RESPECT TO ARAB PROPERTY RIGHTS.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE
P.M'S

12TH NOVEMBER, 1963.

SEC FAS(1,2,4) AS(3) AS(JIC) LA S&SEA DL INT UNS PACAN
AMSP EAMEC E AFME INF

CAIRO LONDON TEL AVIV WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD SAVINGRAM

MH

I.30888

FROM:

DATED: 6TH NOVEMBER, 1963.
1915

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED
NATIONS,
NEW YORK.

REC'D: 8TH NOVEMBER, 1963.
2023

SAV.128. UNCLASSIFIED.

SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE - PALESTINE REFUGEES

GENERAL DEBATE CONTINUED TODAY WITH SPEECHES BY U.A.R.
AND SAUDI ARABIA.

2. FOLLOWING WERE MAIN FEATURES -

(A) WHILE NOT PRESSING ARGUMENT TO POINT OF FORMALLY
SEEKING REVERSAL OF U.N. RESOLUTIONS ESTABLISHING ISRAEL,
SPEAKERS MADE IT CLEAR THAT EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL WAS
COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE.

(B) THEY DEMANDED FULL AND UNCONDITIONAL RETURN OF REFUGEES,
OSTENSIBLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 11 OF RESOLUTION 194
BUT WITHOUT REFERENCE TO IMPLEMENTATION OF ANY OTHER PROVISIONS
OF U.N. RESOLUTIONS AND ON FRANK BASIS THAT REFUGEES WOULD RETURN AS
A NATION REPOSSESSING ITS HOMELAND.

(C) U.A.R. MADE FRANK BID FOR SUPPORT OF AFRICANS BY REPEATED
LINKING OF ZIONISM WITH BRITISH IMPERIALISM AND COLONIALISM AND
BY ARGUING ANALOGIES WITH SOUTH AFRICA AND SOUTHERN RHODESIA.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT TERRITORIES
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE
A-G'S. DEPT
P.M.'S.

13TH NOVEMBER, 1963.

SEC FAS(1,2,4) AS(3) AS(JIC) LA S&SEA DL INT UN@ AMSP PACAM
EA EAMEC E AFME INF ER CR
CAIRO LONDON TEL AVIV

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

316

MH

I.31161

FROM:

DATED: 11TH NOVEMBER, 1963.
1830

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED
NATIONS,
NEW YORK.

REC'D: 12TH NOVEMBER, 1963.
1332

UN1598. CONFIDENTIAL.

SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE - PALESTINE REFUGEES.

OUR 1584.

WE GATHER THAT US FOUND IT INEXPEDIENT TO GO ALONG WITH
ANY MODERATE DRAFT RESOLUTION OF ARAB ORIGIN AND THAT ARABS
HAVE NOW ABANDONED TEXT IN OUR 1585 AND ARE WORKING ON A
NEW AND SOMEWHAT EXTREME DRAFT.

ISRAELIS, WHO WERE DOUBTLESS APPRISED OF THIS DEVELOP-
MENT, ARE ALSO BELIEVED TO BE WORKING ON ANOTHER DRAFT
RESOLUTION WHICH WILL NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE US.

IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES US IS SEEKING TO HEAD OFF THE ARAB
AND ISRAELI INITIATIVES BY ELICITING SUPPORT FOR A COMPROMISE
DRAFT RESOLUTION WHICH U.S. HOPES TO TABLE TUESDAY OR WEDNESDAY.

2. ALTHOUGH THIRTY DELEGATIONS (MAINLY AFRO-ASIAN) HAVE
EXPRESSED A DESIRE TO SPEAK, THE DEBATE IS DRAGGING IN THE
ABSENCE OF DRAFT RESOLUTION.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE
P.M.'S.

12TH NOVEMBER, 1963

SEC FAS(1,2,4) AS(3) AS(JIC) S&SEA DL INT UN PACAM AMSP
EAMEC E AFME INF CR
CAIRO TEL AVIV

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

JT

I.31170

FROM:

DATED: 11TH NOVEMBER, 1963.

1805

REC'D: 12TH NOVEMBER, 1963.

1523

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS,
NEW YORK.

UN1597 UNCLASSIFIED.

SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE - PALESTINE REFUGEES.

SPEAKERS TODAY INCLUDED IRAQ, LIBYA AND SUDAN WHO EMPHASIZED THAT THE U.N. OF 1963 WAS DIFFERENT FROM THE U.N. OF 1947 WHICH HAD BEEN MANIPULATED BY "IMPERALISTS AND ZIONISTS".

2. EXPRESSING CONCERN AT HIGHLY POLITICAL NATURE OF DEBATE SO FAR, UNITED KINGDOM DEVOTED MOST OF ITS SPEECH TO COMMENDING WORK OF U.N.R.W.A., URGING GOVERNMENTS TO INCREASE THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE AGENCY AND SUPPORTING EFFORTS OF P.C.C. IN "WORKING FOR JUST SOLUTION".

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE
P.M'S

12TH NOVEMBER, 1963.

SEC FAS(1,2,4) AS(3) AS(JIC) S&SEA DL INT UN@
PACAM AMSP EAMEC E AFME INF CR
CAIRO TEL AVIV

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

DW

I.31017

FROM:

DATED: 8TH NOVEMBER, 1963.
1943

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS,
NEW YORK.

REC'D: 9TH NOVEMBER, 1963.
0920

UN1585.

CONFIDENTIAL.

SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE - PALESTINE REFUGEES.

OUR 1584.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF ARAB DRAFT RESOLUTION-

BEGINS.

'THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
RECALLING ITS RESOLUTIONS FROM 1948 TO 1962 (THESE ARE
SPELLED OUT IN DETAIL).

NOTING THE ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER-GENERAL
OF THE UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR PALESTINE
REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST, COVERING THE PERIOD FROM 1ST JULY,
1962 TO 30TH JUNE, 1963.

1. EXPRESSES ITS DEEP REGRET THAT REPATRIATION AND
COMPENSATION OF THE REFUGEES AS PROVIDED FOR IN PARAGRAPH
11 OF RESOLUTION 194 (111) HAS NOT BEEN EFFECTED, AND
THAT, THEREFORE, THE SITUATION OF THE REFUGEES CONTINUES
TO BE A MATTER OF SERIOUS CONCERN--.

2. NOTES WITH REGRET THAT THE UNITED NATIONS CONCILIATION
COMMISSION FOR PALESTINE HAS NOT MADE PROGRESS IN CARRYING
OUT THE TASK ENTRUSTED TO IT IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF GENERAL
ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 1456 (XIV), AND URGES THE COMMISSION TO
MAKE SERIOUS EFFORTS TO SECURE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PARA-
GRAPH 11 OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 194 (111) AND
REPORT THEREON NOT LATER THAN 15TH OCTOBER, 1964--.

3. DIRECTS THE UNITED NATIONS CONCILIATION COMMISSION
FOR PALESTINE TO MAKE FURTHER EFFORTS REGARDING MEASURES
FOR THE PROTECTION OF PROPERTY, PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND
INTERESTS OF THE REFUGEES--.

4. EXPRESSES ITS THANKS TO THE COMMISSIONER-GENERAL
AND THE STAFF OF THE AGENCY FOR THEIR CONTINUED FAITHFUL
EFFORTS TO CARRY OUT THE MANDATE OF THE AGENCY, AND TO
SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AND THE PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS FOR
THEIR VALUABLE AND CONTINUING WORK IN ASSISTING THE REFUGEES--.

5. DIRECTS ATTENTION TO THE PRECARIOUS FINANCIAL
POSITION OF THE UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR
PALESTINE REFUGEES AND URGES NON-CONTRIBUTING GOVERNMENTS
TO CONTRIBUTE, AND CONTRIBUTING GOVERNMENTS TO INCREASE
THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS, SO THAT THE AGENCY CAN CARRY OUT ITS
ESSENTIAL PROGRAMMES--.

6. NOTES THE SERIOUS NEED OF OTHER CLAIMANTS FOR RELIEF
PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 5 OF RESOLUTION 916(X) OF 3RD DECEMBER,
1955, ESPECIALLY THE AZAZMEH BEDOUINS, AS DESCRIBED IN THE
REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER-GENERAL--.

..2/..

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

313
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS 131017

INWARD CABLEGRAM

7. REQUESTS THE COMMISSIONER-GENERAL TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS AS TO INCLUDE IN THE RATION ROLLS THE AZAZMEH BEDOUINS AND REQUESTS THE NEGOTIATING COMMITTEE FOR EXTRA-BUDGETARY FUNDS TO SEEK SUCH FUNDS AS MAY BE REQUIRED BY THE AGENCY.'

ENDS.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE.
P.M's.

10TH NOVEMBER, 1963.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SEC FAS(1.2.4) AS(3) AS(JIC) S&SEA DL INT UN PACAM AMSP
EAMEC E AFME INF ER
CAIRO TEL AVIV

INWARD CABLEGRAM

DW

I.31016

FROM:

DATED: 8TH NOVEMBER, 1963.
1905REC'D: 9TH NOVEMBER, 1963.
2236AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS,
NEW YORK.

UN1584.

CONFIDENTIAL.SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE: PALESTINE REFUGEES.

OUR SAVINGRAM 131.

DEARTH OF SPEAKERS SO FAR LENDS SUPPORT TO OTHER INDICATIONS THAT MOST ARABS ARE HAVING DIFFICULTY IN ENGAGING INTEREST EVEN OF AFRO-ASIANS.
(ISRAELIS SEEM TO BE HAVING SIMILAR TROUBLE.)

2. THIS MAY EXPLAIN ARAB APPROACH TO U.S. AND U.K. DELEGATIONS LAST NIGHT WITH SURPRISINGLY UNCONTENTIOUS DRAFT RESOLUTION CONSISTING LARGELY OF REHASH OF PARTS OF PAST RESOLUTIONS.

(TEXT IN OUR 1585.)

3. U.S. AND U.K. DELEGATIONS SEE NO HARM IN CONTENT OF DRAFT. LONDON REACTIONS STILL AWAITED.

STATE DEPARTMENT DO NOT OBJECT TO CONTENT BUT, DESPITE URGINGS OF BRITISH MISSION, SEE GREAT DOMESTIC DIFFICULTY IN ACCEPTING ANY DRAFT WHICH WOULD BECOME KNOWN AS OF ARAB ORIGIN.

AMERICANS WILL NOT, AS ORIGINALLY INTENDED, TABLE THEIR OWN DRAFT IMMEDIATELY TO FORESTALL ARABS BUT WILL EXPLAIN DOMESTIC PROBLEM FRANKLY TO THEM IN HOPE THEY WILL ACCEPT AMERICAN DRAFT (ON GENERAL LINES OF LAST YEAR'S 1856) AS SOLE PROPOSAL TO COMMITTEE.

4. THIS DEVELOPMENT GIVES SOME HOPE FOR EARLY AND RELATIVELY PEACEFUL FIZZLE OF DEBATE (WHICH MIGHT MAKE AUSTRALIAN INTERVENTION UNNECESSARY AND UNDESIRABLE).

THIS HAPPY OUTCOME WOULD DEPEND LARGELY ON ABILITY TO PERSUADE ISRAELIS TO EXERCISE GREAT RESTRAINT IN REPLY.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE.
P.M's.

10TH NOVEMBER, 1963.

SEC FAS(1.2.4) AS(3) AS(JIC) S&SEA DL INT UN PACAM AMSP
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CAIRO TEL AVIV

CONFIDENTIAL

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MH

181/4/4 311
I.31076

FROM:

DATED: 8TH NOVEMBER, 1963.

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED
NATIONS,
NEW YORK.

REC'D: 11TH NOVEMBER, 1963.

SAV.131. UNCLASSIFIED.

SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE - PALESTINE REFUGEES

YEMEN AND SYRIA SPOKE YESTERDAY MORNING ON SAME GENERAL
LINES AS DESCRIBED IN OUR SAVING 128.

2. THIS MORNING AFGHANISTAN SAID HISTORY WOULD PASS
HARSH VERDICT ON UN DECISION ESTABLISHING ISRAEL BUT
PRACTICAL CONCERN OF COMMITTEE TODAY WAS HUMANITARIAN
PROBLEM OF HOMELESS REFUGEES--.

AFTER FIFTEEN YEARS THIS SEEMED NO CLOSER TO SOLUTION--.
NATURAL INCREASE AND OTHER FACTORS MADE IT INCREASINGLY ACUTE
AND UNRWA NEEDED MORE FUNDS--.

REGRETFULLY PCC HAD FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO MAKE PROGRESS BUT SPEAKER
HOPED THEY WOULD MAKE FURTHER EFFORTS--.

HE HOPED THIS YEAR'S RESOLUTION WOULD TAKE ACCOUNT OF VIEWS
OF REFUGEE SPOKESMAN.

3. IN BRIEF SPEECH US APPEALED FOR MORE QUIET ENDEAVOUR
AND LESS ORATORICAL BITTERNESS.

RESOLUTION 1856 LAST YEAR WAS MODERATE AND SENSIBLE--.
SPEAKER HOPED COMMITTEE WOULD REACH SIMILAR RESOLUTION THIS
YEAR AND WOULD NOT BE FACED WITH CONTENTIOUS PROPOSALS
AS IN PAST--.

HE APPLAUDED UNRWA'S EXPANSION OF EDUCATION
AND TRAINING AND ITS PRUDENT ATTITUDE TOWARDS EXPENDITURE--.

US WOULD CONTINUE FINANCIAL SUPPORT AT HIGH LEVEL BUT WOULD
WELCOME ADDITIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO MEET GROWING COSTS--.

IT APPEALED FOR PATIENT EFFORTS TO TRY TO OPEN SOME AVENUE
TO ULTIMATE SOLUTION OF REFUGEE PROBLEM.

4. AFTERNOON MEETINGS BOTH DAYS WERE CANCELLED FOR
LACK OF SPEAKERS.

IN EFFORT TO ACCELERATE DEBATE CHAIRMAN WILL CLOSE LIST
OF SPEAKERS NOON MONDAY.

DESIRABILITY OF AUSTRALIAN INTERVENTION WILL BE
INFLUENCED BY DEVELOPMENTS DISCUSSED IN OUR 1584 BUT WE WILL
PUT OUR NAME DOWN TENTATIVELY TO SPEAK AFTER ISRAEL, UK
AND PREFERABLY TWO OR THREE OTHER DELEGATIONS LESS
DIRECTLY AND EMOTIONALLY INVOLVED.

310

MH

- 2 -

I.31076

WILL ADVISE FURTHER ON MONDAY NIGHT.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE

11TH NOVEMBER, 1963.

SEC FAS(1,2,4) AS(3) AS(JIC) S&SEA DL INT UNO AMSP EAMEC E
INF AFME CR PPO
CAIRO TEL AVIV

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD SAVINGRAM

181/4/4

309

MB.

I.30468.

FROM:

DATED: 4TH NOVEMBER, 1963.
2004.

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO
UNITED NATIONS,
NEW YORK.

REC'D: 5TH NOVEMBER, 1963.
2147.

SAV.124. UNCLASSIFIED.

SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE: PALESTINE REFUGEES.

AT TODAY'S MEETING DAVIS PRESENTED U.N.R.W.A. REPORT AND REPRESENTATIVES OF ISRAEL, JORDAN, SYRIA, IRAQ, UAR AND LEBANON MADE BRIEF OPENING STATEMENTS.

2. AS AT PREVIOUS SESSION ARABS SOUGHT HEARING FOR 'PALESTINE ARAB DELEGATION, REPRESENTING ARAB PEOPLE OF PALESTINE, PRINCIPAL PARTY TO PALESTINE QUESTION'. FOLLOWING PRECEDENT CHAIRMAN PROPOSED WITHOUT OBJECTION THAT 'SPOKESMAN OF REFUGEES' BE HEARD. GUATEMALA INTERVENED TO SEEK CONFIRMATION THAT THIS DID NOT IMPLY ACCEPTANCE OF STATUS AS SOUGHT BY ARABS. CHAIRMAN REPEATED REFERENCE TO EARLIER PRECEDENTS AND MATTER WAS LEFT ON THAT BASIS EXCEPT FOR FORMAL RESERVATION BY ISRAEL.

3. GENERAL DEBATE CONTINUES TOMORROW.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT IMMIGRATION
ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S DEPT
TREASURY
P.M.'s

6TH NOVEMBER, 1963.

SEC FAS(1, 2, 4) AS(3) AS(JIC) LA S&SEA DL INT UNO
PACAM AMSP C&P EAMEC E AFMB@ INF ER CR
CAIRO GENEVA LONDON TEL AVIV

CHECKED ☒

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E 1075/3

Foreign Office and Whitehall Distribution

EASTERN (GENERAL)

September 26, 1963

Section 1

JORDAN AND THE "PALESTINE ENTITY"

Sir Roderick Parkes to Lord Home. (Received September 26)

SUMMARY

At the Arab League meeting in Cairo which opened on the 9th of September Abdullah Zureiqat, the Jordanian delegate, denounced an Iraqi proposal for the creation of a Palestine entity based on the election of representatives by the Palestinians themselves. He also opposed the appointment of Ahmad Shukairy, former Saudi Arabian representative at the United Nations, as official spokesman for Palestine. The Jordanian argument against the Iraqi proposal was that it was impracticable to create an "entity" until Palestine had been liberated. The objections were widely publicised in Jordan and were supported by officially inspired telegrams from refugees (paragraph 2).

2. Shukairy came to Amman on the 17th of September with Zureiqat and had an unprofitable meeting with the Jordanian Cabinet. He declared afterwards that the Iraqi proposal was not directed against Jordan but was intended merely to provide proper Palestinian representation, particularly at the United Nations (paragraph 3).

3. The Jordanians still see the proposal as a direct threat to the present Government; a view confirmed by the terms of the Arab League Council session in February. Jordanian officials are worried by the exposed position into which Jordan has been thrust but are determined not to give ground (paragraph 4).

4. Haj Amin Husseini's representatives visited Amman to support the Iraqi proposal and to oppose Shukairy. They derived little satisfaction from the Jordanians (paragraph 5).

5. Jordanian officials are possibly over-estimating the dangers. There has been no popular response to the proposal and any initiative by a Baathist Government is distrusted. Shukairy is suspected of being chiefly interested in self-advancement and without a strong lead from Egypt habitual cynicism about action on Palestine is likely to supervene. The Jordanian point that the Palestinians are apparently to be left to themselves is also valid, though little notice is likely to be taken of it (paragraphs 6-7).

6. Palestinians in Jordan are not easily roused and the refugees remain largely apathetic. There is no disposition to be in the van of a crusade against Israel and it is privately accepted that most refugees will be exiles for life. A perceptible inclination to consider alternatives to a return to Palestine is demonstrated by speculation about an imposed settlement and attempted emigration (paragraphs 8-9).

7. The weakening of the resolve to return is a factor to be noted for the future but is too tenuous to provide a basis for a general reassessment. Few refugees would contemplate formally abandoning their claims and Jordan is constrained to preserve the unyielding Arab line. She would agree to a negotiated solution also accepted by Egypt but no initiative towards such settlement could come from the Jordanians themselves (paragraph 10).

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(No. 32. Confidential) Amman,
My Lord, September 25, 1963.

The Jordan Government have strongly opposed an Iraqi proposal in the Arab League for the creation of a "Palestine entity" which would in their opinion derogate from their authority on the West Bank of Jordan. I have the honour to report on Jordanian reactions to this proposal and on the current attitude in this country towards the Palestine question.

2. At the opening of the Arab League meeting in Cairo on the 9th of September Abdullah Zureiqat, Jordanian Ambassador to Lebanon and delegate to the League, objected to the inclusion of this proposal in the Agenda; and in subsequent meetings maintained his opposition to any move designed to create a Palestine entity based mainly on the election of representatives from Jordan's West Bank and from the Gaza Strip, or to place full responsibility for the liberation of Palestine in the hands of Palestinians with no provision for the collaboration of the Arab States. I should explain that the text of the Iraqi proposal has not been published here and its terms are known to me in general terms only derived in the main from hostile Jordanian references to it. Zureiqat also objected to the appointment of Ahmad Shukairy, former representative of Saudi Arabia at the United Nations, as official spokesman for Palestine at the Arab League and elsewhere. Zureiqat's objections were widely publicised in Jordan as soon as it became apparent that the Iraqi proposal was being taken seriously. The argument against the proposal was that the creation of a Palestine entity before the Jewish-held part of the country had been liberated was impracticable and that an attempt to form one could only exacerbate present inter-Arab quarrels and be a constant source of friction. This view, given officially by Bahjat Talhuni, Chief of the Royal Diwan, in an interview with a Lebanese journalist, carried the gloss that Jordan was in the forefront of the struggle and, while welcoming constructive efforts towards it, could not accept interventions which distracted attention from the main goal of recovering the usurped country to which she was whole-heartedly committed. Official denunciations of the proposal were supplemented by officially inspired telegrams from refugee leaders both to the Government and the Iraqi Embassy.

3. On the 17th of September Shukairy accompanied by Zureiqat flew to Amman to continue the argument at the highest available level. It is difficult to see what either side hoped to achieve other than a demonstration that it had done its utmost to accommodate the other. A special Cabinet meeting was summoned, presided over by Prince Mohammed acting as Viceroy in the King's absence and attended by Bahjat Talhuni. Shukairy was apparently at least a match for the assembled Jordanians but after a long and at times stormy wrangle this confrontation ended without the slightest move towards a compromise. Before returning to Cairo on the following day Shukairy declared that the Iraqi proposal was in no way directed against Jordan and would not involve any cession of authority by Jordan. The sole object was to provide a focus for Palestinian sentiment and to ensure that Palestine was properly represented. The urgency of the matter lay in the need to send representatives to the current session of the United Nations General Assembly.

4. This public statement did nothing to allay Jordanian suspicions. The Iraqi proposal is still seen as a direct threat to Jordanian sovereignty on the West Bank, as possibly increasing the divisions between East and West Banks which successive Governments have worked hard to close and as being intended, at least in part, to create serious difficulties for the present Government. This view was confirmed by the terms of the decision which referred the proposal to the Arab League Council in February and which endorsed the opinion that the Palestinians' rights to their country were inalienable and that they should be enabled to struggle for these rights themselves through democratically elected representatives. The Jordanian answer, as given by Zureiqat and passed over by the meeting, was that the liberation of Palestine must precede the creation of a Palestine entity. Shukairy is in any case disliked and distrusted by those Jordanians, including many refugees, who have given more than purely emotional thought to the Palestine problem and they see no good coming of any initiative in which he is concerned. In the depressing aftermath of his visit Jordanian officials are considerably worried by the exposed position into which Jordan has been thrust and by possible refugee reactions. Their concern is not only at the revival of familiar attacks on the

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Hashemites as having annexed part of Palestine for themselves but also because they believe that the proposal has the support of the U.A.R. as well as of Iraq and Syria. Jordan's isolation is thus even more evident than usual. They have little doubt that the more intelligent inhabitants of the West Bank will realise the folly of exchanging a stable and reasonably prosperous administration for the uncertainties of divided or ineffective authority; but they are also unhappily aware that the more intelligent are decidedly in the minority. Nevertheless they are convinced that there can be no compromise and are setting their teeth determined to maintain their opposition.

5. Shukairy's visit was followed by one from Emile Ghoury and Issa Nakhleh, representing Haj Amin al Husseini's Higher Arab Committee. They in their turn supported the proposal for the Palestine entity but not unnaturally opposed Shukairy's appointment in view of Haj Amin's prior claim to speak for Palestine. They derived little satisfaction from the Jordanians and said they would come back after King Hussein's return.

6. While the Jordanian Government's position is certainly uncomfortable the supposed dangers are perhaps being exaggerated. There is still no evidence of a popular response to the Iraqi proposal and it seems doubtful whether there will be one, if only because the mass of refugees have no clear idea of what is involved. The Baath are, moreover, particularly obnoxious to the refugees in Jordan as a result of Syrian action against refugees near Damascus. This has become established as a major atrocity and the refugees view any move by a Baathist Government with intense distrust. Unless, therefore, Egyptian support for the proposal is voiced more powerfully strong popular reactions seem improbable. It is also abundantly clear from opinions expressed to members of this Embassy that rational-minded Jordanians attach little more weight to this latest move than to the sterile exchanges about Arab action on Palestine that have normally preceded past sessions of the United Nations General Assembly. There is a tinge of resentment that Iraq, which of all the countries which took part in the Palestine war has the fewest refugees to look after, should try to settle the affairs of Palestine. It is noted as well that Iraq, Syria and even Egypt have good reason to divert

attention from their own affairs and that Palestine is a favourite stand-by for this purpose. This attitude may not be shared by the mass of the refugees but is bound to have a damping effect on them; whilst Shukairy's own efforts to make out that the proposal is not radically new has removed some of the emotional heat and given rise to suspicions that, despite his protestations to the contrary, he is more anxious to find a job for himself than to lead a new Palestine crusade.

7. Prophecy remains as risky as ever but as the officially inspired telegrams remain the only ripple on an otherwise apathetic surface since the proposal was publicised and as further consideration has been postponed until February it seems more than likely that habitual cynicism about the effectiveness of plans for a new look at Palestine, especially in the Arab League context, will supervene and there will be no real crisis. I also think that Jordan has scored a useful propaganda point in what strikes me as a largely academic debate by maintaining that the creation of a Palestine entity implies that the Palestinians would then be left to fight for themselves. If she stands by her unexceptionable declaration that, if and when Palestine is regained in toto, Palestinians will be free to choose whether they wish to remain in the Hashemite Kingdom or leave it she should be able in theory to turn the edge of most propaganda attacks though no one is likely in practice to take much notice or credit the Hashemites with such altruism.

8. On present evidence the million Palestinians in Jordan are not easily or effectively roused. If they were ever prepared automatically to follow any lead that promised to hasten their return to their homes this has long since evaporated. The years of frustration, disappointment and empty declarations by Arab politicians have bred an all-pervading disillusionment and refugee apathy was clearly reflected in the almost unruffled calm of the camps during the disturbances in April of this year. Few look for an early solution or regard it as their responsibility to work or fight for one. Nasser is the only Arab leader on whom they pin any faith and, whilst it is conceivable that they might respond to a direct call to action from him, it is reasonably certain that they would not do so for anyone else. In particular King Hussein's repeated protestations about Palestine are entirely discounted, though tacitly accepted in the

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short term as necessary cover for a not wholly unsatisfactory state of affairs. If there is to be a battle for Palestine most refugees and practically all settled West Bankers would prefer it not to be waged in or near Jordan. The comparative quiescence of the Jordan-Israel border is regarded in private with some approval and there is a strong disposition to avoid provoking Israeli action. It is increasingly accepted, again in private, that most if not all the refugees will be exiles for life and that there is little prospect of the Arabs being able to take effective military action against Israel in the near future.

9. There is thus a perceptible inclination among Palestinians to consider alternative solutions both for the Palestine question and their own future as individuals. The surmise, amounting almost to hope, that the deadlock may be ended by outside intervention is evident in vague speculation which, I see, has also appeared in the Israeli and Lebanese Press that after the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty the Soviet Union and the United States might combine to propose terms for an Arab-Israeli settlement. That the compulsive urge to return to Palestine is fading has been demonstrated afresh by the increasing number of refugee applications to go to Australia, now a main target for Jordanian emigration. There have been demands in the local Press that refugees should not be allowed to leave the country; and these have been met by official declarations that permission to emigrate will be refused. Ayyub Musallam, the Minister for Reconstruction and Development, whose main responsibility is refugee affairs and who takes an ineffectually rabble-rousing line in public, has, however, said privately that, while he allows emigration, his policy is to ensure that a nucleus of each refugee family remains in Jordan to provide manpower, not for an assault on Israel but for the development of this country after what he calls the black day when it has to be

publicly accepted that there can be no return and that the refugees must work for a permanent future on this side of the border.

10. The weakening of the Palestinians' resolve to return can, and should, be noted as a factor in determining future policy. At present, however, it is only marginal and provides no basis for a general reassessment of the problem. The feeling that the refugees' cause is hopeless is far too tenuous to be brought out into the open and any attempt to do so would provoke by way of reaction an immediate reiteration of the most uncompromising demands. Even those Palestinians who speak rationally of the present situation regularly and understandably revert to the old hope that they may somehow be able to go back to their homes and few would as yet seriously contemplate a formal abandonment of their claims. Although Jordan is probably the Arab State in which Government and people alike are most ready to reach a settlement with Israel her isolation as an "unliberated" country makes it essential for her to avoid any appearance of deviationism and preserve intact the unyielding Arab line on the recovery of Palestine. Whilst the Jordanians, including most refugees, would follow with little reluctance an initiative for a negotiated solution that was also accepted by Egypt, always provided that it did not entail the dismemberment of Jordan, it is certain that in present circumstances no such initiative could come from the Jordanians themselves.

11. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives in Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jedda, Tel Aviv, Washington and United Kingdom Mission, New York, Her Majesty's Consulate-General, Jerusalem, and the Secretary, J.I.G., Cyprus.

I am, &c.

RODERICK PARKES.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper SYDNEY MORNING HERALD.

File No.

181/4/4

Published at SYDNEY.

Date

16-8-63

Gift Of Soap To Refugees

The Australian Government will send a gift of £90,000 worth of soap to refugees in the Middle East.

The soap, to be distributed among the one million refugees still on direct relief, is expected to last a year.

The consignment is Australia's entire contribution for this year to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency in the Middle East.

The chief of the U.N. Budget Division in the Middle East, Mr V. M. Rowland, said yesterday that one cake of soap a month would be given to each refugee.

Mr Rowland was passing through Sydney in the P & O-Orient liner, Orcades.

vided more than two thirds of the finance for the aid program and British Commonwealth countries supplied the bulk of the remainder.

Australia had been giving an average of £90,000 since 1952—last year's contribution was also in soap.

Mr Rowland said he had emphasised the vocational training program when speaking to Governmental and charitable bodies here.

He hoped that the Australian and New Zealand Governments would assist vocational training in future.

Conferred With Governments

For the last month he has been conferring with the Australian and New Zealand Governments on aid for the refugees, and explaining future aid programs.

Mr Rowland said there were half a million refugees from the State of Israel in Jordan, 230,000 in the Gaza Strip and 100,000 in Lebanon and in Syria.

All were subsisting on the barest rations and the only clothing they received was from charitable societies overseas.

A vocational training program was begun on a moderate scale in 1953, in an attempt to make the refugees economically independent.

The number of training centres had now increased to twelve, and 2,500 refugees were becoming self-sufficient annually.

The United States pro-

1916 ✓

305

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

ISW.

0.17444.

TO:

Sent: 9th August, 1963.
1600.

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON....1909

Australian High Commission,
LONDON....3157.

REPEATED:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK....617.

Australian High Commission,
OTTAWA....Sav 106.

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U.N.G.A. - 18th Session - Brief.

Please discuss with State Department/ Foreign Office
and report as soon as possible attitudes to following provisional
agenda items :-

- (a) Committee Chairmanship (Special Political, Second, Fourth and Sixth remain unresolved);
- (b) Charter Review (Council Expansion);
- (c) U.N.C.U.R.K. (presumably objective is still, as set out in Washington Savingram 916, an outcome similar to last year's);
- (d) Apartheid and Portuguese Territories (in light of adoption of Security Council resolution); Southern Rhodesia.
- (e) U.N.R.W.A. (Washington Savingram 934 refers);
- (f) U.N.E.F. and Congo costs (Items 19(b) and 60);
- (g) Peace keeping expenses (Item 66, both parts);
- (h) Principles of International Law (Washington Savingram 534 and London memorandum 875 refer);

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(F) 181/4/4

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

ISW.

-2-

0.17444.

- (i) De-nuclearisation of Latin America.
- (j) Indian item on suspension of nuclear tests.
- (k) Proposed U.N. Industrial development organisation
(ECO. SOC. Resolution).
- (l) Report of the Committee of Twenty four.

MIN. & DEPT E.A. (852/17/18/3)
P.M.'s

9th August, 1963.

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SEC A/Ss LA UN@ ER CR PACAM EA AMSP S&SEA SA SEA
EAF&ME E AF&ME INF DL MT C&P IC

INWARD SAVINGRAM

20812

I. 20812

Dated : 31st July, 1963

FROM :

Rec'd: 5th August, 1963,

Australian Embassy,
TEL AVIV.

Saving No. 12 RESTRICTED.

Repeated : Cairo, London, Washington

POLITICAL SAVINGRAM - JULY, 1963

Prime Minister's Press Conference

On 10th July, at his first press conference since becoming Prime Minister, Mr. Eshkol made the following points:-

- (a) His first task was to stabilize the economy and move towards economic independence;
- (b) He believed that the purpose of the United States policy in the Middle East was to promote peace and stability in the area and the maintenance of the territorial integrity and independence of the countries in the area. He said that the best contribution the United States could make would be to take measures in order to prevent the creation of circumstances which may make a military attack on Israel possible. He said that he did not feel "any special pressure" from the United States concerning (presumably Israeli) scientific development.
- (c) Hawk missiles were important for use against aircraft, but in considering Israel's overall defence system, the Government would have to take into account further developments that had already taken place in Arab countries or were liable to take place in the future.
- (d) With regard to Arab countries, it was Israel's policy to strive by all possible means for peace with the neighbouring Arab countries on a basis of mutual respect and the preservation of the independence and territorial integrity of the states in the area.
- (e) Israel's policy was to compensate the Arab refugees for their abandoned property provided that international assistance was available, that property left behind by Jewish refugees from Arab countries was taken into account and that this was part of an overall settlement of the refugee question.
- (f) The initiative for the establishment of diplomatic relations between West Germany and Israel should come from the former.

Cabinet

The major political controversy during July was whether the Deputy Minister for Defence, Mr. Peres, should be asked to become a member of the six-member Ministerial Security Committee. This Committee had not been very active in the past as a result of Mr. Ben-Gurion's habit of taking all defence decisions himself. In view of his own lack of experience in defence matters, Mr. Eshkol (who is also Minister for Defence) announced that he intended to re-activate the Committee. It was expected that Mr. Peres, an expert in defence matters, would be asked to join it as a full member. However, Ahdut Ha'avoda, one of the parties in the coalition,

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(F) 181/4/4

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302

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

JT

0.13247

TO:

Sent: 26th June, 1963.
2228

Australian Embassy,
TEL AVIV...91

Australian High Commission,
LONDON.....2467 (For External)

CONFIDENTIAL.

For Hood.

Thanks your 107.

Mr Calwell has asked our Ambassador in Cairo to explain to the Egyptians that the stringency of his travel arrangements has obliged him to cancel his visit there.

2. We are doubtful whether a visit to another country even to look at Arab refugee camps would necessarily help soothe the Egyptians, particularly if that country were Jordan. There might perhaps be some other way of arranging some show of interest on Mr Calwell's part in Arab refugees, if he thought this worthwhile. Some discussion with United Nations refugee agency officials which Mr Calwell could subsequently announce might serve.

3. (For Eastman). Glad if you would bring this telegram and Hood's telegram No. 9 to you to Mr Calwell's attention.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
P.M'S

27th June, 1963.

SEC A/Ss LA PAC&AM S&SEA EAF&ME E AF ME
INF IC C&P

[Handwritten signature and date 18/6/63]

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File No. 181/4/4

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Record of Conversation with Mr V. Rowland, Chief of the Budget Division of UNRWA
on 17th July, 1963

Officers Present Mr R.L. Harry
Mr I.T. Cummins

MAIN SUBJECTS (S): ARAB REFUGEES AND THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Mr Rowland outlined the three criteria for a person to be classified as a refugee :

- (i) he must have lost his home;
- (ii) he must have lost his means of livelihood; and
- (iii) he must have an actual need for assistance.

There are at present 1,000,000 refugees most of whom are dependent on U.N. aid. Of these about 500,000 are in Jordan, where they constitute one-third of the population. The remainder are at present in the Gaza Strip, Syria and Lebanon. Some other Arab states, such as Iraq have absorbed some refugees, but this has not taken place much during recent years. Those who manage to be resettled are generally those possessing some training or skill which will benefit the host country's economy. Meanwhile UNRWA is providing training for the remaining refugees. Some 70 per cent were illiterate when they left Israel.

2. Mr Rowland said that the 500,000 refugees in Jordan lived for the most part in poverty as Jordan was the poorest of the Arab countries. They had been granted Jordanian citizenship, however, and enjoyed full political rights, including the right to vote. They constituted a substantial political force and were quite capable of overthrowing the government. At present they were concentrated on the West Bank. Large numbers were still housed in camps although some had become comparatively prosperous. Virtually all had fled leaving all their possessions behind in Israel in the expectation that they would not have long to wait before they could return. These hopes had not materialized and hence they have constituted a disgruntled minority which may prove difficult to control.

3. The second largest group of refugees is in the Gaza Strip, where there are 220,000 confined in a small and largely barren area. Apart from a handful employed by UNRWA in medical and teaching capacities, these are completely dependent on Agency aid. These too have remained in the area in the expectation of an early return to their former properties. The U.N. here is concerned to see that there are no fedayeen raids into Israeli territory.

4. The Palestinian refugees in Lebanon number 100,000 of whom 80,000 are still receiving rations from the Agency. Mr Rowland described Lebanon as a basically Christian country (Christians constituted 52 per cent of the population in the last census), where political representation tended to be along religious lines. The Lebanese authorities were anxious to preserve the existing religious balance and thus there was no chance of citizenship being granted to the refugees, 90 per cent of whom are Moslems.

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EAME Br.
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Tel Aviv
Cairo
U.N., New York

Report prepared by *I.T. Cummins*

(I.T. Cummins)

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5. The smallest group of refugees is in Syria. There are at the most 100,000 there who enjoyed working conditions identical to those enjoyed by Syrian labour. They are thus the most prosperous of their group but do not enjoy Syrian citizenship.

6. There are also 40,000 Arabs living in Israel at present who are subjected to a number of restrictions. UNRWA gave Israel certain funds on the foundation of Israel to help towards their welfare. Since then they have been the exclusive responsibility of the Israeli government.

7. Mr Harry asked whether there might not be some refugees who might be prepared to settle elsewhere if they knew the present situation in Israel and could be at least partially compensated for their expropriated assets. He wondered whether they realised the extent of the changes which had taken place in Israel since 1948. It was unlikely that the prospect of returning to Israel on terms of less than equality would appeal to many refugees. Mr Rowland agreed with this assessment and said that if compensation could be arranged many would agree to make their homes elsewhere. There were a number of obstacles to such an agreement being reached however. Foremost among these was the intense feeling of hostility existing between the two sides. Any attempt by an Arab government to negotiate with Israel would be regarded as "compacting with the enemy". Even if some agreement could be reached on compensation Israel was not capable of paying for this as it was itself dependent on economic assistance from the American government and private organisations. Mr Harry attributed Israel's economic difficulties to the need for high defence expenditure and said that if only the Arab states could be persuaded to make peace with Israel funds could be released to help solve the problem. Mr Rowland agreed and added that mutually beneficial trade relations could develop also. But he felt that in the present climate of opinion the prospect of a rapprochement was very remote indeed.

8. Mr Harry returned to the Jordanian political scene and asked Mr Rowland for his views on likely Israeli reactions to a pro-Nasser coup in Jordan. Mr Rowland said that the Israelis would have no difficulty in capturing the West Bank of the Jordan should they want to do so - he felt that this would be their most likely response to a Nasserite takeover. He suspected that some Israelis would like to see their state extending ultimately "from the Euphrates to the Nile". Of all the Arab forces Mr Rowland felt that the most efficient was the Arab Legion, which at present consists of about one division with corps troops. But it seemed to have declined since the days of Glubb Pasha. Israel on the other hand was benefitting militarily from the maquis experience many of its citizens had gained during the war in Europe. Within Israel also there were a number of Jewish communities which had been expelled from Arab countries on the foundation of Israel. Mr Rowland mentioned that Arab hostility towards Israel was directed towards Zionists rather than Jews generally. He added that even Agency officials had to be careful not to have any more contact with Israel than was absolutely necessary, as this would compromise them in the eyes of the Arabs.

9. In reply to a question from Mr Harry, Mr Rowland said that the birthrate among the Arab refugees was one of the highest in the world. The recorded deathrate was very low but this was due to a deliberate failure to report resulting in turn from a reluctance to surrender ration books. Finally Mr Rowland said that fewer refugees were being absorbed by Arab governments today than was the case immediately after the foundation of Israel.

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File No. 181/4/4

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Record of Conversation with Mr V. Rowland, Chief of the Budget Division of UNRWA
on 17th July, 1963

Officers Present Mr R.L. Harry
Mr I.T. Cummins

MAIN SUBJECTS (S): ARAB REFUGEES AND THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Mr Rowland outlined the three criteria for a person to be classified as a refugee :

- (i) he must have lost his home;
- (ii) he must have lost his means of livelihood; and
- (iii) he must have an actual need for assistance.

There are at present 1,000,000 refugees most of whom are dependent on U.N. aid. Of these about 500,000 are in Jordan, where they constitute one-third of the population. The remainder are at present in the Gaza Strip, Syria and Lebanon. Some other Arab states, such as Iraq have absorbed some refugees, but this has not taken place much during recent years. Those who manage to be resettled are generally those possessing some training or skill which will benefit the host country's economy. Meanwhile UNRWA is providing training for the remaining refugees. Some 70 per cent were illiterate when they left Israel.

2. Mr Rowland said that the 500,000 refugees in Jordan lived for the most part in poverty as Jordan was the poorest of the Arab countries. They had been granted Jordanian citizenship, however, and enjoyed full political rights, including the right to vote. They constituted a substantial political force and were quite capable of overthrowing the government. At present they were concentrated on the West Bank. Large numbers were still housed in camps although some had become comparatively prosperous. Virtually all had fled leaving all their possessions behind in Israel in the expectation that they would not have long to wait before they could return. These hopes had not materialized and hence they have constituted a disgruntled minority which may prove difficult to control.

3. The second largest group of refugees is in the Gaza Strip, where there are 220,000 confined in a small and largely barren area. Apart from a handful employed by UNRWA in medical and teaching capacities, these are completely dependent on Agency aid. These too have remained in the area in the expectation of an early return to their former properties. The U.N. here is concerned to see that there are no fedayeen raids into Israeli territory.

4. The Palestinian refugees in Lebanon number 100,000 of whom 80,000 are still receiving rations from the Agency. Mr Rowland described Lebanon as a basically Christian country (Christians constituted 52 per cent of the population in the last census), where political representation tended to be along religious lines. The Lebanese authorities were anxious to preserve the existing religious balance and thus there was no chance of citizenship being granted to the refugees, 90 per cent of whom are Moslems.

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4858/56.

Report prepared by

(I.T. Cummins)

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208
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5. The smallest group of refugees is in Syria. There are at the most 100,000 there who enjoyed working conditions identical to those enjoyed by Syrian labour. They are thus the most prosperous of their group but do not enjoy Syrian citizenship.

6. There are also 40,000 Arabs living in Israel at present who are subjected to a number of restrictions. UNRWA gave Israel certain funds on the foundation of Israel to help towards their welfare. Since then they have been the exclusive responsibility of the Israeli government.

7. Mr Harry asked whether there might not be some refugees who might be prepared to settle elsewhere if they knew the present situation in Israel and could be at least partially compensated for their expropriated assets. He wondered whether they realised the extent of the changes which had taken place in Israel since 1948. It was unlikely that the prospect of returning to Israel on terms of less than equality would appeal to many refugees. Mr Rowland agreed with this assessment and said that if compensation could be arranged many would agree to make their homes elsewhere. There were a number of obstacles to such an agreement being reached however. Foremost among these was the intense feeling of hostility existing between the two sides. Any attempt by an Arab government to negotiate with Israel would be regarded as "compacting with the enemy". Even if some agreement could be reached on compensation Israel was not capable of paying for this as it was itself dependent on economic assistance from the American government and private organisations. Mr Harry attributed Israel's economic difficulties to the need for high defence expenditure and said that if only the Arab states could be persuaded to make peace with Israel funds could be released to help solve the problem. Mr Rowland agreed and added that mutually beneficial trade relations could develop also. But he felt that in the present climate of opinion the prospect of a rapprochement was very remote indeed.

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File No. 852/12/10.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Record of Conversation with Mr. Victor Rowland, Chief of the Budget Division of U.N.R.W.A.
on 17th July, 1963.

Officers Present (A) Mr. Shaw and (B) Mr. John Rowland
Mr. Robertson. Mr. Lee
Mr. Flanagan
Mr. Robertson.

MAIN SUBJECTS (S): Activities of U.N.R.W.A. and Prospects for
Settlement of Refugee Problem

Mr. Rowland expressed regret that, because the Minister's agreement in principle to his visit had not been received until after he had left Beirut (a delay occasioned by Dr. Davis' letter having been despatched to Sir Garfield through New York instead of direct), some difficulties had been experienced in arranging his programme in Canberra. He said that the Commissioner-General still hoped to make his long-delayed visit to Australia and New Zealand, both generous contributors to the Agency's programmes, but had taken the opportunity of his (Mr. Rowland's) travel to New Zealand on home leave to renew contact with the two Governments.

2. In reply to a question from Mr. Shaw, Mr. Rowland first traced the respective functions of his Agency and of the Palestine Conciliation Commission. He explained that while his Agency had the duty of providing relief and rehabilitation for the refugees, the Commission had been charged with the political function of working for a settlement not only of the refugee problem itself (through repatriation, compensation and rehabilitation), but of the wider problem of Arab/Israel relations. He said that the Conciliation Commission had sometimes been inactive, but that during one of its periods of activity its special representative, Dr. Joseph Johnson, had made some very reasonable proposals for an overall settlement, but these proposals had been totally unacceptable to the Arab Governments on political grounds. He expressed the opinion that if the refugees had been allowed to answer the questionnaire which Dr. Johnson proposed should be circulated, only about 40% of them would in fact, if free from political pressure, have opted for repatriation to Israel. (During the later conference, Mr. Rowland elaborated this point by saying that if the State of Israel were obliterated, virtually all unsettled refugees would wish to return, but that in present circumstances and after the lapse of 15 years, only the older age group would seek to return to their former homes now under Israeli administration). He mentioned that one specific success achieved by the Conciliation Commission was the release of a substantial portion of the Arab assets frozen in Israel. He also spoke of the wide gap between the Arab and the Israeli estimates of the value of former Arab property in Israel, but he made no reference to the P.C.C.'s efforts to identify and evaluate the property.

3. Within the limits imposed by its mandate, the Agency had made several costly, and not very successful, attempts at re-settlement. One such case had been the proposed re-settlement in Sinai of agricultural refugees at present in Gaza; technicians from the Tennessee Valley Authority had concluded that it would be feasible to siphon the waters of the Sweetwater Canal under the Suez Canal and

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Report prepared by R.A.H. Robertson.

ACTION:

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irrigate the parched lands to the east of Suez. The Egyptian Government had admitted that the scheme seemed viable, but, when it came to the point, had withheld their agreement on the pretext that the supply of water would be insufficient. In fact, none of the Arab Governments could afford publicly to give support to any mass resettlement scheme. In these circumstances the Agency was now concentrating on relief and training.

4. In regard to training, Mr. Shaw enquired whether jobs were proving to be available. Mr. Rowland replied that in practice most of the graduates of U.N.R.W.A.'s twelve vocational training centres (with a total capacity of 3,500 students and an annual output of about 2,000) were being snapped up for jobs outside the host countries, particularly in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the Trucial States and Libya. So far as the host states themselves were concerned, the situation varied: Syria allowed the refugees equal economic opportunities with the locals, but withheld citizenship, and in fact some jobs were available for them; Lebanon, because its 120,000 refugees (90% of them Moslems) would upset the confessional balance in the State, withheld both political and economic opportunity, and was in fact doing very little for the refugees; in Jordan the refugees had full citizenship rights, but it was a poor country and there were very few jobs available for anybody; there were even fewer jobs available in the Gaza Strip, but recently the Egyptians, with a rapidly expanding secondary industry in Egypt itself, were allowing trained refugees to take jobs in Egyptian industry. Mr. Rowland said that the Agency's training programme was biting slowly into the refugee problem because, when a refugee's wages reached a certain level a month, not only he himself, but all his dependants, were removed from the Agency's responsibility.

5. In regard to relief, Mr. Rowland referred to the budgetary problems created by fluctuating commodity prices and, more particularly, the difficulty in establishing and maintaining accurate ration rolls. There had been fictitious registrations and a consistent failure to report deaths, but gradually the rolls were being authenticated and stabilized (in Jordan there had been a sealing for some years).

6. As to the general prospect of a final settlement, Mr. Rowland said that there was a deep and, in many respects, quite understandable bitterness to be overcome. In particular, Mr. Rowland seemed to sympathise with the Arabs' belief that the West and the U.N. have "let them down" (he said even the partition was patently unfair to the Arabs, who constituted 2/3rds of the population of old Palestine and were to receive only the worse half of its area) and with their aversion to Zionism. The problem of the refugees would take at least a generation to solve and the Agency for its part had no new lines of approach in mind.

7. In the context of Mr. Shaw's enquiries about the prospects for a final settlement, Mr. Rowland said that, while he could well understand the impatience which the contributing Governments felt about the lack of progress after so many years of heavy contributions, there seemed, in present political circumstances, to be no alternative to maintaining the Agency's programmes. Dr. Davis was making as many economies as he could on the relief side, but, given the present political deadlock, he believed that the Agency's vocational training programmes provided the best prospect for movement.

8. During a later and longer discussion in Mr. John Rowland's room, Mr. Victor Rowland went over very much the same ground as he had covered with Mr. Shaw. He provided further details of the Agency's relief and works programmes and, in reply to a question from Mr. Flanagan, said that in the current fiscal and calendar year the Agency was facing a deficit of \$1,500,000. For 1964, it was proposed to decrease the relief budget by \$1,000,000, but to increase the provision for vocational training by \$3,000,000. Dr. Davis hoped to be able to meet the gap by means of private donation of training scholarships (which cost \$500 each a year) and by

CONFIDENTIAL

295
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- 3 -

drawings from the working capital fund which fluctuated between \$4,000,000 and \$7,000,000.

9. Mr. Rowland referred, without labouring the point, to the difficulties created by the insistence of some governments on making their contributions in kind. One example which he gave related to the use of the Australian contribution which was required to be spent on the purchase of goods in Australia; one of the commodities purchased was soap which cost £200 per ton in Australia, but which could almost be matched in quality by a Portuguese product at £140 per ton. He stressed that there were more glaring examples in which, because of the non-convertibility of contributions, the Agency was obliged to make uneconomic purchases, and expressed understanding of the economic reasons leading to the Government's decision against convertibility. But he also indicated that soap purchases came nearest to being an economic use of the Australian contribution.

10. Mr. Rowland's final point was that he believed that the refugee problem could be economically solved within a generation, as a result largely of trained refugees finding employment and being, in fact, resettled (though this term was, of course, still unacceptable to the Arab governments). But he was most doubtful whether even then the political problem of Arab-Israel relations would have eased to the extent where the Arabs would come to accept Israel's existence.

11. During lunch later on the same day (at which Messrs. Shaw, Harry, John Rowland and Doig of External Affairs and Mr. Daniel of the Treasury were present) Mr. Rowland, in response to questions, offered some general comments in the light of his long experience in the Middle East, earlier as a New Zealand army officer and later with U.N. agencies. He believed that Arab hatred of the State of Israel was implacable. Individual Arabs were in fact living contentedly alongside Jews all over the Middle East, but Arabs believed that the partition of Palestine which created Israel was unfair in that it gave the richer areas to the minority people, the Jews, and that the United Nations had let them down by not redressing the balance of injustice. Israel is heavily subsidised by Jews abroad, especially from the United States; left to itself it could never be viable. When the Arabs felt that they had the strength to make a concerted attack they would do so. But Arab unity was unlikely, either under Nasser or Baathist leadership. The Egyptian leaders were disliked elsewhere in the Middle East because of their arrogance and because they were not really Arab. Economic conditions in Egypt seemed much better than a few years back.

CONFIDENTIAL

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

294

File No. 181/4/4

Date 11/7/63

SUBJECT

FOR MR. ROWLAND

Mr Shaw will no doubt talk to Mr Rowland about the U.N. aspects of the refugee problem. If Mr Rowland shows willingness to talk about political questions Mr Harry may wish to raise with him the following points:

(a) Do the Arabs really place so much importance on a genuine solution of the refugee problem? Would a solution contribute much to the settlement of the Arab/Israel question? The Arabs may feel that the refugees problem helps to focus their grievances against Israel.

(b) How much are the refugees influenced by Nasser? Are they an instrument for him? Are they more influenced by Nasser or by the Baathists?

(c) Are the refugees capable of overthrowing the Jordanian Government?

(d) If the Jordanian Government were overthrown, would the Israelis carry out their threat to move into the West Bank of Jordan?

(e) Does he agree with our assessment that most, if not all, of the refugees are basically pan-Arabs or Nasserists? Is there any evidence of the refugees being influenced by Communism?

(f) The Israelis claim that 40,000 refugees have returned to Israel since 1949. Is this true? Have any refugees returned to Israel in the past five years?

(g) Have ^{many} refugees left the settlements for other parts of the Middle East or elsewhere?

Attached is a copy of Mr Harry's telegram (from New York) to the Secretary of the UN and Mr Johnson. (D. Doe)

You may wish to see the attached call to Rowland (UNRWA) with him

Mr. Koe

Mr. Cumme will make a record.

11/7/7.

293

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS **CONFIDENTIAL**

INWARD CABLEGRAM

852/12/10.

10th July, 1963.

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS,
NEW YORK.

PROGRAMME FOR MR. ROWLAND'S VISIT TO CANBERRA,
11TH/12TH JULY.

UNICC. **CONFIDENTIAL**.
REPEATED WASHINGTON FOR INFORMATION.

MR. SHAW
c.c. MR. HARRY
MR. DOIG
MR. ROWLAND

Mr Lee Jean

Mr. J. Rowland

I would appreciate
a note on points which
might be raised with
Rowland if unknown.

The following tentative arrangements have been made for
Mr. Rowland's visit, subject of course to his in fact material-
ising in Canberra on Thursday morning :-

- (1.) Met at airport by myself or Miller.
- (2.) 4 p.m., 11th July, accompanied by me to appointment with Mr. Roy Daniel of Treasury.
- (3.) 10.30 a.m. Friday, 12th July, meeting with yourself and Mr. Harry in your room.
- (4.) Approximately 11 a.m., meeting in Conference Room with Messrs. John Rowland and Doig and other appropriate officers from the United Nations and Europe, Africa and Middle East Branches, the meeting to be chaired by Mr. Doig of United Nations Branch.
- (5.) 12.45 p.m. Luncheon at the Rex at Canberra to be hosted by you, the other guests being Mr. Harry, Mr. Daniel, Mr. John Rowland and Mr. Doig.

Subjects Likely to be Raised:

2. Mr. Rowland will no doubt wish to dwell at some length on the activities of the Agency and will probably require little leading on this subject. The Commissioner General's Report on the work of the Agency for the period 1st July 1962 to 30th June 1963 is not yet available, but I have no knowledge of any radical changes in the Agency's programmes having taken place since the preceding period, the report for which is attached. In this report your attention is drawn to the relatively short introduction and particularly to paragraphs 33 to 36 thereof.
3. It is to be expected that Mr. Rowland will wish to raise two specific matters relating to the Australian voluntary contribution to the Agency. In each of the past 3 years, our contribution has stayed at £490,000 and, despite requests from the Agency, we have declined either to increase this amount or to allow some portion of it to be used for purchase of supplies outside Australia.
4. Mr. Rowland will no doubt return to the charge on both scores. We have again proposed a contribution of £90,000 in our draft estimates for 1963/64, and despite the fact that this is proportionately quite a small contribution, there is no prospect of an early increase. This results partly from other calls on our resources, including particularly the present effort towards a contribution to the Special Fund, and partly from the assessment that, should Dr. Johnson's proposals for a solution to the refugee problem make any headway, Australia and the other contributors will have little alternative to increasing substantially their annual contributions in order to pay for the implementation of the proposals.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

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FROM.

DATED.

1ST FEBRUARY, 1968
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AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS,
NEW YORK.

REC'D.

2ND FEBRUARY, 1968
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REPEATED WASHINGTON FOR INFORMATION.

PALESTINE REFUGEES.

FOR SECRETARY FROM HARRY.

JOSEPH E. JOHNSON THIS MORNING GAVE ME FOLLOWING BACKGROUND TO HIS RESIGNATION, ANNOUNCED TODAY (JOHNSON OF COURSE HAD EARLIER INFORMED US THAT HE DID NOT WISH TO CONTINUE.)

2. ALTHOUGH HIS LETTER OF RESIGNATION SPEAKS ONLY OF LEAVING THE "RECORD" OF HIS EFFORTS WITH THE SECRETARIAT HE HAS IN FACT WRITTEN A REPORT BUT HAS RECOMMENDED THAT IT NOT BE MADE PUBLIC AT THIS STAGE.

HE KNEW WE HAD BEEN GIVEN HIS EARLIER PROPOSALS BY THE U.S.A. AND SUGGESTED THAT WE MIGHT GET A COPY FROM ONE OF THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION.

3. IN BRIEF HIS CONCLUSION IS THAT ANY PLAN FOR EXERCISE OF INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCE BY REFUGEES ON A VOLUNTARY BASIS WAS SOUND.

HE IS CONVINCED THAT NOT MORE THAN A SMALL PERCENTAGE OF THE REFUGEES WOULD OPT TO RETURN TO ISRAEL IF THEY COULD BE INFORMED OF CONDITIONS IN WHICH ARABS ARE NOW LIVING THERE.

HE ALSO BELIEVES THAT OPPORTUNITIES CAN BE FOUND OR CREATED FOR RESETTLEMENT.

HE HOPES THAT A CONTINUING EFFORT WILL BE MADE WITH THE U.N. PLAYING A ROLE TO PERSUADE ISRAEL AND THE ARABS TO ACQUIESCE IN THE GRADUAL AND SIMULTANEOUS IMPLEMENTATION OF HIS PROPOSALS.

4. IN STRICT CONFIDENCE (PLEASE PROTECT HIM) HE TOLD ME THAT HE HAD HAD THE STRONGEST SUPPORT AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FOR HIS PROPOSALS (RUSK AND MCGHEE WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS APPOINTMENT).

PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S ADVISER ON JEWISH AFFAIRS HAD BROUGHT STRONG PRESSURE TO BEAR ON THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT TO GIVE HIM A HEARING.

BUT IT HAD NOT BEEN POSSIBLE TO MAKE PROGRESS BECAUSE THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HAD DISLIKED HIS PROPOSALS AND HAD WORKED HARD TO DISTORT AND DEFEAT THEM.

THE ARABS, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAD NOT REJECTED HIS IDEAS, AND COULD, HE JUDGED, BE PERSUADED TO ACQUIESCE IN THEM.

INDIVIDUAL ARABS HAD BEEN IN FAVOUR OF THE PROCESS OF OPTION EVEN IF ISRAEL GAVE NO ASSURANCES.

(HE HIMSELF FELT THIS MIGHT PRODUCE A FALSE RESULT).

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② 181/4/4.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

5. IT HAD NOW BEEN CONCLUDED (I GATHER THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT IS ACTIVELY CONCERNING ITSELF) THAT THE U.S. MIGHT BE ABLE TO BREAK THE DEADLOCK IS PRESIDENT KENNEDY HIMSELF. THE "JERUSALEM POST" HAD REPORTED A DEMARCHE BY THE U.S. AMBASSADOR IN TEL AVIV EARLIER THIS WEEK AND (THE FOLLOWING SHOULD BE COMPLETELY SAFEGUARDED) PUBLICITY WILL BE GIVEN TO A VISIT BY JOHNSON TO THE PRESIDENT THIS WEEK.

6. JOHNSON ASKED WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR AUSTRALIA TO EXPRESS CONFIDENTIALLY TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT INTEREST IN THE POSSIBILITY OF AN AMERICAN MOVE, AND A WILLINGNESS TO CONTRIBUTE TOWARDS A SOLUTION, E.G. BY TAKING A FEW SKILLED REFUGEES AS MIGRANTS.

7. I TOLD JOHNSON IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR US TO MAKE EVEN PRIVATELY TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT ANY COMMITMENTS TO MAKE FURTHER FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS OR TO ACCEPT MIGRANTS.

I UNDERTOOK HOWEVER TO ASK YOU WHETHER I COULD, WHEN IN WASHINGTON, SHOW AN INTEREST IN THE POSSIBILITY OF U.S. ACTION.

8. FURTHER COMMENTS WILL FOLLOW FROM THE MISSION, BUT IT WILL BE CLEAR FROM THE ABOVE THAT IN THE EYES OF THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION THE PALESTINE CONCILIATION COMMISSION HAS PROBABLY NOW EXHAUSTED ITS FUNCTIONS.

WE UNDERSTAND THAT AT THE RELEVANT MEETING OF THE COMMISSION STRONG DISAGREEMENT OCCURRED BETWEEN THE U.S. AND FRANCE AS TO THE NEXT STEPS TO BE TAKEN FOLLOWING ON JOHNSON'S QUITTANCE.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT IMMIGRATION.
P.M's.

2ND FEBRUARY, 1963.

SEC A/S's LA MR LOOMES UN PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA EAF&ME E ME
INF C&P

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EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

290

File No. 181/4/4

Date 11/7/63

SUBJECT

FOR MR ROWLAND

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- (g) Have any refugees left the settlements for other parts of the Middle East or elsewhere?

File

Attached is a copy of Mr Harry's letter 11/11/63 (from New York) to the Secretary on his talk with Mr Johnson. (C. Lee)



COPY FOR MR. CUMMINS

CONFIDENTIAL

852/12/10.

10th July, 1963.

PROGRAMME FOR MR. ROWLAND'S VISIT TO CANBERRA,
11TH/12TH JULY.

MR. SHAW
c.c. MR. HARRY
MR. DOIG
MR. ROWLAND

The following tentative arrangements have been made for Mr. Rowland's visit, subject of course to his in fact materialising in Canberra on Thursday morning:-

- (1.) Met at airport by myself or Miller.
- (2.) 4 p.m., 11th July, accompanied by me to appointment with Mr. Roy Daniel of Treasury.
- (3.) 10.30 a.m. Friday, 12th July, meeting with yourself and Mr. Harry in your room.
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....

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4. Mr. Rowland will no doubt return to the charge on both scores. We have again proposed a contribution of £90,000 in our draft estimates for 1963/64, and despite the fact that this is proportionately quite a small contribution, there is no prospect of an early increase. This results partly from other calls on our resources, including particularly the present effort towards a contribution to the Special Fund, and partly from the assessment that, should Dr. Johnson's proposals for a solution to the refugee problem make any headway, Australia and the other contributors will have little alternative to increasing substantially their annual contributions in order to pay for the implementation of the proposals.

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288

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5. On the other hand there is some possibility that we will be able to go some way towards meeting the Agency on the question of convertibility. I understand from the Department of the Treasury that, particularly in view of an appeal by the Technical Assistance Committee of ECOSOC, they will be prepared seriously to consider allowing up to 15% of all our voluntary contributions to United Nations programmes to be in convertible currency. I also understand from Mr. Bouchier that a letter has been drafted to Treasury concerning this matter of convertibility.

6. In theory of course Mr. Rowland, as an officer of U.N.R.W.A., may be reluctant to venture beyond discussing matters strictly within the Agency's mandate and may prove uninformative on political questions such as general developments in the Middle East and the prospects, if any, for a settlement of the refugee problem, whether in terms of the Johnson proposals or otherwise. However the tentative programme is sufficiently flexible that the various appointments can be extended if discussion proves useful within the wider frame.

UNITED NATIONS (POLITICAL)
RHR/ss.

CONFIDENTIAL



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AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
GARDEN CITY
CAIRO221.3.1.2
In reply quote No. 221.3.1.3
Memorandum No. 166

14 March, 1963.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

VISIT TO THE GAZA STRIP

When the Commercial Counsellor visited Gaza from 10 to 12 March, 1963, to make trade enquiries, I accompanied him with a view to establishing contacts with UNEF and UNRWA, and to take a general look at the Gaza Territory under UAR administration.

THE GAZA STRIP

2. The territory is quite distinct from the United Arab Republic, both officially and physically. After crossing the oasis-dotted barren sandhills of the northern Sinai desert one enters Palestine at Rafah to find, not the flat lushness of the delta, but gentle rolling hills, some still barren but most now planted with citrus groves, and wide flat valleys with a good wheat crop. This visible difference is confirmed by the villages, which are a little cleaner than those in Egypt, and where the people, especially the women, are more colorfully dressed. The people, mostly displaced from the villages further north or Bedouin now obliged to stay put, are themselves different in appearance; lighter-skinned and with a more European cast to their features, possibly largely the result of the long Turkish occupation of the area. We found them also softer-spoken and pleasanter than Egyptians, and apparently harder-working.

3. Governmentally, the Gaza Strip is administered by a UAR-appointed Governor-General, whose top officials are, like him, Egyptian military men. But the bulk of the officials are Palestinians, and the laws still in force are basically those laid down by the British Mandatory authorities. The small military force within the Strip is said to have the strongest UAR influence, but even in that there is some attempt to make it predominantly Palestinian.

4. The economy is also distinct from that of the UAR. Exports largely consist of about a million cases of oranges, lemons and mandarins a year, bringing in a revenue of about £1 million, used to finance imports which are not subject to UAR licencing and other regulations. There is much loose talk about the amount of smuggling from Gaza into the UAR, and the customs officials of the latter (at El Kantara, on the Suez Canal just north of Ismailia) have a reputation for strenuous thoroughness. But it is difficult to believe that much could be smuggled: only transistor radios and liquor are at all plentiful in Gaza, and at prices not all that much below those in Egypt itself.

5. We did not call on the Governor-General (Lieutenant-General Yussef el-Agrudy, who the day before our visit had made a routine inflammatory speech promising imminent disaster for Israel, and attempted verbal confirmation of the huge "We will return" signs plastered all over the Strip and in every office) or on any other officials of the administration.

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Orig on 175/1120/9

⑤ 181/4/4

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UNEF

6. Lieutenant-General P.S. Gyani, the Indian Commander of the UNEF forces, gave us a resumé of the Force's activities, most of which will already be known to you. He was quite firm on the necessity for the maintenance of UNEF: since its inception at the end of 1956 there have been no shooting incidents at all on the UAR-Israeli border; and minor violations of the frontier have recently been lower than at any previous stage - one or two a month, compared with the hundred to hundred and forty which are common on the borders of Syria and Jordan (where shooting incidents also are not infrequent). We heard later, from the Swedish Operations Officer, that the main border violations are, on the one hand, by Arabs sneaking across by night to steal a donkey or, more popularly, water pipes from Israeli irrigation projects, and on the other, by Israeli agents who are known to slip over at night but who are never caught.
7. UNEF has complete jurisdiction in the border zone: no UAR (or Palestinian) troops are stationed within that area and therefore, the General remarked, there was an added necessity for UNEF to perform its border control functions with even greater thoroughness than would the UAR itself. By night Gaza inhabitants must not approach within 500 metres of the border; by day within 50, except that special permission may be obtained by farmers to cultivate land right up to the demarcation line. When we were touring the UNEF posts strung along the border (each within sight of the next, and manned by day by two UNEF men) we saw some farmers ploughing the side of the demarcation ditch. One had obviously been cutting grass just across it: but there were no Israelis in sight, either here or on the whole border that day, and most of the *Kibbutzim* are well back, usually only their water towers showing above the nearest hills (although pillboxes are evident on many of the latter). From No. 1 Observation Post on the coast north of Gaza one can see Tel Aviv; but looking at Israel (and especially photographing it) is not encouraged on the hills further back where the UAR's writ runs. The other side of the line is clearly developed better and the General said the contrast from the air is striking. At night jeeps patrol the Gaza Armistice Demarcation Line; in largely uninhabited Sinai Yugoslav troops are stationed at key points on the 117 mile International Frontier, and Canadian reconnaissance planes make several sweeps each week.
8. General Gyani spoke highly of the cooperation extended by the UAR military administration, and touched on the difficulties of his own position as a neutral observer allowed only in the territory of one of the disputants. (Even observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization are not permitted by Israel to go to the Gaza-Sinai border.) He said it was almost impossible to tell what the Israelis were up to on their side of the ADL: manoeuvres within sight of the border (of which there was one two weeks ago) might indicate a build-up of forces, or be a demonstration of strength, or might simply be part of the normal military training activity. On the Gaza side, however, UNEF could not but help being aware of any special build-up (the Swede told us that the UAR Sinai forces, depleted earlier, as we have reported, for duty in Yemen, have been considerably strengthened near El Arish within the past three weeks); and the General remarked that all he could do was attempt to show the UAR administration that, even if he were not blind, he was at least completely uninterested in its military activities. The officers under him were clearly not so uninterested, and one can only assume that if hostilities were to break out the General also would be obliged to pay close attention to relative strengths, despite the fact that his mandate does not normally include such reporting.
9. (We spoke also to Major A. Lofts, an Australian observer with UNTSO, who expressed some concern at the possibility of Israel taking advantage of confusions following the recent coup in Damascus by trying to wrest a few acres from Syria. We were unable to discover whether this was simply speculation or based on reports from UNTSO's Tiberias base.)
10. General Gyani commented also on the value of the experience built up by UNEF for future operations of this kind. Although the nature of the UN's work in the Congo was completely different from that in Gaza-Sinai, he believed that the problems of organization, administration and supply had been considerably helped, and any future border-guarding operation could be got under way at very short notice and with minimum waste. He commented also that he believed this type of operation might become more frequent in future - undoubtedly with Yemen in mind.

CONFIDENTIAL

UNRWA

11. We called on Mr James Weldon, the Gaza area Director of Operations of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, and were given an extensive survey of UNRWA activities in the Strip by the Chief Finance Officer. Most of these will be known to you from the UNRWA newsletter Palestine Refugees Today and the series of background information papers UNRWA Reviews.

12. We were impressed immediately by the sense of economy shown not only by the small handful of international staff but also by the Palestinians (mostly refugees themselves) who manage the camps and training centres. We gained the impression of a sober concern for priorities, a genuine understanding of the problem not merely the result of UNRWA's limited budget. This, which has now been at about \$33 million since 1958, must provide for all UNRWA activities - housing (1%), health (10%), education (34%), and basic subsistence (33%) - for a total of over one million refugees, and some pride was expressed in UNRWA's ability to maintain a fairly even level of expenditure despite increases in numbers and activities. A large part of this has resulted from the use of refugees to do their own work. The main camp visited, Jubalia, which holds some 35,000 of the 170,000 camp inhabitants of the Gaza Strip's quarter million refugees, consists of eight-person housing units, built of concrete bricks and roofed with cement tiles. Both these items, as well as doors, windows and furniture, are made in the camp by the refugees themselves. The camp is remarkably clean, as the houses themselves appeared to be; the camp sanitation squad makes periodic inspections and regularly sprays against flies, mosquitoes and bugs. A further economising measure lies in the extremely close checks which are kept on all camp residents; every issue of subsistence-standard foodstuffs is carefully recorded, as are medical services and clothing issues, and a small sum is paid for funerals to encourage families not to bury their dead surreptitiously in order to be able to go on drawing the deceased's rations.

13. Great emphasis is placed on health, particularly on preventive medicine, and the natural reluctance of uneducated people to use medical services has been so much overcome that the one harassed doctor at the Jubalia clinic is treating (with his semi-trained assistants) four hundred patients a day in hopelessly inadequate surroundings. (A sterilizer, for instance, consists of an aluminium pan on a primus stove.) Each of the strips' eight camps has such a clinic, to which is attached a maternal and child-welfare centre, and there is a hospital for surgical and serious medical cases in Gaza. Officials were despairing about improving the medical facilities: some refugees have had medical training, but they are promptly attracted away from the Strip by lucrative offers from the Persian Gulf oil companies. However, UNRWA is at least holding its ground medically. There has never been a serious epidemic of any kind (quite an achievement, given the primitive tent camps with which the operation began) and the incidence of other diseases (with the exception of diseases of the eye, endemic throughout the Middle East) is no greater than in a normal western community, contrary to lurid reports occasionally spread abroad. The main field where UNRWA can not keep up is in the care of teeth; there is only one dentist for the entire quarter million refugees, and it seems both strange and unfortunate that no member-country of the United Nations has seen its way to providing a single dental unit for the area.

14. The present Commissioner-General of UNRWA (Dr John H. Davis, whose headquarters are in Beirut) has placed great emphasis on vocational training for young refugees. And to judge by the Gaza Vocational Training Centre, where 120 boys go through a three-year course in a trade (all are taught - from refrigeration engineering to die-making to accountancy), the programme is very successful. The Centre is a very impressive place, its workshops well-equipped and its privileged trainees obviously devoting all their attention to their work, and to a layman the products of their efforts appear of a very high standard. The Agricultural Training Centre at Beit Hanoun, near the Aschalon border check-point, is making less headway. It covers most aspects of agriculture and animal husbandry, but the latter is weak and some of the work on crops amateurish. The Centre is only eighteen months old and working under stringent financial conditions

CONFIDENTIAL

284
CONFIDENTIAL

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(there is not a single book in the library), but the Director is at least enthusiastic and determined to progress steadily and sensibly within the limits imposed on him. There is another VTC at Khan Yunis, south of Gaza, and eight other training centres of various kinds in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria.

UNRWA - GAZA TERRITORY RELATIONS

15. UNRWA's activities are run in very close cooperation with the UAR administration of the Strip, and, once again, the Director of Operations spoke highly of the latter's attitude. The indigenous population (about 150,000) has taken kindly to the refugees and incidents between the two are unknown. Standards of living, health, education - are very closely comparable for the two groups, largely the result of budgetary considerations, but with the added advantage of keeping jealousies to a minimum. UNRWA has 50,000 children in primary and post-primary schools, the UAR administration 30,000. Some 25,000 refugee children then go on to the administration's secondary schools, and later small numbers to universities in the UAR. A programme has been arranged for graduates of the training centres to do practical work in UAR industries, and the entire first class under this scheme has been offered permanent employment by their host factories. The enthusiasm for education is remarkable (we had never before seen so many children and young people walking along streets or across paddocks with their heads buried in textbooks) and is some indication that the refugees are not idling away their time at United Nations expense while waiting to return to the land promised in every Arab speech.

16. The return to Palestine is, nevertheless, constantly before them. UNRWA officials felt that no propaganda was necessary to maintain this goal constantly before the refugees; nevertheless, propaganda was everywhere in evidence. It was a somewhat unnerving experience to hear a roomful of children in a school at Jubalia shouting that they would give their blood, die with their guns smoking, to regain their land. Half of them were girls, and they were four and five years old. Demonstrations (spontaneously organized by the UAR administration) are frequent, but UN officials could recall only one which became violent. This was last December, when the General Assembly extended UNRWA's mandate to June, 1965; a group of young men marched on the UNRWA administration compound and broke every window in the place. That it was indeed spontaneous was evidenced by the Governorate-General's despatch of Frontier Corps troops (the toughest in the UAR) and anxious apologies. The apparent reason for the refugees' turning on their source of help was that they felt the Assembly's resolution condemned them to refugee status for at least two more years.

17. No-one we spoke to could foresee what solution to the refugee problem there could ultimately be, and there was reluctance to speculate on such an unpromising subject, particularly following the complete failure of the Johnson proposals. Most felt that a scheme along those lines was the only conceivable possibility, but none felt inclined to suggest that either the Arabs or the Israelis would compromise their position to any significant extent. The Israelis cannot afford to allow large numbers of - in effect - fifth columnists into their country; the Arabs maintain that repatriation for all who wish to return to Palestine is their minimum condition.

18. One can only say that the refugees look like being a feature of the Middle East for a considerable time, and one does not dare to guess what would happen if UNRWA's activities were terminated.

19. Copies of this memorandum are being sent to the Australian missions in London, New York, Tel Aviv and Washington.

ER Pocock
(E.R. Pocock)
Third Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

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COPY

283
OF LETTER FROM
AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
750 THIRD AVENUE NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

7th February 1963

File No. 210/1/3

Memorandum No. 211/63

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra A.C.T.

Palestine Refugees

As you have been advised, Dr Joseph E. Johnson last week submitted his resignation as Special Representative of the Palestine Conciliation Commission in connexion with the question of the Palestine Arab refugees. Although there was no formal reference during the recent session of the General Assembly either to Dr Johnson's activities or to the future intentions of the Conciliation Commission in this regard, the letters exchanged last week between Dr Johnson and the Chairman of the Commission have now been made public. As suggested in Mr Harry's telegram of 30th January, the implication of the letters would seem to be that at any rate for the time being the Conciliation Commission has abandoned the kind of approach to the problem implicit in Dr Johnson's initial appointment.

....

2. The texts of the letters are attached to this memorandum.

A7/11
Mr Phillips
Copy for your
file B. en 852/12/10.

Rur.
4/3.

181/4/1

Permanent Representative

JDLH/fab

Letter from the Chairman of the Conciliation Commission, Mr Vahap Asiroglu,
to the President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Dr Joseph
E. Johnson) on his resignation as Special Representative
of the Conciliation Commission

31 January 1963

Dear Dr Johnson,

I have the honour to acknowledge your letter of resignation
dated 23 January.

All members of the Conciliation Commission for Palestine have
observed with great respect during the past eighteen months the sincere
devotion with which you have pursued your role of Special Representative and
sought to find practical means in behalf of the Arab refugees for making
progress in the implementation of paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III). The
careful study, the understanding, the intelligent imagination and the energy
with which you have explored this most complex task has confirmed for us the
initial confidence with which the Commission requested you to assume the role
of Special Representative.

As you point out in your letter, the five States directly
concerned have not, in the present circumstances, proved receptive to the
proposals that you have presented. The Commission is, however, convinced that
your efforts will not have been in vain and that the studies in depth that
you have undertaken and the numerous contacts that you have made will mark
an important milestone in the search for a solution of the tragic human
problem to which you have so generously devoted your efforts.

The Commission accepts your resignation with great regret and
with sincere appreciation for your dedicated service. While we understand
your personal reasons for laying down your active role at this time, the
Commission hopes that it may feel free to call upon you for counsel or further
assistance as it continues its endeavours with the Member States directly
concerned to find a way to achieve progress on the Palestine Arab refugee
problem.

Sincerely yours,

Vahap Asiroglu (signed)
Chairman
Conciliation Commission for Palestine

281

Letter from Dr Joseph E. Johnson, President of the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace to the Chairman of the Conciliation Commission,
Mr Vahap Asiroglu of Turkey

23 January 1963

Dear Mr Asiroglu,

I have the honour to ask the Conciliation Commission for Palestine to accept my resignation as its Special Representative, to take effect on 1 February 1963.

The Commission will recall that I was first appointed Special Representative on 21 August 1961 with instructions to explore with the Arab host Governments and with Israel practical means of seeking progress on the Palestine Arab refugee problem pursuant to resolution 1604 (XV). In that resolution the General Assembly had noted with regret that the Commission had not yet been able to report progress on the task entrusted to it in resolution 1456 (XIV), of securing the implementation of paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III), and requested the Commission to make further efforts to that end.

Paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III), adopted on 11 December 1948, formed therefore the basis of my assignment. It reads as follows:

"The General Assembly

"11. Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Government or authorities responsible;

Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation, and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations;"

After my September 1961 trip to the Middle East and further conversations at United Nations Headquarters with representatives of the Governments concerned, I submitted a report which was published as an addendum to the Commission's Nineteenth Progress Report (A/4921/Add.1). In that report I stated that in the time available I had been unable to explore all possible avenues towards progress and suggested that the experiment of a Special Representative be continued, provided that the qualified and cautious optimism expressed in the report continued to be justified. I added that certain considerations set forth in my Conclusions, particularly those in paragraph 54, would almost certainly have to form the basis of further endeavours by a Special Representative.

The Commission, to my great satisfaction, warmly endorsed my Conclusions, and within a month the General Assembly adopted resolution 1725 (XVI) which requested the Commission to intensify its efforts for the

780

implementation of paragraph 11 and urged the Arab host Governments and Israel to co-operate in that regard. In March 1962 the Commission reappointed me. In asking me to assist it in its further efforts, the Chairman pointed out that, while the responsibilities of the Commission remained all those assigned to it by the General Assembly in its relevant resolutions, my own related entirely to paragraph 11 and to the responsibilities assigned to the Commission in connexion therewith by resolution 1725 (XVI).

After careful examination of all aspects of the enormously complex problem of implementation of paragraph 11 and preliminary conversations at United Nations Headquarters, I had detailed talks in the Middle East with the highest officials of the Governments of the four Arab host countries and of Israel. Subsequent to my return to New York, I drafted certain proposals. These I submitted to the Commission in late August and while it was studying them, presented them, with its authorization to the Governments of Israel and the four Arab host States for their concurrent consideration.

Before the seventeenth session of the General Assembly had begun debate on the report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency it had become evident that the five States directly concerned were not at that time prepared to accept the plan outlined in my proposals. Under the circumstances it was decided not to publish the proposals, the Commission limiting itself in the Twentieth Progress Report of 7 December 1962 to the simple statement that it intended "to carry forward its initiative on this question".

On 20 December 1962 the General Assembly adopted resolution 1856 (XVII) in which, after expressing its thanks to the Commission for its efforts to find a way to achieve progress on the Palestine Arab refugee problem pursuant to paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III), it requested the Commission to continue its endeavour with the Member States directly concerned.

Needless to say I was gratified that the Commission expressed its intention to continue work on the question and that the Assembly requested it to do so. I do not know how the Commission intends to carry out that request, but I feel I owe it to the Commission to state that because of compelling personal commitments I shall not be able to continue as Special Representative.

I appreciate deeply the opportunity that the Commission has afforded me to attempt to continue to a solution of the problem of the Arab refugees whose tragedy has become so increasingly apparent during these past fifteen years.

It may be appropriate to state now that the experiment of a Special Representative of the Commission has, in my view, proved a worthwhile method for beginning a new effort to facilitate implementation of paragraph 11. As Special Representative I was free to study afresh and in depth this paragraph first adopted in 1948, and to examine and evaluate the attitudes of all concerned. I sought to isolate and develop some basic considerations and specific elements that I believe require consideration in any approach to the implementation of that paragraph in the 1960's. There is reason to think however, that the role a single individual representing the Conciliation Commission can play in trying to move beyond analysis into the actual achievement of progress on this complex problem has at least for the time being been carried as far as is practicable.

I believe, as I have suggested, that certain ideas I have developed should be of use to the Commission as it continues its endeavours. Accordingly, while I see no present utility in formally presenting a report, I have arranged to deposit with the Commission's Secretariat a full record of my mission.

In closing I wish to state for the record that I share the view, implicit in repeated resolutions of the General Assembly, that paragraph 11 remains a proper basis for an equitable resolution of the tragic human problem of the Arab refugees. I have a deep concern for the welfare of the refugees and believe that the urgency for action in their behalf grows rather than lessens with the passing of time. I also have an abiding interest in all aspects of the United Nations efforts on their behalf -- notably through the Conciliation Commission and through the United Nations Relief and Works Agency. I shall therefore follow keenly the Commission's continuing endeavours to help them.

Respectfully submitted,

Joseph E. Johnson (signed)
Special Representative

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

SRG

O. 2344

Dated: 5th February, 1963
2115

TO:

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK..... 75.

Repeated:

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.....227.

CONFIDENTIAL.

For Harry.

Your UN166.

We shall of course be interested to have a report on your conversations with State Department on questions of Palestine refugees. You may assure State Department of our desire to see this matter brought to a satisfactory conclusion and of our recognition of Johnson's efforts. However, notwithstanding that two key elements for implementing the Johnson plan for refugee preference are provision of finance and acceptance of migrants, we must affirm the advice you gave Johnson that we would have difficulty in increasing our present financial contribution to U.N.W.R.A. and in accepting as migrants any refugees who might indicate a preference for resettlement in Australia.

MIN. & DEPT E.A. (852/12/10)
(181/4/4)
MIN. & DEPT IMMIGRATION
P.M.'s

6th February, 1963

SEC A/S's LA MR LOOMES UN@ ER PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SEA EAF&ME
E AF ME INF IC

GENEVA TEL AVIV

(F) 181/4/4

DW

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

I.3030

FROM.

DATED.

1ST FEBRUARY, 1966
1910

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS,
NEW YORK.

REC'D.

2ND FEBRUARY, 1966
1337

UN166. CONFIDENTIAL. PRIORITY.

REPEATED WASHINGTON FOR INFORMATION.

PALESTINE REFUGEES.

FOR SECRETARY FROM HARRY.

JOSEPH E. JOHNSON THIS MORNING GAVE ME FOLLOWING BACKGROUND TO HIS RESIGNATION, ANNOUNCED TODAY (JOHNSON OF COURSE HAD EARLIER INFORMED US THAT HE DID NOT WISH TO CONTINUE.)

2. ALTHOUGH HIS LETTER OF RESIGNATION SPEAKS ONLY OF LEAVING THE "RECORD" OF HIS EFFORTS WITH THE SECRETARIAT HE HAS IN FACT WRITTEN A REPORT BUT HAS RECOMMENDED THAT IT NOT BE MADE PUBLIC AT THIS STAGE.

HE KNEW WE HAD BEEN GIVEN HIS EARLIER PROPOSALS BY THE U.S.A. AND SUGGESTED THAT WE MIGHT GET A COPY FROM ONE OF THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION.

3. IN BRIEF HIS CONCLUSION IS THAT ANY PLAN FOR EXERCISE OF INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCE BY REFUGEES ON A VOLUNTARY BASIS WAS SOUND.

HE IS CONVINCED THAT NOT MORE THAN A SMALL PERCENTAGE OF THE REFUGEES WOULD OPT TO RETURN TO ISRAEL IF THEY COULD BE INFORMED OF CONDITIONS IN WHICH ARABS ARE NOW LIVING THERE.

HE ALSO BELIEVES THAT OPPORTUNITIES CAN BE FOUND OR CREATED FOR RESETTLEMENT.

HE HOPES THAT A CONTINUING EFFORT WILL BE MADE WITH THE U.N. PLAYING A ROLE TO PERSUADE ISRAEL AND THE ARABS TO ACQUIESCE IN THE GRADUAL AND SIMULTANEOUS IMPLEMENTATION OF HIS PROPOSALS.

4. IN STRICT CONFIDENCE (PLEASE PROTECT HIM) HE TOLD ME THAT HE HAD HAD THE STRONGEST SUPPORT AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FOR HIS PROPOSALS (RUSK AND MCGHEE WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS APPOINTMENT).

PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S ADVISER ON JEWISH AFFAIRS HAD BROUGHT STRONG PRESSURE TO BEAR ON THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT TO GIVE HIM A HEARING.

BUT IT HAD NOT BEEN POSSIBLE TO MAKE PROGRESS BECAUSE THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HAD DISLIKED HIS PROPOSALS AND HAD WORKED HARD TO DISTORT AND DEFEAT THEM.

THE ARABS, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAD NOT REJECTED HIS IDEAS, AND COULD, HE JUDGED, BE PERSUADED TO ACQUIESCE IN THEM.

INDIVIDUAL ARABS HAD BEEN IN FAVOUR OF THE PROCESS OF OPTION EVEN IF ISRAEL GAVE NO ASSURANCES.

(HE HIMSELF FELT THIS MIGHT PRODUCE A FALSE RESULT).

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② 151/4/4.

277
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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

276

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5. IT HAD NOW BEEN CONCLUDED (I GATHER THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT IS ACTIVELY CONCERNING ITSELF THAT A DELEGATION MIGHT BE ABLE TO BREAK THE DEADLOCK IS PRESIDENT KENNEDY HIMSELF. THE "JERUSALEM POST" HAD REPORTED A DEMARCHE BY THE U.S. AMBASSADOR IN TEL AVIV EARLIER THIS WEEK AND (THE FOLLOWING SHOULD BE COMPLETELY SAFEGUARDED) PUBLICITY WILL BE GIVEN TO A VISIT BY JOHNSON TO THE PRESIDENT THIS WEEK.

6. JOHNSON ASKED WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR AUSTRALIA TO EXPRESS CONFIDENTIALLY TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT INTEREST IN THE POSSIBILITY OF AN AMERICAN MOVE, AND A WILLINGNESS TO CONTRIBUTE TOWARDS A SOLUTION, E.G. BY TAKING A FEW SKILLED REFUGEES AS MIGRANTS.

7. I TOLD JOHNSON IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR US TO MAKE EVEN PRIVATELY TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT ANY COMMITMENTS TO MAKE FURTHER FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS OR TO ACCEPT MIGRANTS.

I UNDERTOOK HOWEVER TO ASK YOU WHETHER I COULD, WHEN IN WASHINGTON, SHOW AN INTEREST IN THE POSSIBILITY OF U.S. ACTION.

8. FURTHER COMMENTS WILL FOLLOW FROM THE MISSION, BUT IT WILL BE CLEAR FROM THE ABOVE THAT IN THE EYES OF THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION THE PALESTINE CONCILIATION COMMISSION HAS PROBABLY NOW EXHAUSTED ITS FUNCTIONS.

WE UNDERSTAND THAT AT THE RELEVANT MEETING OF THE COMMISSION STRONG DISAGREEMENT OCCURRED BETWEEN THE U.S. AND FRANCE AS TO THE NEXT STEPS TO BE TAKEN FOLLOWING ON JOHNSON'S QUITTANCE.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT IMMIGRATION.
P.M's.

2ND FEBRUARY, 1963.

CONFIDENTIAL

SEC A/S's LA MR LOOMES UN PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA EAF&ME E ME
INF C&P



THIS PAGE IS REPRODUCED FROM A BADLY FADED OR ILLEGIBLE SOURCE.
SCANNING THIS ITEM AT A HIGHER RESOLUTION WILL NOT IMPROVE ITS LEGIBILITY.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper NEW YORK TIMES.

File No. 181/4/4

Published at PARIS.

Date 26-1-65

JOHNSON TO LEAVE U. N. REFUGEE JOB

Negotiations Fail to Break
Arab-Israeli Deadlock

By KATHLEEN TELTSCH

Special to The New York Times.

UNITED NATIONS, N. Y., Jan. 25—Dr. Joseph E. Johnson intends to resign in a few days after 10 months of trying to persuade the Arab states and Israel to adopt a new approach toward settling the Palestine refugee problem.

Dr. Johnson took on the United Nations negotiating effort last spring and conducted talks here and in the Middle East. He intends to return to his full-time position as president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

His impending resignation means apparently that intensified efforts will be made to work through the usual diplomatic channels rather than through an individual negotiator. This will be undertaken in Middle Eastern countries but primarily in Washington, since the United States has taken the lead in pushing for a settlement.

Many diplomats here have been expecting Dr. Johnson to leave the scene at least for now, since it has been clear that neither the Arab states nor Israel gave his proposals any encouragement. Opposition from both, in fact, led to an agreement during the recent General Assembly session not to publish his proposals officially, although the general lines became known.

New Formula Urged

In essence, he advised a new formula for seeking permanent homes for the Arabs who were uprooted by the 1948 Palestine war and who have been living in the Arab states that border on Israel. Among other ideas, he proposed that refugees be given opportunities to express a preference for several alternatives: repatriation to Israel or resettlement in the Arab lands or elsewhere.

The proposals, however, apparently did not alter the basic positions of either side—the Arab insistence that the refugees be repatriated to Israel and Israel's just as strongly felt rejection of this for security and economic reasons.

Diplomatic sources here believe that the Johnson mission served as a preparatory step and suggested that he might at some time take on a further negotiating effort.

However, even that argument, there will be renewed and stronger emphasis on private negotiations with the parties concerned to determine if, and under what conditions, they would consider repatriation to Israel or resettlement in the Arab world on a permanent basis with compensation for their losses.

The United States has financial reasons for pushing for a settlement, apart from the obvious interest in resolving both the humanitarian and persisting political problem. As the major supporter of the United Nations aid program for the refugees, the United States has contributed \$291,268,000 since 1950.

Name of Paper NEW YORK TIMES.

Published at PARIS.

File No.

Date

ARAB REFUGEE AID
WINS IN U.N., 101-0

Continued From Page 1, Col. 2

tantamount to final approval by the Assembly later this week, since both bodies have identical membership.

As in past years, the resolution to continue assistance was sponsored by the United States, which has been the major supporter of the aid operation carried out by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency. The agency's present mandate expires next June 30 but now has been given an extension until June 1965.

The reference to the mission of Dr. Johnson was indirect but clear. It was contained in a key paragraph asking the Palestine Conciliation Commission to continue its endeavors "with the member states directly concerned."

Dr. Johnson, who is president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, served as the commission's special representative. In this role he conferred separately with both sides, seeking a way out of the 14-year impasse over the status of refugees forced from their homes by the war in Palestine.

Attitude of the Arabs

The refugees have been living in the Arab lands bordering Israel-Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and the United Arab Republic. These states insist that the refugees be sent back while Israel refuses to admit them on the ground that they present a security risk and an impossible economic burden.

The committee debate was marked this year by particularly venomous Arab attacks on Israel but ended on an uncommon note of near harmony.

Sponsors agreed not to press two other resolutions to a vote. One sponsored by 21 states called for direct negotiations between the Arabs and Israelis to iron out their disputes, particularly over the refugees.

The resolution was favored by Israel but attacked by the Arabs, who have protested that as long as Israel does not yield on the refugee issue there is nothing to negotiate.

A second resolution, favored by the Arabs sought to establish a United Nations custodianship over properties abandoned by the refugees when they fled Palestine.

ARAB REFUGEE AID
WINS IN U.N., 101-0Committee Approves 2-Year
Extension—Abstention by
Israel Trks MediatorBy KATHLEEN TELTSCH
Special to The New York Times.

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y., Dec. 18—A two-year extension of United Nations aid to Palestinian Arab refugees was approved today by the General Assembly's Special Political Committee.

The resolution, adopted 101 to 0, also provided for continuation of the mediation efforts undertaken by Dr. Joseph E. Johnson to find permanent homes for the refugees. Israel and Cameroon abstained.

Minutes after the vote, however, Dr. Johnson expressed indignation privately over what he called a "no confidence vote" by Israel in his mission. He was reported to have said that Israel would have to make it clear that this was not the case or he saw little purpose in trying to continue his negotiating work.

Resolution Much Quoted

Israeli spokesmen, reached after the vote, denied that they had in any way cast doubts on Dr. Johnson's integrity. It was explained that they had insisted on a separate vote on a paragraph referring to his efforts because they wanted to register opposition to its mention also of a 1948 resolution.

This resolution has been much quoted by the Arab states as the basis for their demands that the refugees be returned en masse to Israel.

The vote by the committee is

Continued on Page 9, Column 4

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

273

MT

AMENDED COPY.

I.32343

FROM:

Dated 20th December, 1962
1815

Rec'd 22nd December, 1962
1319

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK.

x

UN2051. UNCLASSIFIED.

Washington for information, Ottawa Sav.1243, London
Sav.1376.

Palestine Refugees.

Plenary today adopted special political committee
resolution on Palestine Refugees by 100 - 0 - 2 (Israel).

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT IMMIGRATION
TREASURER & TREASURY
P.M.'s

(x amendment)

24th December, 1962

(P) 181/4/4

SEC A/S's LA MR LOOMES UN@ ER PAC@AM AM&SP S&SEA EAF&ME
E AF ME INF IC C&P

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

MT

I.32343

FROM.

DATED 20TH DECEMBER, 1962
1815REC'D 22ND DECEMBER, 1962
1319

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS,
NEW YORK.

UN2057. UNCLASSIFIED.

WASHINGTON FOR INFORMATION, OTTAWA SAV.1243, LONDON
 SAV.1376.

PALESTINE REFUGEES.

PLENARY TODAY ADOPTED SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE
 RESOLUTION ON PALESTINE REFUGEES BY 100 - 0 - 2 (ISRAEL).

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
 MIN. & DEPT IMMIGRATION
 TREASURER & TREASURY
 P.M.'s

22ND DECEMBER, 1962

181/4/4

SEC A/S's LA MR LOOMES UN@ ER PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA EAF&ME
 E AF ME INF IC C&P

CONFIDENTIAL

271

File No.

181/4/4

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Record of Conversation with H.E. Mr. Moshe Yuval, Ambassador of Israel
 on 18th December, 1962
 Officers Present Mr. P. Shaw

MAIN SUBJECT(S):

The Israeli Ambassador called to discuss the Item on Palestine Refugees before the current session of the United Nations General Assembly.

2. The Ambassador first asked that the Australian Delegation speak in opposition to the draft Resolution suggesting the appointment of a controller of former Arab assets within Israel. He said that such a suggestion ran counter to the sovereignty of Israel and the purpose of the United Nations. I said that the Australian delegation would oppose this Resolution and that there did not seem much chance that it would have the necessary support.

3. Mr. Yuval then asked that we speak for and vote for a draft Resolution calling upon the two parties to get together to negotiate their differences. The importance of this lay firstly in its encouragement of the Brazzaville group of Africans who had taken an initiative in putting forward this draft. These Africans should be encouraged and made to feel that their constructive suggestions were listened to. More important from the Israeli point of view to speak and vote for this Resolution would bring a salutary realization to the Arabs that other members of the United Nations simply would not accept the current Arab doctrine that they could work for the elimination of a fellow United Nations member. Mr. Yuval spoke of the ~~intimate~~ Soviet support for the Arab position which he believed to be quite intolerable.

4. I said that I was not sure whether the Item in question had not already been discussed and decided in New York. I said that there was not much point in supporting a Resolution which even if it were carried would have no practical effect of bringing the parties together. The Arab delegations knew where we and other delegations stood on the question of the existence of Israel.

5. I made no commitments to Mr. Yuval but said that we would look again at the current situation and whether any additional instructions were required.

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Ex. Comms. Br.
 Melbourne Office
 Antarctic Division

FOLLOWING POSTS:

ACTION:

5515/60.

Report prepared by:

(P. Shaw)
 First Assistant Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD CABLEGRAM

JW

I.32021

DATED. 18TH DECEMBER, 1962,
2110
REC'D. 19TH DECEMBER, 1962,
2230

FROM.

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS,
NEW YORK.

UN.2027 UNCLASSIFIED.

PALESTINE REFUGEES.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF AMENDMENT TO DRAFT UNITED STATES
RESOLUTION IN OUR TELEGRAM 1988 WHICH WAS ADOPTED IN COMMITTEE
TODAY.

VOTE WAS 68 - 2 (ISRAEL, UNITED STATES) - 34 (AUSTRALIA).

BEGINS - "NOTING WITH DEEP REGRET THAT REPATRIATION OR
COMPENSATION OF THE REFUGEES AS PROVIDED FOR IN PARAGRAPH XI
OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 194 (III) HAS NOT BEEN
EFFECTED, THAT NO SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN THE
PROGRAMME ENDORSED IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF RESOLUTION 513 (VI)
FOR THE REINTEGRATION OF REFUGEES EITHER BY REPATRIATION
OR RESETTLEMENT AND THAT, THEREFORE, THE SITUATION OF THE
REFUGEES CONTINUES TO BE A MATTER OF SERIOUS CONCERN."
ENDS.

2. AFTER SERIES OF SEPARATE VOTES (DETAILS BY BAG)
UNITED STATES RESOLUTION AS AMENDED WAS ADOPTED AS A WHOLE
101 - 0 - 2 (ISRAEL CAMEROON).

3. BOTH BRAZZAVILLE RESOLUTION CALLING FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS
AND RESOLUTION REQUESTING APPOINTMENT OF UNITED NATIONS CUSTODIAN
WERE NOT PRESSED TO VOTE.

A/MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT IMMIGRATION
TREASURER & TREASURY
P.M.'s

20TH DECEMBER, 1962.

⑤ 181/4/4

SEC A/Ss LA MR LOOMES UN ER PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA EAF&ME
E AF ME INF DL IC

CAIRO LONDON OTTAWA TEL AVIV

269
CONFIDENTIAL

File No.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Record of Conversation with Mr. A.W. Marzook, Counsellor, U.A.R. Embassy
on 18th December, 1962
Officers Present J.R. Rowland

MAIN SUBJECT(S):

Mr. Marzook called to discuss the resolution calling for direct negotiations between Israel and the Arab States which is before the current Session of the United Nations Political Committee.

2. He explained at some length that the Arab States were unable to recognise Israel, and indeed maintained a state of war; Israel was an artificial creation of the United Nations, and had been guilty of a great number of aggressive acts against its Arab neighbours. In particular, the expulsion from their own country of one million Palestinian Arab refugees amounted to the destruction of the "Palestinian nation". Not until Israel had accepted the long series of resolutions on the Palestine situation adopted by the United Nations could the Arab States possibly entertain the idea of direct negotiations.

3. He asked that the Australian Government should not support this resolution, which was put forward by the supporters of Israel.

4. I explained to Mr. Marzook, likewise at some length, that our own attitude to the Arab-Israel conflict was one of sincere desire that these neighbouring countries should come to understand that they were indeed neighbours and must live together peacefully as such. There were faults on both sides but it was no use keeping one's eyes fixed on past history; the problem now was to find acceptable solutions for the future. It was not made easier by the persistent declarations on the Arab side of intention to destroy Israel. So long, for example, as these declarations were repeated and a state of war maintained, Israel would have a powerful motive for not accepting the repatriation of the Arab refugees: that problem could in the last resort only be settled by co-operation between Israel and its Arab neighbours.

5. We saw nothing objectionable in the language of the resolution now submitted in New York; in the long run we hoped that a situation would emerge in which direct relations and negotiation were possible. But we fully recognised that the resolution was not realistic in present circumstances, and our delegation would not be supporting it. I doubted whether it would, in fact, be pressed to a vote in the event.

6. Mr. Marzook said that the Embassy would always

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Com. Rel.
Sydney Office
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Melbourne Office
Antarctic Division

....2

FOLLOWING POSTS:

Cairo

ACTION:

2981/61.

Report prepared by

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

268

be very happy to discuss Middle East questions with us and to put frankly before us the U.A.R. point of view. He went on to emphasise that the U.A.R. genuinely needed peace for its own economic development and had no desire to stir up trouble. But it could not ignore its moral duty to help the Arab movement of social progress and national liberation in other backward Arab countries such as the Yemen. It had just given a loan of £10,000,000 to Algeria though it could ill afford this.

Report prepared by J.R. Rowland.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

267

File No.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

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M.T. Br.
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 Sydney Office
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Ex. Comms. Br.
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 Antarctic Division

....2

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FOLLOWING POSTS:

Cairo

ACTION:

2981/61.

Report prepared by

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266

2.

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Report prepared by J.R. Rowland.

CONFIDENTIAL

265

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

PJ.

O.22856.

Sent: 15th December, 1962.
1615.

TO:

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK.

1033. UNCLASSIFIED.

U.N.R.W.A.

Your telegram 1978.

Parliament has approved appropriation and contribution of
£A90,000 has been paid.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
(855/6/34/3)
P.M.'s

16th December, 1962.

(F) 16/14/4

SEC	A/S's	LA	UN@	TA	PAC&AM	ER	AM&SP	S&SEA
SEA	EAF&ME	E	AF	ME	INF	DL	IC	

264

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

PJ.

I.31666.

Dated: 14th December, 1962.
1645.

Rec'd: 15th December, 1962.
0900.

FROM:

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK.

UN. 1978. UNCLASSIFIED PRIORITY.

Palestine Refugees - Australian Contribution to UNWRA.

Please confirm appropriation has been approved as pledging
conference is on 19th.

E.A.
IMMIGRATION
TREASURY
P.M.'s

15th December, 1962.

(K) 181/4/4

SEC	A/S's	LA	UN@	PAC&AM	AM&SP	S&SEA
EA&ME	E AF	ME	INF	C&P		

INWARD CABLEGRAM

SRG

I. 31675

DATED. 14TH DECEMBER, 1962
2020

FROM.

REC'D. 15TH DECEMBER, 1962
1346

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS,
NEW YORK.

UN1988.

UNCLASSIFIED.

PALESTINE REFUGEES.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF UNITED STATES RESOLUTION TABLED THIS
AFTERNOON -
BEGINS:

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

RECALLING ITS RESOLUTIONS 194 III OF 11 DECEMBER
1948, 302 IV OF 8 DECEMBER 1949, 393 V AND 394 V OF 2
AND 14 DECEMBER 1950, 412 VI AND 513 VI OF 26 JANUARY 1952,
614 VII OF 6 NOVEMBER 1952, 720 VIII OF 27 NOVEMBER 1953,
818 IX OF 4 DECEMBER 1954, 916 X OF 3 DECEMBER 1955,
1018 XI OF 28 FEBRUARY 1957, 1191 XII OF 12 DECEMBER
1957, 1315 XIII OF 12 DECEMBER 1958, 1456 XIV OF 9 DECEMBER
1959, 1604 XV OF 21 APRIL 1961 AND 1725 XVI OF 20 DECEMBER
1961,

NOTING THE ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER-GENERAL OF
THE UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR PALESTINE
REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST, COVERING THE PERIOD 1 JULY
1961 - 30 JUNE 1962,

1. EXPRESSES ITS THANKS TO THE COMMISSIONER-GENERAL
AND THE STAFF OF THE AGENCY FOR THEIR CONTINUED FAITHFUL
EFFORTS TO PROVIDE ESSENTIAL SERVICES FOR THE PALESTINE
REFUGEES AND TO THE SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AND PRIVATE
ORGANIZATIONS FOR THE VALUABLE WORK IN ASSISTING THE
REFUGEES,

2. EXPRESSES ITS THANKS TO THE UNITED NATIONS CONCILIATION
COMMISSION FOR ITS EFFORTS TO FIND A WAY TO PROGRESS
ON THE PALESTINE ARAB REFUGEE PROBLEM PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH
11 OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 194 III AND REQUESTS
THE COMMISSION TO CONTINUE ITS ENDEAVOURS WITH THE
MEMBER STATES DIRECTLY CONCERNED,

3. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO PROVIDE THE STAFF
AND FACILITIES THAT THE COMMISSION MAY REQUIRE IN CARRYING
ON ITS WORK,

4. DECIDES TO EXTEND THE MANDATE OF THE UNITED NATIONS
RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY UNTIL 30 JUNE 1965,

5. DIRECTS ATTENTION TO THE PRECARIOUS FINANCIAL POSITION
OF THE UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR PALESTINE
REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST AND URGES NON-CONTRIBUTING GOVERNMENTS
TO CONTRIBUTE, AND CONTRIBUTING GOVERNMENTS TO CONSIDER
INCREASING THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS, SO THAT THE AGENCY CAN CARRY
OUT ITS ESSENTIAL PROGRAMMES.

ENDS:

..2

262

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

SRG

I. 31675

- 2 -

2. YOU WILL NOTE THAT RESOLUTION CALLS FOR EXTENSION OF U.N.R.W.A.
MANDATE FOR TWO YEARS.

3. VOTE IN COMMITTEE WILL PROBABLY BE ON MONDAY.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT IMMIGRATION
TREASURER & TREASURY
P.M's

16TH DECEMBER, 1962

SEC	A/S's	LA	MR LOOMES	UN@	ER	PAC&AM	AM&SP	
S&SEA	EAF&ME	E	AF	ME	INF	DL	MT	IC
CAIRO	LONDON	OTTAWA	TEL AVIV	WASHINGTON				

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

MEH

0.22722

TO:

Dated: 13th December, 1962
2040

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK...1024

Repeat:

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON...2627

Australian High Commission,
OTTAWA...437

External Affairs Office,
LONDON...SAV.E.A.229

Australian Embassy,
TEL AVIV...SAV.21

CONFIDENTIAL.

Palestine Refugees.

Our telegram 1018.

We have noted that Brazzaville Group's draft (now received) is identical with A/SPC/L.80/Rev.1 of Sixteenth Session for which we voted. In view of this, abstention may be more appropriate than negative vote. Were explanation necessary you could in either event argue that:

- (a) present situation can be distinguished from last year's by reference to moderately promising progress made by P.C.C. through Johnson;
 - (b) withholding of support would be consistent with "quiet approach" and with other elements mentioned.
2. You will, of course, be maintaining contact on this with others in contributors' group.

MIN. & DEPT E.A. (852/12/16)
MIN. & DEPT IMMIGRATION
TREASURY
P.M.'s

14th December, 1962

SEC A/Ss LA MR. LOOMES UNO PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA EAP&ME
E AFME INF C&P

INWARD CABLEGRAM

ED.

I.31329.

DATED. 10TH DECEMBER, 1962.
2140.

REC'D. 12TH DECEMBER, 1962.
2151.

FROM.

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS,
NEW YORK.

UN1923. UNCLASSIFIED.

PALESTINE REFUGEES.

OUR CABLE 1915 (PARA 5).

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF RESOLUTION CO-SPONSORED BY BRAZZA-
VILLE GROUP, NETHERLANDS, ICELAND, SIERRA LEONE, LUXEMBOURG
LIBERIA, EL SALVADOR, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND HAITI.

BEGINS

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
TAKING NOTE OF THE ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER-
GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR
PALESTINE REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST (A/5214),

RECOGNIZING THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACEFUL REL-
ATIONS BETWEEN THE ARAB STATES AND ISRAEL WOULD DO MUCH
TO FACILITATE A SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF THE ARAB
REFUGEES,

RECALLING THAT, UNDER THE CHARTER, IT IS THE FUNDAMENTAL
DUTY OF ALL STATES MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO ENDEAVOUR
TO SETTLE ALL INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES BY PEACEFUL MEANS,

CONFIRMING THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AND IN PARTICULAR GENERAL ASSEMBLY
RESOLUTION 194(III), CALLING UPON ISRAEL AND THE ARAB
STATES TO SETTLE THE QUESTIONS IN DISPUTE BETWEEN THEM
AS SOON AS POSSIBLY AND BY COMMON AGREEMENT, SO THAT
PEACEFUL RELATIONS MAY BE ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THEM.

CONSIDERING THAT SUCH PEACEFUL RELATIONS WOULD PROMOTE
THE WELL-BEING OF ALL THE PEOPLES CONCERNED AND WOULD
MAKE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE AND SECURITY IN
THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE WHOLE WORLD,

RENEWING ITS APPEAL TO THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED TO UNDER-
TAKE DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS - WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THE CONCIL-
IATION COMMISSION FOR PALESTINE, IF THEY SO DESIRE -
WITH A VIEW TO FINDING A SOLUTION, ACCEPTABLE TO ALL
THE PARTIES CONCERNED, FOR ALL THE QUESTIONS IN DISPUTE BETWEEN
THEM, PARTICULARLY THE QUESTION OF THE ARAB REFUGEES.

ENDS.

MIN. & DEPT E.A. (852/12/107)
MIN. & DEPT IMMIGRATION.
P.M'S.

12TH DECEMBER, 1962.

SEC A/Ss LA MR LOOMES UN@ PAC&AM AM&SP
S&SEA SA EAF&ME E ME INF C&P.

Mr. Rowland:
Are you happy about the line we are
taking in UN on this?

13/12

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

259

MEH

0.22650

TO:

Dated: 12th December, 1962
2000

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK...1018

Repeated:

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON...2616

Australian High Commission,
OTTAWA...435

External Affairs Office,
LONDON...SAV.E.A.228

Australian Embassy,
TEL AVIV...SAV.20

CONFIDENTIAL

Palestine Refugees.

Your 1915 and 1922.

Our attitude to item as a whole and to three draft resolutions is made up of three main elements:

- (a) since we believe that continuance of problem is a danger to peace in the Middle East and that Parliaments of contributing countries cannot be expected indefinitely to support the refugees, we would not wish the Assembly to take any action likely to prejudice any proposals embodying some genuine prospect of a solution;
- (b) as the principal contributor, the United States has the main running in the exercise and is, in general, entitled to expect other contributors to support it in any reasonable tactics which it may adopt (paragraph 9 of the brief);
- (c) we do not believe that any useful purpose is served by the Assembly's adopting resolutions known in advance to be totally unacceptable to either of the parties; such resolutions contribute neither to a solution of the problem (since they increase animosities and, in the present context, conflict with the "quiet approach" which the United States is pursuing) nor to the standing of the United Nations (paragraph 2 of the Acting Secretary's record of conversation with the Israeli Counsellor on 30th November).

....2/.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

258

-2-

0.22650

2. Endorsing (almost of necessity) the "quiet approach and resolution" and believing that the contributors can best help a solution by this year steering a strict middle course, we believe that neither the Afghan etc. nor the Brazzaville Group etc. draft resolutions can be supported, and that identical votes should ideally be cast on them. Since the former is totally unacceptable, we believe that both should be opposed if they come to a vote. However, we would not wish you to get out of line with the United States on this, and you should, if explanation becomes necessary, make clear the essential differences in the nature of our opposition to the two draft resolutions.

MIN. & DEPT E.A. (852/12/10)
MIN. & DEPT IMMIGRATION
TREASURY
P.M's

13th December, 1962

SEC A/S LA MR. LOOMES UNO PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA EAF&ME
E ME INF C&P

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

257

MEH

O.22650

TO:

Dated: 12th December, 1962
2000Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK...1018

Repeated:

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON...2616Australian High Commission,
OTTAWA...435External Affairs Office,
LONDON...SAV.E.A.228Australian Embassy,
TEL AVIV...SAV.20CONFIDENTIALPalestine Refugees.

Your 1915 and 1922.

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- (a) since we believe that continuance of problem is a danger to peace in the Middle East and that Parliaments of contributing countries cannot be expected indefinitely to support the refugees, we would not wish the Assembly to take any action likely to prejudice any proposals embodying some genuine prospect of a solution;
- (b) as the principle contributor, the United States has the main running in the exercise and is, in general, entitled to expect other contributors to support it in any reasonable tactics which it may adopt (paragraph 9 of the brief);
- (c) we do not believe that any useful purpose is served by the Assembly's adopting resolutions known in advance to be totally unacceptable to either of the parties; such resolutions contribute neither to a solution of the problem (since they increase animosities and, in the present context, conflict with the "quiet approach" which the United States is pursuing) nor to the standing of the United Nations (paragraph 2 of the Acting Secretary's record of conversation with the Israeli Counsellor on 30th November).

(F)
18/4/4

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CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

256

-2-

0.22650

2. Endorsing (almost of necessity) the "quiet approach and resolution" and believing that the contributors can best help a solution by this year steering a strict middle course, we believe that neither the Afghan etc. nor the Brazzaville Group etc. draft resolutions can be supported, and that identical votes should ideally be cast on them. Since the former is totally unacceptable, we believe that both should be opposed if they come to a vote. However, we would not wish you to get out of line with the United States on this, and you should, if explanation becomes necessary, make clear the essential differences in the nature of our opposition to the two draft resolutions.

MIN. & DEPT E.A. (852/12/10)
MIN. & DEPT IMMIGRATION
TREASURY
P.M's

13th December, 1962

CONFIDENTIAL

SEC A/S LA MR. LOOMES UNO PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA EAF&ME
E ME INF C&P

255

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

ED.

I.31212.

DATED. 10TH DECEMBER, 1962.
2150.
REC'D. 11TH DECEMBER, 1962.
2256.

FROM.

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS,
NEW YORK.

UN1922. UNCLASSIFIED.

PALESTINE REFUGEES.

OUR CABLE 1915.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF RESOLUTION TABLED TODAY BY AFGHAN-
ISTAN, MAURITANIA, AND PAKISTAN.

BEGINS

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
RECALLING ITS RESOLUTION 394(V) OF 14 DECEMBER 1950
BY WHICH THE UNITED NATIONS CONCILIATION COMMISSION FOR PALESTINE
WAS DIRECTED TO TAKE MEASURES FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE
RIGHTS, PROPERTY AND INTERESTS OF THE PALESTINE ARAB REFUGEES,
1. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO APPOINT A UNITED
NATIONS CUSTODIAN FOR THE ADMINISTRATION AND PROTECTION
OF ARAB PROPERTY, ASSETS AND PROPERTY RIGHTS WITHIN ISRAEL.,
2. REQUESTS THE UNITED NATIONS CUSTODIAN TO REPORT TO
THE EIGHTEENTH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE
FULFILLMENT OF HIS FUNCTIONS.,
3. CALLS UPON THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED TO RENDER THE
UNITED NATIONS CUSTODIAN ALL FACILITIES AND ASSISTANCE.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT IMMIGRATION.
TREASURY.
P.M'S.

11TH DECEMBER, 1962.

(S) 181/4/4

SEC	A/Ss	LA	UN@	PAC&AM	AM&SP	S&SEA	SA
EAF&ME	E	AF	ME	INF	C&P.		

254

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

DW

I.31182

FROM.

DATED. 10TH DECEMBER, 1962.
1947

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS,
NEW YORK.

REC'D. 11TH DECEMBER, 1962.
1627

UN1915. CONFIDENTIAL. PRIORITY.

WASHINGTON FOR INFORMATION, OTTAWA SAV.1161, LONDON
SAV. 1289, TEL AVIV SAV.11, CAIRO SAV.43.

PALESTINE REFUGEES.

YOUR 988.

AT WESTERN MEETING TODAY UNITED STATES (BLAKE)
SAID NEITHER ARABS NOR ISRAELIS WANTED SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION
OF JOHNSON PROPOSALS IN COMMITTEE.

BOTH PARTIES HAD REITERATED IN PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS WITH
UNITED STATES WILLINGNESS, UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS,
TO RESUME "SUBSTANTIVE TALKS" AFTER CURRENT SESSION.

DECISION HAD THEREFORE BEEN TAKEN NOT TO
PUBLISH JOHNSON REPORT.

2. WE UNDERSTAND P.C.C. REPORT WHICH WILL BE AVAILABLE LATER
THIS WEEK WILL ALSO BE "SHORT AND UNCOMPLICATED".
SECTION ON JOHNSON MISSION WILL BE DESCRIPTIVE AND
SUBSTANTIVE.

3. UNITED STATES PROPOSES TO TABLE "QUIET RESOLUTION"
WEDNESDAY OR THURSDAY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE "QUIET
APPROACH" IT HAS BEEN PURSUING.

TEXT IS NOT AVAILABLE YET BUT ITS THREE PREAMBULAR
PARAGRAPHS WILL RECALL PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS, NOTE U.N.W.R.A.
REPORT, AND NOTE TWENTIETH PROGRESS REPORT OF THE P.C.C.
THE THREE OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS WILL COMMEND P.C.C. FOR
EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 11
OF RESOLUTION 194, REQUEST THE P.C.C. TO CONTINUE ITS WORK,
AND SEEK THE EXTENSION OF THE U.N.W.R.A. MANDATE FOR ONE YEAR.
(FRENCH SUGGESTED RESOLUTION SHOULD ALSO COMMEND
U.N.W.R.A. REPORT AND UNITED STATES SEEMED RECEPTIVE TO THIS
SUGGESTION.)

4. WE EXPRESSED VIEW THAT TWO YEAR EXTENSION WOULD SEEM
PREFERABLE.

SWEDISH, DANISH, NEW ZEALAND, CANADIAN AND UNITED
KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVES THEN ALSO SAID THEY WOULD FAVOUR
TWO YEAR EXTENSION.

U.S. SAID THEY WOULD CONSIDER THIS BUT CONGRESS WANTED
SHORTER EXTENSION.

DR. DAVIS HAD DISCUSSED QUESTION WITH STATE DEPARTMENT ON
SATURDAY AND IN ANSWER TO QUERIES BLAKE SAID HE (DAVIS)
WOULD AGREE TO ONE YEAR EXTENSION "WITH RELUCTANCE"
AND COULD PLAN ON THIS BASIS IF OBLIGED TO DO SO.

ARABS WANTED FIVE YEAR EXTENSION.

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD CABLEGRAM

5. RESOLUTION CALLING FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS HAS NOW BEEN TABLED BY EIGHTEEN COSPONSORS (BRAZZAVILLE GROUP, THREE LATIN AMERICANS, NETHERLANDS, ICELAND, LUXEMBOURG, LIBERIA, SIERRA LEONE) BUT, AS REPORTED, WE UNDERSTAND THAT THIS IS A TOKEN RESOLUTION AND MAY BE WITHDRAWN AFTER U.S. RESOLUTION IS TABLED.

GRATEFUL ADVICE WHETHER WE SHOULD ABSTAIN OR VOTE AGAINST IF IT IS NOT WITHDRAWN.
UNITED STATES WILL OPPOSE.

6. CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEE HOPES TO FINISH ITEM AND VOTE BY OR ON MONDAY 17TH.

PLEDGING CONFERENCE FOR U.N.W.R.A. CONTRIBUTIONS WOULD PROBABLY BE ON 18TH OR 19TH DECEMBER.

7. WITH REFERENCE TO YOUR COMMENTS CONCERNING REVISION OF FINANCIAL STRUCTURE OF U.N.W.R.A., IT WAS NOT INTENDED IN OUR TELEGRAM 1893 TO MENTION SOME PRESENT THINKING HERE ON THIS AS A MAJOR ELEMENT IN THE POSITION OF CONTRIBUTING MEMBERS.

HOWEVER, EVENTUAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR DEVOLVEMENT OF CERTAIN U.N.W.R.A. EXPENDITURES ARE IN THE MINDS OF, FOR EXAMPLE, CANADIAN AND U.S. DELEGATIONS HERE AT THEIR LEVEL, AND WE THOUGHT IT USEFUL TO KEEP THIS IN YOUR VIEW.

CONSIDERATION OF SUCH IDEAS WOULD OF COURSE REQUIRE LONGER THAN ONE YEAR.

MIN. & DEPT E.A. (852/12/10).
MIN. & DEPT IMMIGRATION.
TREASURY.
P.M's.

11TH DECEMBER, 1962.

SEC A/S'S LA UN@ PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA EAF&ME E AF ME INF
C&P

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

MEH

0.22454

TO:

Dated: 10th December, 1962

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK...988

Repeated:

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON...2575

Australian High Commission,
OTTAWA...427

External Affairs Office ,
LONDON...SAV.E.A.225

Australian Embassy,
TEL AVIV...SAV.19

CONFIDENTIAL.

Palestine Refugees.

United States assessment that in bitter atmosphere of current debate detailed pursuit of Johnson proposals would not be productive, seems to be sound.

2. Reference paragraph 3 of your 1893 we doubt whether extension of U.N.R.W.A. mandate by only one year would provide sufficient time for either of the activities mentioned. We also believe that Davies could reasonably complain that his planning and fund raising activities would be prejudiced. On the other hand we can see that shorter extension than usual would be desirable in interests of maintaining pressure on parties. Perhaps two years would be suitable duration.

3. We are rather surprised that the "thorough revision of the financial structure of U.N.R.W.A." which you describe should at this stage have become apparently a major element in the contributors' policy. Only previous explicit reference to this was in paragraph 5, of Washington Savingsgram 1051 but proposal was then of much more limited scope. Our doubts about earlier proposal (principally that contributors would lose all control over expenditure of their funds) would apply all the more strongly to the widened proposal. Latter appears to us to involve almost insuperable problems of co-ordination, to leave unanswered the question who would provide the funds for the specialised agencies or the High Commissioner for refugees to pursue their section of the agency's former mandate and not to be in the interests of the refugees.

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181/4/4

CONFIDENTIAL

251
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

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0.22454

4. We also find hard to understand the assumption which is the basic premise for the new proposal since it suggests to us that the Israeli approach to the Palestine refugee problem is being accepted virtually in its entirety. We doubt whether the refugee problem can be solved along this type of line.

MIN. & DEPT E.A. (852/12/10)
MIN. & DEPT IMMIGRATION
TREASURY
P.M.'s

11th December, 1962

SEC A/Ss LA MR. LOOMES UNO PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA EAF&ME
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CAIRO

INWARD CABLEGRAM

LJH.

I. 30957.

DATED. 7TH DECEMBER, 1962.
1900.

REC'D. 8TH DECEMBER, 1962.
1245.

FROM.

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS,
NEW YORK.

UN. 1893. CONFIDENTIAL. PRIORITY.

WASHINGTON FOR INFORMATION, REPEATED OTTAWA SAV. 1147,
LONDON SAV. 1277.

PALESTINE REFUGEES.

IN CONNEXION WITH WASHINGTON SERIAL NO.3919, UNITED STATES DELEGATION HAS NOW CONVENED MEETING OF SMALL GROUP INCLUDING AUSTRALIA FOR MONDAY NEXT.

IN THE MEANTIME WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE PALESTINE CONCILIATION COMMISSION WILL MEET THIS EVENING TO DECIDE THE FORM OF ITS REPORT, IF ANY, TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL. AS YOU HAVE BEEN ADVISED, SUCH REPORT WOULD NOT IN ANY CASE INCLUDE THE JOHNSON PROPOSALS.

IT IS THEREFORE TO BE EXPECTED THAT THE SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE WILL HAVE BEFORE IT AS THE SUBSTANTIVE PROPOSAL NEXT WEEK A DRAFT RESOLUTION SIMPLY OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE CHARACTER.

2. WE ARE SCHEDULED TO SPEAK IN THE GENERAL DEBATE ON WEDNESDAY AND WOULD PROPOSE TO CONFINE OUR REMARKS TO AN EXAMINATION OF THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER-GENERAL AND AN EXPRESSION OF SUPPORT FOR EXTENDING THE MANDATE OF UNWRA.

THE QUESTION ARISES OF THE DURATION OF SUCH EXTENSION.

SUBJECT TO WHAT MAY BE PUT AT THE PRIVATE MEETING ON MONDAY, IT MIGHT BE THOUGHT THAT AN EXTENSION FOR TWELVE MONTHS ONLY WITHOUT FURTHER STATED CONDITIONS OR QUALIFICATIONS IS ADMINISTRATIVELY SPEAKING UNSATISFACTORY AND THAT, GIVEN EXISTING CONDITIONS, AN EXTENSION OF, SAY, TWO YEARS SHOULD BE CONTEMPLATED.

CANADIAN DELEGATION TOLD US TODAY THAT THEIR INSTRUCTIONS ENVISAGE AN EXTENSION FOR THREE YEARS BUT CERTAINLY NOT LESS THAN TWO.

3. THE ISSUE OF COURSE IS OF A DOUBLE NATURE.

FIRST, WHETHER WITHIN ONE YEAR THERE IS ANY REAL PROSPECT THAT THE JOHNSON PROPOSALS OR SOMETHING LIKE THEM COULD BE RENDERED ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH PARTIES.

SECOND, WHETHER ONE YEAR IS ENOUGH TIME IN WHICH TO CANVASS AND PREPARE A THOROUGH REVISION OF THE FINANCIAL STRUCTURE OF UNWRA SUCH AS TO ALLEVIATE THE BURDEN OF DIRECT CONTRIBUTIONS FROM GOVERNMENTS.

ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT ANY APPRECIABLE DEGREE OF REPATRIATION IS OUT OF THE QUESTION FOR GOOD, THERE COULD WELL BE A CASE FOR REDUCING UNWRA IN DUE COURSE TO PURELY RELIEF AND MAINTENANCE FUNCTIONS AND DEVOLVING

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CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD CABLEGRAM

LJH.

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I. 3 0957.

THE REMAINDER OF ITS PRESENT ACTIVITIES PARTLY UPON THE SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AND UNHCR AND PARTLY BY WAY OF DIRECT SUBSIDY TO THE HOST GOVERNMENTS.

BUT OBVIOUSLY TO PREPARE THE GROUND FOR SUCH A DEVELOPMENT WILL TAKE TIME AND IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT THE DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE NEAR EAST, ESPECIALLY THE SHARP ARAB DIFFERENCES ARISING OUT OF THE YEMEN SITUATION, WILL ALLOW THIS TO BE DONE BY THE DATE OF THE EIGHTEENTH SESSION.

WE WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR COMMENTS ON THIS ASPECT.

4. THE DEBATE IN THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE THIS WEEK HAS BEEN NOTABLY MORE BITTER THAN IN THE PAST THREE OR FOUR YEARS.

ARAB STATEMENTS HAVE TAKEN THE LINE THAT THE REFUGEE PROBLEM IS DUE ENTIRELY TO ZIONIST "IMPERIALISM" AND HAVE VERGED ON THE SCURRILOUS IN EQUATING ISRAELI POLICIES TO NAZISM.

THE ISRAELIS HAVE REPLIED IN KIND.

THE APPARENT CONCLUSION OF THE UNITED STATES THAT ANY DISCUSSION OF PROPOSALS SUCH AS THOSE OF THE JOHNSON REPORT WOULD BE UNPRODUCTIVE IN THIS ATMOSPHERE IS THUS UNDERSTANDABLE.

5. AS YOU KNOW, THE ISRAELIS HAVE BEEN UNDER STRONG PRESSURE FROM THE UNITED STATES NOT TO PURSUE THEIR RESOLUTION CALLING FOR DIRECT OVER-ALL NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES AND WE HAVE HEARD TODAY, ALTHOUGH NOT DEFINITELY, THAT WHILE SUCH A DRAFT RESOLUTION MIGHT BE TABLED IT WILL NOT BE PRESSED TO A VOTE.

MEANWHILE THE ARABS THEMSELVES HAVE A RESOLUTION WHICH SHUKAIRY TOLD US TODAY THEY INTENDED TO PRESENT NEXT WEEK SEEKING A FORM OF UNITED NATIONS CUSTODY OF ARAB ASSETS IN ISRAEL ON THE LINES OF THEIR SIMILAR PROPOSAL OF LAST SESSION.

THIS ALSO WOULD APPEAR TO BE DESIGNED FOR TACTICAL PURPOSES.

A/MIN. & DEPT E.A. (852/12/10)
MIN. & DEPT IMMIGRATION.
TREASURY.
P.M.'s.

8TH DECEMBER, 1962.

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E AF ME INF C&P

CAIRO

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD CABLEGRAM

EAP.

I.30967

FROM :

Dated : 7th December, 1962.
1530
Rec'd : 8th December, 1962.
0258

Australian Embassy,
TEL AVIV.

139. CONFIDENTIAL.

Addressed Canberra repeated New York 3.

Palestine Refugees.

Your telegram 105.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not know what degree of support Israel initiative for direct negotiations has obtained. Assembly tactics are being handled in New York by Mrs. Meir apparently without much reference to Jerusalem.

A/MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT IMMIGRATION
TREASURY
P.M.'S

8th December, 1962.

(R) 181/4/4

SEC A/Ss LA UN@ PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA EAF&ME E AF ME@
INF DL IC

GENEVA LONDON

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

247

INWARD CABLEGRAM

KA

I.30914

DATED - 6TH DECEMBER, 1962
1705
REC'D - 7TH DECEMBER, 1962
2055

FROM.

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON.

3299. CONFIDENTIAL.

COPIES U.N. NEW YORK, OTTAWA, LONDON.

OUR 3841.

U.N. : PALESTINE REFUGEES.

PALMER (U N POLITICAL AND SECURITY AFFAIRS) SAID 6TH DECEMBER THAT UNITED STATES TACTICS CONCERNING PALESTINE REFUGEES WERE STILL UNRESOLVED.

HOWEVER THE FINAL POSITION WOULD PROBABLY BE ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES.

2. A DEBATE ON THE DETAILS OF THE JOHNSON PROPOSAL AT THIS STAGE WOULD NOT SERVE ANY USEFUL PURPOSE BUT WOULD TEND TO DRIVE ISRAEL AND THE HOST COUNTRIES INTO EVEN MORE INTRANSIGENT POSITIONS.

BOTH SIDES HAD REQUESTED THAT THE JOHNSON PROPOSALS NOT BE MADE PUBLIC IN AN OFFICIAL WAY.

CONSEQUENTLY THE CONTINUATION OF QUIET NEGOTIATIONS SEEMED TO PROVIDE THE BEST CHANCES OF PROGRESS AND IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THE USA WOULD PROBABLY GLIDE OVER THE JOHNSON PROPOSALS IN THE UNITED NATIONS DEBATE.

3. PROVIDED NO MAJOR DEVELOPMENT OCCURRED WHICH INVALIDATED FOREGOING ASSUMPTION, USA WOULD CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN STRONG PRESSURE ON THE PARTIES THROUGH THE P C C AND OTHER MEANS TO MAKE SOME PROGRESS ALONG THE LINES OF THE JOHNSON PLAN.

AT THE SAME TIME THE USA WOULD FAVOUR EXTENDING UNWRAS MANDATE FOR A FURTHER 12 MONTHS.

4. PALMER SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE U N WOULD PROBABLY ARRANGE A MEETING IN NEW YORK ON OR BEFORE 10TH DECEMBER WITH AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, U K AND ONE OR TWO OTHERS TO DISCUSS TACTICS.

5. PALMER SAID THAT HE WOULD CONTACT US AS SOON AS THE UNITED STATES POSITION FIRMED AND STRESSED THAT THE FOREGOING WAS TENTATIVE AND SUBJECT TO CHANGE.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT IMMIGRATION
TREASURY
P.M.'s

8TH DECEMBER, 1962

181/4/4
SEC A/Ss LA UN@ ER PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA EAP&ME E AF ME@
INF DL IC C&P
CAIRO GENEVA TEL AVIV

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

246

MEH

I. 31011

FROM:

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON

Dated: 7th December, 1962
2223
Rec'd: 8th December, 1962
2200

3309. CONFIDENTIAL

Copies U.N. New York, Ottawa and London.

Our 3230.

United Nations Palestine Refugees.

Palmer (United Nations Political and Security Affairs), confirmed 7th December that the United States position would be as outlined in our 3230.

The United States Mission in New York would be consulting Australian and other friendly missions soon.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT IMMIGRATION
TREASURY
P.M's

9th December, 1962

(P) 181/4/4

SEC. A/Ss LA UN@ PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA EAF&ME E ME INF
C&P
CAIRO TEL AVIV

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD CABLEGRAM

IM

I.30768

FROM.

DATED. 5TH DECEMBER, 1962.
1750AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE
UNITED NATIONS,
NEW YORK.REC'D. 6TH DECEMBER, 1962.
1553UN 1872 CONFIDENTIAL.WASHINGTON FOR INFORMATION, OTTAWA SAV 1136, LONDON SAV 1266
TEL AVIV SAV 10, CAIRO SAV 42PALESTINE REFUGEES.

YOUR 940 (FINAL SENTENCE)

WE DID NOT SUGGEST OR IMPLY WE WOULD BE PREPARED
TO SPONSOR RESOLUTION BASED ON JOHNSON PROPOSALS.
OUR SOUNDINGS WERE MERELY A FOLLOW UP OF PLIMSOLL'S
TALK WITH JOHNSON (PARAGRAPH 8 OF OUR MEMORANDUM 1594
REFERS) AND WERE INTENDED TO ASCERTAIN LIKELIHOOD OF
INTRODUCTION OF SUCH RESOLUTION SO THAT, IF NECESSARY,
YOU WOULD HAVE HAD ADEQUATE TIME TO WORK OUT POSITION
IN ADVANCE.

A/MIN. & DEPT E.A. (852/12/10)
MIN. & DEPT IMMIGRATION
TREASURY
P.M.'S

6TH DECEMBER, 1962.

SEC A/SS LA UNO ER PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA EAF&ME E AF ME INF C&P

CAIRO

COPY

244
OF LETTER FROM
AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
750 THIRD AVENUE NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

File No. 210/1/3

3rd December 1962

Memorandum No. 1704

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra, A.C.T.

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees

Attached for your information are two copies of
the statement made by the Commissioner General of UNRWA, Dr.
J. H. Davis, to the Special Political Committee of the General
Assembly on the 29th November 1962.

(A)
181/4/4

for Delegation

RAW/ft

Mr Phillips

*Copy for your file.
Original on 852/12/10.*

243

UNITED NATIONS
Press Services
Office of Public Information
United Nations, N.Y.

(For use of information media -- not an official record)

CAUTION

Advance Text -- Hold for Delivery
at Approximately 3:30 p.m. today

Press Release PAL/917
29 November 1962

STATEMENT BY DR. JOHN H. DAVIS, COMMISSIONER GENERAL

UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR PALESTINE

REFUGEES (UNRWA) BEFORE THE SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE

1. Mr. Chairman-- I deem it an honor to appear again before this Committee to introduce discussion on the agenda item entitled "Annual Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East."
2. My comments today shall be brief, as I see no point in repeating the facts contained in my Annual Report and in the set of six special background information papers covering selected aspects of UNRWA's work, all of which have been in the hands of Committee Members for several weeks.
3. In introducing discussion in this Committee on a similar agenda item in 1959, I outlined a three-year program designed to assist young refugees—a program for the Agency to carry out during its current mandate period. Both the discussion in the Committee and resolution 1456 (XIV), passed on 9 December of that year, supported the proposed plan.
4. Briefly stated, this program included holding relief expenditures to the per capita level of 1960 in order that increased emphasis might be placed on expanding general education, teacher training, vocational training, university scholarships and loans and grants to worthy individuals seeking to become self-employed. At that time it was envisioned that the carrying forward of this expanded program would increase the Agency's expenditure level by a little more than \$5 million per year. As you may recall, we

(more)

Press Release PAL/917
29 November 1962

proposed to meet this need by soliciting increased regular contributions from Governments, by seeking extra-budgetary contributions and, if necessary, by drawing down our working reserves. In my Annual Reports covering the years 1960-1961 and 1961-1962, I have included progress statements on the program and on the financial status of the Agency.

5. Now we are near enough to the end of the present mandate period to see quite clearly where the Agency is likely to be at the end of its three-year program. Briefly stated, the picture is as follows:

(A) The Agency will have held per capita relief expenditure at the level of 1960, throughout the three-year period;

(B) It will have almost kept pace with the action of "host" country Governments in meeting the soaring need and demand for education which is being brought about by the factors of a growing population, the adding of one more year of instruction to the curriculum and the rapidly increasing enrollment in the upper classes due to students remaining in schools to an older age;

(C) It will have extensively increased its vocational training and teacher training program by having taken the following measures:

(1) The Agency has continued to operate its original vocational training center at Kalandia, Jordan, which has capacity for 400 men.

(2) Doubled the capacity of the vocational training center in Gaza so that it can accommodate 400 persons.

(3) Opened a new vocational training center for men at Wadi Seer in Jordan with capacity for 400 students.

(4) Opened a teacher training school for men at Ramallah, Jordan, with capacity for 400 students.

(5) Opened a new vocational training center for men at Damascus with capacity for 400 students.

(more)

(6) Opened
Siblin, Lebanon, for
(7) Opened a comb
training center for 6
633 persons.
(8) Opened
which will acco
(9) Too
ing center
a number
about 8
Sib
a

(6) Opened a new vocational training center for men at Sibliin, Lebanon, for 400 students.

(7) Opened a combination teacher training and vocational training center for girls near Ramallah, Jordan, with capacity for 633 persons.

(8) Opened a new training center for men at Homs, Syria, which will accommodate 200 students.

(9) Took over the responsibility for the agricultural training center at Beit Hanoun, Gaza, which the Agency had constructed a number of years ago but never operated. This unit will train about 80 boys in agricultural skills.

(10) Currently the Agency is constructing a second center at Sibliin, Lebanon, for providing training for vocational instructors and industrial foremen. This will have a capacity for 264.

(11) Currently also plans are well advanced for a vocational training center at Khan Younis, Gaza, which will accommodate about 100 men.

(12) In addition, the Agency has arranged for about 400 students a year to take commercial training, on-the-job industrial training, nursing and pharmaceutical training in centres operated by "host" Governments or private institutions within the area.

(13) Finally, during the past year the Agency has worked out a cooperative effort with the Government of Sweden whereby it is providing advanced training in Sweden for 50 instructors and industrial foremen a year. The first group of 50 men began their course work there in October of this year.

(D) The Agency has increased its total of university scholarships to some 500 per year, which enabled it to award about 125 scholarships to beginning university students this fall;

(E) The loan-grant program has been carried out along the lines projected in 1959 but on the modest scale of about half a million dollars.

(more)

This is because the Agency, faced with a limited budget, deliberately has given higher priority to educational needs than to loans and grants.

6. Parenthetically, may I add that four of the new vocational training centers were officially dedicated on United Nations Day, 24 October, of this year—one each in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and the Gaza Strip—with representatives of "host" Governments and principal donors participating alongside of UNRWA officials.

7. On the financial side the regular contributions from Governments have remained almost constant, i.e., at about \$34 million per year, which sum approximates the Agency's expenditure level for 1960. In view of the pressing and increasing need for more funds for education, the Agency has redoubled its efforts to raise money from extra-budgetary sources. Whereas the original goal, which was set in connection with World Refugee Year, was \$4 million, the total which has been raised or definitely committed now stands at almost \$6 million. Moreover, UNRWA now is diligently continuing to seek a total of 2,000 scholarships of \$500 each for use in the current school year. If this is successful, the resulting total sum of \$7 million from extra-budgetary sources will about equal the total cost of building all the new and expanded vocational and teacher training units and of operating them to 30 June 1963.

8. As pointed out in my Annual Report for 1961-1962, the Agency expects to end the three-year mandate period with a cumulative deficit (for the three-year period) of about \$4 million. In other words, we will have spent about \$11 million more than will have been contributed by Governments, \$7 million of which will have been offset by extra-budgetary contributions. The remaining \$4 million deficit, of necessity, will be taken from the Agency's working reserve. For the three-year period as a whole, the average annual total expenditure for all UNRWA activities probably will be slightly less than \$4 million in excess of the 1960 expenditure level, instead of the \$5 million plus originally anticipated.

(more)

9. As of 30 June 1963, that it will be in position to continue its mission to creditors the tended by action of the will not be in a position to serve as it has been

10. At the on behalf of the its period. of factors at least, educational raising view

9. As of 30 June 1963, the Agency will be fully solvent in the sense that it will be in position to fulfill all of the financial obligations to staff and to creditors then outstanding. Alternatively, it will be in a position to continue its work beyond 30 June 1963 if its mandate should be extended by action of the General Assembly. However, in the latter event it will not be in a position to continue to finance operations from working reserves as it has been doing.

10. At the same time, as stressed in my Report, the need for education on behalf of the Palestine refugees will continue to increase for an indefinite period. Also as explained in paragraphs 24 to 28 of the Report, a set of factors will almost certainly continue to exist which, in the short run at least, will tend to make it virtually impossible to meet these increasing educational needs from savings in relief costs. Moreover, our experience in raising funds from extra-budgetary sources, while rewarding, leads us to believe that this source holds little promise of supplying the extra funds to which I have referred. While strategically education is of highest importance, operationally UNRWA must put relief needs first when total funds are short in order that life may be sustained and health maintained. Moreover, within the total education budget, priority must be given to basic general education in preference to vocational, teacher and university training if and when total budget needs are not met. This means that if UNRWA's mandate is to be extended beyond 30 June 1963 in a manner which projects the carrying forward of the Agency's present relief and educational programs even for a short period, the Agency must receive during its next fiscal year an increase in regular contributions of \$3 million. Parenthetically, may I point out that this sum will just about equal the total cost of operating at capacity for one year the 11 vocational and teacher training facilities which UNRWA has established and of maintaining university scholarships at the current level. Of course, by the same token, if the Agency is short of total funds by this amount, the impact on these activities will be severely crippling--bringing them partially, if not totally, to a halt. This, in my opinion, would be tragic.

(more)

11. Mr. Chairman, in the foregoing statement I have tried to highlight pertinent facts which I believe are important for the General Assembly to consider as it formulates future policy pertaining to the Palestine issue. In doing this, I have striven to minimize any repetition of the contents of my Annual Report and the six supporting background information papers which have been distributed. Admittedly, the picture here presented is not as promising as one might desire. Even so, I believe it is an accurate picture and one that needs to be faced squarely. Moreover, it is not altogether a situation without promise or hope. Most of all, it is a challenge to be met. The crucial factor is one of funds for education in addition to relief.

12. Before closing these remarks, I want to express sincere appreciation to the Governments, including "host" Governments, which have so consistently and faithfully contributed to UNRWA's support. Also a word of sincere gratefulness is due the numerous voluntary organizations and individuals who have contributed in many ways to benefit the refugees and, particularly so, recently in support of the vocational and teacher training program. Without such assistance, this aspect of UNRWA's work would not have been possible.

240.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

DW

O.21962

Sent: 3rd December, 1962.
1925

TO:

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK.....933.

REPEATED:

Australian Embassy,
TEL AVIV.....105.

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.....2506.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Palestine Refugees.

In Ambassador's absence, Israeli Counsellor on Friday urgently sought our support for draft resolution calling for direct negotiations. Counsellor adduced usual arguments (pressure of world opinion, etc.,) but made no more than passing reference to Johnson proposals.

2. Acting Secretary replied that while we believed there had to be some movement on refugee problem, we did not believe an approach clearly unacceptable to one side could be helpful. We had reluctantly supported similar resolution last year, but it had not been carried, and particularly in view of some new and concrete proposals by Johnson, we did not believe it was a suitable approach this year. Acting Secretary added that we did not have a closed mind on the question and would consider carefully any further material he could obtain from Tel Aviv and particularly any firm evidence that proposal would this year receive considerably wider support than last.

3. Counsellor did not seem surprised by this reserved reaction and mentioned that United States was also opposed.

A/MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT IMMIGRATION.
TREASURY.
P.M's.

4th December, 1962.

(F) 15/4/4

SEC A/S's LA UN@ PAC&AM AM&SP@ S&SEA E.A.F&ME@ E AF ME@ INF DL
MT IC
LONDON GENEVA

239

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

JRR

I.30403

FROM

SENT - 30TH NOVEMBER, 1962.
1930

RECD - 2ND DECEMBER, 1962.
1540

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON.

3230 CONFIDENTIAL.

REPEATED U.N. NEW YORK.

YOUR 2454 - PALESTINE REFUGEES.

PALMER (UNITED NATIONS POLITICAL AND SECURITY AFFAIRS)
SAID 30TH NOVEMBER THAT THE TACTICS IN RELATION TO THE
ITEM IN U.N.G.A. WERE STILL UNRESOLVED.

PALMER HOPED A DECISION WOULD BE TAKEN SOON AND UNDERTOOK
TO LET US KNOW AS SOON AS HE HAD ANYTHING DEFINITE.

A/MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT IMMIGRATION
TREASURY
P.M's.

2ND DECEMBER, 1962.

① 181/4/4

SEC A/Ss LA UN@ PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA E.AF&ME E
ME INF

CAIRO TEL AVIV

238

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

JRR

I.30348

FROM

SENT - 30TH NOVEMBER, 1962.
1830
RECD - 1ST DECEMBER, 1962.
2045

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS,
NEW YORK.

UN1827 CONFIDENTIAL.

WASHINGTON FOR INFORMATION.
REPEATED OTTAWA SAV.1114, LONDON SAV.1241, TEL AVIV SAV.9
CAIRO SAV.41.

PALESTINE REFUGEES.

YOUR 904. OUR 1804.

SO FAR IN DEBATE ON THIS ITEM SAUDI ARABIA HAS MADE LONG
VEHEMENT STATEMENT ON FAMILIAR LINES THAT PALESTINE ARABS
ARE ENTITLED TO RETURN TO 'HOMELAND' AND THAT THIS IS
'NOT NEGOTIABLE'.

STATEMENT ALSO APPEARED TO DISMISS JOHNSON PROPOSALS
AS DID STATEMENT YESTERDAY BY SPOKESMAN OF ARAB REFUGEES.

LATTER WAS PERMITTED TO SPEAK FIRST ALTHOUGH WE, WITH
OTHERS, INDICATED PROPER PROCEDURE WOULD BE FOR MEMBERS
OF COMMITTEE LISTED TO SPEAK TO OPEN DEBATE.

NONE WERE PREPARED TO SPEAK AND ROLL CALL VOTE WAS TAKEN
ON WHETHER REFUGEE REPRESENTATIVE BE HEARD IMMEDIATELY.

COMMITTEE VOTED IN FAVOUR 34 - 16 (AUSTRALIA) - 42.

2. REGARDING GENERAL POSITION AMERICANS ARE NOT YET READY
TO CALL FRIENDLY MEETING.

BLAKE HOWEVER HAS TOLD US IN STRICT CONFIDENCE THAT
UNITED STATES IS AT PRESENT PUTTING STRONG PRESSURE ON
ISRAEL TO AGREE TO ACCEPT 'SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER'
OF REFUGEES (BUT NOT SUFFICIENT TO PREJUDICE ISRAEL'S
SECURITY) AND NOT TO PROCEED WITH ITS PROPOSED RESOLUTION
CALLING FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS.

UNITED STATES CONSIDER THAT IF THEY SUCCEED ATMOSPHERE
MAY THEN BE MORE CONDUCTIVE TO ARAB CONCESSION.

3. UNITED STATES IS ALSO CONTEMPLATING INTRODUCTION OF PRIMARILY
ADMINISTRATIVE RESOLUTION CALLING FOR EXTENSION OF MANDATE OF
U.N.R.W.A. FOR SAY TWO YEARS.

4. WE HAVE SOUNDED DISCREETLY POSSIBILITY OF INTRODUCTION
OF RESOLUTION BASED ON JOHNSON PROPOSALS BUT HAVE FOUND
LITTLE SUPPORT FOR THIS PARTLY BECAUSE NEITHER THE ARABS
NOR THE ISRAELIS APPEAR AT THIS STAGE PREPARED
TO IMPLEMENT THEM.

A/MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT IMMIG.
TREASURY
P.M.'s.

2ND DECEMBER, 1962.

SEC A/Ss LA UN@ PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA E.AF&ME
E AF ME INF C&P

CAIRO TEL AVIV

181/4/4

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Record of Conversation with Mr. N. Astar, Counsellor,
on Embassy of Israel,
30th November, 1962
Officers Present Acting Secretary
Mr. R.H. Robertson
Main Subject : PALESTINE REFUGEES

Mr. Astar said that he had come from Sydney on instructions from his Foreign Minister to seek Australia's support for (or possibly co-sponsorship of - it was not made explicit) the resolution which was again to be presented in the Special Political Committee calling for direct negotiations between the Arabs and Israel. Mr. Astar explained that Israel still believed that the only real prospect for solution of the refugee problem lay in world pressure on the Arabs to enter into such negotiations.

2. The Acting Secretary said that the international community in general believed that there must be some movement on this issue, but that, in his opinion, an approach which would clearly be unacceptable to one of the parties could not be helpful. While Australia fully recognized that one of the greatest stumbling-blocks to a solution was Arab intransigence in refusing to recognize Israel's existence, and while Australia had, with some reluctance, supported the direct negotiations resolution last year, we were far from convinced that it was a suitable approach this year. This was particularly the case as the General Assembly would probably have before it some new and concrete proposals by Dr. Johnson. From reports that we had seen of these proposals (and he understood from Mr. Yuval that they had been discussed in detail with the Government of Israel), we were inclined to think that they contained many elements which would probably have to be included in any final settlement; however, we had not been able to study the proposals in detail ourselves, and therefore did not know whether they would be satisfactory in every particular.

3. When Mr. Astar reiterated the Israeli position that the only possible way to a settlement lay in direct negotiations, the Acting Secretary replied that we did not have a closed mind on the question. He suggested that Mr. Astar should discuss the matter further with Mr. Robertson giving him such details as he had on the proposal, including the degree of support which Israeli canvassing had secured for it.

4. After the Acting Secretary's departure for another engagement, Mr. Robertson said that he had noted from Mr. Astar's opening remarks that the proposal for direct negotiation had the support of "some Afro-Asian and Scandinavian countries". He observed that at the last

CONFIDENTIAL

→ Mr. Phillips
on 5/6

Session the resolution had been sponsored by a group of Brazzaville countries, two or three Latin Americans and the Netherlands, but that no Scandinavians or Asians had then been included. He wondered whether Mr. Astar had any details. It appeared that, beyond a report of a relatively favourable response from Burma, he had none, but he undertook to seek further advice.

5. Mr. Robertson said that, as the Acting Secretary had already explained, our minds were not closed on this question, but that we felt that there were both substantive and tactical difficulties associated with the presentation of this proposal at the present Session. As Mr. Harry had said, there were some specific proposals originating with Dr. Johnson, and the discussion of the Israeli proposal (which was known to be totally unacceptable to the Arabs) might well prejudice the chances of Dr. Johnson's proposals being accepted in whole or in part. On the tactical side, Mr. Robertson suggested that unless Israel had a prospect of much greater support than last year (when the resolution had not received a majority) the exercise would not exert any pressure on the Arabs and in fact would have a quite contrary effect.

6. A general discussion then ensued covering such matters as the Arab trade boycott and Israeli technical assistance activities in Africa, Asia and Latin America, but the only substantial additional point which emerged was that Mr. Astar confirmed that Israel's desire to have this resolution adopted reflected its present belief not only that Arab/Israel problems could only be solved by direct negotiations but also that the refugee problem could conceivably be solved in isolation.

7. During neither part of the conversation did Mr. Astar make any more than a passing reference to the substance of Dr. Johnson's proposals. In particular, he did not advert to Israel's renewed rejection of the repatriation concept. It was also noteworthy that Mr. Astar seemed rather to have expected the Acting Secretary's reserved reaction.

Report Prepared by R.H. ROBERTSON

Distribution : Acting Secretary
A/S Div. 2
E.A.M.E. Br.

Following Posts : Mission to U.N.
Washington
London
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Tel Aviv
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Embassy,
AUSTRALIAN LEGATION,
TEL AVIV.

In reply quote No. 230.5

Memorandum No. 441


26th November, 1962.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

PALESTINE REFUGEES

I refer to our memorandum No. 437 of 15th November, 1962, and attach a copy of the English text of Mrs. Meir's speech delivered in the Knesset on 12th November. The text, which was only passed to us last week by the Foreign Ministry, differs in some respects in wording though not substance from the newspaper accounts on which I relied when writing my memorandum 437.

2. Copies of this memorandum and attachment have been sent to Washington, New York, Cairo and London.


(J.H.A. Hoyle)
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

*to Ruckelshaus (VN)
to see
Mr Phillips
230/41*

*→ Mr Phillips Mas, yes.
Hardly conciliatory! Or novel!
K+7 30/1*



234
AUSTRALIAN LEGATION,
TEL AVIV

In reply quote No. 230.5
Memorandum No. 441

26th November, 1962.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
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J.H.A. HOYLE
(J.H.A. Hoyle)
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

5/11/62
J.H.A.

STATEMENT BY THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
IN THE KNESSET ON 12 NOVEMBER 1962

Honourable Knesset:

In recent years, we have not had the blessing of lengthy periods of stability, quiet and truce, either in the world as a whole or in our own region. But in the last few weeks there have been tension, shocks, and collisions on the international scene of such special gravity that they claim our closest attention, and we must make quite clear to ourselves what is their real and overall significance and what consequences we may expect from them as regards ourselves.

Cuba

I do not have to describe what a relief it was to feelings throughout the world when a way was found out of the unprecedented crisis which swept the globe as the Government of the United States announced that it had learnt for sure that in Cuba, at relatively short distance from vital centres of the American nation, the Soviet Union was constructing missile bases capable of discharging nuclear havoc of the most appalling kind. Since the Second World War, and all through the years of the Cold War, this was the moment ^{when} many feared that - Heaven forbid - there was no escape from fateful decisions that would determine the future of humanity for generations to come and perhaps put mankind's existence in jeopardy.

There are indications, and we hope there will be fulfilment, of a positive solution. The solution stems from swift, vigorous and effective negotiation. It prevents disturbance of the delicate world balance which today is a vital condition of the safeguarding of peace. It symbolizes the success of human understanding and strengthens the hope in us that this same understanding will also prevail in the future,

and arrest the outburst of the dreadful powers of annihilation man has made. The human imagination is no longer capable of grasping what those powers can do, for they threaten to blot out human civilization, even human life, from off the face of the earth. This time, indeed, the world stood on the very edge of disaster, and perhaps there is hope that the glimpse of the abyss will bring the nations nearer to a practical and practicable agreement on general disarmament, and, following it, the abolition of missiles of all kinds and of all weapons of death and destruction everywhere, so that war itself will forever become impossible.

Between India and China

But, meanwhile, to our great regret, the peace has been broken along the border between the two most populous countries in the world. The frontier dispute between India and China has deviated from the realm of political discussion and fighting is taking place within territorial bounds and beyond them, both sides ceaselessly stepping up their combat strength and means.

The Prime Minister of India, Pandit Nehru, addressed himself to the Heads of Governments throughout the world, including our own, and explained his country's standpoint in the grave and dangerous situation China's invasion had placed it. Our Prime Minister's reply gave expression to our hope that the tension and clashes between India and China would speedily end through direct negotiations between the parties, so that they should be able to apply all their resources to the tasks of progress and development which both sorely need. In conclusion, our Prime Minister emphasized in particular that every effort to prevent aggression and adjust differences in peaceful ways, between neighbouring States especially, would always enjoy Israel's complete understanding and sympathy. In that respect, he mentioned our own efforts and aspirations to settle the problems between ourselves and our neighbours in those ways:

'All our efforts have been and are directed towards the preservation of peace in our area and throughout the world... It is for that

reason that we also proposed a general disarmament in Israel and in the Arab States to our Arab neighbours, even in advance of global disarmament, under mutual supervision; in that we see the most effective way of preventing wars. Moreover, we have expressed our readiness to sign treaties of non-aggression between us and our neighbours. I am in total agreement with the views expressed by Your Excellency, that it is incumbent upon all of us to do all in our power to achieve the elimination of the use and the threat of force in international relations.'

Yemen

A month ago, during the general debate in the Assembly of the United Nations, I tried to explain that it was a mistake to think that the tension in the Middle East was solely a result of Arab-Israel relations. This is what I said:

'Anyone who follows affairs in the Middle East knows that during this last year the focus of trouble in the area has again been the bitter struggle within the Arab world, which has made of the Arab League no longer even a facade of unity, even externally.'

I did not know then that within a few days such concrete and actual proof of my words would be produced. At this moment, battles are raging in the Arabian Peninsula, within Yemen and on its borders. Regular units of the Yemenite Army are engaged and, in particular, powerful detachments of the Egyptian Army, operating against Yemenite tribes that resist the revolution engineered in the capital of the country a few weeks ago. Egyptian war-planes are bombing tribal villages and encampments, and Egyptian warships shelling them from the sea. There is no doubt at all that the main military forces committed in the Yemen at this juncture are foreign troops from outside, Egyptian troops. Hard on the heels of this intervention by the Egyptian Army, other armed Arab contingents may also have entered the theatre of war.

It is proper, in this connection, to recall what the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mahmud Fawzi, said at the UN Assembly on 2 October of this year, when he indignantly disclaimed any thought of foreign intervention in the events in Yemen. Only a few days after that, on 19 October, Egypt's part from the very start in all the stages of the struggle had become public property. It was not only on this subject that Fawzi spoke as he did: Egypt's representatives have distinguished themselves on every occasion and in every place by spurious outcry against aggression, by professed support of the principle of self-determination in theory and by armed intervention in practice.

The special interest of Israel in what is happening among the Arab States is a compulsion of circumstance; we are part of this region and must be vigilant lest our security, too, be jeopardized. In the past, Israel has refrained, and it will refrain today, from meddling in inter-Arab quarrels. That is how we behaved more than a year ago when the union between Syria and Egypt was so dramatically ended, ^{of course,} and ^{the same} line of policy guided us on other occasions of the same kind. In its programmes the Government of Israel has on a number of occasions made clear that it aspires to friendly relations with **all** States irrespective of their internal regimes.

It must, however, be pointed out that the Imam of Yemen, whose regime, in Egyptian eyes, has now become a symbol of tyranny and reaction, was received in Cairo, and in more important places, with royal pomp, and his country was deemed worthy of constituting an important link in the 'Union of Arab Countries' which Nasser founded.

In our opinion, the open military intervention of Nasser's Egypt beyond its own bounds cannot be ignored, and we are amazed and dismayed by an unusual tendency to shrink from drawing those conclusions, as to the nature of Nasser's regime and his real aims, which ought to be inferred from this new and extreme manifestation. More than once we have observed attempts to explain away his belligerent declarations against us,

and even against others, in any way rather than in the light of their plain meaning. How will his actions be interpreted now by those experts who, only a little while ago, hinted that his regime from then on would be concerning itself solely with Egypt's difficult domestic problems, the real problems of the Egyptian people, and would forsake propaganda and subversion beyond the frontiers of Egypt, would give up its striving for expansion and hegemony?

When the Arab League met at Shtora and there were the clearest disclosures of Nasserist subversion in Syria and elsewhere, the optimistic appraisal of these experts was unshaken. Yet the Egyptian military adventure in the Yemen is an extreme and glaring violation of basic international principles. Hate-propaganda and subversion endanger peace, but open military intervention in the internal affairs of another country, when revolution is being attempted in it or in any other circumstances, is far ~~gr~~aver and much more dangerous. Are we to forget the lesson of the past? Need I underline that acquiescence in a precedent of that sort is infinitely more risky today? Is it not plain and obvious that the naive strategy of appeasement, of concession that pursues concession, of vacillation, must inevitably take its revenge, upset stability to its core and in the end shatter peace?

Debate in the Assembly on the Refugee Problem

Honourable Knesset:

As inter-Arab quarrels grow more serious and acute, and perhaps just for that reason, the Arab leaders of these countries of blind and unbridled hatred against Israel go on preaching without respite that we must be destroyed, and they devote infinite means and the best part of their resources to preparations that threaten our existence. We know that Nasser's Egypt is active in that sphere to the limit of its capacity. At the same time, the Arabs put on innocent expressions and cry out to high heaven because the Government of Israel is carrying out its primary obligation towards its people and its State and taking care to acquire

228

defensive arms which will deter the publicly proclaimed war-like plans of the Arab Governments.

That, sad to say, is the real background in our area to the annual argument about the Arab refugees, or, to be more correct, about the Report of UNRWA, which is to be resumed in the UN Assembly within the next few days.

In the last few weeks the Arab representatives, in their various categories, have managed to give clear expression to their views on the refugee problem and their general attitude towards Israel, both in the Assembly and locally.

At the tenth anniversary celebrations on 23 July 1962, in Cairo, Nasser declared:

'We have to prepare our civil and military industry; we have to pit force against force, and we must stand against Israel and those who back it. There is no escape from the obligation to restore the rights of the Palestine people and hence there is no escape from the duty of preparing and sacrificing ourselves.'

General Zaher Eddin, Chief-of-Staff of the Syrian armed forces, said in a speech at Aleppo on 3 August 1962:

'We shall march and crush the rocks beneath our feet. We shall go on to liberate all the lands that are still not free, first and foremost, bleeding Palestine ... We cannot be silent and see how Palestine is used as an imperialist bridge over which foreigners intend to cross to infiltrate into every Arab country. We will blow up this bridge, cross the border and shrivel up the bodies of the Israeli criminals.'

The Governor of the Gaza Strip, General Al-Zaghrudi, in a speech on the anniversary of the Balfour Declaration on 2 November, said:

'Tomorrow will be our meeting on the summit of Mount Carmel, where the flag of Arabism will be unfurled.'

At the UN Assembly on 12 October, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Hashin Jawad, said:

'The rights of the Arab inhabitants of Palestine are not negotiable - justice and self-determination are not negotiable. One's own country and existence are not negotiable. Yet that is what Israel hopes to achieve from direct negotiations - surrender, total, complete. This Arabs will never do. The Arab people of Palestine will never surrender their rights. They are determined to regain their lost homeland.'

In the UN Assembly on 2 October, Mahmoud Fawzi, Egyptian Foreign Minister, said:

'The position of my Government relating to Palestine is firmly based on the inalienable rights of the Arab nation of Palestine. My country, which has borne the brunt and by far the main sacrifices of supporting the Palestinian Arabs in the struggle for the restoration of these rights, will unflinchingly continue to give unstinted support to our Arab brothers and sisters in Palestine.'

All these words are clear and unequivocal. We have got used to them. They exemplify the real background to the discussion in the Assembly on the refugee question. We have formulated our policy against that background, which has existed since the first bloody Arab aggression against us on the day of the establishment of the Jewish State - from the Arab invasion of 1948 and to this very day.

Anyone who sees that problem, or wants to see it, outside the compass of the belligerency of the Arab States against Israel neither understands nor seeks to understand reality. The Arab leaders exploit the Arab refugees in their countries for the purposes of their political war against us. In their eyes, it is not a human problem. We have accepted hundreds of thousands of Jewish refugees from Arab lands, and without waiting for compensation from the Arab Governments for their abandoned property, we have done everything in our power to absorb these Jewish refugees who immediately became citizens of our Jewish State, of Israel. The Arab leaders, however, do not look upon the refugees as human beings for whose lot they should be solicitous, but as one of the instruments in their war against Israel, one of the weapons in planning their military operations against us. That, and only that, is the truth of the matter. They hope to ruin or undermine Israel from within through a mass return of refugees, and so make an invasion from outside easier. So long as the question of Arab belligerency in all its forms is unsolved, there can be no practical solution of the refugee problem, whereas the ending of Arab belligerency and the willingness of the Arab Governments to pursue regular relations of neighbourliness will of themselves bring about a solution of the problem of the refugees.

I must say a word or two here about the Annual Report of Dr. Davis, Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, which was published a few weeks ago. Davis exceeded his authority in the widest way. Not only did he take it upon himself to be the spokesman and partly the judge of what the refugees want, but he went much further and set himself up as the spokesman of all the Arab nations. Even if he states an ostensibly personal opinion, after all he is still an official of the United Nations. While, after seeming inquiry, he reaches political conclusions on matters that are outside his jurisdiction, he has failed to persuade the Arab leaders to do what is certainly his responsibility - to examine the lists of those enjoying relief from the United Nations, ascertain the numbers of the refugees and determine their genuine identity, that is to say, define who

is a refugee and who not, who has long since established himself yet still holds a ration-card, who has died,, and so on and so on. Dr. Davis evaded a further duty laid upon him - the examination of opportunities of self-rehabilitation. Here, too, he professed to be the judge as to economic opportunities of development in the Arab countries - and all this so as to prove that there is no room in those countries to absorb refugees. Two years ago, the then Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Hammerskjold, proposed a far-reaching programme for the development of all the countries in the Middle East. It was wrecked by the Arabs. Was it in the light of that sabotage that Dr. Davis reached his conclusion?

We observe social-economic processes within the refugee community which have conduced and are conducing to the absorption of many of them within the Arab countries, even in present conditions and in spite of the political opposition of the Arab leaders to this positive and progressive trend.

This process of absorption of Arab refugees among their own race in the lands where they live will tend to a natural solution of the problem of the Arab refugees, whatever the circumstances be. It will go forward much more rapidly if and as the attitude of the Arab rulers change, and they decide that the refugee problem, too, must be solved, and give up their immoral and perverse policy of exploiting the refugees for the purposes of their struggle against Israel.

In a debate which took place in this House a year ago, our basic position was summarized by the Prime Minister and myself, and the House displayed a wide unanimity with us on the principles of the matter. The Prime Minister said on 11 October 1961:

'If an Arab refugee problem still exists, this is entirely a result of the violation of the UN Charter by the Arab rulers and their callous treatment of members of their own people ... The Arab rulers treated the Arab refugees not as human beings and members of their own people but as a weapon with which to strike at Israel treating them as nothing more than a political and military weapon with which to undermine and destroy Israel.'

And I myself said on 6 November 1961:

'... we are ready to enter into negotiations with the Arab States on the refugee issue, we are ready to discuss things with them, to negotiate on compensation - and we have always said: mutual compensation, and this was recalled by the Prime Minister in his

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announcement - even if there is not peace, but on condition that what is discussed is a solution of the refugee problem, the problem of the refugees in the Arab States. That is to say, it must be with the agreement of the Arab leaders. Then we will sit down and negotiate with them, we will draw up the balance sheet of compensation, and if they want us to, we shall gladly help them also to settle the refugees in their countries. We have had experience in settling refugees.'

And I said this too:

'We took in tens of thousands of refugees... And the declared stand of the State of Israel is not 'No, not a single refugee', but a solution of the refugee problem in the Arab States.'

The Knesset thereupon adopted the following resolution by a large majority:

'The Knesset takes note of the attitude of the Government on the Arab refugee issue, as expressed in the declaration of the Prime Minister to the Knesset on 11 October 1961 and in the speech of the Foreign Minister in the debate in the Knesset on 6 November 1961, which will serve as the fundamental guiding line for the Israel delegation to the UN in the debate on the Arab refugee problem. The Knesset decides: there can be no returning the Arab refugees to Israel territory, and the only solution to the problem is their settlement in the Arab States.'

Since that debate, I am sorry to say that there has been no change in fundamental issues. Rather the reverse, threats to destroy us are intensified accompanied now by a flow of aggressive armament, and Nasser arrogantly declares that his missiles can reach any place south of Beirut. All these menaces and phrases, all this preparation, do not bring peace in our region any nearer, and manifestly do not prepare the ground for the only practical solution of the problem of the refugees.

So it seems today that agreement and peace are still out of our sight, and few and far between, indeed, are the glimmers of understanding in the encompassing darkness of Arab hatred. But we do not despair, we never will despair.

We were happy when, last year, thanks to the initiative of a number of African and Latin-American countries which have no selfish interest whatsoever in our region, the UN Assembly praiseworthily showed itself inclined to solve Arab-Israel problems, including the problem of the

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refugees, by way of direct negotiations. A number of countries went along with that welcome initiative, and I hope that it will find stronger expression in the continuation of the present Assembly. Just as the world was saved from a horrible catastrophe by the negotiations which the Great Powers conducted so rapidly and effectively, so it is our duty to follow this path, for no other will lead us to the goal. If the House permits me, I will conclude by quoting what I said at the end of my speech in the general debate of the Assembly this year:

'Despite all the speeches which we have heard from Arab representatives, we are convinced that for us and for our neighbours the day must come when we shall live in amity and co-operation. Then will the entire Middle East become a region where the tens of millions of people will dwell in peace, and only then will its economic potentialities and rich cultural heritage achieve fulfilment. This Israel believes, and towards this end we shall devote all our efforts.'

222
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

JPH

I.30039.

DATED. 28TH NOVEMBER 1962.
1745.

REC'D. 29TH NOVEMBER 1962.
1700.

FROM

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS,
NEW YORK.

UN1805. CONFIDENTIAL.

WASHINGTON FOR INFORMATION. REPEATED LONDON SAV.1225

OMAN.

OUR 1787.

ARAB RESOLUTION WITHOUT AMENDMENT WAS PUT TO VOTE TODAY.

VOTING WAS BY PARAGRAPHS AND ROLL CALL (DETAILS BY BAG).

RESOLUTION AS A WHOLE WAS ADOPTED 41 (ARABS SOVIET GROUP CHAD CAMBODIA GUATEMALA PAKISTAN NEPAL TANGANYIKA) - 18 (UNITED STATES WESTERN EUROPE SCANDINAVIANS AUSTRALIA) - 36 (LATIN AMERICANS MOST BRAZZAVILLE GROUP INDIA GHANA AND SOUTH EAST ASIA EXCEPTING INDONESIA AND CAMBODIA).
2. UNITED KINGDOM NOW CONSIDER PROSPECT OF BLOCKING THIRD IN PLENARY VERY UNCERTAIN.

ALTHOUGH LATIN AMERICANS AND BRAZZAVILLE GROUP DID NOT PRESS IDEA OF A UNITED NATIONS COMMISSIONER OR COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE SITUATION IN OMAN THEY HAVE NOT ABANDONED IDEA AND MAY INTRODUCE RESOLUTION IN PLENARY.

FROM DISCUSSIONS HERE IT WOULD SEEM THAT IF THEY DO SUCH RESOLUTION WOULD COMMAND A LARGE MAJORITY.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.
P.M.'s

30TH NOVEMBER 1962.

(F) 181/4/4

SEC A/Ss UN PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA EAF&ME E AF MEQ
INF DL IC
OTTAWA CAIRO COLOMBO KARACHI NEW DELHI SINGAPORE WELLINGTON.

CONFIDENTIAL

22)

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

TM.

I. 29993.

FROM:

DATED. 28TH NOVEMBER, 1962.
2200
REC'D. 29TH NOVEMBER, 1962.
0958.

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS,
NEW YORK.

UN.1804. CONFIDENTIAL. PRIORITY.

WASHINGTON FOR INFORMATION.

REPEATED OTTAWA CABLE 139, LONDON CABLE 104.

PALESTINE REFUGEES.

YOUR 904.

ITEM WILL COMMENCE TOMORROW AFTERNOON, 29TH.

2. DESPITE THIS UNITED STATES DELEGATION HERE (BLAKE) SAYS THAT AT THIS STAGE DELEGATION HAS NOT HAD FINAL DECISION ON TACTICS FROM WASHINGTON WHERE OFFICIALS CONCERNED ARE APPARENTLY STILL DIVIDED ON BEST APPROACH.

3. ACCORDING TO BLAKE UNITED STATES HAS HOWEVER DECIDED TO OPPOSE ANY PROPOSAL TO RECONSTITUTE P.C.C. AND ALSO TO OPPOSE RESOLUTION SEEKING DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WHICH THEY CONSIDER WOULD NOT CONTRIBUTE AT THIS STAGE TO EASING ARAB-ISRAELI TENSIONS. (POSITION STILL APPEARS SIMILAR TO THAT OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPH 8 OF OUR MEMORANDUM 1594).

4. ACCORDING TO BLAKE UNITED STATES IS STILL CONSIDERING HIGH LEVEL PRESSURE ON ISRAEL TO ACCEPT SMALL NUMBER OF ARAB REFUGEES FOR RESETTLEMENT BUT DECISION ON THIS HAS NOT YET BEEN TAKEN OR WAS UNKNOWN TO BLAKE.
DELEGATION HERE ALSO HOPES AVOID AND CERTAINLY WILL NOT ENCOURAGE RESOLUTION ALONG LINES OF JOHNSON PROPOSALS.

5. ON QUESTION OF PALESTINE ARAB DELEGATION UNITED STATES WILL FAVOUR THEIR BEING HEARD AS INDIVIDUALS BUT HOPES THAT THIS ISSUE WILL NOT BE PRESSED TO VOTE.

6. WE ARE ALSO KEEPING IN TOUCH WITH CANADIANS AS MRS MEIR IS IN OTTAWA TODAY. CANADIANS SAY, HOWEVER, THAT PRESENT THINKING IS AGAINST SUPPORTING ISRAEL RESOLUTION ON DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS.

A/MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT IMMIGRATION.
TREASURY.
P.M's.

29TH NOVEMBER. 1962.

SEC A/S's LA UN@ PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA EAF&ME E AF ME
INF C&P.
CAIRO TEL AVIV.

*Discussed with W. Robertson
& decided Washington's reply
necessary before any further
instructions, if any necessary,
can be formulated.*
A 29
J.

220

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

.GS I.29797

SENT. 26TH NOVEMBER, 1962
2100

FROM. REC'D. 27TH NOVEMBER, 1962
1829

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS,
NEW YORK.

UN 1788. CONFIDENTIAL.

PALESTINE REFUGEES.

YOUR 902.

PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF ARAB COUNTRIES HAVE CIRCULATED
LETTER REQUESTING THAT "THE PALESTINE ARAB DELEGATION
REPRESENTING THE VIEWS OF THE PALESTINE ARAB PEOPLE,
THE PRINCIPAL PARTY TO THE PALESTINE DISPUTE", BE HEARD
BY THE SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE.

2. AS USE OF PHRASE "THE PRINCIPAL PARTY TO THE PALESTINE
DISPUTE" GOES BEYOND PREVIOUS ARAB STATEMENTS ON THIS
MATTER AND HAS UNACCEPTABLE POLITICAL OVERTONES WE
PROPOSE TO OPPOSE THIS REQUEST IF PRESSED TO A VOTE.

A/MIN.&DEPT E.A.
MIN.&DEPT DEFENCE
P.M.'s

28TH NOVEMBER, 1962

(P) 181/4/4

SEC A/Ss UN PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA EAF&ME E AF ME INF C&P

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

DW

0.21538

TO:

Sent: 27th November, 1962.
1800

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK.....1831.

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.....2454.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Palestine Refugees.

Your memorandum 1594. With item scheduled to commence this week, United States has presumably now worked out its tactics and assessed prospects for some progress along lines of Johnson proposals or otherwise. Grateful brief report, including developing attitudes of Israel, Arabs and other key groups.

For Washington.

Please thank Palmer for providing copy of Johnson proposals. Your Savingsgram 1115 has been helpful in clarifying proposals, but while we can appreciate reasons for pilot approach (your paragraph two) is there not a risk that very small number proposed for initial processing may be represented by Arabs (should they decided to discuss proposals at all) as further evidence of P.C.C.'s failure to come to grips with the problem? Reference your paragraph nine and paragraphs seven and eight of New York's memorandum 1594 will not Johnson plan be buried unless a resolution along lines of his proposals is presented quite early? We have no additional comment on proposals themselves except that paper you have sent does not seem to present them very clearly.

A/MIN. & DEPT E.A.
TERRITORIES.
TREASURY.
P.M.'s.

27th November, 1962.

SEC A/S's LA UN PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA E.A.F&ME E AF ME INF
C&P
CAIRO TEL AVIV

CONFIDENTIAL. 218



Embassy,
AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
TEL AVIV.

In reply quote No. 230.5

Memorandum No. 437

15th November, 1962.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

PALESTINE REFUGEES

I refer to your Savingsgram No. 15 of 20th October, 1962.

2. Mrs. Meir, in opening on Monday a two-day Knesset debate on foreign policy, devoted most of her speech to Israel's policy on Arab refugees. In his 1962 report, she said, Dr. Davis, the U.N.R.W.A. Chief of Operations, "blatantly exceeded his authority. Not only did he take it upon himself to become the spokesman and partly the judge of the refugees but went even further and set himself up as the spokesman of all Arab nations. He drew political conclusions on matters outside his jurisdiction and failed to carry out his basic responsibility, namely, to persuade Arab leaders to examine the refugee relief lists, ascertain their true number, identify authentic refugees, expose those illegitimately receiving aid and entered in the refugee roll and to investigate opportunities of self-rehabilitation. Here too Dr. Davis professed to be the judge of opportunities for economic development in the Arab countries in order to prove that there is no room in these states to absorb refugees....."

3. Mrs. Meir then introduced the latest Israeli theme - the Foreign Ministry propounded the same view to me last week - on the refugees:-

"We observe social and economic processes inside the refugee community conducive to their absorption within the Arab countries even in present conditions and despite the political opposition of Arab leaders to this positive trend. This process of absorption of the refugees among their own race, in the lands where they live, will tend to a natural solution of the problem whatever the circumstances. The process will go forward the more rapidly if the Arab leaders change their perverse and immoral policy of exploiting the refugees for the purpose of their struggle against Israel."

The real background to the United Nations discussion on the refugee issue was continued Arab belligerency against Israel.

"We have formulated our policy against this background. Anyone who wishes to see the problem outside it neither understands nor seeks to understand reality."

4. Reiterating her statement to the Knesset last year that Israel was willing to negotiate for a true solution of the issue directly with the Arabs even in the absence of a peace settlement Mrs. Meir made a meaningless distinction when she summed up Israel policy thus:-

"The declared stand of Israel is not "No, not a single refugee", but a solution of the refugee problem in the Arab states."

5. Mrs. Meir concluded by saying that the 1961 United Nations initiative of certain African and Latin American states had been welcome and she hoped that it would find "stronger expression" at the current Assembly session.

Knesset Debate

6. In the Knesset debate which followed Mrs. Meir's speech nearly all

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

217

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participants denounced the Davis report. Mr. Beigin, the leader of the extreme right wing Herut party, noted that Mrs. Meir had failed to make any mention of Dr. Johnson's proposals. This silence, he thought, was "too clever"; what was needed was an outright rejection of the Johnson plan. Mr. Hazan of Mapam, the most pro-Arab party excepting for the Communists, also felt that Israel could only reject the Johnson proposals. The Knesset eventually adopted a resolution by 63 votes to 11 with 13 abstentions. It read:-

"The Knesset, after having heard the review of the Foreign Minister and held a debate thereon, reiterated its resolution on the refugees of November 8, 1961 to the effect that the Arab refugees should not be returned to the territory of Israel and that the only solution to their problem is their resettlement in the Arab states."

The votes cast against the resolution, as well as the abstentions, were a reflection not of opposition to the sentiment of the resolution but of certain party considerations.

Comment

7. Mrs. Meir leaves for the Assembly again next week. The main lines of Israel's policy it would now appear have been set. All parties, except the Communists, are now behind her when she propounds the familiar Israeli viewpoint on the interconnection between the refugee problem and an Arab/Israeli peace settlement, the theory of an exchange of population (between Arabs and Jews) together with the new gloss that the refugees are, irrespective of the views of the Arab rulers, being absorbed in the life of the countries in which they dwell. Israel's basic security objection to the return of the refugees will be obscured by a reiteration of the theme "a solution of the refugee problem in the Arab states". The 1961 call for direct Arab/Israeli relations will be reiterated.

8. The one point that is still unclear is how Israel will formally reject the Johnson proposals. The Foreign Ministry told me last week that Dr. Johnson had already been told that his proposals were unacceptable to Israel. Israel might however go further than this for, according to a friendly mission here, Mrs. Meir, shortly before returning home after the opening of the current Assembly session, saw Dr. Johnson again, was very rude to him and said that she did not wish to see him again. This story, if true, would suggest that Israel will not only formally reject the Johnson proposals if they come before the Assembly but might also couple it with a refusal to see Dr. Johnson if his mandate should be further extended by the Assembly.

9. Copies of this memorandum have been sent to New York, Cairo, London and Washington for information.

(J.H.A. Hoyl)
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM ²⁸⁸²¹

JW

DATED. 15TH NOVEMBER, 1962,
1715
REC'D. 16TH NOVEMBER, 1962,
2040

FROM,

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS,
NEW YORK.

UN.1685 CONFIDENTIAL,

ARAB REFUGEES.

SAFE HAND BAG 589 CONTAINS OUR MEMORANDUM 1594 REPORTING
DISCUSSION BETWEEN PLIMSOLL AND DR. JOHNSON (U.N. SPECIAL
REPRESENTATIVE) ON LATTER'S RECENT PROPOSALS FOR RESETTLEMENT OF
REFUGEES.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT IMMIGRATION
P.M.'s

17TH NOVEMBER, 1962.

(R) 181/4/4

SEC A/Ss MR LOOMES UN PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA EAF&ME
E AF ME INF DL IC C&P

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COPY

 215
 OF LETTER FROM
 AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
 750 THIRD AVENUE NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

CONFIDENTIAL

15th November, 1962.

File No. 210/1/3

Memorandum No. 1594.

 The Secretary,
 Department of External Affairs,
 Canberra, A.C.T.
Arab Refugees.

Dr. Joseph E. Johnson, the Special Representative of the United Nations Palestine Conciliation Commission, called on Sir James Plimsoll on Tuesday, 13th November, to discuss with him his proposals for a settlement of the question of Arab refugees in Palestine. Sir Kenneth Bailey, Mr. J.D.L. Hood and Mr. R. A. Woolcott were also present.

2. Both the New York Times and the New York Herald Tribune had that morning carried news items from Jerusalem to the effect that the Foreign Minister of Israel, Mrs. Golda Meir, had indirectly indicated in the Knesset that Israel would not accept Dr. Johnson's recent proposals. According to these reports she said there could be "no return of the Arab refugees to Israeli territory", the "only solution to the problem" being "their settlement in the Arab States".

3. Dr. Johnson said that the Israeli reaction, if true, was discouraging as he still believed his proposals represented the best hope for some movement towards a settlement of this long standing problem. (The Johnson proposals have been forwarded to you under cover of Washington memorandum No. 1241.) Dr. Johnson said that although Israel appeared to have rejected the proposals he thought that the United States would not let the matter rest there and would continue to press Israel to reconsider the proposals. At this point he said that he believed President Kennedy would be displeased by Israel's attitude and he implied some pressure might be put at a high level. The Arab countries had neither rejected nor accepted the proposals.

4. Dr. Johnson said that he did not think he should in all conscience continue as the Special Representative of the Palestine Conciliation Commission if his proposals did not result in progress being made in this dispute. He said he could see no other possible course of action, except an agreement between Israel and the Arab countries which would be backed by the great powers for the parties to the dispute each to agree to accept a specified number of refugees for resettlement. Dr. Johnson said that this would be, however, a political agreement outside of his mandate which really derived from paragraph 11 of General Assembly Resolution 194 (111) of 11th December 1948.

5. Dr. Johnson then turned to the question of the form his report to the Palestine Conciliation Commission should take. He said there were arguments both for and against publishing a full account of his proposals together with the reasoning behind them. He said that France and Turkey both favoured his making an oral report to the Commission which would not be published. (On the other hand we understand from the United States delegation here that the third member of the Commission, the United States, favours the publication of an informative report.) Sir James Plimsoll, Sir Kenneth Bailey and Mr. Hood generally agreed that as the contents of the report were already fairly well known through leaks in the Washington Post and the New York Times, it would be better to publish a fairly full report. Mr. Hood also mentioned

...../that governments

CONFIDENTIAL

(F) 181/4/4

M. Phillips

Copy for

Your files. Paragraph
8 raises the question
what the United States
does favour - & his
I propose to ask by
cable tomorrow.

R+R

26/11

CONFIDENTIAL COPY

214
OF LETTER FROM
AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
750 THIRD AVENUE NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

- 2 -

that governments which contributed to U.N.R.W.A. such as Australia, would prefer to have a published report to which they could refer in seeking parliamentary approval for continued contributions.

6. Sir James Plimsoll said he had some sympathy with the Israeli view that the refugee problem could not be seen independently of the whole Arab attitude towards the continued existence of Israel as a state. He asked whether, if Israel did accept the resettlement of a number of Arab refugees, the Arabs would then take it as a starting point for further demands for the resettlement of more Arab refugees. Mr. Johnston did not entirely agree. Sir James Plimsoll also questioned Dr. Johnson about the attitude of the younger generation of Arab refugees. Dr. Johnson said that they continued to be subject to extensive anti-Israel propaganda but that he was not sure how deeply this affected them. For example, they were responding well to the Commission's vocational training schemes. Dr. Johnson also said that some of the Arab governments, for example Jordan and Lebanon, were not as intractable or uncooperative as they were often obliged to appear in public.

7. The question of how the issue might best be handled in the Special Political Committee was also discussed. Dr. Johnson wondered whether it might be an idea for some non-involved country (Ireland was suggested) to incorporate in a general statement the basic ideas of Dr. Johnson's proposals without calling them such by name. This might be followed by the tabling of a resolution incorporating the main features of the Johnson proposals. Sir James Plimsoll said that much would depend on the attitude of the United States which had always played an active role on this issue.

8. From preliminary discussions afterwards with Mr. R. Blake of the United States delegation here, we have ascertained that while the question would be referred to Washington for decision the United States wants to handle the question by "quiet diplomacy" and to minimize the Arab-Israeli confrontation in the Committee. Thus they tend neither to favour the introduction of a resolution along the lines of the Johnson proposals nor to support a call for direct negotiations, neither of which course they consider would assist their long term policy directed towards an easing of Arab-Israel tensions and the ultimate settlement of the dispute.

9. Copies of this memorandum have been sent to Australian posts in Tel Aviv, Cairo, Washington and London.

RAW/yal


For Delegation.

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD SAVINGRAM

RB

1.27684

FROM:

DATED: 31ST OCTOBER, 1962

REC'D: 6TH NOVEMBER, 1962

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON.

SAV.1115. CONFIDENTIAL.

COPY U.N. NEW YORK, LONDON AND OTTAWA.

YOUR SAVINGRAM 295 - PALESTINE REFUGEES.

PALMER (U.N. POLITICAL AND SECURITY AFFAIRS) PROMISED OCTOBER 30TH TO GIVE US A COPY OF THE JOHNSON PROPOSALS SHORTLY FOR AUSTRALIAN USE ONLY.

2. REFERENCE YOUR PARA 3(A) AND (B), PALMER SAID JOHNSON DID NOT CONTEMPLATE THE U.N. ADMINISTRATOR AND HIS ADVISORY COUNCIL REPLACING THE CONCILIATION COMMISSION. INSTEAD JOHNSON FAVOURED APPOINTING AN ACTING ADMINISTRATOR OF FAIRLY LOW RANK WITH TWO OR THREE CLERKS AND ANSWERABLE TO THE CONCILIATION COMMISSION.

INITIALLY, THE ACTING ADMINISTRATOR WOULD PROCESS A SMALL NUMBER OF QUESTIONNAIRES SLOWLY, PERHAPS STARTING WITH THE 200 REFUGEES ASKING FOR COMPENSATION AND RESETTLEMENT.

CONCURRENTLY THE ACTING ADMINISTRATOR WOULD ALSO TRY TO REPATRIATE A SMALL NUMBER OF OTHER REFUGEES TO ISRAEL AND RESETTLE OTHERS IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES, MAINTAINING A REASONABLE RATIO BETWEEN RESETTLEMENT AND REPATRIATION.

BY MOVING SLOWLY, JOHNSON HOPED TO FORESTALL ANY POLITICAL MOVE AIMED AT GETTING THE MAJORITY OF REFUGEES TO DEMAND REPATRIATION.

ONCE THE ACTING ADMINISTRATOR HAD ACCOMPLISHED THESE INITIAL STEPS, JOHNSON HOPED THAT THE MOVEMENT OF REFUGEES WOULD GATHER MOMENTUM.

AT THIS POINT CONSIDERATION COULD BE GIVEN TO THE APPOINTMENT OF A PERMANENT ADMINISTRATOR TOGETHER WITH AN ADVISORY COUNCIL.

JOHNSON HAD ALLOWED A PERIOD OF AT LEAST TEN YEARS FOR SOLVING THE REFUGEE PROBLEM.

3. REFERENCE YOUR 3 (C), PALMER AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO KEEP THE ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONNAIRES CONFIDENTIAL AND FREE FROM PRESSURE.

HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE FOR PROCESSING APPLICATIONS WOULD BE VERY THOROUGH AND BEFORE EACH APPLICATION WAS FINALLY DISPOSED OF THE APPLICATION WOULD BE TOLD AGAIN THE CONDITIONS OF RESETTLEMENT AND REPATRIATION.

PALMER THOUGHT THAT THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE WOULD TEND TO MINIMISE THE PROBLEM OF PRESSURE AND LACK OF SECRECY.

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

212

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD SAVINGRAM

RB

2.

I.27684

CONFIDENTIAL

4. REFERENCE YOUR 3(D), PALMER AGREED WITH YOUR COMMENTS BUT SAID JOHNSON HOPED THAT THE ARABS WOULD ACQUIESCE IN THESE PROPOSALS.

NO DOUBT THEY WOULD PUBLICLY PROCLAIM THAT IT WAS A VICTORY FOR THE RIGHT OF REPATRIATION.

ISRAEL LIKEWISE MIGHT BE ABLE TO ACQUIESCE BECAUSE THE PROPOSALS IN FACT PROVIDED THAT MOST OF THE REFUGEES WOULD BE RESETTLED AND NOT REPATRIATED.

5. REFERENCE YOUR 3(E), PALMER SAID THAT INITIALLY THE FUND WOULD BE VERY SMALL AND NOT MORE THAN 200,000 DOLLARS OR 300,000 DOLLARS.

NO LARGE CONTRIBUTIONS WOULD BE REQUIRED UNTIL IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE PLAN WOULD WORK.

PALMER THOUGHT THAT CONGRESS WOULD BE WILLING TO CONTRIBUTE TO A FUND TO IMPLEMENT THE JOHNSON PLAN IF IT HAD GOOD PROSPECTS OF SUCCESS.

THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD ENCOUNTERED STRONG CRITICISM FROM CONGRESS ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE USA HAD CONTRIBUTED 300 MILLION DOLLARS SO FAR FOR THE PALESTINE REFUGEES AND THERE WAS NO SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM IN SIGHT.

JOHNSON HAD CALCULATED THAT THE COST OF KEEPING UNRWA GOING AT ITS PRESENT LEVEL OVER THE NEXT TEN YEARS WOULD APPROXIMATELY EQUAL THE COST OF HIS PLAN FOR RESETTLING AND REPATRIATING REFUGEES.

IF THE PLAN WAS ACCEPTED THE COST WOULD INITIALLY BE HIGH BECAUSE UNRWA WOULD NEED TO BE MAINTAINED AT ITS PRESENT LEVEL AND THE COSTS OF RESETTLING AND REPATRIATION WOULD HAVE TO BE MET.

HOWEVER, OVER A PERIOD THE COST OF UNRWA AND LIKEWISE THE COST OF IMPLEMENTING THE PLAN WOULD DIMINISH.

6. REFERENCE YOUR 3(G), PALMER SAID THAT LIKE YOU, THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD EXPECTED ISRAEL TO MAKE THIS POINT.

Still 3(E)

HOWEVER ISRAEL HAD NOT DONE SO TO DATE.

7. REFERENCE YOUR 4(A), PALMER AGREED WITH YOUR COMMENTS BUT SAID THAT, AS A MATTER OF JUDGMENT, THE STATE DEPARTMENT SAW MERIT IN KEEPING THIS THREAT ALIVE.

THE DEPARTMENT THOUGHT THAT THE PARTIES CONCERNED IF TOLD AT THIS STAGE THAT UNRWA WOULD CONTINUE, WOULD LOSE INTEREST IN THE JOHNSON PLAN.

FURTHER, FOR GENERAL POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS ISRAEL HAD A STAKE IN THE CONTINUATION OF UNRWA.

IN ADDITION, THE DEPARTMENT HAD SOME PRIVATE INDICATIONS THAT THE ARAB COUNTRIES WERE NOT SO ADAMANT AS THEY APPEARED ON THE QUESTION OF RESETTLEMENT.

8. THE ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS IN YOUR 4(B) AND 4(C) IS YES.

PALMER AGREED WITH YOUR COMMENT THAT THE ARABS WOULD OPPOSE PHASING OUT OF UNRWA.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD³. SAVINGRAM

I.27684

RB

HOWEVER, THE DEPARTMENT THOUGHT THAT IF THE JOHNSON PLAN WAS NOT ADOPTED, REFERENCE COULD BE MADE TO REFORMS IN A VAGUE WAY WHEN PASSING THE RESOLUTION RENOVING UNRWA'S MANDATE.

ONCE THIS WAS DONE THE MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS COULD PERSUADE THE DIRECTOR TO IMPLEMENT THE DESIRED REFORMS QUIETLY.

9. PALMER SAID THE STATE DEPARTMENT HOPED THE JOHNSON PLAN WOULD NOT BE BURIED IN THE DEBATE ON THE REFUGEES.

IF JOHNSON'S PLAN WAS REJECTED, THE DEPARTMENT HOPED THAT IT WOULD BE BORNE IN MIND IN FUTURE ATTEMPTS TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM.

10. REFERENCE YOUR PARA 5, PALMER EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION OF YOUR POSITION ON THIS POINT.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT IMMIGRATION
TREASURY

6TH NOVEMBER, 1962

SEC A/Ss MR LOOMES LA UN PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA EAF&ME
E AF ME INF DL IC C&P
CAIRO TEL AVIV

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The Secretary

This has not yet been distributed. Mr Phillips has added a sentence in para. 3 as suggested by you and amended paragraph 9.

M J

6/11

He

CONFIDENTIAL

209

Record of Conversation with H.E. Mr. M. Yuval, Israeli
Ambassador

on 2nd November, 1962

Officers present: The Secretary
L.E. Phillips

(F)

181/4/1

PALESTINE REFUGEES : CUBA : INDIA/CHINA

Palestine Refugees

Mr. Yuval said that although early discussion of the subject in the General Assembly was not indicated he wished to discuss Israeli thinking on the Palestine refugees item.

2. The Ambassador referred to press reports that Mr. Johnson, Special Representative of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, would be proposing that a census should be taken of all refugees. Mr. Yuval said that such a census would be misleading and a waste of time, and would not reflect the true situation, as the refugees would not be free to express their true wishes.

3. He next described Dr. Davis' report as a disappointment and observed that in tone it seemed to favour the Arab point of view. Mr. Yuval then proceeded to make practical suggestions for resolving the problem of the refugees. He thought that it would be wiser to treat them as any other refugees and place them under the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. Education, technical training and the health of the refugees could also be made the responsibility of the specialised agencies. The host countries would also play their part in the rehabilitation of the refugees and in so doing would be contributing to the general development of the host countries. The Secretary suggested that a case could be made that assumption by host governments of these responsibilities prejudged the question at issue between Israel and the Arab countries. Mr. Yuval noted the Secretary's observation but gave the Yarmuk project as an example of what a host country (Jordan) could do in projects receiving outside aid to assist refugees. He said that Gaza was a special case with the U.A.R. placing restrictions on the movements of refugees there to the U.A.R.

4. Mr. Yuval considered that the Palestine Conciliation Commission, which now had a staff of approximately 11,400, was in danger of becoming a state within a state. In much of its work it was performing functions parallel to those carried out by the host country, e.g. education, technical training, and it seemed logical for the Palestine Conciliation Commission's work to be taken over by the host country. Funds for the added responsibility would come from the voluntary contribution made to the Palestine Conciliation Commission.

5. Mr. Yuval pointed out that Israel had never said it would not receive refugees and that it had accepted 35,000 in its programme of uniting families.

6. The Ambassador said that Israel still believed that a solution of the refugee problem required direct negotiations between the parties concerned. He said that it was not yet known how much support Israel could expect for a resolution calling for direct negotiations but he hoped that Australia would be able to sponsor such a resolution. The Secretary recalled that last year Australia had not been able to co-sponsor the Israeli resolution but had voted in favour of it.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

He told Mr. Yuval that it had not been decided what attitude Australia would take this year if Israel again proposed direct negotiations.

Cuba.

7. The Secretary enquired as to the reaction in Israel to the American action over Cuba. Mr. Yuval said that the Israeli press had shown that the emotions of the Israeli people had been aroused by the situation. He added that inevitably Israel looked at outside events in the context of Israel/Arab relations. In the face of a build-up by the U.S.S.R. of ground-to-air missiles and heavy armaments in the U.A.R., Israel had had to seek comparable weapons from the U.S. These weapons would not be supplied for another 18 months and in the meantime Israel would have to have its troops and technicians trained to handle them.

8. In general discussion of the position of Khrushchev and Castro, Mr. Yuval said that he thought Mr. Khrushchev's reactions to the U.S. blockade indicated that he was domestically in a strong position and that Castro could be expected to make some hard bargaining.

India/China

9. The Ambassador said that, along with other countries, Israel had received the Indian appeal for assistance, but that it was not certain what shape the assistance should take. He agreed with the Secretary's view that the removal of Mr. Menon as Minister of Defence might simplify the question of supplying arms to India a little as it was in Mr. Menon's psychology to suspect offers of military aid as a move to embroil India in the Cold War.

Soviet Jewry

10. The Secretary gave the Ambassador a copy of the statement made in the Third Committee by the Australian delegate.

Distribution

Secretary
A/S Div. IV
" " II
" " I

EAME Branch
UN Branch
S.&SEA Branch

Posts
New York
Tel Aviv
Cairo
London
Washington

L. Phillips
Report prepared by L.E. Phillips

CONFIDENTIAL

(F) 181/4/1

2071

5th November, 1962.

Conversation with Israeli Ambassador.

The Secretary

Attached for your approval is a draft of the record
of your conversation with Mr. Yuval.

(L.E. Phillips)

CONFIDENTIAL

206

DRAFT

3/11/62

Record of Conversation with H.E. Mr. M. Yuval, Israeli Ambassador
on 2nd November, 1962

Officers present: the Secretary
L.E. Phillips

PALESTINE REFUGEES: CUBA: INDIA/CHINA.

Palestine Refugees. Mr. Yuval said that although early discussion of the subject in the General Assembly was not indicated he wished to discuss Israeli thinking on the Palestine refugees item. The Ambassador referred to press reports that Mr. Johnson, Special Representative of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, would be proposing that a census should be taken of all refugees. Mr. Yuval said that such a census would be misleading and a waste of time, and would not reflect the true situation, as the refugees would not be free to express their true wishes.

He next described Dr. Davis' report as a disappointment and observed that in tone it seemed to favour the Arab point of view. Mr. Yuval then proceeded to make practical suggestions for resolving the problem of the refugees. He thought that it would be wiser to treat them as any other refugees and place them under the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. Education, technical training and the health of the refugees could also be made the responsibility of the specialised agencies. The host countries would also play their part in the rehabilitation of the refugees and in so doing would be contributing to the general development of the host countries. Mr. Yuval gave the Yarmuk project as an example of what a host country (Jordan) could do in projects receiving outside aid to assist refugees. He said that Gaza was a special case with the U.A.R. placing restrictions on the movements of refugees there to the U.A.R.

Mr. Yuval considered that the Palestine Conciliation Commission, which now had a staff of approximately 11,400, was in danger of becoming a state within a state. In much of its work it was performing functions parallel to those carried out by the host country, e.g. education, technical training, and it seemed logical for the Palestine Conciliation

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

2.

Commission's work to be taken over by the host country. Funds for the added responsibility would come from the voluntary contribution made to the Palestine Conciliation Commission.

5. Mr. Yuval pointed out that Israel had never said it would not receive refugees and that it had accepted 35,000 in its programme of uniting families.

6. The Ambassador said that Israel still believed that a solution of the refugee problem required direct negotiations between the parties concerned. He said that it was not yet known how much support Israel could expect for a resolution calling for direct negotiations but he hoped that Australia would be able to sponsor such a resolution. The Secretary recalled that last year Australia had not been able to co-sponsor the Israeli resolution but had voted in favour of it. He told Mr. Yuval that it had not been decided what attitude Australia would take this year if Israel again proposed direct negotiations.

Cuba.

7. The Secretary enquired as to the reaction in Israel to the American action over Cuba. Mr. Yuval said that the Israeli press had shown that the emotions of the Israeli people had been aroused by the situation. He added that inevitably Israel looked at outside events in the context of Israel/Arab relations. In the face of a build-up by the U.S.S.R. of ground-to-air missiles and heavy armaments in the U.A.R., Israel had had to seek comparable weapons from the U.S. These weapons would not be supplied for another 18 months and in the meantime Israel would have to have its troops and technicians trained to handle them.

8. In general discussion of the position of Khrushchev and Castro, Mr. Yuval said that he thought Mr. Khrushchev's reactions to the U.S. blockade indicated that he was domestically in a strong position and that Castro could be expected to make some hard bargaining.

India/China.

9. The Ambassador said that, along with other countries, Israel had received the Indian appeal for assistance, but that

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL 204

3.

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Distribution

Secretary
A/S Div. IV
" " II
" " I

EAME Branch
UN Branch
S.&SEA Branch

Posts
New York
Tel Aviv
Cairo

Report prepared by L.E. Phillips

CONFIDENTIAL

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CONFIDENTIAL²⁰³

FILE No

DATE 2nd November, 1962.

SUBJECT

CALL OF MR. YUVAL.

FOR the Secretary

In connection with Mr. Yuval's visit today the following notes may be useful:-

1. Palestine Refugees.

.....
A note is attached. Mr. Yuval has said that he would like to discuss current U.N. questions relating to the Middle East.

2. Nomination of Israel Ambassador.

.....
Notice of the Queen's approval of the nomination of Mr. Teshler has not yet been received. (Note attached).

3. Accession of U.A.R. to GATT.

The U.A.R.'s request to accede to the GATT was examined by a Working Party of GATT members, including Australia, between 15th and 19th October, 1962. Mr. Yuval called on 13th September and 3rd October to ask whether Australia would support Israel in the Working Party in questioning the U.A.R. on its boycott of Israel and its closure of the Suez Canal to Israeli goods and shipping. He was told that we could not undertake to do this; that such questions might be better raised in some other forum and that GATT permitted contracting parties to maintain as exceptions certain practices and policies concerning defence and security. The Working Party has recommended to the 20th Session of GATT now meeting in Geneva that accession of U.A.R. be approved, subject to tariff negotiations with Contracting Parties. The Australian representative (Thomson) on the Working Party supported in recommendation but made a statement about Australian dislike of the "secondary boycott" (Arab blacklisting of foreign firms trading with Israel). The Australian GATT Delegation to the 20th Session has been instructed to support Working Party recommendation.

Mr. Yuval may seek our support for a statement on U.A.R. practice at 20th Session. If he does, it is suggested that he be told that we would consider the request, but are unlikely to go further than saying that we do not like boycotts as a weapon of international relations. Reference to the Department of Trade would be needed.

CONFIDENTIAL

202
CONFIDENTIAL

2.

4. Australian Trade Mission to Israel.

The Israeli Government has now agreed to the despatch of a small Australian trade survey mission to Israel early next year. Details and exact dates have yet to be arranged.

5. Shipping between Israel and Australia.

The first sailing in a new Zim Israel Line shipping service between the Israeli port of Eilat and Australian ports has taken place. (M.V. Thorkillund).

J.R. Rowland

(J.R. Rowland)
Acting Assistant Secretary.

CONFIDENTIAL

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

701

File No.....1500/1/35/19.....

Date..2nd..November,..1962..

SUBJECT


NOMINATION OF ISRAEL AMBASSADOR

FOR.....MR. ROWLAND:.....

A note from the Embassy of Israel seeking the consent of Her Majesty The Queen to the appointment of Mr. David Z. Teshar as Israeli Ambassador to Australia, dated 23rd October, 1962, was received in the Department.

2. On 24th October a letter was addressed to the Official Secretary to the Governor General asking that His Excellency submit Mr. Teshar's nomination to the Queen for approval. Notice of this approval has not yet been received.

3. As a matter of interest, appointment by the Israeli Government of Mr. Teshar to this post was reported in the "Jerusalem Post" some time ago. I understand that it has also been reported in a Jewish newspaper in Australia. If this were to be known at the Palace, it could easily result in a rejection of Mr. Teshar on the grounds of discourtesy.



(J. M. McMillan).

Consular and Protocol Branch.

CONFIDENTIAL

200

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PALESTINE REFUGEES

The Ambassador called on Mr Border early last week to discuss this question, which will be considered quite late in the present General Assembly session. The conversation related mainly to proposals which Dr Joseph Johnson (President of the Carnegie Endowment, and Special Representative of the Palestine Conciliation Commission) is reported to be going to make. Newspapers reports, confirmed in broad outline by the State Department, state that these proposals include the following points :-

- (a) appointment of a new United Nations Administrator to carry out the 1948 resolution providing for repatriation or resettlement and compensation of the Arab refugees; the Administrator would ~~conduct~~ present to individual refugees or heads of families a private questionnaire, giving them a non-binding choice between repatriation to Israel, or resettlement elsewhere; Israel would have the right to deny repatriation to individual security risks;
- (b) establishment of voluntary international funds to compensate refugees not returning, to assist integration of those choosing repatriation to Israel, and to make possible hardship payments.

2. The Ambassador told Mr Border that he understood the Arabs had already indicated opposition to the proposals (on the ground that they implied recognition of Israel and did not acknowledge repatriation as a right) and that Israel also found them unacceptable because the questionnaire could only be a farce.

3. We commented to Washington on 20th October (before Mr Yuval's call) that, while we believed that the status quo could not be allowed to continue and that a new approach had to be found, we doubted whether the proposals would be acceptable to either side, instancing, in addition to Mr Yuval's points, doubts about the availability of international contributions on the scale required, Israel's willingness itself to contribute (as Dr Johnson envisaged) unless and until its own claims on the Arabs for Jewish refugee property in the Arab States were satisfied, and Israel's willingness (even apart from security considerations) to countenance a right of repatriation unrestricted as to numbers.

/4. Mr Yuval

CONFIDENTIAL

99
CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

4. Mr Yuval made two other points :-

- (a) no decision had yet been made as to whether Israel should again have its friends submit a draft resolution calling for direct negotiations between the parties; the Brazzaville States, one or two Latins and the Netherlands presented such a resolution last session. Last year, we supported the resolution (which was defeated), but our attitude this year has not been considered. It is not unlikely that Mr Yuval will again be seeking our support for such a resolution;
- (b) the report by the Commissioner-General of U.N.R.W.A. was this year virtually pro-Arab, and lacked constructive proposals; specifically, it should, in his view, have included a proposal that the Host Countries take over from the Agency the present health and education services. Quite apart from obvious unacceptability to the Arabs, one obvious flaw in this is that education is virtually the only present activity by the Agency which goes beyond keeping the refugees alive and has long-term benefits to them.

5. We have had no further word from Washington, nor have Dr Johnson's proposals yet been officially released. We are therefore in no position to formulate a recommendation to the Minister on the precise attitude to be taken to the proposals or on the best way of handling the resolutions which may arise.

Soviet Jewry

6. The Ambassador may also wish to discuss this matter, and the relevant cables are attached. The mid-day A.B.C. news today reported that Mr H.D. White has spoken to the item in the Third Committee, stressing the right of emigration.

CONFIDENTIAL

192

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

MEH

I.27349

FROM:

Dated: 1st November, 1962
1710

Rec'd: 2nd November, 1962
0650

Australian Embassy,
TEL AVIV.

123. RESTRICTED.

Palestine Refugees.

Your savingram 15, paragraph 5.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs told us yesterday that Israel had not yet made up its mind whether to propose again, through its African supporters, direct Arab/Israel negotiation. Decision will depend on likely voting Ø in favour of proposal.

I gave Ø Ø our attitude.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT IMMIGRATION
TREASURY
P.M's

Ø corrupt groups)

2nd November, 1962

SEC A/Ss LA MR.LOOMES UN PAC&AM S&SEA EAF&ME E AF MEØ
INF DL IC C&P

(F) 181/4/1

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

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MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT IMMIGRATION
TREASURY
P.M.'s

(/ Amendments)

2nd November, 1962

⑦ 181/4/1

SEC A/Ss LA MR. LOOMES UN PAC&AM S&SEA EAF&ME E AF ME@
INF DL IC C&P

RESTRICTED
RESTRICTED
RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

196



Embassy,
AUSTRALIAN ~~LEGATION~~
TEL AVIV.

In reply quote No. 230.5
223.3.12

Memorandum No. 407

19th October, 1962.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE : QUESTION OF ARAB REFUGEES

I refer to memorandum 1353 of 8th October, 1962, from the Australian Delegation to the Seventeenth General Assembly to the Department concerning Dr. Johnson's proposals on the Arab Refugee problem.

2. I have not had an opportunity in the last couple of weeks to speak to anyone in the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem about Dr. Johnson's proposals since they were published in outline in the "New York Times" of the 3rd October, 1962. However, it seems here that Israel will formally reject the proposals - it might have already - but only after the Arab States have first done so. As for the proposals themselves, "official sources" in Jerusalem are reported in the Israel press as saying that the Israel Government objects to them on the following (familiar) grounds:-

- (a) a referendum would be a farce as the conditions prevailing in the camps would not permit the refugees to exercise a free choice. The Arab Governments, intent on destroying Israel, would coerce the refugees into opting for return to Israel where they would serve as a fifth column;
- (b) the proposal to appoint a United Nations Administrator to implement the 1948 free choice resolution rests on a number of misconceptions. Unlike the situation in 1948 Israel is a sovereign state member of the United Nations and it is not possible to appoint in Israel a sort of "High Commissioner";
- (c) many of the houses to which the Arab refugees might wish to return no longer exist;
- (d) hundreds of thousands of Jewish refugees have come to Israel since 1948 and their movement, together with the flight of Arab refugees from Israel, should be seen as an exchange of population.

3. Copies of this memorandum have been sent to Washington, Cairo and the Australian Delegation to the Seventeenth General Assembly for their information.

Mr Phillips
For your file
orig on 852/2/10.

J.H.A. HOYLE

(J.H.A. Hoyle)
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

(F)

181/4/1

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper **TIMES.**

File No. **181/4/1**

Published at **LONDON.**

Date **8-4-62**

**Arab League's Leader
To Leave His Post Soon**

Despatch of The Times, London
CAIRO, Sept. 7.—The Secretary General of the Arab League, Abdel Khaliq Hassouna, said yesterday that he would not carry on his duties after his term expired Sept. 15. This, he said, is in accordance with the league's charter.

The charter also stipulates that the league Council cannot be called except by the Secretary General or his assistant. No statement has come from Sayed Nofal of the United Arab Republic or El Dardri Ismail of the Sudan, the two assistant secretaries. It is generally understood that their terms automatically expire also.

The situation as it stands is that after Sept. 15 there will be no officials to convene a meeting of the league Council, which, according to the charter, is the only body able to appoint or reappoint the Secretary General.

Mr. Hassouna will have completed ten years in office. It had been expected that he would be reappointed.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD SAVINGRAM

194

PJ.

0.18987.

Sent: 20th October, 1962.
1900.

TO:

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON. Sav. 295

Repeated:

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK... Sav. 104

Australian High Commission,
OTTAWA...121

Australian High Commission,
LONDON...(for External)Sav. E.A.174

Australian Embassy,
CAIRO... Sav. 28

Australian Legation,
TEL AVIV...Sav. 15

CONFIDENTIAL.

PALESTINE REFUGEES.

Thank you for your savingrams 1046 and 1051.

2. Like State Department we believe that status quo cannot and must not continue indefinitely and that, old approaches having clearly failed, new approach must be found. Respective attitudes of Arabs and Israel are so completely rigid that settlement probably could only be achieved on basis described in first two sentences of paragraph 4 of your 1051. We also agree that Johnson's proposals as summarized by "Washington Post" contain many elements which would have to be included in any possible future settlement. However we doubt whether any of the parties involved (Arabs, major contributors or-least of all - Israel) could even "acquiesce" in the proposals as stated.

3. Following are preliminary comments which may be useful in further discussions with State Department, United States Delegation and Johnson:-

- (a) we assume United Nations Administrator and his Advisory Council would replace Conciliation Commission, would operate independently of U.N.R.W.A. while latter continued, and (since he is to take over duty of carrying out resolution 194(111) would be responsible for compensation aspects as well as repatriation or re-settlement;
- (b) in view of probable composition of Advisory Council voting provisions would require careful study;
- (c) it is doubtful whether answers to questionnaires could be prepared free from pressure and could be kept confidential;

OUTWARD SAVINGRAM

-2-

0.18987.

193

CONFIDENTIAL

- (d) although Arabs might agree to resettlement as an alternative, they would only do so if Israel accepted that refugees had right to repatriation (without upper limit on numbers). On past performance Israel would not do this. Moreover, Israel contends that Arab propaganda has made all refugees potential security risks, and no amount of "United Nations overall surveillance" could prove the contrary, except in individual cases;
- (e) Johnson seems to have in mind international financing (apparently largely voluntary) of assistance for integration (point E), compensation (point F) and hardship payments (point I). Even if P.C.C.'s work on identification and valuation of refugee property makes scale of payments relatively easy to determine, we greatly doubt whether international community (even in interests of ending the problem) would be able or willing to make voluntary contributions of scale required to three funds envisaged. We also suspect that considerable pressure would be required before Israel would contribute, and Israel would probably require some prior satisfaction of its claim on the Arabs for compensation for Jewish refugee property in Arab States.

4. Following are points on United States tactics:-

- (a) as foregoing will indicate, we believe Israel may conclude it has no alternative to rejection of Johnson proposals, and that Arabs will realize that that onus can be left to Israel. Threat to terminate U.N.R.W.A. mandate (which would affect Arabs more than Israel) might therefore not have much effect as means of securing acceptance of Johnson proposals;
- (b) we should like to know on what basis State Department is now talking of twelve months' extension. Hitherto extension has been of three years' duration. Is this a further lever?
- (c) does paragraph 5 of Savingram 1051 mean that U.N.R.W.A. would be reduced to mere channel through which voluntary contributions for maintenance etc. of refugees would be paid to Host Governments and that even this assistance would be phased out? Incidentally Arabs will not readily abandon their contention that refugees are entitled as of right to United Nations assistance, nor will attempt to make them do so easily attain non-aligned support.

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5. Israel Ambassador has not yet approached us in sense of paragraph 6 of your savingram 1051, but has asked to see us next week. Departmentally, we are disinclined to encourage their line this year.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. IMMIGRATION
TREASURY
P.M.

21st October, 1962.

SEC A/S's MR LOOMES LA UN PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA
EAF&ME E AF ME INF DL IC C&P

192
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Washington } Saving - leased line
New York }

Ottawa }
London } Saving
Cairo }
Tel Aviv }

PALESTINE REFUGEES

Thank you for your savingsgrams 1046 and 1051.

2. Like State Department we believe that status *and must not* quo cannot continue indefinitely and that, old approaches having signally failed, new approach must be found. Respective attitude of Arabs and Israel are so completely rigid that settlement probably could only be achieved by tactics described in first two sentences of paragraph 4 of your 1051. We also agree with Palmer that Johnson's proposals as summarized by "Washington Post" contain many elements which would have to be included in any possible future settlement. However we doubt whether any of the parties involved (Arabs, major contributors or-least of all - Israel) could even "acquiesce" in the proposals as stated.

3. Following are preliminary comments which may be useful in further discussions with State Department, United States Delegation and Johnson :-

(a) we assume United Nations Administrator and his Advisory Council would replace Conciliation Commission, would operate independently of U.N.R.W.A. while latter continued, and (since he is to take over duty of carrying out resolution 194(111)) would be responsible for compensation aspects as well as repatriation or resettlement;

(b) particularly in view of probable composition of Advisory Council (voting provisions in which would require very careful study), we doubt whether answers to questionnaires

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CONFIDENTIAL

(F) 181/4/4
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191
CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

- (b) could be prepared free from pressure and could be kept confidential; of twelve months' extension. *Further*
- (c) although Arabs might agree to resettlement as an alternative, they would only do so if Israel accepted that refugees had right to repatriation (without upper limit on numbers). This Israel on past performance would not do. Moreover, Israel contends that Arab propaganda has made all refugees potential security risks, and no amount of "United Nations overall surveillance" could prove the contrary, except in individual cases; *as of*
- (d) Johnson seems to have in mind international financing (apparently largely voluntary) of assistance for integration (point E), [#]compensation (point F) and hardship payments (point I). Even if P.C.C.'s work on identification and valuation of refugee property makes ~~scale~~ *scale* of payments relatively easy to determine, we greatly doubt whether international community (even in interests of ending the problem) would be able or willing to make voluntary contributions of scale required to three funds envisaged. We also suspect that considerable pressure would be required before Israel would contribute, and Israel would probably require some ^{prior} satisfaction of its claim on the Arabs for compensation for Jewish refugee property *in Arab States*

4. Following are points on United States tactics :-
- (a) as foregoing will indicate, we believe Israel may conclude it has no alternative to rejection of Johnson proposals, and that Arabs will realize that that onus can be left to Israel. Accordingly we rather doubt efficacy or relevance of traditional threat that mandate may not be extended if Johnson proposals are rejected; such threat will worry Arabs more than Israel;

CONFIDENTIAL3

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10/10

- 3 -

- (b) we should like to know on what basis State Department is now talking of twelve months' extension. Hitherto extension has been of three years' duration. Is this a further lever?
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189
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DRAFT

Washington } Saving - leased line
New York }

Ottawa }
London } Saving
Cairo }
Tel Aviv }

PALESTINE REFUGEES

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.....2

CONFIDENTIAL

198
CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

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CONFIDENTIAL.....3

187
CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

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CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD SAVINGRAM^{I.25131}

FROM.

DATED 9TH OCTOBER, 1962

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON.

REC'D 11TH OCTOBER, 1962

SAV.1051. SECRET.

COPY AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, OTTAWA,
LONDON, CAIRO, TEL AVIV.

OUR SAVINGRAM 1046 - PALSTINE REFUGEES.

PALMER (UNITED NATIONAL POLITICAL AND SECURITY AFFAIRS
DESK OFFICER) CONFIRMED THE "WASHINGTON POST" SUMMARY OF
JOHNSONS PROPOSALS.

HE CONSIDERED THE PROSPECTS WERE POOR THAT THE COUNTRIES
DIRECTLY INVOLVED WOULD ACCEPT THE PROPOSALS.

THE INITIAL ISRAEL REACTION HAD BEEN UNFAVOURABLE.

THE ARAB COUNTRIES HAD SHOWN A LACK OF ENTHUSIASM, THOUGH SO
FAR THEY HAD NOT REJECTED THEM.

2. SO FAR AS POSSIBLE THE STATE DEPARTMENT WANTED THE
ISSUE KEPT "UNDER WRAPS" AT LEAST UNTIL AFTER UNITED
STATES NOVEMBER ELECTIONS.

UNITED STATES DOMESTIC PROBLEMS ASIDE, THE DEPARTMENT
WOULD DISCOURAGE THE ARABS FROM ASSUMING THAT THE UNITED
STATES WOULD AUTOMATICALLY SUPPORT THE EXTENSION OF UNRWA'S
MANDATE FOR A FURTHER TWELVE MONTHS IF THE JOHNSON PROPOSALS
WERE REJECTED.

THE DEPARTMENT HOPED THAT THIS WOULD ENCOURAGE THE
PARTIES TO EXAMINE THE PROPOSALS SERIOUSLY.

THE DEPARTMENT RECOGNISED THAT THIS UNCERTAINTY WOULD
BE UNSETTLING TO UNRWA BUT CONSIDERED THAT THIS DISADVANTAGE
WAS OUTWEIGHED BY THE FOREGOING.

3. THE DEPARTMENT WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO DETERMINE THE
NEXT STEPS UNTIL IT BECAME CLEAR EITHER THAT THE ARABS
OR THE ISRAELIS OR BOTH HAD REJECTED THE JOHNSON PROPOSALS.

WHATEVER HAPPENED THE UNITED STATES ADMINISTRATION
CONSIDERED THE STATUS QUO COULD NOT CONTINUE INDEFINITELY,
PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF GROWING CONGRESSIONAL IMPATIENCE OVER
PROVIDING FUNDS FOR UNRWA, A NEW APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM WOULD
HAVE TO BE FOUND.

4. THE DEPARTMENT AGREED IN PRINCIPLE WITH JOHNSON'S VIEW
THAT NO SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATED BETWEEN THE PARTIES WAS
POSSIBLE.

THE BEST HOPE FOR A SOLUTION LAY IN MAKING PROPOSALS
IN WHICH BOTH SIDES WOULD ACQUIESCE.

MANY OF THE POINTS OUTLINED BY JOHNSON WERE ESSENTIAL
IN ANY POSSIBLE FUTURE AGREEMENT.

5. IF THE ARABS AND ISRAEL BOTH OR THE ARABS ALONE
REJECTED THE JOHNSON PROPOSALS DEPARTMENT WOULD PROBABLY
SUPPORT THE PROVISION OF MORE INTERNATIONAL RELIEF BUT ON
TERMS DIFFERENT IN SOME ASPECTS FROM THOSE IN UNRWA'S MANDATE.

THE DEPARTMENT MIGHT TRY TO DISENGAGE UNRWA FROM THE
ACTUAL TASK OF LOOKING AFTER THE REFUGEES AND PASS THIS PROBLEM
ON TO THE ARAB COUNTRIES INVOLVED.

FURTHER THE DEPARTMENT WOULD TRY TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE
PALESTINE REFUGEES WERE NOT AUTOMATICALLY ENTITLED TO U.N.
ASSISTANCE AS OF RIGHT.

...2/

File 181/4/4

MT

- 2 -

I.25131

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

PALMER DID NOT ATTEMPT TO PREDICT DEPARTMENT'S POSITION
IF ISRAEL ALONE REJECTED THE PROPOSALS.

6. PALMER ENQUIRED WHETHER ISRAEL HAD APPROACHED AUSTRALIA
FOR SUPPORT FOR THE ISRAELI RESOLUTION CALLING FOR DIRECT
NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
WE WOULD APPRECIATE ADVICE.

7. PALMER SAID THAT JOHNSON WOULD BE WILLING TO BRIEF OUR
U.N. DELEGATION ON THE PROGRESS OF HIS PROPOSALS.

MIN & DEPT E.A.
MIN & DEPT IMMIGRATION
A.G.'s DEPT
TREASURY
P.M.'s

15TH OCTOBER, 1962

SEC A/S's LA MR LOOMES UN@ PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA EAF&ME
E AF ME INF DL IC
NEW DELHI PARIS ROME WELLINGTON KARACHI COLOMBO

COPY

184
OF LETTER FROM
AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
750 THIRD AVENUE
NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

RESTRICTED

8th October 1962

File No. 210/1/2

Memorandum No. 1353

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra.Special Political Committee - Question
of Arab Refugees.

We have had talks recently with United States delegation and with Dr. J. E. Johnson, the special representative of the Palestine Conciliation Commission on the question of Arab refugees. On 3rd October 1962 the New York Times also published a report about Dr. Johnson's proposals which, we understand, is authoritative.

2. From our discussions and from the New York Times article, we understand that Dr. Johnson will be including in his report a proposal which will enable refugees to express their preferences for a return to their homes, now in Israel, to go to new sites in Israel or to accept resettlement in Arab countries or elsewhere. Dr. Johnson's proposals would permit the refugees to express their preferences privately and it would allow Israel to reject individual Arabs on Security grounds.
3. Israel would be expected to compensate the Arabs for lost property such as farms and homes but would receive unspecified outside assistance. The United Nations would assist the integration of the Arabs in Israel through a special fund made up of voluntary contributions. The United Nations would also attempt to assist refugees requesting resettlement in Arab lands or in other countries.
4. Another of Dr. Johnson's proposals is for the establishment of a new administrator and an advisory council to work on the solution of the refugee problem. Such a council would include representatives of Israel, the U.A.R., Syria, Jordan and Lebanon.
5. The Johnson report will not be available until well on into November as the proposals embodied in it are still under discussion between Arab and Israel representatives and Dr. Johnson. Moreover, the United States does not want the item taken in the Special Political Committee until late in November, (that is after the American elections) at the earliest. They would prefer to have it taken last in the Special Political Committee if possible, although the Arabs will probably want it taken earlier and the British would prefer to have the question of QMAN taken last.
6. Observers in the United Nations generally expect that both the Arab and the Israelis will find objections to Dr. Johnson's latest proposals, if they finally emerge. On the other hand, our U.S. delegation informant says that the United States will not support the alternative again being canvassed by the Israelis, i.e. a call on both parties to proceed to direct negotiations.

EAME

copy for spec
file. Original on 852/12/10.R.H.
17/10.

RW/ft

C.C. Washington
C.C. Canberra

For Delegation

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD SAVINGRAM 183.

TM.

SENT . 8TH OCTOBER, 1962.
REC'D. 11TH OCTOBER, 1962.

FROM.

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON.

SAV.1046 UNCLASSIFIED.

COPY AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS NEW YORK, OTTAWA
LONDON, CAIRO, TEL AVIV.

OUR SAVINGRAM 770 - PALESTINE REFUGEES.

"WASHINGTON POST" ON 2ND OCTOBER CONTAINED FOLLOWING
SUMMARY OF PROPOSALS SAID TO HAVE BEEN COMPLETED BY U N
SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE JOSEPH E JOHNSON-
BEGINS.-

(A) APPOINTMENT OF A NEW U N ADMINISTRATOR AND STAFF
CHARGED WITH THE DUTY OF CARRYING OUT THE 1948 U N ASSEMBLY
RESOLUTION FOR REPATRIATION OR RESETTLEMENT OF THE RE-
FUGEES.

(B) INDIVIDUAL REFUGEES AND HEADS OF FAMILIES TO BE GIVEN
CONFIDENTIAL QUESTIONNAIRES.

THEY WOULD MAKE A "PRELIMINARY" CHOICE, KEEPING THE
RIGHT TO CHANGE THEIR MINDS LATER.

POSSIBLE CHOICES WOULD INCLUDE RETURN TO FORMER PRO-
PERTY IN ISRAEL., RETURN TO ALTERNATIVE LOCATIONS IN ISRAEL.,
RESETTLEMENT IN ARAB COUNTRIES., RESETTLEMENT ELSEWHERE
IN THE WORLD.

(C) U N AGENTS TO CONSULT ISRAEL ON POSSIBILITIES FOR
REPATRIATION AND ARAB AND OTHER COUNTRIES SPECIFIED IN
THE PRELIMINARY QUESTIONNAIRES REGARDING RESETTLEMENT.

(D) ISRAEL TO BE ASKED NOT TO SET A MAXIMUM
NUMBER OF RETURNING ARABS IT WOULD ADMIT.

HOWEVER ISRAEL WOULD RETAIN THE RIGHT TO REJECT
INDIVIDUAL ARABS AS SECURITY RISKS, SUBJECT TO U N OVER-
ALL SURVEILLANCE AND REVIEW.

(E) A SPECIAL U N FUND CONSISTING OF VOLUNTARY CONTRI-
BUTIONS FROM GOVERNMENTS AND THE WORLD PUBLIC TO BE SET UP
TO HELP THE REFUGEES BECOME INTEGRATED.

ISRAEL WOULD BE EXPECTED TO MAKE A SUBSTANTIAL CON-
TRIBUTION TO THE FUND.

(F) ISRAEL, WITH HELP FROM THE U N AND FRIENDS, MAINLY
THE UNITED STATES, WOULD BE REQUIRED TO PAY INDENTITIES TO
ARABS WHO LOST PROPERTY IN ISRAEL.

(G) EXPENSES OF THE U N ADMINISTRATOR AND AGENTS TO GO
INTO THE REGULAR U N BUDGET, ASSESSED AGAINST ALL U N
MEMBER COUNTRIES (INCLUDING COMMUNIST AND ARAB COUNTRIES
WHICH HAVE NOT PAID CASH FOR THE U N RELIEF PROGRAM IN THE
PAST).

(H) THE U N AGENTS WOULD BE "CO-ORDINATORS" AND "CATALYSTS"
WITH THE RESPONSIBILITY TO INFORM THE INDIV-
IDUAL REFUGEES AND SEE THAT THEY UNDERSTAND AND OBTAIN THE
OPPORTUNITIES.

ILLITERATES, FOR EXAMPLE, WOULD GET SPECIAL HELP.

(I) ALL REFUGEES TO BE ENTITLED TO A U N FUND INDEMNITY
COVERING THE HARDSHIPS UNDERGONE BY THEM (SOMETHING LIKE
A VETERANS BONUS.)

INWARD SAVINGRAM
(2).

I.25138.

(J) THE ARAB HOST GOVERNMENTS (UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC, SYRIA, JORDAN AND LEBANON) AND ISRAEL TO BE INVITED TO NAME REPRESENTATIVES TO A COUNCIL OF ADVISERS TO THE U N ADMINISTRATOR.

THESE COUNTRIES SIGNED THE 1949 ARMISTICE PACTS.

(K) ALTHOUGH REFUGEES WOULD INDICATE PREFERENCES ON THE QUESTIONNAIRES, THEY WOULD BE TOLD FROM THE START THAT THEY WOULD NOT NECESSARILY GET THEIR FIRST CHOICE.

(L) GOOD WILL AND COOPERATION BY THE ARAB GOVERNMENTS ISRAEL, THE REFUGEES, AND OTHER U N MEMBERS WOULD BE REQUIRED TO MAKE THE PLAN WORK.

MIN & DEPT EA
MIN & DEPT IMMIGRATION

SEC A/SS LA MR LOOMES UNG PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SAR&ME
E AF ME INF IC C&P

MID-EAST trends and events

A Newsletter from "The Jerusalem Post," P.O.B. 91, Jerusalem, Israel

Number 5

SEPTEMBER 1962

In this Issue:

Pages 1 - 5

AN ANALYSIS OF
ARAB REFUGEE POLICY
WITH REGARD TO
THE INTERNAL SECURITY
OF THE HOST COUNTRIES

Pages 6 - 10

DIARY OF EVENTS

Mr Phillips

(F)

181/4/4

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180

AN ANALYSIS OF ARAB REFUGEE POLICY
WITH REGARD TO
THE INTERNAL SECURITY OF THE HOST COUNTRIES

On July 7, 1962, the Arab Higher Committee issued a statement directed to the Palestine refugees in all host countries. It read, in part:

"The Committee repeats its appeal to all Palestinians to desist from intervening in the local and political affairs of the countries in which they are presently residing, and to refrain from intervening in the quarrels between the Arab States... The Committee calls upon the Palestinians to cooperate closely with the responsible authorities in order to promote the national security of their host countries."

This statement throws light upon a situation within Arab States which appears to be a side-product of the overall Arab policy aimed against Israel with regard to the Palestine refugees.

For fourteen years now, that policy has sought to keep the Palestine refugee problem alive, mainly by thwarting measures which could lead to the constructive integration of the refugees into their host communities. Inevitably, the price in human terms has been high; in a certain sense, and for reasons which are paradoxical, it has also proved costly to the internal political well-being of at least some of the host countries. For in order to maintain the abnormal status of the refugees—which is the underlying implication of present Arab policy—the Governments involved have had to resort to diverse discriminatory practices, which have had the calculated effect of making integration difficult, if not impossible. By keeping the refugees a community apart, and by discriminating against them politically, socially and economically the Arab Governments have themselves nurtured in their midst a large unstable element, so unstable as, at times,

to imperil the viability of their regimes. Mainly confined in camps, compelled for the most part to lead unproductive lives, feeling unwanted and resenting their status, the Palestine refugee communities have, in many areas, provided fruitful breeding grounds for extremist nationalist sentiment and subversive adventurism.

The Status of the Refugees in the Different Host Countries

Only in Jordan have the refugees been granted citizenship rights—and yet discrimination in favour of the indigenous Trans-Jordan population is still said to persist. One oft-heard grievance of the local Palestinians and the refugees is that the Government is neglecting the development of the annexed Western bank while promoting that of the Eastern territory. More significant is that though the Palestinians, together with the refugees, constitute two-thirds of the total population, the administration is predominantly in the hands of the Jordanians. No more than fifty percent of the seats in Parliament are controlled by the Palestinians.

The position of the refugees in Lebanon (138,000 according to UNRWA) is undoubtedly partly dictated by the peculiar and tenuous balance of the country's communal structure—90 percent of the refugees being of Muslim origin. Regarded as foreigners, the refugees enjoy no citizenship rights and their movements are subject to strict control. (Following the abortive revolt in Lebanon instigated by the National Syrian Party at the end of last year, a report appeared in the Lebanese daily "Al Hayat" of 9 January, 1962, of a decision of the authorities to arrest all refugees found outside the confines of the camps.) Employment without a work permit is illegal and refugees are obliged to carry special identity cards. They are forbidden to change their place of residence without authority and may be forcibly shifted to other areas on grounds of national security. Speaking at a press conference recently, the Lebanese Minister of the Interior, Mr. Kamal

Jumblatt, reported that at least 40,000 refugees had entered the country illegally and that it was the Government's intention to deport all those apprehended.

Syria's 117,000 refugees are on a fairly high economic level compared with those in other host countries, primarily because of the increased labour opportunities which the Syrian economy provides. Yet in other respects they suffer much the same restrictions as their compatriots in Lebanon. These include such controls as registration of assets, limitation of property rights and movement restrictions.

Concentrated for the most part in the Gaza Strip, the 260,000 refugees under Egyptian rule possess no citizenship rights and, as elsewhere, are subject to a variety of restraints. They cannot travel to Egypt without a permit from the local military governor, such permission being generally hard to get. "Al-Ahram", the semi-official Egyptian daily, reported on May 11 1962 that Egypt had, at long last, rescinded the directive obliging Palestine refugees living in Egypt (there are some few thousands) to carry work permits. Observers have pointed out that Egypt could afford this somewhat belated gesture because of the small number of refugees residing in the country proper, while movement from the Gaza Strip to Egypt remains subject to strict control.

Propaganda Among the Refugees

The refugee issue is a common theme of inter-Arab competitive propaganda, Radios Cairo, Amman, Beirut, Damascus and Baghdad all broadcasting special refugee programmes. Judging by their often vitriolic content and general tone of mutual recrimination, these programmes must add their share to the mood of discontent prevailing among so many of the refugees. A recurring Egyptian propaganda theme is that the "reactionary

regimes"—usually a pseudonym for the Kingdom of Jordan—are betraying the refugees by working to eliminate the problem as a whole. In return, Egypt is accused by virtually all the other Arab propaganda services, particularly those of Jordan and more recently of Syria, of exploiting the refugee problem to further her own expansionist designs by inciting the refugees to acts of subversion against their host Governments.

The Extent of Subversion

In truth, provoking refugees to subversion is not an Egyptian monopoly. Jordanian agents have been known to operate in the Gaza Strip and Syrian agents among the refugees of Lebanon. Thus, for example, Cairo Radio, in April 1958, charged the existence of a plot against Egypt centred in Gaza and involving local refugees suborned by Jordanian agents. As recently as February 1962, Egyptian sources again claimed that they had uncovered a Jordan-inspired anti-Egyptian plot to be carried out by refugees in Gaza. The unsuccessful coup d'état of the National Syrian Party in Lebanon in 1961 was likewise allegedly supported by Arab refugees encouraged by outside agents. Yet most observers agree that these incidents cannot compare in extent or effectiveness with the scale of the Egyptian operations. Indeed, it would appear from the record that refugee subversion constitutes a foremost component of the Egyptian campaigns supposedly designed to undermine the security of regimes hostile to President Nasser. One may refer to the role played by refugee elements in every major pro-Nasser upheaval which has occurred in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria in recent years.

In Jordan, Palestine refugees took a leading part in the 1955 pro-Egyptian riots which resulted in Jordan's abstention from the Baghdad Pact. Again in 1957, they were said to be largely responsible for the

attempted overthrow of the Hussein regime. In 1958, Lebanon accused Egypt of having incited local refugees to acts of subversion during the pro-Egyptian riots in Beirut and elsewhere. And in Syria, in the wake of the break-up of the United Arab Republic, Palestine refugees played an active role in the ensuing pro-Nasser disturbances, again, it is claimed, with Egyptian encouragement.

The Location of Refugee Concentrations

A factor of significance in evaluating the efficacy of the refugees as instruments of subversion is that of location. In this respect Egypt enjoys a decided advantage. For, whereas Egypt's refugees are mostly isolated in the Gaza Strip, those residing in Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon are chiefly concentrated in or near the capital cities and other major towns. It is this proximity to the national nerve centres which has made host Governments so sensitive to refugee tensions. Thus, of the 205,000 residents of Amman, no less than 134,000 are refugees living in the city or in camps on its periphery. Damascus, which has a population of 455,000, houses 77,500 refugees, that is, seventeen percent of the citizenry. Beirut's refugee population is officially placed at some 30,000—six percent of the city's residents; in fact, however, the real figure is probably closer to twenty percent in view of the large number of refugees who entered the country illegally.

* * *

DIARY OF EVENTS

August 7

August 1

A broadcast over Cairo Radio calls upon the Syrian Army to revolt in face of the "deteriorating situation" in Syria.

August 7

August 1

The Shah of Persia returns to Teheran after a six-day visit to Afghanistan and Pakistan following attempted mediation in their border dispute.

August 7

August 2

The British Government announces final settlement with Egypt for British property seized after the 1956 Suez conflict.

August 7

August 4

The U.S. signs an agreement in Cairo under which Egypt is to receive £E21 m. from the proceeds of U.S. surplus agricultural products.

August 7

August 5

Syrian Premier Bashir Azmeh confirms that Iraq has massed troops on Syria's eastern frontier to "join in repelling any anti-Syrian aggression".

August 7

August 6

Moroccan security services announce that three "Palestinian terrorists" have been arrested, suspected of planning to assassinate King Hussein when he visited Tangier on July 27.

August 7

Premier Wasfi a-Tal of Jordan announces that a Jordanian in the pay of the Egyptian intelligence had led the abortive plot to assassinate King Hussein in Tangier. . . . by surrounding countries.

August 7

General Abdul Karim Zahr e-Din, Syrian Commander-in-Chief, calls for a joint Arab naval striking force to "strangle Israel".

August 8

The new Prime Minister of Persia, Mr. Assadollah Alam, declares that Persia wants to have the best relations with the Soviet Union. . . . of Premier Kassein's troops.

August 9

The Lebanese Foreign Minister, Mr. Philip Takla, in a statement in Parliament, appeals to Arab countries to refrain from involving Lebanon in their differences and not to try and impose moral and material pressure upon her. . . . and to define the responsibilities of the reform.

August 11

The Kenya Minister of Labour, Mr. Tom Mboya, arrives in Israel on a brief visit for talks on the implementation of technical aid plans. . . . tour of West African countries.

August 15

Iraqi Mig jet fighters bomb and machine-gun a Turkish gendarme frontier post and a nearby village. Two gendarmes were reported killed and homes in the village set on fire.

August 15

Prime Minister Ben-Gurion declares that Israel continues to seek peace but warns that she would speedily carry war into enemy territory in the event of an attack by surrounding countries.

August 16

Algeria is elected a full member of the Arab League by unanimous vote. Algeria becomes the League's 13th member.

August 16

According to reports from Beirut, rebel Kurds are said to have consolidated control of northern Iraq, having surrounded two regiments of Premier Kassem's troops.

August 16

Emir Talal ben Abdul Aziz, half-brother of King Saud of Saudi Arabia, calls for the setting up of constitutional government "to protect the rights of individuals and to define the responsibilities of the rulers".

August 18

President and Mrs. Ben-Zvi return to Israel after an 18-day State tour of West African countries.

August 18

An Iraq Government spokesman charges Turkey with assisting Kurdish rebels.

August 18

Jordan Premier Wasfi a-Tal reveals that investigations were going on into two Nasserist plots to assassinate him and other Jordanian personalities in Amman.

August 20

Mr. Ben-Gurion leaves for Stockholm, the first stop on his month-long official tour of North European countries.

August 20

Damascus Radio reports the smashing of a 30-member Egyptian-paid sabotage gang.

August 22

The Arab League Council's special meeting to consider a Syrian complaint against Egypt opens at Shtura, Lebanon. Agreement is reached to hold the talks in secret.

August 26

The Arab News Agency reports from Cairo that the forthcoming Arab League Council in preparation for the U.N. General Assembly will instruct all Arab delegations to oppose the Johnson report on Arab refugees.

August 27

Syrian sources report that the Syrian delegation at the Arab League Council meeting at Shtura has threatened to take its case to the U.N. if the Arab League fails to condemn Egypt for interfering in her internal affairs.

* 10 *

August 27

King Hussein of Jordan, paying a visit to Saudi Arabia, holds talks with King Saud. The Jordanian King was accompanied by his Prime Minister, Wasfi a-Tal.

August 28

Egypt walks out of the Arab League Council's meeting at Shtura, demanding that the League openly condemns Syrian attacks against Cairo. The Egyptian delegation reportedly issued an ultimatum that unless the attacks cease, Egypt will quit the Arab League.

August 29

King Hussein of Jordan and King Saud of Saudi Arabia jointly announce an extensive plan for mutual cooperation between the two countries. The two countries will set up a joint military command for "outright unity", it was stated.

* * *

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD SAVINGRAM

170

SRG

I. 17996

DATED. 23RD JULY, 1962.

FROM.

REC'D. 24TH JULY, 1962.

VIA (L/L)

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON.

SAV. 770.

SECRET.

COPIES TO U.N. NEW YORK AND LONDON.

CLEVELAND'S TALKS IN LONDON:

SISCO (U.N. AFFAIRS) HAS GIVEN US FOLLOWING ACCOUNT OF CLEVELAND'S AND HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH BRITISH AND N.A.T.O. AND CONCLUSIONS AND LINES OF POLICY ARISING THEREFROM.

SOME OF THIS HAS ALREADY BEEN REPORTED BY LONDON AND U.N. NEW YORK.

SISCO ASKED THAT WE TREAT THE INFORMATION WITH PARTICULAR CARE, ESPECIALLY THE CRITICISMS OF BRITISH ATTITUDES AND REVELATIONS OF BRITISH POSITIONS ON THE VARIOUS SUBJECTS - UNLESS BRITAIN ITSELF INDEPENDENTLY REVEALED THIS TO US.

2. SISCO WAS CONFIDENT THAT THE U.S. POLICY HEREAFTER WOULD BE TO PARTICIPATE ENERGETICALLY IN ALL U.N. PROCEEDINGS AND WORK VIGOROUSLY AND OPENLY AGAINST ALL IRRESPONSIBLE PROPOSALS (PARAGRAPH 3B OF LONDON'S 3490).

HE CONCEDED THAT PREVIOUSLY USA HAD GENERALLY BEEN CONTENT, AT LEAST ON COLONIAL ISSUES, TO LET AFRO/ASIANS BLOW OFF STEAM.

HOWEVER THE DAMAGE BEING DONE BY RESULTANT IRRESPONSIBLE DECISIONS TAKEN IN U.N. COULD NO LONGER BE IGNORED.

ACCORDINGLY U.S. POLICY HAD ALREADY BECOME ONE OF PARTICIPATION AND LEADERSHIP, AN EXAMPLE OF THIS BEING IN THE CASE OF RUANDA URUNDI WHERE USA HAD TAKEN A POSITION SO FAR IN ADVANCE OF ANY AFRO/ASIAN OR EVEN BELGIAN INITIATIVE.

3. SISCO SAID THAT CLEVELAND AND HE HAD CONCLUDED THAT THERE WAS NOW MORE UNEASE IN BRITAIN ABOUT U.N. THAN HERETOFORE, THIS ARISING FROM DIFFICULTIES WITHIN CONSERVATIVE PARTY, INSCRIPTION OF RHODESIA AND GENERAL FEAR OF FURTHER MEDDLING IN BRITISH COLONIAL QUESTIONS.

HOWEVER BRITISH POLICY APPEARED TO LACK DRIVE IN RESPECT OF U.N. THERE HAD BEEN EVIDENCE AT SIXTEENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF "STARGLASS" APPROACH AND ALMOST COMPLETE ABSENCE OF ANY IDEAS ON HOW TO COPE WITH THE VARIOUS PROBLEMS ARISING, PARTICULARLY THE COLONIAL.

DURING THE LONDON DISCUSSIONS THE COLONIAL OFFICE HAD ADOPTED A MORE VIGOROUS, FLEXIBLE AND CONSTRUCTIVE ATTITUDE THAN THE FOREIGN OFFICE.

AT THE SAME TIME DISCUSSIONS IN LONDON HAD REVEALED THAT BRITISH WERE MOST ANXIOUS TO CO-OPERATE IN IMPROVING WORKINGS

169

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD SAVINGRAM

SRG

I. 17996

- 2 -

OF U.N. AND WESTERN POSITION THEREIN, AND WERE MOST APPRECIATIVE OF ASSISTANCE GIVEN BY USA ON COLONIAL ISSUES.

BRITISH AGREED WITH U.S. BELIEF THAT IF THE WEST COULD GET OVER THE NEXT 5- OR 6-YEAR HUMP, ITS POSITION IN U.N. WOULD BE MUCH EASIER.

DISARMAMENT:

4. ON QUESTION OF PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES BOTH SIDES HAD AGREED THAT THEY SHOULD TRY TO DEFINE LIMITS BEYOND WHICH THEY MUST SEEK TO MUSTER A BLOCKING THIRD.

THE DISARRAY IN THE WESTERN CAMP WHICH HAD BEEN APPARENT IN LAST SESSION COULD NOT BE TOLERATED IN THE FUTURE.

SISCO SAID STATE DEPARTMENT WAS PREPARING TWO BASIC PAPERS ON -

(A) IDENTIFICATION OF HOW AND IN WHAT FORMS NUCLEAR PROBLEMS COULD BE EXPECTED TO COME UP IN U.N., AND

(B) WHERE THE LIMITS TO IRRESPONSIBLE INITIATIVES SHOULD BE DRAWN IN RESPECT OF GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT, PROLIFERATION, NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES, PROHIBITION, TESTING, AND OUTER SPACE.

PEACE-KEEPING MACHINERY:

5. THE TWO SIDES HAD AGREED THAT SCANDINAVIANS SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO GIVE LEAD WHERE POSSIBLE, IT BEING UNDERSTOOD THAT ONLY MODEST STEPS, NOT DRAMATIC CHANGES, WOULD BE TAKEN, AND THEN ONLY AFTER DISCUSSION WITH SECRETARY-GENERAL.

COLONIAL PROBLEMS:

6. SISCO CONSIDERED THAT BRITISH POLICIES HAD BEEN SLOWLY ADJUSTING TO CHANGED INTERNATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND THAT UP TO A YEAR OR TWO AGO THIS CHANGE HAD BEEN ADEQUATE.

NOW HOWEVER IT WAS NOT PROCEEDING QUICKLY ENOUGH: IN OTHER WORDS, THE BRITISH DE-COLONIALISATION POLICY WAS NOT OPERATING, OR COULD NOT OPERATE, QUICKLY ENOUGH IN RESPECT OF PROBLEM CHILDREN, SUCH AS RHODESIA, TO KEEP BRITAIN AHEAD OF INTERNATIONAL ANTI-COLONIAL PRESSURES.

CLEVELAND AND HE HAD THEREFORE SOUGHT TO ENCOURAGE BRITISH OFFICIALS TO FOCUS ON PROBLEM OF HOW TO HANDLE REMAINING COLONIAL PROBLEMS IN U.N. AND HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT IF BRITAIN WOULD SPECIFY ITS AIMS AND OBJECTIVES THIS WOULD ENABLE USA TO AFFORD THE MOST EFFECTIVE HELP.

SISCO SAID HE WAS NOW AWAITING PRECISE INFORMATION FROM BRITISH OFFICIALS IN RESPECT OF THEIR VARIOUS COLONIAL "PROBLEM CHILDREN."

7. QUESTION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST, FOR INSTANCE, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AFRICA HAD BEEN DISCUSSED, BOTH SIDES BEING VERY CONCERNED.

BRITISH HAD INDICATED THEY WOULD OPPOSE SANCTIONS IN RESPECT OF BOTH PRACTICALITY AND OF PRINCIPLE, BUT U.S. OPPOSITION WOULD BE BASED ON CONSIDERATIONS OF PRACTICALITY.

BOTH SIDES HAD AGREED THAT TO COUNTER SUCH INITIATIVES MUCH MORE VIGOROUS LOBBYING WAS NECESSARY PARTICULARLY WITH

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INWARD SAVINGRAM

SRG

I. 17996

- 3 -

LATIN-AMERICANS, AND CLEVELAND HAD CHIDED BRITISH POLITELY BUT FIRMLY ABOUT LACK OF GOOD LOBBYISTS AND IN PARTICULAR LACK OF ANY SPANISH-SPEAKING OFFICER IN BRITISH MISSION IN NEW YORK.

ARAB-ISRAELI PROBLEM:

8. THERE HAD BEEN DETAILED DISCUSSION AND IT WAS RECOGNISED THE ISSUE COULD BECOME A MAJOR ONE AT FORTHCOMING ASSEMBLY BECAUSE OF SUCH QUESTIONS AS JORDAN WATERS, FRONTIER INCIDENTS, AND CONFLICT BETWEEN DEMANDS AND WHAT WAS PRACTICABLE IN RESPECT OF REFUGEES.

ON QUESTION OF REFUGEES SISCO TOLD US THAT JOHNSON WAS PRESENTLY REFINING CERTAIN PROPOSALS RELATING PARTICULARLY TO RESPONSIBILITY AND TO REPATRIATION AND RESETTLEMENT.

WHEN THESE WERE COMPLETED MATTER WOULD PROBABLY BE SUBMITTED TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY FOR DECISION WHETHER THE PROPOSALS SHOULD BE PUT TO ARABS AND TO ISRAEL.

IF PRESIDENT DECIDED AFFIRMATIVELY JOHNSON WOULD PROBABLY PUT THEM TO THE TWO PARTIES. THIS COULD OCCUR WITHIN A WEEK.

MUCH WOULD THEN DEPEND ON REACTIONS OF THE TWO PARTIES. IF THERE WAS A STRONG NEGATIVE REACTION MATTER WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO BE RE-SUBMITTED TO PRESIDENT FOR DECISION ON WHETHER THE PROPOSALS SHOULD BE SUBMITTED IN GENERAL ASSEMBLY NOTWITHSTANDING. BUT SISCO THOUGHT PRESIDENT WOULD PROBABLY DECIDE AGAINST SUCH INITIATIVE, IN WHICH CASE WEST WOULD STILL HAVE TO DEVISE MEANS OF EXERCISING SOME CONTROL OVER THE ISSUE IN SEVENTEENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

SECRETARY-GENERAL:

9. BOTH SIDES HAD FAVOURED U THANT'S ELECTION BUT AGREED THAT HE SHOULD NOT BECOME A WESTERN CANDIDATE.

SECURITY COUNCIL:

10. BOTH SIDES HAD GIVEN BLESSING TO NORWAY-ARAB DEAL AS A MEANS OF PRESERVING EUROPEAN SEAT.

SISCO TOLD US THAT NOTWITHSTANDING THIS STATE DEPARTMENT TENDED TO THE VIEW THAT, BECAUSE OF NIGERIA'S EFFORTS FOR PERMANENT BLACK AFRICAN REPRESENTATION IN A NON-PERMANENT SEAT ON SECURITY COUNCIL, NORWEGIAN CANDIDACY COULD ONLY SUCCEED IF SOME UNDERSTANDING COULD BE REACHED THAT HEREFTER THERE WOULD ALWAYS BE A BLACK AFRICAN ON THE COUNCIL.

SISCO OUTLINED IMPLICATIONS OF THIS FOR THE COMMONWEALTH SEAT ALONG LINES OF LONDON'S 3493.

CHINESE REPRESENTATION:

11. BRITISH HAD AGREED TO SUPPORT USA FULLY. BOTH SIDES HAD AGREED THAT THE WEST WAS IN GOOD SHAPE THIS YEAR.

FINANCES:

12. BOTH SIDES HAD EXPRESSED CONCERN. ALTHOUGH THEY HAD NOT REACHED ANY CONCLUSIONS ON HOW ADEQUATE FINANCE COULD BE

....4

167

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD SAVINGRAM

SRG

I. 17996

- 4 -

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD SAVINGRAM

SRG

I. 17996

- 5 -

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MIN. & DEPT E.A.

24TH JULY, 1962

SEC A/S's MR LOOMES UNQ ER PAC&AM EA AM&SP S&SEA SA SEA
EAF&ME E AF ME INF DL MT IC C&P

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

GS

I.19041

Sent: 3rd August, 1962
1535

FROM:

Rec'd: 4th August, 1962
0500

Australian High Commission,
KARACHI.

296. CONFIDENTIAL.

Repeated Saving Washington 30, New York 6, New
Delhi 53, London 58.

U.N.G.A. XVII.

Reference your telegram 216.

Ministry of External Affairs expressed their
gratitude when I advised support for Zafrullah. They remain
cagey about Kashmir but have indicated no decision regarding
inscription (or, it seems, the next step generally) likely
till end of the month.

2. Reference your Savingsram 33 on briefing, we cannot
arrange discussions at most senior levels till next week.
Following emerges from our discussions and assessment -

- (i) Subject to decision on Kashmir, no new departures
or initiatives apart from greater measure of
support for Arabs on other issues (in particular
Oman and Palestine refugees).
- (ii) West New Guinea - Pakistanis expect issue to be
tidied up before Assembly meets.
- (iii) Disarmament - inability here to keep abreast and
no departure from Ayub's stand at Prime Ministers'
Meeting London 1961.
- (iv) China's support for Communist China's case will be
re-affirmed with probably warmer overtones in view
of recent developments.
- (v) Secretary-General - Pakistan will support U Thant
but no thought given to problem if Soviet veto.
- (vi) Trusteeship say Pakistan prepared to be helpful
within limits of Afro-Asian Membership. For
political reasons prefer to abstain even when
legally they would support and for two-thirds
majority on voting. See little use in truncated
Trusteeship Council. Accept that Committee of
Seventeen has emerged as the most important body
in "Colonial" field.

Marshall.

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(F) 181/4/4

165
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD SAVINGRAM

SRG

I. 17996

DATED. 23RD JULY, 1962.

FROM.

REC'D. 24TH JULY, 1962.

VIA (L/L)

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON.

SAV. 770.

SECRET.

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*Mr. Kelly's R. W. Cunningham - Re per
Re para 8. L. am*

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(F) 181/4/4.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD SAVINGRAM

163

SRG

I. 17996

- 2 -

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD SAVINGRAM

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- 3 -

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IF THERE WAS A STRONG NEGATIVE REACTION MATTER WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO BE RE-SUBMITTED TO PRESIDENT FOR DECISION ON WHETHER THE PROPOSALS SHOULD BE SUBMITTED IN GENERAL ASSEMBLY NOTWITHSTANDING, BUT SISCO THOUGHT PRESIDENT WOULD PROBABLY DECIDE AGAINST SUCH INITIATIVE, IN WHICH CASE WEST WOULD STILL HAVE TO DEVISE MEANS OF EXERCISING SOME CONTROL OVER THE ISSUE IN SEVENTEENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

SECRETARY-GENERAL:

9. BOTH SIDES HAD FAVOURED U THANT'S ELECTION BUT AGREED THAT HE SHOULD NOT BECOME A WESTERN CANDIDATE.

SECURITY COUNCIL:

10. BOTH SIDES HAD GIVEN BLESSING TO NORWAY-ARAB DEAL AS A MEANS OF PRESERVING EUROPEAN SEAT.

SISCO TOLD US THAT NOTWITHSTANDING THIS STATE DEPARTMENT TENDED TO THE VIEW THAT, BECAUSE OF NIGERIA'S EFFORTS FOR PERMANENT BLACK AFRICAN REPRESENTATION IN A NON-PERMANENT SEAT ON SECURITY COUNCIL, NORWEGIAN CANDIDACY COULD ONLY SUCCEED IF SOME UNDERSTANDING COULD BE REACHED THAT HEREAFTER THERE WOULD ALWAYS BE A BLACK AFRICAN ON THE COUNCIL.

SISCO OUTLINED IMPLICATIONS OF THIS FOR THE COMMONWEALTH SEAT ALONG LINES OF LONDON'S 3493.

CHINESE REPRESENTATION:

11. BRITISH HAD AGREED TO SUPPORT USA FULLY, BOTH SIDES HAD AGREED THAT THE WEST WAS IN GOOD SHAPE THIS YEAR.

FINANCES:

12. BOTH SIDES HAD EXPRESSED CONCERN. ALTHOUGH THEY HAD NOT REACHED ANY CONCLUSIONS ON HOW ADEQUATE FINANCE COULD BE

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
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I. 17996

- 4 -

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161
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MIN. & DEPT E.A.

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SEC A/S's MR LOOMES UN@ ER PAC&AM EA AM&SP S&SEA SA SEA
EAF&ME E AF ME INF DL MT IC C&P

160
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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
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181/4/4

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WHEN THESE WERE COMPLETED MATTER WOULD PROBABLY BE SUBMITTED TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY FOR DECISION WHETHER THE PROPOSALS SHOULD BE PUT TO ARABS AND TO ISRAEL.

IF PRESIDENT DECIDED AFFIRMATIVELY JOHNSON WOULD PROBABLY PUT THEM TO THE TWO PARTIES. THIS COULD OCCUR WITHIN A WEEK.

MUCH WOULD THEN DEPEND ON REACTIONS OF THE TWO PARTIES. IF THERE WAS A STRONG NEGATIVE REACTION MATTER WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO BE RE-SUBMITTED TO PRESIDENT FOR DECISION ON WHETHER THE PROPOSALS SHOULD BE SUBMITTED IN GENERAL ASSEMBLY NOTWITHSTANDING, BUT SISCO THOUGHT PRESIDENT WOULD PROBABLY DECIDE AGAINST SUCH INITIATIVE, IN WHICH CASE WEST WOULD STILL HAVE TO DEVISE MEANS OF EXERCISING SOME CONTROL OVER THE ISSUE IN SEVENTEENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

SECRETARY-GENERAL:

9. BOTH SIDES HAD FAVOURED U THANT'S ELECTION BUT AGREED THAT HE SHOULD NOT BECOME A WESTERN CANDIDATE.

SECURITY COUNCIL:

10. BOTH SIDES HAD GIVEN BLESSING TO NORWAY-ARAB DEAL AS A MEANS OF PRESERVING EUROPEAN SEAT.

SISCO TOLD US THAT NOTWITHSTANDING THIS STATE DEPARTMENT TENDED TO THE VIEW THAT, BECAUSE OF NIGERIA'S EFFORTS FOR PERMANENT BLACK AFRICAN REPRESENTATION IN A NON-PERMANENT SEAT ON SECURITY COUNCIL, NORWEGIAN CANDIDACY COULD ONLY SUCCEED IF SOME UNDERSTANDING COULD BE REACHED THAT HEREAFTER THERE WOULD ALWAYS BE A BLACK AFRICAN ON THE COUNCIL.

SISCO OUTLINED IMPLICATIONS OF THIS FOR THE COMMONWEALTH SEAT ALONG LINES OF LONDON'S 3493.

CHINESE REPRESENTATION:

11. BRITISH HAD AGREED TO SUPPORT USA FULLY. BOTH SIDES HAD AGREED THAT THE WEST WAS IN GOOD SHAPE THIS YEAR.

FINANCES:

12. BOTH SIDES HAD EXPRESSED CONCERN. ALTHOUGH THEY HAD NOT REACHED ANY CONCLUSIONS ON HOW ADEQUATE FINANCE COULD BE

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
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- 4 -

OBTAINED IN THE POST-BOND PERIOD, THEY HAD AGREED THAT IN THE LONG TERM SOME INCREASE IN FUNDS AVAILABLE TO U.N. SEEMED INEVITABLE, THIS BEING PARTLY MET PERHAPS BY INCREASED ASSESSMENTS. HOWEVER BOTH HAD CONSIDERED THAT, IF ONLY FOR REASONS OF INTERNAL POLITICS IN INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES, IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL TO ENSURE SOME SATISFACTORY ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OVER FUTURE EXPENDITURES.

13. IN RESPECT OF DEFAULTERS, BRITISH HAD AGREED WITH U.S. INTENTION OF MOUNTING A MAJOR CAMPAIGN AROUND THE WORLD TO MAKE COUNTRIES AWARE OF IMPLICATIONS OF ARTICLE 19 (LOSS OF VOTE). SISCO COMMENTED THAT IF THIS CAMPAIGN WERE PORTRAYED AS BEING MOUNTED TO OVERCOME A U.N. CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS CONSIDERABLE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT COULD PROBABLY BE WORKED UP. SISCO ADDED THAT AS RESULT OF FAVOUREBLE I.C.J. DECISION USA WOULD NOW MAKE AN ALL-OUT EFFORT TO GET GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO ACCEPT THE DECISION, E.G. THROUGH A RESOLUTION TAKING APPROPRIATE NOTE OF IT.

DEFAULTERS WOULD THEN HAVE TO COMPLY WITH WHAT WOULD THUS BE A U.N. DECISION OR FACE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 19.

AT SAME TIME USA WOULD UNDERTAKE A STRONG INITIATIVE WITH THE 4 OR 5 FRIENDLY DEFAULTERS (PRESS SUGGESTS THAT CAMPAIGN IS ALREADY UNDER WAY IN RESPECT OF YEMEN, BOLIVIA, GUAETAMALA AND PARAGUAY) TO PERSUADE THEM TO IMPROVE THEIR POSITIONS (SEE ALSO PARAGRAPH 16 BELOW IN RESPECT OF FRENCH POSITION).

SECRETARIAT:

14. BOTH SIDES HAD AGREED THAT THEY COULD SUPPORT A MODEST PROGRAMME FOR MODERATE CHANGES., BUT MUST PREVENT SOVIET PENETRATION OF SECRETARIAT, AND MUST DEVELOP A STRATEGY FOR INSERTING THE "RIGHT KIND" OF AFRO/ASIANS INTO APPROPRIATE SLOTS IN SECRETARIAT.

SISCO TOLD US THAT STATE DEPARTMENT WOULD BE ASKING POSTS ABROAD TO RECOMMEND NAMES OF HIGH CALIBRE PERSONNEL IN THE COUNTRIES OF THEIR POSTINGS WHO MIGHT BE ENCOURAGED INTO THE SECRETARIAT WHEN VACANCIES OCCURRED.

DEPARTMENT WAS ALSO CALLING VARIOUS U.S. AGENCIES TOGETHER TO STUDY HOW BEST TO RECRUIT FIRST CALIBRE TOP-LEVEL AMERICANS FOR SECRETARIAT.

N.A.T.O.:

15. SISCO SAID THAT SUBSEQUENTLY CLEVELAND AND HE HAD OUTLINED SOME OF THE FOREGOING IN NATO.

THE PRINCIPAL POINT THEY HAD MADE HOWEVER WAS THAT WESTERN EUROPEANS HAD NOT DONE THEIR JOB DURING LAST GENERAL ASSEMBLY, HAVING BEEN SLOW AND LAX.

IN FUTURE THEY MUST EXERCISE MORE LEADERSHIP AND DETERMINATION.

SISCO SAID THESE REMARKS HAD BEEN ACCORDED A VERY GOOD RECEPTION.

FRENCH ATTITUDE:

16. SISCO SAID SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS WITH FRENCH HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT FRANCE ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO U.N., IF ONLY BECAUSE IT WAS ONLY BY CONTINUED MEMBERSHIP OF IT THAT IT COULD MAINTAIN GOOD RELATIONS WITH FRENCH AFRICANS.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD SAVINGRAM

SRG

I. 17996

- 5 -

OFFICIALS IN QUAI D'ORSAY HAD INDICATED CLEARLY THAT THEY WERE ANXIOUS NOW TO BE MORE ACTIVE IN NEW YORK AND TO DO EVERYTHING THAT WAS POSSIBLE WITHIN THE BROAD FRAMEWORK LAID DOWN BY DE GAULLE.

SISCO SAID DISCUSSIONS HAD BROUGHT HOME TO CLEVELAND AND HIM THE INADVISABILITY AND STERILITY OF PUTTING TO FRENCH SPECIFIC PROPOSALS WHICH WOULD REQUIRE DECISION BY DE GAULLE, AND, BY CONTRAST, POTENTIALLY FRUITFUL FIELD FOR CO-OPERATION AT ADMINISTRATIVE LEVEL BY NOT EXCEEDING COMPETENCE ALLOWED BY DE GAULLE TO HIS OFFICIALS.

17. SISCO SAID FRENCH OFFICIALS HAD INDICATED THAT IF I.C.J. DECISION WAS FAVOURABLE THIS COULD HAVE EFFECT OF CAUSING A HELPFUL MODIFICATION IN FRENCH POSITION, SINCE LAW-CONSCIOUS FRENCH WOULD NOT WISH TO MAINTAIN THEMSELVES IN DEFIANCE OF A LEGAL DECISION.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.,

24TH JULY, 1962

SEC A/S's MR LOOMES UN@ ER PAC&AM EA AM&SP S&SEA SA SEA
EAF&ME E AF ME INF DL MT IC C&P

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

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Sent: 21st July, 1962.

1750

TO:

Australian High Commission,
LONDON..(2540)

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON..(Sav.174)

Australian Mission to
United Nations,
NEW YORK..(Sav.70)

Australian High Commission,
OTTAWA..(Sav.78)

Australian High Commission,
WELLINGTON..(Sav.90)

Australian Embassy,
PARIS..(Sav.79)

Australian Embassy,
THE HAGUE..(Sav.54)

Australian Embassy,
CAIRO..(Sav.16)

Australian Embassy,
TOKYO..(Sav.39)

Australian High Commission,
NEW DELHI..(Sav.39)

Australian Consulate-General,
STOCKHOLM..(Sav.15)

Australian Embassy,
ROME..(Sav.44)

Australian High Commission,
LAGOS..(Sav.9)

Australian Embassy,
DUBLIN..(Sav.4)

Australian High Commission,
KARACHI..(Sav.33)

Australian High Commission,
KUALA LUMPUR..(Sav.33)

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In connection with briefing for next General Assembly we should be glad of views of Foreign Ministry on following items. The following includes preliminary Departmental views which may be drawn on at your discretion.

APPOINTMENT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

2. A separate AP. Savingram reviews this question. We incline to favour re-election of U Thant. We are opposed to a Troika either at the top or at principal Under-Secretary level: nor do we favour a "cabinet" system of principal advisers.

CHARTER REVIEW.

3. This is a perennial issue. Our attitude remains as in the Brief for Sixteenth Assembly Item 18. Should we expect increasing African pressure for review and do Nehru's recent statements about the Charter being out of date imply any modification of India's traditional stand?

QUESTION OF CONVENING CONFERENCE TO SIGN A CONVENTION PROHIBITING NUCLEAR WEAPONS (RESOLUTION 1653 (XVI)).

4. Secretary-General has canvassed all Members and will report results. We opposed resolution and Minister replied to Secretary-General that we see no merit in proposal which, if implemented before general disarmament achieved, would impair right of self-defence and place unwarrantable reliance on declaratory undertaking.

Para 2 19 on Arab Refugees.

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OUTWARD CABLEGRAM 12802

-2-

SUSPENSION OF NUCLEAR TESTS (See Sav. AP.77)

5. This item has again been raised by India. If pursued along same lines as last year it would in effect call for an uncontrolled moratorium to which we are opposed. We would be interested in assessment whether Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (E.N.D.C.) likely to have affected either India's attitude or degree of support it might expect from other countries.

6. In general we would hope that number of Assembly Resolutions on disarmament could be kept down to avoid prejudicing the negotiations at Geneva. We realise however that much will depend on degree of progress the E.N.D.C. can report to Assembly.

OUTER SPACE: REPORTS OF U.N. COMMITTEE, I.T.U. AND W.M.O.

7. We should be interested in comments on these reports. A separate AP Savingram on Outer Space follows.

UNITED NATIONS FINANCES: I.C.J. ADVISORY OPINION.

8. We would welcome advice of reactions to I.C.J. advisory opinion and comments on implications for United Nations.

QUESTION OF OMAN.

9. Arabs have again raised this question: is it likely to become more "live" than in past? Our attitude remains as in last year's Brief Item 23.

REPORT OF THE TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL.

10. This will include recommendations on, inter alia, political development in the Trust Territory of New Guinea (see Savingram AP.85). The Australian Government is studying the proposals made by the United Nations Visiting Mission and is not yet able, because of the short time that has elapsed, to state its attitude on them.

11. It would be useful to have views, if any, on the United Nations Missions proposals and on time within which self-government or independence for New Guinea seems feasible.

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF SEVENTEEN.

12. The Committee has so far concentrated on British African Territories - especially the Rhodesias, Nyasaland, and the Protectorates. Its report to the Seventeenth Session has not yet been completed. Our representative has adopted a moderate and constructive approach; the Committee has given to many observers

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CONFIDENTIAL

152

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

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-3-

the appearance of being in general somewhat irresponsible, with cold-war elements running strongly through it.

13. We believe that if this Committee approaches the complex tasks and problems facing it can do useful and constructive work, and we hope it can be encouraged in this direction. Views of this Committee, its composition, and efforts to date would be very helpful.

SITUATION IN ANGOLA.

14. It would be useful to have views on how the Portuguese might be persuaded or encouraged to co-operate more in regard to improvements in the situation in Angola (and their other territories).

QUESTION OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA.

15. Australia abstained on the resolution adopted (73-1-27) by the Second Resumed Session of the Sixteenth Session. It would be useful to have views on likely further developments on this item.

FUTURE OF THE TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL.

16. (This is not so far an item on the Agenda, but it might come up under some other item). On 1st January, 1963, the Council will comprise Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the United States (Administering Members); China, France, the Soviet Union (Security Council Members), and only 1 elected member, to replace India and Bolivia, who are due to retire on 31st December, 1962. The Council will accordingly consist of 8 members, only one being elected. It would be useful to have views on the future of the Council, its work, significance and importance. We think Trusteeship Council should continue in existence and should not so far as is possible be completely superseded by the Committee of Seventeen.

POPULATION, GROWTH AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

17. Studies already made by E.C.A.F.E. have been useful and might be made in other economic commissions. We have told Swedish Legation that while believing this to be important matter which should be discussed at Seventeenth Session, we are unlikely to cosponsor revival of their last year's resolution and that we think raising of the issue in more technical forum (TAC or WHO) would have been wiser.

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OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

- 4 -

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Renewal of U.N.H.C.R. Mandate.

18. There may be pressure to replace the present Statute by one giving the U.N.H.C.R. direct responsibility for new refugee problems, i.e. outside Europe. Refugees in under-developed countries, for example, are now the subject only of his "good offices".

U.N.R.W.A.

19. Mandate expires June 1963. Australian Delegation to Fifteenth W.H.A. reported Commissioner-General said agency would not have authority for health work for Palestine refugees in 1963. Appreciate advice from Geneva and New York whether any major change in scope of U.N.R.W.A.'s activities is contemplated.

O.N.U.C. Costs and Financing.

20. Costs of operations in the Congo are continuing at a high level. Appreciate advice from New York and Washington -

(a) for what period proceeds of Bond Issue are expected to cover total residual requirements O.N.U.C. after 30 June, 1962;

(b) on position of expenditures from and contributions to Congo Fund. See telegrams UN.865 on United States/United Kingdom talks; and Washington 1806.

Administration and Budgetary Co-ordination.

21. We are concerned at tendency in Specialized Agencies to depart from United Nations common system of staff salaries and benefits. At Fifteenth World Health Assembly our efforts to ensure uniformity were supported only by Israel, Iraq, New Zealand and Ireland. We should be interested to hear of any action contemplated in Fifth Committee to secure maximum uniformity.

Other matters.

22. Views on Korea should not be canvassed since appropriate discussions are proceeding. Views on matters not yet listed but which may arise, such as Chinese Representation, Kashmir, Congo situation, expansion of the Security Council and Eco. Soc., would be welcome, together with advice about possible new initiatives, "themes" and election slates.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.

23rd July, 1962.

SEC A/Ss MR LOOMES LA UN TA ER PAC&AM EA AM&SP COMREL
S&SEA SA SEA EAF&ME E AF ME INF DL MT IC C&P

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Embassy,
AUSTRALIAN ~~LEGATION~~
TEL AVIV.

In reply quote No. 230.5

Memorandum No. 181

24th May, 1962.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.THE ARAB REFUGEE QUESTION.

Since the date of my memorandum No. 494 of 22nd December, 1961, there has been little to report from this Post on developments in the situation affecting the Arab refugee question. Now, however, Dr. Joseph Johnson has made another visit to the Middle East, including two visits to Israel, and his efforts to find an outcome from the impasse have been carried a step further.

2. I was yesterday given an opportunity to learn something of Dr. Johnson's visit from Mr. Gilboa Rafael, Deputy Director-General in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Mr. Rafael asked that what he told me be treated as confidential, because the Foreign Ministry is only passing on what it has to say to a limited number of chosen countries. I am not sure as to which countries have in fact been favoured in this way, but I suppose in the long run it would include most countries except the Communist Bloc.

3. Mr. Rafael said that Dr. Johnson had tried to promote a proposal that he should take a sampling of opinion among the refugees, perhaps interrogating about 20,000 of them and posing them three questions somewhat along the following lines:

- (a) Would you care to be repatriated to Israel on the basis of not receiving compensation?
- (b) Would you care to be resettled in an Arab country and receive compensation?
- (c) Would you care to stay as you are and continue to receive relief on the present basis?

Apparently Dr. Johnson was told by the Arab Governments that this kind of enquiry would be unacceptable to them. As far as Israel is concerned, it would not be satisfied that such an enquiry however carefully presented would not be interpreted by the refugees as giving them some right to the course for which they opted. There could be no useful purpose also because the Arab Governments had declared themselves against resettlement.

4. According to Mr. Rafael, Dr. Johnson ascertained from the Arabs that they would not move from the line of policy on which they decided at the last meeting of the Arab League Council in Riyadh.

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Mr. [unclear] to [unclear]
Copy sent to UN.

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8-11-62

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149

5. Dr. Johnson had an interview with Mr. Ben-Gurion, which Mr. Rafael described as being extremely satisfactory. Dr. Johnson asked the Prime Minister whether Israel would be prepared to accept resettlement of refugees who wished to come to Israel. Mr. Ben-Gurion said that Israel had already declared that it would accept Arabs who wished to return.

6. Mr. Rafael pointed out, however, that if Arabs returned to Israel they could not expect to be able to go back to the position they had previously occupied. Israel demanded that those returning should accept obligations of residence in the country and refrain from security breaches. He said that Israel wanted any settlement to be accompanied by a declaration of peaceful intent on the part of the Arab countries. With regard to Arabs returning to Israel, the Government could not accept any outside proposal as to the number of refugees to be accepted. Security conditions demanded that Israel alone be the judge of how many Arabs it could absorb.

7. In general Mr. Rafael conveyed the impression that the Israel authorities had concluded that Dr. Johnson's visit was not entirely unproductive, but they could see little chance of any modification in the Arab position. He suggested that Dr. Johnson was optimistic about making some kind of gradual headway, but could not exactly determine how this might be achieved. His principal hope seemed to be that something could be done for the refugees in the sense of giving them opportunities to earn a self-respecting living, largely though giving them more education and technical training.

8. An element to which Israel attached importance was the determination of precisely how many people were now really refugees. By now Israel calculated that there must be about 100,000 "dead souls" on the lists, that is to say, people who had either ceased to be refugees or who were deceased. Israel believed the numbers of actual refugees to be greatly exaggerated. A census was therefore important.

9. I am not quite sure whether the Israel authorities would be as accommodating as Mr. Rafael has suggested about the return of refugees or about compensation for those who did not wish to return to their previous homes. Mr. Ben-Gurion is quite likely to say something different at another time, depending on his personal judgment of security aspects at any given time, and perhaps also depending on the degree to which Israel can hope to use funds from elsewhere for the payment of compensation.

10. I am sending copies of this memorandum to the Senior External Affairs Representative, London, to the Australian Embassy, Washington, Australian Embassy, Cairo, and to the Australian Mission to the United Nations, New York.


(J.M. McMillan)
Ambassador.

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THE ARABS OF PALESTINE

BY MARTHA GELLHORN

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[Signature]

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in Phillips
in ~~London~~ ^{to me}
in Edinburgh
Full 181/4/4
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(Reprinted from the Atlantic Monthly, October 1961)



47

THE ARABS OF PALESTINE

BY MARTHA GELLHORN

MARTHA GELLHORN, novelist, journalist, and former war correspondent, has recently returned from a journey to the Middle East, where she went to see the "Palestinian Refugee Problem" in terms of real life, real people. Here she reports how the Arab refugees and the Arab Israelis live, and what they say about themselves, their past and their future.

ACCORDING to Arab politicians and apologists, this is what happened, this is the authentic view, these are the facts. Doubt is treasonous. There can be only one truth, according to Arab politicians and apologists, and it belongs to them:

In 1948, war took place between five Arab nations of the Middle East and the Jews in Palestine. This war was caused by the United Nations, whose General Assembly resolved to partition Palestine into two states, one for the Palestinian Arabs, the other for the Jews. The Arab nations and the Palestinian Arabs would not accept this monstrous decision. They were obliged to protect themselves against it, with force. The United Nations operated as the tool of the Western Imperialists, notably Great Britain and the United States. The United Nations wanted the Jews to proclaim the upstart state of Israel. Because of the Western Imperialists, who favored Israel, the Arabs lost the war. By massacre, threatening broadcasts, pointed bayonets, and the murderous siege of cities, the Jews drove hundreds of thousands of Arabs out of their homeland. For thirteen years, these Arab refugees have languished in misery around the borders of Israel. The United Nations (Western branch) bears the blame for these events and must repair the damage. The condition of the refugees is a sore on the conscience of honorable men. The Israeli government refuses to welcome back to their homeland the refugees, now swollen to more than a million in number. This refusal demonstrates the brutality and dishonesty of Israel, an abnormal nation of aliens

who not only forced innocent people into exile but also stole their property. There is no solution to this injustice, the greatest the world has ever seen, except to repatriate all Palestinian refugees in Palestine. Palestine is an Arab country, now infamously called Israel. Israel has no right to exist, and the Arab nations will not sign peace treaties with it but will, by every means possible, maintain the state of war.

The details of the Arab case vary, depending on the political climate of the moment and the audience. However, the Palestinian refugees always remain the invaluable, central theme. The case is painted the color of blood in the Arab countries: Revenge and Return. For the Western public, tears replace blood; the Arab case rests on the plight of the refugees and is a call to conscience rather than to arms. But no Arab statesman has ever promised final peace with Israel if only the million Palestinian refugees may return to their former homes.

The best way to consider this case is close up, by looking at the Palestinian refugees themselves, not as a "problem," not as statistics, but as people. The Palestinian refugees, battered by thirteen years in the arena of international politics, have lost their shape; they appear as a lump and are spoken of as one object. They are individuals, like everyone else.

Despite the unique care and concern they have

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received, despite the unique publicity which rages around them, the Arab refugees, alas, are not unique. Although no one knows exactly how many refugees are scattered everywhere over the globe, it is estimated that since World War II, and only since then, at least thirty-nine million non-Arab men, women, and children have become homeless refugees, through no choice of their own. Their numbers grow every year; Angolans are the latest addition to the long list. The causes for this uprooting are always different, but the result is the same: the uprooted have lost what they had and where they came from and must start life again as handicapped strangers wherever they are allowed to live.

The world could be far more generous to these unwilling wanderers, but at least the world has never thought of exploiting them. They are recognized as people, not pawns. By their own efforts, and with help from those devoted to their service, all but some six million of the thirty-nine million have made a place for themselves, found work and another chance for the future. To be a refugee is not necessarily a life sentence.

The unique misfortune of the Palestinian refugees is that they are a weapon in what seems to be a permanent war. Alarming signs, from Egypt, warn us that the Palestinian refugees may develop into more than a justification for cold war against Israel. We ignored *Mein Kampf* in its day, as the ravings of a lunatic, written for limited home consumption. We ought to have learned never to ignore dictators or their books. *Egypt's Liberation*, by Gamal Abdel Nasser, deserves careful notice. It is short, low-keyed, and tells us once again that a nation has been ordained by fate to lead — this time, to lead the Arab nations, all Africa, all Islam. The Palestinian refugees are not mentioned, and today, in the Middle East, you get a repeated sinking sensation about the Palestinian refugees: they are only a beginning, not an end. Their function is to hang around and be constantly useful as a goad. The ultimate aim is not such humane small potatoes as repatriating refugees.

THE word "refugee" is drenched in memories which stretch back over too many years and too many landscapes: Spain, Czechoslovakia, China, Finland, England, Italy, Holland, Germany. In Madrid, between artillery bombardments, children were stuffed into trucks to be taken somewhere, out of that roulette death, while their mothers clung to the tailboards of the trucks and were dragged weeping after the bewildered, weeping children. In Germany, at war's end, the whole country seemed alive with the roaming mad —

slave laborers, concentration camp survivors — who spoke the many tongues of Babel, dressed in whatever scraps they had looted, and searched for food in stalled freight cars though the very rail yards were being bombed. From China to Finland, people like these defined the meaning of "refugee."

No one could wish to see even a pale imitation of such anguish again. In the Middle East, there would be no high explosive, no concentration camps, but the imagined, expected scene was bad enough; lice and rickets and tuberculosis, bodies rotting in the heat, the apathy of despair. Why, in 1961, did I have such a picture of the Palestinian refugees? Obviously from what I had read, as one of the average absorbent reading public; notions float in the air exactly as dust does. Nothing that I had read or heard prepared me for what I found.

What do they look like, the undifferentiated mass known as the "Palestinian Refugee Problem"? What do they think, feel, say? What do they want? How do they live, where do they live, what do they do? Who takes care of them? What future can they hope for, in terms of reality, not in terms of slogans, which are meaningless if not actually fatal, as we know.

The children are as fast as birds, irreverent as monkeys, large-eyed, ready to laugh. The young girls, trained by carrying water jars or other heavy household bundles on their heads, move like ballerinas and are shrouded in modesty and silence as if in cocoons. The young men, crudely or finely formed, have in common the hopefulness and swagger of their new manhood. The middle years seem nondescript, in both sexes. After this the women, who age quickly but not as quickly as the men, wear unpainted experience on their faces; they look patient, humorous, and strong. When the men have grown visibly old, they turn into a race of grandees. Their color, infant to mahogany dark, all warmed by the glare of sun. The instinct for hospitality, the elegance of manner have not been exaggerated.

UNRWA (the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East), inheriting its role from previous caretakers, has been the splendid mother-and-father of these people for eleven years. In the course of its parenthood UNRWA has spent about \$360 million on the Arab refugees, this money having been contributed by members of the United Nations, with smaller but loving donations from private charitable organizations as well. Of the total the United States provided more than \$238 million, Great Britain over \$65 million — but spread across the years and in varying amounts, sixty-one states, including Israel and the Holy See, have helped

with cash. The Soviet Union is cent. This is a tiny note of material often express tender emotions for whereas most of the village United States and England, or ern Imperialism," for their ex-

In the so-called "host countries" Jordan, Syria, and Egypt, UNRWA has eight refugee camps. The camps are in Egypt but in the Gaza Strip, Egypt is the *de facto* mandator and the government of the Palestinian. The majority of camps are on what was the territory of the kingdom of Jordan.

UNRWA has never yet been a total proper census of its refugees. Statistics about the numbers are nothing except the best UNRWA itself says this. Over 1 million Palestinian refugees do not have made more or less of arrangements varying from the top, to hand-built Hoover bottom. UNRWA calculates that in June, 1960, 421,500 refugees were in camps, almost double their numbers a year ago. The advantage of that life there is rent free; a standard of housing and sanitation camp is better than that of the host country.

The international personnel — Americans and Western Europeans — and women work in four categories: those who serve the Palestinian refugees themselves, 10,000 of them. UNRWA, simply, a little welfare state called camps, and keeps the disease, feeds, educates, trains, and craftsman, operates centers, sends out visiting small private enterprises which tributes clothing, soap, kerosene, hospitalization, footballs, you

UNRWA is a kind, impartial favorites. However, people are ill; and though one man will destitute refugee and in time Chevrolet and be a self-employed a cozy home and a smiling wife dress and a gleaming refrigerator, another will remain in UNRWA gave him, sitting at a table or at a café table, waiting for divine intervention, or for the delivering fist of Nasser. UNRWA is the human condition.

with cash. The Soviet Union has never paid one cent. This is a tiny note of malice: Arab refugees often express tender emotions for the Soviet Union, whereas most of the village orators blame the United States and England, or that bogey, "Western Imperialism," for their exile.

In the so-called "host countries," Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and Egypt, UNRWA runs fifty-eight refugee camps. The camps in Egypt are not in Egypt but in the Gaza Strip, which is Palestine; Egypt is the *de facto* mandatory power, the land and the government of the Gaza Strip are Palestinian. The majority of camps in Jordan are also on what was the territory of Palestine, now annexed to Jordan.

UNRWA has never yet been allowed to make a total proper census of its refugee population, so statistics about the number of ex-Palestinians are nothing except the best estimate possible; UNRWA itself says this. Over half of the registered Palestinian refugees do not live in camps, but have made more or less comfortable private arrangements varying from first-class houses, at the top, to hand-built Hooverville shacks, at the bottom. UNRWA calculates that, at the end of June, 1960, 421,500 refugees were living in their camps, almost double their camp population ten years ago. The advantage of living in a camp is that life there is rent free; and for the poor, the standard of housing and sanitation in an UNRWA camp is better than that of the native population.

The international personnel of UNRWA, Americans and Western Europeans, is small; 128 men and women work in four countries. The mass of those who serve the Palestinian refugees are Palestinian refugees themselves, something over 10,000 of them. UNRWA is running a world, simply, a little welfare state. It makes villages, called camps, and keeps them clean and free of disease, feeds, educates, trains teachers and technicians and craftsmen, operates clinics and maternity centers, sends out visiting nurses, encourages small private enterprises with small loans, distributes clothing, soap, kerosene, blankets, provides hospitalization, footballs, youth clubs, mosques.

UNRWA is a kind, impartial parent; it has no favorites. However, people are all different, luckily; and though one man will arrive in exile as a destitute refugee and in time own a whopping Chevrolet and be a self-employed taxi driver, with a cozy home and a smiling wife in a flowered print dress and a gleaming refrigerator in the dining room, another will remain in whatever shelter UNRWA gave him, sitting either on his own floor or at a café table, waiting for nothing, or for divine intervention, or for the mailed, promised, delivering fist of Nasser. UNRWA did not invent the human condition.



Of UNRWA's fifty-eight camps, I visited eight — in Lebanon, the Gaza Strip, and Jordan. The plan and facilities of every UNRWA camp are alike; they differ only in size and are better or worse depending on whether they are newer or older and on the character of the people who live in them. Each camp has its clinic and school (or schools), warehouse center for distributing rations, "supplementary feeding station," where hot meals are served to those who need them, village bazaar street with small shops, market booths, cafés. The bigger the camp, the bigger the bazaar. I also went round two hospitals, two vocational training schools, and was received in two private homes, having been invited by refugees.

My guide and chaperone was an UNRWA employee, a Palestinian Arab, who served as translator when needed. My system was to say: please show me your best and your worst camp, and if time permits, let us also look at the in-between. In the camps, I knocked on any door and many. Nothing was planned. We chatted at random and went wherever I liked. In the Gaza Strip, I was accompanied for a day by a young Palestinian in a pin-striped suit; he or someone like him is a cross every foreigner has to bear. He is local Secret Service, and the refugees know this; he is an ardent Nasserite, as apparently all

Palestinian government officials in Gaza are, or must appear to be; and he is by avocation a propagandist and demagogue. At one Gaza camp, besides this young gent, I had an escort of three Palestinian cops who lent an even heavier note to the proceedings. Otherwise, my visits were uncensored. I may have seen a true cross section of the Palestinian refugee population, and I may not have. I only know that I saw real people in the flesh, and a large number of them, and I know what they said. When the word "they" appears on these pages, it means those Arabs whom I saw; it means nothing more.

BEURUT is a lovely boom town, an entrancing mixture of Asia Minor and France, with scenery to lift the heart and glamour hotels all over the lot and more abuilding. We set off, my Palestinian guide and I, in a shiny car for an UNRWA camp in the Lebanese hills. My guide, like his colleagues who accompanied me elsewhere, was an executive, responsible for an UNRWA department, dressed in a Western business suit, a self-assured, middle-class Organization Man. The refugees are not only individuals, but they come from widely different social backgrounds. Men of the class of my guides would not be living in refugee camps; they might work in them as doctors or teachers.

This camp was inhabited exclusively by Christian Arabs. I wondered aloud at a separation by creed. My guide was a Muslim and said that Christian camps were always cleaner and superior to Muslim ones, and besides, very few Christians lived in camps; they arranged their lives better on their own.

The camp consisted of little cement or frame houses rambling over the hillside, a village of poor people, disorderly and beflowered and cheerful. School was letting out for lunch; troops of children, dressed in the pinafore uniform that small boys and girls wear in Italian schools, meandered home, shouting bye-bye at friendly, giggling length. They are Roman Catholics here, but the young teachers are refugees, not priests. They have to teach the children about Palestine, since most of them have never seen the country and even the oldest cannot remember it. The children are taught hate, the Garden of Eden stolen from them by murderers; their duty is to live for Return and Revenge.

The miniature white clinic had only one customer, a nice-looking girl of twenty-one who had brought her fourth baby for a checkup. Her husband works in Libya; she too lived there for a few years but returned. Libya is very expensive; she can live here with his parents and thus save

money for the future. The resident nurse, a buxom elderly woman, said they had no real sickness; in summer, the children got a bit of conjunctivitis and diarrhea; oh, no, trachoma is very rare, and besides, we cure it; there's some chicken pox now. My guide announced that if any refugee needed an operation he was taken in an ambulance to a hospital in Beirut where UNRWA reserved beds and paid for everything; you would have to be a rich man in Lebanon to get such good and speedy treatment. Her fourth baby, I mused, and she only twenty-one. Yes, yes, said my guide, the refugees have a higher birth rate than any other Arabs, and healthier children.

Refugees receive a monthly basic food ration of flour, pulse (dried peas, beans, lentils), sugar, rice, oils, and fats; this amounts to 1500 calories a day per person, increased in winter to 1600 calories a day, and it is not enough. The refugee must find some way to earn money to increase his diet, or keep poultry or rabbits, or grow vegetables. Many had planted tiny gardens here, but charmingly and with more enthusiasm, they also grow flowers for the joy of the thing. There is a daily milk ration for children and pregnant and nursing mothers; and hot meals are served in the "supplementary feeding station," to those who need them, on the doctor's order. In this camp, said my guide, 85 per cent of the people have work. If there are hardship cases, when no one can bring money to the family, UNRWA's Welfare Section steps in. This pattern is universal.

If you think it your duty, I said, to make everything seem better than it is, don't. I'm not on an inspection tour, I only want to get some idea of what life is really like. He stopped, offended, in the middle of the stony path and explained: here, in Lebanon, 80 per cent of the refugees are better off than they were in Palestine. Twenty per cent are not. The 20 per cent were small capitalists, and there is much rivalry with the Lebanese in business, they make obstacles. Also it is political; they do not give the refugees citizenship, you understand, because the main part of the refugees are Muslims and that would upset the balance here, where the Christians rule. I do not speak to you of the rich Palestinian refugees; they are richer than before, they are very happy.

WE WENT to pay the required *visite de politesse* to the camp leader. Every camp leader acts as an appointed village mayor; he has to keep the place running, serve as liaison officer with UNRWA local headquarters, and handle the complaints of his own people. Sitting in his neat

office, with my guide, the (a former member of the camp leader, I listen became an almost daily M

It went like this:

"The Arab countries in save the Palestine Arabs fr the Jews."

"Were there massacres?"

"Oh, yes, everywhere."

"Then you must have friends."

This, being a tiresome vious statement, is brush ment.

"Israel overran the tr country. We left from fe our property, which brin a year in income. If w we would need nothing fr money is much more. grateful for the little m should have our own."

"Then, of course, you property and to Israel?"

"Not to Israel. Never country, to our own part."

"But didn't the Jews the Palestine Arabs and refused?"

"Yes, yes. And Engl An Arab was arrested if I deicend himself, but Jew streets in tanks and not Also, England told the Israel."

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office, with my guide, the principal of the school (a former member of the Palestinian police), and the camp leader, I listened to the first of what became an almost daily Mad Hatter conversation. It went like this:

"The Arab countries invaded Israel in 1948 to save the Palestine Arabs from being massacred by the Jews."

"Were there massacres? Where?"

"Oh, yes, everywhere. Terrible, terrible."

"Then you must have lost many relatives and friends."

This, being a tiresome deduction from a previous statement, is brushed aside without comment.

"Israel overran the truce lines and stole our country. We left from fear. We have a right to our property, which brings in 47 million pounds a year in income. If we had our own money, we would need nothing from UNRWA. Our own money is much more. We do not have to be grateful for the little money spent on us. We should have our own."

"Then, of course, you want to return to your property and to Israel?"

"Not to Israel. Never to Israel. To our own country, to our own part."

"But didn't the Jews accept Partition, while the Palestine Arabs and the Arab governments refused?"

"Yes, yes. And England protected the Jews. An Arab was arrested if he carried a pistol only to defend himself, but Jews could go through the streets in tanks and nothing happened to them. Also, England told the Arab states to attack Israel."

The principal of the school then spoke up. "In our school, we teach the children from their first year about their country and how it was stolen from them. I tell my son of seven. You will see: one day a man of eighty and a child so high, all, all will go home with arms in their hands and take back their country by force."

On this warlike note, we left. My guide had seemed a sober contented fellow until our little meeting, whereupon he sounded like a politician running recklessly for office. He then astonished me again.

"It can all be solved with money," he said. "Now the people have nothing in their mouths but words, so they talk. Money fills the mouth too. If every man got a thousand dollars for each member of his family, for compensation to have lost his country, and he could be a citizen in any Arab country he likes, he would not think of Palestine any more. Then he could start a new life and be rich and happy. And those who really do own something in Palestine must be paid for

what they had there. But those are not many. Most had nothing, only work."

High on a mountaintop, with a down-sweeping view of orange groves and the satin blue of the Mediterranean, is a small Muslim camp named Mia Mia. Here one whole Palestinian village, amongst others, had landed; they came from a mountaintop in Galilee, a place called Meron. Their headman, or village leader, the Muktar, plied us with Coca-Cola and Turkish coffee in his exile's parlor. He is a beautiful man, perhaps sixty-five years old, lean, with exquisite manners. He wore the handsome white Arab headdress, held in place by the usual black double-corded crown; he was dressed in a well-preserved cream silk jacket, a white silk shirt, pressed gray flannel trousers, polished Italianate black shoes.

Whilst we sucked Coca-Cola through straws and studied his son's pitifully bad but lovingly executed paintings — a portrait of Nasser; Christ and the Virgin — the Muktar talked. Seventeen people of his village were massacred, which was why they fled, but an old blind woman of 104 was left behind and the Jews poured kerosene over her and burned her alive. How did they know, if they had all fled? Well, then the Jews went away and some villagers crept back and found her, and besides, the United Nations Truce Commission also found her.

My guide looked embarrassed. The Truce Commission was a shaky point. It was a strain to believe that the UN military observers, occupied with armies and frontiers, would have had time to investigate each atrocity story in the country. I wondered where the families of the massacred and the cremated were; everyone knows everyone else in a village, surely the surviving relatives were the best witnesses.

"I could tell you many such stories," said the Muktar.

"I am sure of it," said I. "But please tell me about Meron."

So I heard of Meron, their beautiful stone houses, their lovely groves, their spacious and happy life in Eden; all lost now. I could readily imagine this aristocrat living in a palace on a mountaintop and decided that I would later go and see his home; but for the moment I accepted a rose from him, and we set off to pay calls in the camp.

A woman of forty or so, with a face like the best and juiciest apple, and lively eyes, seized me and hauled me into her house. She began, with gestures, to deliver an oration. She touched the ceiling with contempt, pulling bits away; she called

upon heaven to witness her misery. Her voice soared and fell in glorious rhythms. She loved doing it and I loved watching it. In mutual delight, we smiled more and more as the tale of woe unfolded, until she could keep it up no longer, burst into roars of laughter, and kissed me copiously. My guide seemed unduly glum about all this, perhaps because this day we were three; a European UNRWA official had joined us.

"She is a big liar," said my guide, when we had left her house. "She lies as she breathes. We gave her all the material for a new roof. She sold it. She is so poor that she is going to make a pilgrimage to Mecca this year. She does not have to make a pilgrimage. Do you know what that costs? One thousand pounds."

In Lebanese money, this amounts to about \$350 — a fortune.

"Oh, she is a terrible bad one."

"I loved her," I said. "She's one of my favorite types of people in the world. A really jolly open crook. I hope she has a wonderful time at Mecca."

"But we have to fix her roof anyhow," said the UNRWA official.

In our suite of followers, I had noticed a tall boy of sixteen or seventeen, with fine intelligent eyes, a happy face, and a fresh white shirt. I spoke to him in English, and he understood; I asked whether we could visit his family. His house was no larger than any other, but clean, peaceful, and touching, with orderly furniture and picture post cards tacked to the walls. His mother was blind from cataract, and his grandmother seemed older than time, of a generation so old that she had tattoo marks on her cheeks.

The boy had graduated from high school and now worked as manager of the food distribution center in the big camp (14,000 inhabitants) on the plain below. He must have been very competent and very reliable to merit this job. He hoped to become a TV-radio engineer. He did not speak of Palestine. There was work he wanted to do, wherever a man could do such work. UNRWA is now building a vocational training school in Lebanon; it should be open in the autumn. With any luck, this boy will learn the technical skill he so desires and make his own life independent of anyone's charity.

We heard shrill painful child's crying and went toward the sound. A child of about two was tied by the ankle to a chair, howling the same word over and over. A younger child was silently trying to hold its body up, clinging to the arm of another chair. On a clean mat, on a clean little sheet, a baby twisted its body restlessly, but its legs lay still. All three were remarkably good-looking, all seemingly husky and well formed.

The camp leader carried on a short barking ex-

change with their young mother and reported: "She is twenty-five. None of the children can move their legs; the legs will not hold them. The child is tied because he can pull himself out of the house and get hurt. She says, please, will you help her?"

Speaking French to the UNRWA official, because no one else there knew the language, I said, "She can easily have five or six more children like this. It is terrible for her. The visiting nurse ought to explain about birth control."

"You don't know what you're saying. UNRWA could not touch such a thing, not even mention it. Here are these people, and the name of their country does not exist on the map any more. If we start teaching them birth control, we will be accused of trying to wipe out the people too. Besides, the men would never allow it. They want to have a lot of sons; it is a matter of pride with them. And politics enters too, as into everything; I've heard them say it. We need to have many children and grow and increase so that the world will never forget us."

"They're doing well, from what I've seen."

"About 30,000 babies a year."

The camp leader, escorting us to our car, remarked that no one here had any work. He delivered a short speech in English; he was a very nice, gentle man. "All the men do is sit in café and suffer, suffer. A young man sees time running, running, and he gets old with no years. If I did not got my land to hope for, I lose my brains."

On our way to Beirut, the UNRWA official said, "Eighty per cent of the men in that camp work. It's quite a prosperous little camp."

"Do they lie just for the fun of it?" It had been a long day.

"Well, it's natural in front of us. If they earn too much, they are taken off the ration lists. If they earn above a certain amount, they aren't eligible for the services. Free medicine and doctoring and schooling. So, obviously they don't want us to know."

"Like non-refugees with the income tax collectors?"

"That's it."

"Do you know what they are earning?"

"Not really. How could we? Of course, if anyone has regular employment, we eventually learn of it and cut down the rolls."

The refugees, in camps as well as outside of camps, do find work of some sort; otherwise, on 1500 calories a day, they would soon become and look like a severely undernourished, sickly group. UNRWA's health statistics can be relied on; they know how many refugees use their medical services and for what reason and with what results. The

standard of health is unusual. UNRWA's finest achievement

On the plain below Mecca, with citrus groves, but nothing grew before. The someone should be very; who were city dwellers; city work: taxi drivers. No matter what official people tend to seek relief under the universal relief from scratch, of being petition with establishments living in a part of the endemic disease and it a good living, unless a spoon family.

Out of the blue, my no crime in the camp blood feuds. It is much time. They know the There were a few men one raping, something But no crime."

And this is true. I taught one valuable lesson and lawfully together

TO ENTER the Gaza visa from the Egyptian had arrived in Cairo the wind directly formed, by the local this permit took two sometimes you never only one UNEF arrived, and they didn't their own personnel day, and tomorrow indeed all looked like a jeep ride over the trating into the Strip called on the Egyptian

Because of the Member of passport photo of offices I had to wait days to get the visa able. The Egyptian kinder, and I loved class, who remind important busyness have observed round It is difficult to believe men, in shirt sleeves ous callers, their teleographed forms,

standard of health is unusually high and is one of UNRWA's finest achievements.

On the plain below Mīa Mīa, the land is green with citrus groves, banana plantations, where nothing grew before. This is the work of refugees; someone should be very grateful to them. Refugees who were city dwellers in Palestine gravitate to city work: taxi drivers, employees, merchants. No matter what official attitudes are, all of these people tend to seek their own previous level, under the universal refugee handicap of starting from scratch, of being exploitable, and in competition with established locals. Besides, they are living in a part of the world where poverty is an endemic disease and it is hard for anyone to make a good living, unless you are born into a silver-spoon family.

Out of the blue, my guide announced: "There is no crime in the camps. No thefts, no fires, no blood feuds. It is much better than it was in Palestine. They know they are all brothers in refuge. There were a few murders some time ago; someone raping, something like that. It is natural. But no crime."

And this is true. In all the camps. Exile has taught one valuable lesson: how to live peacefully and lawfully together.

TO ENTER the Gaza Strip you require a military visa from the Egyptian government in Cairo. I had arrived in Cairo expecting to proceed like the wind directly from there to Gaza but was informed, by the local UNRWA press officer, that this permit took two or three weeks to get, and sometimes you never got it. Besides, there was only one UNEF army plane to Gaza each Saturday, and they didn't like carrying anyone except their own personnel; besides, it was now Thursday, and tomorrow was the Muslim Sunday, and indeed all looked hopeless. I foresaw bumming a jeep ride over the sandstorming desert and infiltrating into the Strip somehow; but meantime I called on the Egyptian authorities.

Because of the Muslim holy day, and the number of passport photos I needed and the number of offices I had to run between, it took about four days to get the visa, and every minute was enjoyable. The Egyptian officials could not have been kinder, and I loved seeing them, the new ruling class, who remind me, in their cheerful, inchoate, important busyness, of many new ruling classes I have observed round and about, over the years. It is difficult to believe that these pleasant young men, in shirt sleeves or uniforms, with their numerous callers, their telephones, their mounds of mimeographed forms, their empty Turkish coffee

cups, have any connection with the vainglory, the xenophobia, the anti-Semitic hatred that smear the press and pour over the air of their fascinating city.

THE Gaza Strip, from all accounts, would be a real hell hole. It is a roughly rectangular slice of land, on the southernmost Mediterranean frontier of Israel, some forty kilometers long by five to ten kilometers wide, and 365,000 people, refugees and residents, live on it. I imagined it as a sand dune, packed solid with human flesh, blazing hot, hideous, and filthy. It is none of these. The weather was so idyllic — a china-blue sky and a constant cool breeze — that I assumed this was special luck and at once asked my charming landlady about it. No, the weather in Gaza was always delightful. She had lived here for thirty years; there were two "sticky" weeks in the summer, otherwise you could not find a more benign climate. Flying over the Strip, I had noted plenty of sand, but also plenty of green. There were always citrus groves in Gaza, my landlady reported, Gaza was famous for them, but since the refugees came these had greatly increased, as had the general cultivation. Anything grows here, she said, exhibiting her blossoming garden.

Then I remarked that Gaza town was a beehive of activity, with all the UNEF soldiers, Danes, Norwegians, Indians, Canadians, Yugoslavs, who patrol the Israeli-Gaza border and spend money in the town in their free time, and the Egyptian upper crust which oversees the Palestinian officials, and UNRWA and visitors and the local residents and, indeed, the refugees. The refugees seemed to bring prosperity with them; it was most mysterious.

Not at all, said my landlady, we do not know why we are not completely bankrupt; but she was adding a third floor to her already roomy house, so great is the demand for lodgings. Sizable villas are being built in what must be the fashionable section of Gaza. The main square boasts an array of parked Mercedes, finned pastel American cars, and humbler Volkswagens. The taxis in Gaza are new. There is an imposing movie theater, in the ugly world-wide chromium-and-junk style; there are abundant cafés and numerous ill-lit dingy shops, typical of the region. An economist could surely answer this riddle: if no one has any money, what are these eccentric merchants and purveyors of services doing?

The refugee camps are much larger than those in Lebanon, small towns by Middle Eastern standards. They are by no means luxury establishments, but many people live in a nastier state in American and European slums. The poor villagers of Gaza

"What do you want to make this war with?"
"No, we want you to stop money to Israel. Just now Israel \$25 million for arms."
"I do not believe that it has ever given or sold arms to the arms Nasser gets from Slovakia?"

"That is all right. That peace-loving nations. They undeveloped countries."

The Secret Service man offered us arms, but with accept conditions. So we countries, who give without

"What do you do?" husband.

husband.
 "Nothing."
 "What would you like?"
 "Be a soldier and fight."
 This oratory pleased the
 "Do you all like Nasser?"
 Wide smiles. General
 "We do. Certainly."

FOR rest and relaxation, of locals, I went to the S thousand refugee children Gaza Strip, 98 per cen

Gaza Strip, 98 per cent population. In Gaza's school children were gaily tiny tots, the Brownies skirted orange uniforms, and muscles. They paraded the Gaza Strip in the winter in colored outfits who huddled. The human flag was

The human flag was for babies, Girl Scouts, Boy Scouts, boy gymnasts. "We drew an English UNRWA flag. It costs us about two dollars, but it's worth it. It gives them a sense of pride. They all love it." The children loved it. The children loved it.

The children had m
legged style. ("Like th

31/4/4 PART 3

lure the women into talk, but one of the husbands talked freely. The Secret Service youth translated.

"It is the blame of America that this happened, because they help the Jews. We only want America to help us to get back to our land."

"How?" I asked. "By war?"

"When the Arabs are united, we will make the war."

"What do you want from us then? Arms to make this war with?"

"No, we want you to stop giving arms and money to Israel. Just now Kennedy has given Israel \$25 million for arms."

"I do not believe that the U.S. government has ever given or sold arms to Israel. What about the arms Nasser gets from Russia and Czechoslovakia?"

"That is all right. That is different. They are peace-loving nations. They only want to help the undeveloped countries."

The Secret Service man put in: "America offered us arms, but with conditions. We will not accept conditions. So we take from the Eastern countries, who give without conditions."

"What do you do?" I asked the fat young husband.

"Nothing."

"What would you like to do?"

"Be a soldier and fight Jews."

This oratory pleased the public very much.

"Do you all like Nasser?" I asked, politely.

Wide smiles. General joy.

"We do. Certainly. Oh, of course. He will unite us and make us strong. He is our leader."

For rest and relaxation, together with thousands of locals, I went to the School Sports Day. Fifty thousand refugee children attend school on the Gaza Strip, 98 per cent of the possible school population. In Gaza's spacious stadium, 2000 school children were gathered. They ranged from tiny tots, the Brownies, in berets and ballet-skirted orange uniforms, to boys in running shorts and muscles. They paraded past the governor of the Gaza Strip in the viewing stand, led by girls in colored outfits who formed the Palestine flag. The human flag was followed by the Brownie babies, Girl Scouts, Boy Scouts, girl gymnasts, and boy gymnasts. "We dressed every one of them," an English UNRWA official said. "This show costs us about two thousand dollars, but it's worth it. It gives them something to look forward to. They all love it." They loved it and their admiring families loved it and the public loved it.

The children had marched in earnest stiff-legged style. ("Like the British Army," I said.

"Like the Egyptian Army," he said.) They then lined up in formation, and a loudspeaker blared out Arabic. Three times the children shouted a unanimous, squeaky but enthusiastic reply to the loudspeaker's commanding male voice.

"What are the cheers for?"

"The first is: 'Long Live a Free Palestine.' The second is: 'Long Live the United Arab Republic.' The third is: 'Long Live Gamal Abdel Nasser.'"

I stayed to see the white-clad girl gymnasts, as graceful as a field of Isadora Duncans, doing lovely swaying motions with blue gauze handkerchiefs.

The Vocational Training School at Gaza is a freshly painted group of buildings, with well-kept lawns, flower borders, scrubbed Spartan self-respecting dormitories, and impressive workshops equipped with the complex machinery that modern life seems to depend on. The boys were on their playing field that afternoon, a holiday, marking white lines for various sporting events to come. A few of them drifted back and wanted to show off every inch of their school. Did they like it here, did they enjoy their work, were they happy? Needless to ask; the answer glowed and shone on them. The graduates of this school find good jobs for which they are trained; amongst its many other parental functions UNRWA operates a placement bureau throughout the Middle East. This is the new generation, the UNRWA graduates, and you find them everywhere in the Arab refugee world. They have not yet been crippled by exile, regret, or hate, and they may well be the brightest citizens of the Arab future. They are the source of all hope.

Two accidental conversations stick in my memory. Once, lost in the UNRWA compound of offices, I chanced on a pretty, dark secretary, who told me the kind of inside human angle of history which is more interesting than any other. In 1956, when the Israelis took the Gaza Strip, during what they call the Sinai campaign and we call Suez, for short, telephone communication was restored between the Strip and Israel, which is, after all, just across the fields. In the midst of enemy occupation, the secretary's sister-in-law rang up from the small town where she lived in Israel, to have a chat. How was everyone? The sister-in-law reported that they were fine, her husband was doing very well, they had a nice house and no trouble of any kind. The secretary, recalling this family news, said, "I think if we had all stayed where we were, nothing would have happened to us. All this would not have come about. And what is it for? My children have never seen Palestine. I tell them; and in every school, every minute, they are always told. But when they are grown? The people who knew Palestine will die, and the young ones — will they be interested?"

The second memorable talk took place at the

I left Gaza, wishing that I could take all the young people with me, and not to Palestine, but out into a wider world. Their destiny should not be to go back, but to go forth. They need exactly

Two men, living next door to each other in a camp outside Jerusalem, aptly illustrate this difference in personality and politics. The camp watchman, who lived in a new little UNRWA house which was already a pigsty, with empty sardine tins on the floor, a filthy yard, rags for bedding, announced, "We were evicted by force, and so we will return. Led by Nasser and Hussein and all the Arab leaders." His neighbor, an old man, had cleared the stony ground around his house and made a flourishing vegetable garden. Inside his courtyard you could hardly move for the rows of drying laundry. He did not have a word to say about war or force or Arab leaders. He said that he would rather starve to death than not give his grandchildren education. "As long as I live and can work, my grandson will go to the university."

Jordan has a Vocation as happy and hopeful as I gathered with a cl another set of citizens the were very merry in the greasy hands, and full of wished to go to Kuwait boy said he wanted to youngest and smallest of voice — both bored and

The largest Jericho camp is run by an objectionable tyrant, yet its cleanliness was nearly Swiss. "I gave them six thousand trees," said the refugee-tyrant, speaking in his capacity of God. "Five years ago, the Mukhtars [the village leaders] would not let me give the people trees; they said if they plant trees, the people will never want to go home." Now trees rise over the walls that separate the little houses, and more trees are to be distributed. An inexhaustible supply of clean water flows from twenty-one water points. Forty thousand people live here in solid dwellings, under the stern eye of their tyrant; bird-fast children play in the streets.

"How is your name? Are you well? Good-by! Good night! Hello, ledly!" The children chirped and circled; the tyrant tried roughly to shout them off. One boy, determined to have his say, presented me with a whole English sentence.

He took me to his home, four airy rooms (one lined with chairs for visiting), a neat yard, presided over by a smiling serene-faced mother, very proud of her son who could speak alone in a foreign language to a foreign guest. He told me, slowly, of his life, his family, and his ambitions. He was thirteen and had studied English here for two years, in school. He had never talked English with anyone before, except his teacher. After this encounter, I visited some English classes in another camp, to watch the miracle in the making. The boy wants to become a teacher.

"In this country?" I asked, waiting for the expected cry, "No! In my country! Palestine!"

"No, not in this country, in Jerusalem or Amman."

So finally I realized, as I should have all along, that "country" means town or village; when the Arab peasant refugees talk of their country — even if they happen to be in it, as they are here — they are talking about their own village, their birthplace. The boy's mind had gone no farther than the big cities of the only country he knows; his mind may travel much farther than that. The highest ambition of all the best students is to become a teacher or a doctor. Teachers and doctors are needed throughout the world, and the Arab world needs them intensely.

Jordan has a Vocational Training School also, as happy and hopeful as the school in Gaza. Here I forgathered with a class of budding plumbers, another set of citizens the world can well use. They were very merry in their blue work clothes and greasy hands, and full of plans for the future. One wished to go to Kuwait, one to America. One boy said he wanted to plumb in Palestine. The youngest and smallest of them, in a curiously wise voice — both bored and dismissive — said, "Oh,

all that will take a long time." None of them was interested enough to go on with it.

The only place that looked as I originally expected refugee life to look was in the Jordanian part of divided Jerusalem, in the old Ghetto. Jews had festered in those lightless rat holes, jammed among the ancient stones, for longer than one can imagine; for thirteen years, Arab refugees have endured the same hideous life. This is medieval misery and squalor; nothing like it exists in the modern world.

From a fetid passageway, a straight-backed, cleanly dressed, handsome boy bounded into the cobbled alley street. He took the arm of his teacher, who happened to be my guide that day; they were good friends. He was the star pupil of his class. Where could he possibly study? In the street, the boy said, anywhere outside. He has known no other home than a single damp room, a dungeon, where he lives with his bedridden grandfather, his parents, and a brother.

"All the boys from here are good boys," the teacher said, and his amazement showed in his voice. "And very witty." He meant "intelligent," I later discovered.

Did the UNRWA Director know of this vile slum? No, said the camp leader. I hurried off to ask why UNRWA allowed human beings to live in such revolting squalor. Whereupon I was informed that the Director had visited the Jerusalem Ghetto within two weeks of taking on his job. UNRWA had tried, at various times, to move these refugees, who refused to go because they preferred living inside the city. But now, since their birth rate had risen at such lightning speed, they were more than ready to leave, and within the year they would be settled in a new camp outside Jerusalem. There were two more dreadful refugee slums in the "host countries" — I did not see either; these were the only subhuman living conditions, and it was not UNRWA's fault they continued. They would, in time, be eradicated.

Despite all difficulties, UNRWA runs a welfare state; no other exists in the Arab Middle East. "The refugee has a net under him; the local population has none." Quote from an UNRWA official. It should be stated that the UNRWA personnel loves its Arab charges, which is not only right but essential. You cannot help those you do not cherish.

With my suitcases packed, and my mind overpacked with "treasonous" doubts, I set off for Israel, across the street. I had not dared tell anyone, including the Western UNRWA officials,

of this intention: to have been in Israel, to go to Israel, is enough to brand you as an enemy and, more possibly, a spy. The Arab psychosis (an ornate word but not too strong) about Israel is official, and infectious. There may be many reasonable people in the Arab countries who are able to think calmly about Israel and about Arab-Israel relations; if so, they choose safety and keep their mouths shut.

When it comes to moving from one side of Jerusalem, which is Jordan, to the other side of Jerusalem, which is Israel, the world of dream sets in. You take a taxi, through normal streets, and suddenly you arrive at a small Jordanian frontier post, also in a city street. You wait, in this little shack, while your passport is checked against the exit list. After this formality, a charming courteous young porter carries your suitcases half a block. You tip him, and he deposits them on the porch of a house which is no longer there. Artillery fire removed it, years ago. Around you are shelled houses; one side of the street is Jordan, with laughing soldiers in the shelled houses; one side of the street is Israel, with washing hung out on lines. You walk a half block further, leaving your bags behind. You are now at the Israel frontier post, another shack. Like crossing the river Styx, this is a one-way journey. When you have left Jordan for Israel, you cannot return by this road. The Arab blockade of Israel thus extends to foreign visitors. You would have to fly from Israel to neutral territory and start all over, provided the Arabs still like you, after a visit to Israel.

Since you will not be admitted to any Arab country if you have an Israeli visa on your passport, you carry your Israeli visa on a separate sheet of paper. Other nations than ours present their traveling citizens with two passports. After the Israeli border police have checked your visa, an equally charming courteous young porter, an Israeli, collects your bags from the porch of the nonexistent house in no man's land. You tip him and put the luggage in a taxi and drive a few blocks to your hotel. From your hotel in Israel you have a fine view of the beautiful wall and the Old City of Jerusalem, where you were residing three quarters of an hour ago.

There is not a war on, not by any terms we know. The object of this non-peace-non-war exercise is to destroy Israel, which remains undestroyed. I cannot see how it helps the Arab countries, but perhaps it does. Perhaps they need one enemy they can agree on, as a unifying force, as cement for their nationalism.

I wanted to visit Palestinian Arabs in Israel, the ones who stayed behind, the non-refugees. Seeing them at home, I thought I might better

understand the mentality of their brothers in exile. Some important clue was lacking, but I could not name it or define it.

The driver of my car, on the journey in Israel, was an Israeli Jew, born there, who speaks Arabic as his second mother tongue and looks so like Nasser that it is a joke. I said I wanted to visit the village of Meron, on a mountaintop in Galilee. He said that at Meron there was an ancient temple of the Jews, the grave of a famous rabbi, a synagogue, a Yeshiva (the Orthodox Jewish equivalent of a Catholic seminary), but nothing else to his knowledge. Let us go and find out, I said. So we drove north through this country, which is a monument to the obstinate, tireless will of man. In 1949, the new immigrants, like ants on the hillsides, were planting trees: their first job. It looked as if they were planting blades of grass and seemed a pitiful act of faith. Now the trees have grown.

There are countless changes in Israel, but the Arab villages along the road to Nazareth have not changed. The old adobe or field-stone houses cling to and grow from each other. They are charming, picturesque, primitive, and wretched; but not to Arab peasants. This is the way it always was; this is the way they like it and want to keep it.

We drove up the mountain. Between the synagogue and the heroic ruins of the two-thousand-year-old temple, we did indeed find Meron, the home of the aristocrat who had offered me a rose on a mountaintop in Lebanon. There were not more than twelve houses in the village. The Muktar's palace is a long narrow stone shed, with an ugly narrow porch along the front. Instead of beams, bits of rusted railway track hold up the porch. The other small houses were built of the honey-colored, rough field stone, with traditional graceful doors and windows. Inside, the houses were like stables unfit for decent animals. The rich fields and groves the Meron refugees had described were the steep slopes of the mountain behind, where the villagers cultivated tobacco and some fruit and fig trees. In their day, the village had no electric light or water; the women carried water on their heads from the wadi at the foot of the mountain. The view is a dream of beauty. Hardship for hardship, Meron is no better than their refugee camp, Mia Mia, perhaps not as good; but memory is magical, and Meron was home.

Beside these pretty stone hovels tower the remains of a great temple. The blocks of granite in the fragmented wall are as massive as those in the wall of Solomon's Temple in Jerusalem. The broken pillars are enormous, unadorned, and suddenly Samson is real and pulled down real pillars as heavy as these. Here, two thousand

years ago, the Jews were for two thousand years history of the Jews or of weeds around their loved houses of the dead, the Arabs who conquered it when the villagers of Meron, this mountain; did they why did they run away this place.

On January 1, 1960, 159,236 Muslims, 22,351 Druses lived in have increased, but to work on; roughly a now. The Jewish population here from the four 1,858,841. These dissimilarly and lovingly reduce — of which one The Druses, a separate phenomenon; they approve of the Jews; Israel. The remaining again.

On this tour, I visit near the Lebanese front on the coastal plain villages near the Jordan settlement near Tel Aviv new Jewish settlements and a Roman Catholic Crusader city of Acre.

My idea was to search on the grounds that English, were educated feelings of their community thought about Arab their own community by their own wish, which in Arabic, according to my driver, was to search found someone I could disappear. I did not perished by his alien presence myself anxiety. The of their freedom inside not in the least cowed.

In the Christian Arab was an attractive lean turely gray hair, working of the evening. He had a young modern wife,

years ago, the Jews were praying in a new temple, for two thousand years is not all that much in the history of the Jews or of this land. And here, with weeds around their low walls, stand the abandoned houses of the descendants of warrior strangers, the Arabs who came to this country and conquered it when the temple was some six hundred years old, doubtless already a ruin. Were the villagers of Meron happy when they lived on this mountain; did they think it Eden then? And why did they run away? The war never touched this place.

On January 1, 1960, according to Israeli statistics, 159,236 Muslims, 48,277 Christian Arabs, and 22,351 Druses lived in Israel. These people will have increased, but that is a good enough basis to work on; roughly a quarter of a million Arabs by now. The Jewish population, coming together here from the four corners of the earth, was 1,858,841. These dissimilar people live on eight thousand square miles of quite beautiful, laboriously and lovingly reclaimed rock heap and sand dune — of which one third is irreducible desert. The Druses, a separate and secret sect, are a phenomenon; they are content. They trust and approve of the Jews; they are loyal citizens of Israel. The remaining Arabs are something else again.

On this tour, I visited a Christian Arab village near the Lebanese frontier; a Muslim Arab village on the coastal plain near Acre; two Muslim villages near the Jordanian frontier; a new Muslim settlement near Tel Aviv — the exact copy of a new Jewish settlement, built by the government; and a Roman Catholic priest, in the beautiful Crusader city of Acre.

My idea was to search out Arab schoolteachers, on the grounds that they would probably speak English, were educated men, would know the feelings of their communities, and would have thought about Arab problems. Arabs, living in their own communities, have their own schools, by their own wish, where the children are taught in Arabic, according to Arab principles. Nissim, my driver, was to serve as translator until I had found someone I could talk to; he was then to disappear. I did not want anyone to feel hampered by his alien presence. I might have spared myself anxiety. The candor of the Arabs is proof of their freedom inside the state of Israel; they are not in the least cowed.

In the Christian Arab village, the schoolteacher was an attractive lean young man, with prematurely gray hair, working in his garden in the cool of the evening. He had a good modern house, a young modern wife, and after six years of mar-

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riage, a first baby, a six-months-old girl named Mary, whom he and his wife so adored that neither of them took their eyes off the child at the same moment. He was healthy, prosperous, respected, freely doing his chosen work, loved and loving; by any standards, a fortunate man. After hours of listening to him, I had grasped the lacking clue, and felt hopeless.

"Great Britain helped the Jews," he said. "The English gave weapons to the Arab countries, and they gave weapons to us. In this village we were all armed; we all fired at the Jews, every one of us. But our bullets were no good; the English gave bad bullets to the Arabs. Four out of five of the bullets were no good. When we saw this, we ran

away to Lebanon for two weeks and then we came back."

"Were any of you killed in these battles?"

"No, no one. Yes, we refused Partition. We did not want the Jews here; we wanted the whole country for ourselves, as is right. We only lost because of the United Nations and the Western powers."

"The Ottoman Empire crushed the pride of the Arabs. The Western powers divided the Arabs into many nations, after the First World War, to keep them weak. In the 1948 war, the next village was bombed by the Jews; when we saw that, we knew we had no hope."

(Pause for breath: the Jewish Air Force at the time consisted of nineteen Piper Cubs, a nice little plane, not a bomber; the next village was a good seven or eight miles away.)

"Now we have military zones, all along the frontiers. We must ask for permission to travel or work in different places. They have taken our land which is in the military zones. Yes, they pay for it, but very cheaply."

"At the price it used to be worth in the Mandate? Before it was improved by the Jews?"

"Something like that. No, even cheaper. Just now two boys from this village were caught on the Lebanese frontier; the Lebanese police sent them back. The Israelis are holding them for interrogation. How could such boys be spies?"

"I don't know. But you do remember that the Arab countries are at war with Israel? I should think it might be hard for the Jews to know what Arabs they could trust."

"They are right not to trust 50 per cent of the Arabs in this country."

"How can they know which 50 per cent?"

"Oh, they know everything. They have a C.I.D. agent in every Arab village. He is a Jew, and everyone knows him."

"What's the use of having a secret policeman if everyone knows he's a secret policeman?"

"There are plenty of informers. I don't know what it is that has taught all Arabs to be spies." He said this with real despair.

"There is compulsory education in this country up to the age of fourteen. That is a very good thing. We did not have such a thing before. But the Muslims do not send their girls to school half the time and do not send the boys if they can earn. Then what? The fine for the father is only five pounds. What is five pounds to the father?"

"Do you really mean that you want the Jews to supply the schools and the law which makes education compulsory, and also to force the Arabs and Druses to send their children to school and take advantage of this education? Wouldn't that make the Jews even more unpopular?"

He admitted, with a smile, that this might be the case and went on: "Nasser buys arms from Russia because he could not get them from the West. Egypt has twenty-two million people, so it needs many more arms than the Israelis, who are only two million. But Nasser is not crazy; he will not make war. He spends as much on social reform as on arms. All children now go to school in the Arab countries."

"Have you ever visited the Arab countries? Have you been to Egypt?"

"No."

We drank more coffee; we lit more cigarettes. I braced myself for further enlightenment.

"The Arab Kings were not the true representatives of the Arab peoples when they made war against Israel. Now all the refugees should come back and we should have Partition."

At this point, I decided to make one long, determined stand to see whether there was any meeting ground of minds on a basis of mutually accepted facts and reasoning.

"Please bear with me and help me," said I. "I am a simple American, and I am trying to understand how the Arab mind works, and I am finding it very difficult. I want to put some things in order; if I have everything wrong, you will correct me. In 1947, the United Nations recommended the Partition of Palestine. I have seen the Partition map and studied it. I cannot tell, but it does not look to me as if the Arabs were being cheated of their share of good land. The idea was that this division would work, if both Jews and Arabs accepted it and lived under an Economic Union. And, of course, the Arab countries around the borders would have to be peaceful and cooperative or else nothing would work at all. The Jews accepted this Partition plan; I suppose because they felt they had to. They were outnumbered about two to one inside the country, and there were the neighboring Arab states with five regular armies and forty million or more citizens, not feeling friendly. Are we agreed so far?"

"It is right."

"The Arab governments and the Palestinian Arabs rejected Partition absolutely. You wanted the whole country. There is no secret about this. The statements of the Arab representatives in the UN are on record. The Arab governments never hid the fact that they started the war against Israel. But you, the Palestinian Arabs, agreed to this, you wanted it. And you thought, it seems to me very reasonably, that you would win and win quickly. It hardly seemed a gamble; it seemed a sure bet. You took the gamble and you lost. I can understand why you have all been searching for explanations of that defeat ever since, because it does seem incredible. I don't happen to

accept your explanations point. The point is that "Yes." It was too asto and West were in acc words.

"Now you say that y past; you want Partition us forget that war we sta after all, we think Par idea. Please answer me know. If the position had started the war and war, would you now ac give up part of the cou Jewish residents of P from the war — to com

"Certainly not," he hesitation. "But there refugees. They had no all be dead or in the s

He had given me th word we use nowadays into the emotions of oth admired individual re felt no blanket empath gees, and finally I knei gray-haired schooltear for those who only so difficult to pity the p past all doubt, those must be innocent. Th victorious rewarding for their defeat, and them may be unfortun lization would collap Nazi Germany) if me move to help their h found difference exis fortune (there, but for victims of injustice. I stood, thanks to the s

"Do you follow the An Arabic daily pap tion thrive in Israel. "Yes. Every day." disgust.

"Do you not ima Israel believe this ma have been prevented land to escape to? Don also, what you just s no Jewish refugees fi dead or in the sea? I them to you a little?"

He shrugged, he su tacitly admitted the importance. "In 1948 that is why we lost. I

accept your explanations, but that is beside the point. The point is that you lost."

"Yes." It was too astonishing; at long last, East and West were in accord on the meaning of words.

"Now you say that you want to return to the past; you want Partition. So, in fact you say, let us forget that war we started, and the defeat, and, after all, we think Partition is a good, sensible idea. Please answer me this, which is what I must know. If the position were reversed, if the Jews had started the war and lost it, if you had *won* the war, would you now accept Partition? Would you give up part of the country and allow the 650,000 Jewish residents of Palestine — who had fled from the war — to come back?"

"Certainly not," he said, without an instant's hesitation. "But there would have been no Jewish refugees. They had no place to go. They would all be dead or in the sea."

He had given me the missing clue. The fancy word we use nowadays is "empathy" — entering into the emotions of others. I had appreciated and admired individual refugees but realized I had felt no blanket empathy for the Palestinian refugees, and finally I knew why — owing to this nice, gray-haired schoolteacher. It is hard to sorrow for those who only sorrow over themselves. It is difficult to pity the pitiless. To wring the heart past all doubt, those who cry aloud for justice must be innocent. They cannot have wished for a victorious rewarding war, blame everyone else for their defeat, and remain guiltless. Some of them may be unfortunate human beings, and civilization would collapse (as it notoriously did in Nazi Germany) if most people did not naturally move to help their hurt fellow men. But a profound difference exists between victims of misfortune (there, but for the grace of God, go I) and victims of injustice. My empathy knew where it stood, thanks to the schoolteacher.

"Do you follow the Eichmann trial?" I asked. An Arabic daily paper, weeklies, and radio station thrive in Israel.

"Yes. Every day." He wrinkled his nose with disgust.

"Do you not imagine that all the Jews in Israel believe this massacre of their people could have been prevented if the Jews had had a homeland to escape to? Don't you think that they knew, also, what you just said: there would have been no Jewish refugees from here — they would be dead or in the sea? Doesn't that perhaps explain them to you a little?"

He shrugged, he smiled; with these gestures he tacitly admitted the point, but it was of minor importance. "In 1948, the Arabs were not united; that is why we lost. In 1956 the Jews beat Nasser.

He will never make war. But when there are five million Jews here in Israel, the Jews will make war, because they will need more land."

"Israel is about the size of New Jersey, a state in America. Some six million people live quite comfortably in New Jersey. Israel could become an industrial state, a very useful one."

"No, it cannot. The Arab nations will not allow it. They will not trade with Israel. They will not let Israeli ships go through the Canal. They do not wish Israel to do these things. They will not accept Israel."

"It is hopeless," I said. "In my lifetime, those who threatened war sooner or later produced it. If Arab-Israel politics keep up like this, my friend, perhaps all of us, everywhere — you and your wife and Mary, and my child and my husband and I — will have the privilege of dying in the same stupid final war."

He thought I was making a rich foreign joke. He has never seen even a corner of a real big war; he cannot imagine it. He thinks war is something that lasts a few weeks, during which you shoot off bad bullets at a remote enemy, no one is killed, you run away for a bit and then come home to your undamaged houses and lead a good life, indeed a better material life than before. None of these Arabs has suffered anything comparable to what survivors of modern war know; none can imagine such catastrophe.

THE Christian schoolteacher sent me on to a friend of his, a Muslim schoolteacher, in a village called Masra on the plain near Acre. The Muslim schoolteacher was a young black-eyed beauty, who received me in a bleak cement-walled room, scantily furnished with an ugly desk, wardrobe, straight chairs, and day bed. He wore striped pajamas, traces of shaving cream, and a princely ease of manner. We got right down to business.

Before 1948, the population of Masra was 350; now it is 200. They owned little land, they had worked on neighboring *kibbutzim* and in Acre factories. They always had good relations with the Jews. "No one here shot at Jews; and no Jews shot at us." (Note the order of the sentence.) But now Masra had grown and swollen; 900 refugees lived here.

"Refugees?"

"Yes, people from those villages."

He gestured out the door, across the fields.

"What? From villages nearby?"

"Yes, yes. Those villages. They are maybe seven kilometers away."

"And you consider them refugees?"

"Of course. There was no fighting near here,

but the people are frightened, so they fled to the Druse villages, where they know they will be safe, because the Druses were always friendly with the Jews, and after, they came here. The Israeli government will not let them go back to their villages. The government offered them other land, but they will not take it. Before the war, only my father sent his sons to school from this village. Now we have a school and 240 children in it, 100 girls and 140 boys. We have a water tap at every house and electric light; never such things before. No one owned a radio; now there are 100 radios and frigidaires too. The people earn good wages."

"Then everyone must be happy."

"No. The people are not glad. They want to go back to their old houses, even if there is no light or water or money."

They knew the refugees were "living under good conditions"; he had brothers in Lebanon and Syria who were doing well. How did he know? They wrote messages to the Israel radio, which broadcast them, and the Lebanon radio sent messages back; that way they heard news of their families.

But all the refugees should return and Israel should be partitioned. I put the same proposition to him as to his Christian colleague; if the Arabs had won the war, would they accept Partition?

"No, never, of course not. We would let some few Jews live here as immigrants but not be masters, not in any part of Palestine."

"Why do you think the refugees left in the first place?"

Well, there was much fear. Then, they all knew about Dir Yassin and expected the same to happen to them. Inside Israel, the Arabs do not need or use the refugees' stories of massacres; they do not have to account for flight, since they are still at home. They know what happened around them, and their neighbors know, and such stories would be pointless. But they do speak of Dir Yassin, which was a genuine massacre and took place in the village of that name, near Jerusalem, on April 9, 1948.

Before the official Arab-Israeli war started (on May 15, 1948) there had been months and months of "incidents." ("From the first week of December 1947, disorder in Palestine had begun to mount. The Arabs repeatedly asserted that they would resist partition by force. They seemed to be determined to drive that point home by assaults upon the Jewish community in Palestine."—Trygve Lie, *In the Cause of Peace*, Macmillan, 1954.) By February, 1948, aside from scattered Arab attacks on scattered Jews, and reprisals for same, the "Arab Liberation Army" had moved into Palestine from the north, and Jerusalem was

bombarded, besieged, and cut off. The Jews were trying to run food to the beleaguered Jewish population of Jerusalem. A lot of Jews were getting killed in that effort, in Jerusalem and elsewhere, and in the eyes of some Jews not enough was being done to prevent or avenge this. The state of Israel did not exist; no functioning Jewish government could control this anarchic, deadly phase of undeclared war.

Two famous illegal groups of militant Jews, the Stern Gang and the Irgun Zvai Leumi, had their own ideas on how to fight fire with fire. The British regarded them both as terrorists. The Jewish Agency and their underground army, the Haganah, which were the official Jewish authorities in Palestine, also rejected the Stern Gang and the Irgun Zvai Leumi, because of their ruthlessness. Under the circumstances that created them, these two outlawed bands do not seem very different from Resistance groups, Partisans, or Commandos, all of whom were admired as patriots, and none of whom obeyed the Queensberry rules.

The Irgun Zvai Leumi, in any case, behaved like desperate men at war, not like the millennial inheritors of a high moral code. The village of Dir Yassin lay close to besieged Jerusalem and its life-line road. According to the Irgun, Dir Yassin was a nest of snipers and armed Arabs; an effective enemy concentration. On their own, the Irgun decided to attack Dir Yassin. Their leader was killed by Arab fire from the village; the Irgun fighters then went brutally mad and shot everyone in sight. Two hundred and fifty Arabs were killed.

To this day, Israelis cannot get over their shame for Dir Yassin while failing to remind themselves, the Arabs, and the world that murder, horribly, begets murder; and they could present a longer casualty list of Jews killed by Arabs, before and after Dir Yassin, during the twilight period of terror that preceded open war.

The news of Dir Yassin spread like the tolling of a funeral bell throughout Arab Palestine. According to their own ethical code and practice of war, Dir Yassin must have seemed a natural portent of the future to the Arabs. They intended to massacre the Jews; if the Jews were victorious, obviously they would massacre the Arabs. As the beautiful schoolteacher pointed out, Dir Yassin threw the fear of death into vast numbers of the Arab population. In panic, they fled from Palestine.

Since we were talking about war, we came easily to the subject of Nasser.

"Here they love Nasser. All love him. He is Arab person. They do not believe what he says on the radio—kill the Jews, kick them into the sea. So long he says it, and nothing happens. It

will not be war. Something not soon."

The Christian Arab school of a priest in Acre whom I not find him. Instead, I the nearest church steep neath, and was admitted priest in a brown cassock but was an Italian. He for nearly thirty years survive: by laughter. H and it was an awesome s broke into silent mirth.

We settled on his chairs, and he ruminates refugees. If there was financial compensation of the refugees would those who came back could not endure how discipline. The work thinking of Palestine propaganda. Why not land resettlement in Arab governments d Give the money to the them to get on with the By force. (But what f

He often told Arab million refugees who c West Germany; they Germany and enriched not 800,000 Arab ref tries, which were big is no use; Arabs have refugees or any other they cannot think abo

The whole problem West; the Arabs are using blackmail. Th the West came to ter and strong and coul Father?)

Ah well, the Jews come back; the Arab ("The ones I've seen Father, and you know to make a sound, it is true, but they do no no underground. T they really wanted around as a base. (S Father—until 1956 incidents with the U investigate murders, was nothing, nothing they really wanted t With another mu

will not be war. Something else will arrange, but not soon."

The Christian Arab schoolteacher had told me of a priest in Acre whom I should see, but I could not find him. Instead, I directed myself toward the nearest church steeple, rang a doorbell beneath, and was admitted by an enormous, rotund priest in a brown cassock. He looked like an Arab but was an Italian. He had lived in this country for nearly thirty years and had learned how to survive: by laughter. He laughed at everything, and it was an awesome sight, as if a hippopotamus broke into silent mirth.

We settled on his stiff upholstered visitors' chairs, and he ruminated on the problem of the refugees. If there was the choice between a big financial compensation or return, only 50 per cent of the refugees would wish to return, and most of those who came back would not stay. "They could not endure how this country is run. The discipline. The work." The refugees are kept thinking of Palestine by the Arab leaders, by propaganda. Why not build factories and arrange land resettlement in the Arab countries? (The Arab governments do not wish this, Father.) Give the money to the Arab governments and tell them to get on with the job and control it. (How?) By force. (But what force, Father?)

He often told Arab priests about the thirteen million refugees who came from East Germany to West Germany; they were all absorbed into West Germany and enriched the country. Why would not 800,000 Arab refugees enrich the Arab countries, which were big and underpopulated? But it is no use; Arabs have never heard of any other refugees or any other problem than their own, and they cannot think about that, in a practical way.

The whole problem is between the East and the West; the Arabs are very happy in the middle, using blackmail. This would stop if the East and the West came to terms, or if the West was united and strong and could impose its will. (But how, Father?)

Ah well, the Jews might as well let the refugees come back; the Arabs here are loyal to the state. ("The ones I've seen detest the Jews and the state, Father, and you know it.") I expected his laughter to make a sound, it was so violent. Yes, yes, that is true, but they do nothing. There is no resistance, no underground. Think what they could do if they really wanted to, with the Arab countries all around as a base. (Some Arabs did for a long time, Father — until 1956, in fact; look at the countless incidents with the UN police force called out to investigate murders, thefts, sabotage.) Oh, that was nothing, nothing to what they could do if they really wanted to.

With another mute roar, he told me that the

Arabs said, First we will finish with the Shabbaths, and then with the Sundays. They never changed their ideas. They went around looking at the women and the houses they would take when they managed to get rid of the Jews and the Christians. He laughed himself into a good shake over this one.

I asked about the Eichmann trial and the reaction of his Roman Catholic parishioners. Well, his Christian Arabs thought Eichmann was right, because the Jews were the enemy of the German state. They were always the enemy of the state; the Pharaohs had to drive them out of Egypt, the Persian King tried to clear them out, Ferdinand and Isabella kicked them out of Spain. No one could live on good terms with them, so Eichmann was right. (Horried, really horried, I said, "Surely that is not a Christian attitude to the most appalling murders we know about?" He found it terribly funny that I should expect a Christian attitude from Arabs.)

"I do not like either Arabs or Jews," the priest announced with great good humor, "but I serve them with my whole heart, as I must."

He asked me at the door whether there are any Christian Arabs in refugee camps. Yes, I had seen a camp of Christians in Lebanon.

"I am surprised. There must be very few. I would have expected them to manage better. They do not dream all the time. They have more contact with reality than the Muslims."

By now I could foretell one local Arab account of reality. First they explain that they did not lose the war against the Jews; various others are responsible for the defeat. Then they boast cheerfully of their present material well-being, as if they had invented prosperity. At this stage, the Israeli Jews might be wisps of smoke; they had nothing to do with building the country. However, Arabs are miserable; although they never had it so good, it is not good enough, owing, of course, to the Jews. Usually these Arabs say how much they love Nasser and in their devotion are curiously remindful of Nazi Austrians, twenty-five years ago, when they praised the handsome distant leader, Adolf, from whose hand all blessings would flow. What they believe they now want is to bring the refugees home and partition the state. They have not considered this as a practical matter, nor imagined its effects on their new-found prosperity.

I visited a school in a village where prosperity had broken out like a rash — new houses, shops, hospital, high school, bigger elementary schools — and the teachers harangued me as foreseen. After telling me how well off everyone was, and bragging of their growth, they told me they were all

unhappy and poor because they had owned 40,000 dunams of land (10,000 acres) and now only owned 10,000 dunams. But another Arab, who had not overheard this conversation and was employed as an agricultural inspector, explained that the 10,000 dunams were irrigated, which was new, and also they were scientifically farmed, and therefore produced far more than the 40,000 dunams had. To listen to these conversations is work for a psychiatrist, not a journalist.

I yearned for my silent hotel room in Jerusalem, but Nissim had two heart's-desires, and Nissim was such a nice man that I could not refuse him. There was a "great lady" he wanted me to meet, a Muslim. "She began a Muslim women's club all alone, she," Nissim said. "Such a thing has never been. What a brave woman. The Muslims go to a place and learn together, and hear lectures, the women. Is it not wonderful?" I could see that Nissim was by nature a suffragette. He also wanted me to visit a new village of government-built houses, which the Arab citizens buy on the installment plan by paying a low rent. Not everyone has a chance to own such fine, inexpensive houses, and Nissim — like all Jewish Israelis — is ardently proud of every improvement in his country.

First we called on the lady, who lived in a modern villa, luxurious by middle-class standards anywhere and palatial by Middle Eastern standards, very shiny and tasteless. Nissim thought it wonderful; so did she, with well-bred restraint. She was young, charming, just returned from her schoolteacher's job, bathed and dressed for the afternoon in a sleeveless red dress. She spoke of her Muslim women's club, whose members ranged in age from fifteen to sixty, and learned sewing, cooking, child care, listened to lectures, and were enthusiastic over their new venture. I am a suffragette like Nissim and was delighted. Then the predictable complaints began. The peasants, she said, have work and money and don't care about anything else. But the educated people suffer; they have all this education, and after they finish their studies, what can they do? Only the professions, and business, and a few are elected to Parliament; but they cannot get positions in the army. Her husband, a pharmacist, has to take four buses to reach his place of work, but here is this village of eight thousand people without a pharmacy; why don't the Jews open a pharmacy?

"If there is such a crying need for a pharmacy here, why doesn't your husband start one himself? This is not a Communist state; there are no laws against private enterprise. You are well-known people, full and free citizens. You could certainly raise a loan, if you need it."

You are not supposed to argue about com-

plaints; it is abominable manners. Her face closed like a lovely olive-colored trap.

"The Israelis say that they do not conscript Arabs — except the Druses, who insisted on it themselves — because the only people the Israeli Army would ever have to fight are Arabs. It seems decent to me, and it seems like reasonable military security. How would your men feel if called upon to fight fellow Arabs, who might be their blood relatives and intended to be their liberators? Do you think it is a good job for a man to join an army he cannot serve with his heart, and would sell out if the time came? That may be excellent work for spies, but not for soldiers."

She opened her closed face to say, "Yes, I see. But it is our country."

It was too hot, and too futile. Besides, I was tired of the convention which apparently requires non-Arabs to treat Arabs as if they were neurotic children, subject either to tantrums or to internal bleeding from spiritual wounds. This girl did not strike me as a pathetic weakling.

"Only by right of conquest," I said. "In the seventh century. The Jews got here first, about two thousand years ahead of you. You haven't lived as masters in your own house for a long time. Aside from the Crusaders, the Ottoman Turks bossed you for a steady four hundred years, before the British took over. Now the Jews have won back their land by right of conquest. Turn and turn about," I said, feeling as beastly minded as an Arab myself. "Fair's fair."

"How was it?" asked Nissim, who had been waiting in the car. "She is fine, isn't she? Think that she starts to teach the Muslim women. No other one did."

Israelis are the first to explain (and who can know better?) that it is painful to be a minority: the Arabs in Palestine became a minority suddenly. It is grievous (as who knows better than Israelis?) to be separated from the numerous, needed members of your family. Israelis will also explain that the Arabs in Israel are torn in two: their racial loyalty belongs to the enemies of Israel, and they are afraid; if the Arab nations make war against Israel, as is regularly promised on the radio from Cairo, Damascus, Beirut, what will be their fate? Would the outside Arabs regard them, the Arabs inside Israel, as collaborators, traitors?

The emotional position of the Israeli Arabs is tormenting (and is held in that torment by the Arab radio stations), though they are materially secure, protected by equal justice under law, and by an almost exaggerated respect for their feelings. If the Arab nations made peace with Israel, it is possible that all Israeli Arabs would relax, be happy, and wholehearted supporters of Israel. If not, not. No one, after listening to Israeli Arabs,

could believe that Palestine either contented or loyal.

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could believe that Palestinian refugees would be either contented or loyal citizens of Israel.

The new village, that so pleased Nissim, was rows of small plastered houses painted in pastel shades, or white with pastel-colored woodwork. They have a porch-veranda, two fairly large rooms, a kitchen, a shower-washroom, and small gardens. No working-class Arabs I saw anywhere in the Middle East possess houses like these, but the owners were not satisfied, as I knew they would not be. One boy of about fourteen could speak English; boys of this age are valuable informants — they parrot their elders without reflection.

"We are very poor," he said.

"How can you be very poor and live in these houses? You have to pay for them."

"We must to work very hard. More harder than before. Terrible work. We have no land."

"Wasn't farming hard work?"

"No. That was easy. Not like now."

"How does your family manage?"

"My brother works. In Tel Aviv. In a gasoline station. That is terrible hard work."

When we left, the pretty, healthy children ran beside the car, shouting. I waved. Nissim looked queer, something was wrong; that chronic optimist seemed sad.

"What's the matter, Nissim?"

"Nothing. What the children say."

"You mean just now, shouting?"

"Yes. They say: 'Where you going, bastard? I spit on you.'"

What for, I thought, what for, and will it never stop?

"Do you hate the Arabs, Nissim?"

"No. Of course no."

"Why not?"

"What is the good of hate?"

What indeed? Arabs gorge on hate, they roll in it, they breathe it. Jews top the hate list, but any foreigners are hateful enough. Arabs also hate each other, separately and en masse. Their politicians change the direction of their hate as they would change their shirts. Their press is vulgarly base with hate-filled cartoons; their reporting describes whatever hate is now uppermost and convenient. Their radio is a long scream of hate, a call to hate. They teach their children hate in school. They must love the taste of hate; it is their daily bread. And what good has it done them?

THERE is no future in spending UN money to breed hate. There is no future in nagging or bullying Israel to commit suicide by the admission of a fatal locust swarm of enemies. There is no future in Nasser's solution, the Holy War against Israel;

and we had better make this very clear, very quickly. Long bleak memories will recall the Sudetendeutsch and Czechoslovakia. In a new setting, Palestinian refugees assume the role of the Sudetendeutsch. Israel becomes Czechoslovakia. Propaganda prepares the war for liberation of "our brothers." Victory over a minor near enemy is planned as the essential first step on a long triumphant road of conquest. A thousand-year Muslim Reich, the African continent ruled by Egypt, may be a mad dream, but we have experience of mad dreams and mad dreamers. We cannot be too careful. The echo of Hitler's voice is heard again in the land, now speaking Arabic.

Unfortunately for us all, including the Arabs, the Middle Eastern Arab nations have been hit by independence and the twentieth century at the same time. It is a lot to handle, and they are not handling it safely or sanely. The Cold War does not help them; it encourages folly. East and West both treat the Arabs with nervous anxiety; placatory and bribing, East and West keep their eyes fixed on the geographical location of the Arab states and the immense amount of oil under their deserts. No one does or can talk practical facts about Israel to the Arabs; it would be useless. Even the soundest Arab leaders have tied their own hands tight in an official hate policy. At present, any Arab government which urged a quick, peaceful, advantageous settlement of the Palestine Refugee Problem would be mobbed. The mobs have been indoctrinated for thirteen years, as have the Arab refugees.

The Palestinian refugees could have been absorbed into the economic life of the Arab countries long ago, despite the remark of UNRWA's Director — in his 1960 report — that jobs do not exist for the refugees in the Arab countries. Of course they do not exist; if they did, the Arab standard of life would be a finer and a better thing than it is now. The jobs must be made; but the Arab countries need to have the jobs done as much as the refugees need to do them. The Director of UNRWA states, in the same report, that the majority of Palestinian refugees are unskilled peasants and there are enough or too many of those in the Arab countries already. No doubt. But unskilled peasants, all over the world, have learned to become skilled factory workers or scientific farmers, at very short notice; that ability to learn is what makes our modern industrial civilization tick. The Yemenite Jews who moved in a week from the Middle Ages to Israel, the unskilled Polish peasants operating the Nova Huta steel mills are obvious examples of this transformation. Neighboring Arabs regard the Palestinian Arabs as outstandingly intelligent.

I would think this reputation deserved. There is no reason to believe that they cannot learn as others have.

Where there's a will — and as much unused land and wasted water, mineral and oil resources, underpopulation and undeveloped industries as in the vast Arab territories — there's a way. "Western Imperialists" would have to contribute most of the cash for the way, and it would be cheap at the price. It is more expensive to maintain paupers forever than to establish free, self-supporting citizens. One outlay of capital is futile and never ends; the other is a capital investment, humane and profitable, and pays for itself. It pays in buying peace, and we don't have to argue which is the better bargain, peace or war. "Western Imperialists" should provide the way; the Arab governments would have to provide the will.

Economics are not all, and the tragedy of most refugees is not that they starve in their countries of adoption, but that their hearts and minds and souls starve. They are lonely strangers who do not speak the language of the new land, or know its customs; they are aliens. But the Palestinian refugees look, think, feel, and organize themselves socially as the Arabs of the "host countries" do. They speak the same language, they practice the same religion. The Christian minority would find fellow minority Christians in every Arab country except Lebanon, where they are on top. The Palestinian Arabs are not foreigners in the Arab world; they are members of their own family.

According to Arab politicians and apologists, the Palestinian refugees refuse to become integrated in the Arab world; it is Palestine or nothing for them. Everyone shouts for the Palestinian refugees, and at them, and about them, but no one has ever asked the refugees what they themselves want: where do you want to live; what do you want to do? My tiny personal Gallup poll unearthed plenty of refugees who were happy where they were and had no desire to return to Palestine, no matter what; and plenty of refugees who longed to emigrate to the richer Arab countries, where the future looks brighter, or out into the great non-Arab world. Except for one Christian Arab from Jaffa, who thinks Jews more honest than Arab Muslims and better people to do business with, none of them wanted to return to Israel, as Israeli citizens, and dwell in peace with their Jewish neighbors. We need a secret poll of both sexes, from the age of twelve onward, to discover the refugees' own wishes for their own lives. The poll would have to be secret because it is impossible, even perilous, for an Arab refugee openly to disclaim interest in Palestine. Such a freethinker would be marked as a traitor to the Arab cause. Man is a political animal, but he also

wants to live. Politics have offered a very dry crust to these refugees for a very long time.

Yet the Arab governments insist that the Palestinian refugees are a political problem. Once a year, formally, they brandish these waiting lives at the UN Assembly. The rest of the year, with different degrees of intensity, depending on their domestic politics, they wield these waiting lives to stir up Arab hate at home. The Arab governments say they will not accept the existence of the state of Israel, now or ever. The logical conclusion is that, when ready, they intend to burst from their cold belligerent status into hot armed conflict and terminate Israel's existence. We cannot force the Arab nations to make peace with Israel, but we have to prevent them from making actual war — for the sake of all human life, their own included. A vital preventive act would be to remove the Palestinian refugees as a justification of war.

Is it fruitless to offer terms to the Arab governments? We cannot hurry them, or threaten them. Their pride has been scarred; they are uncertain noisy adolescents in a tricky clever adult world; their nationalism is new, and they suspect insults or attacks on it, from every side; they do not live easily with themselves or with each other; and they have not yet understood that a nation is only as strong as its people — arms laid on top of disease, illiteracy, and poverty are a useless burden. But if we know our own minds, are patient, firm, and generous, in time the Arab governments might allow us to enrich their countries.

Our Western offer should be clear: UNRWA is to continue as a bridge to the future; we will pay for the bridge and the future — Palestinian refugees are gradually to become Arab citizens, earning their own livelihood on land, in industries, which our money and technical help will make available. All of this, but not another penny for a political problem. The Palestinian refugees must be taken out of politics forever and given the same chance that millions of refugees have had before them: a chance for work, private peace, and private life.

Would the Arab governments reject such an offer flatly, in pique, and turn UNRWA over to the Russians? The Arab leaders do not care for Communism at home. Russia, as parent and teacher of hundreds of thousands of young Arab refugees, would not charm them. In the ugly East-West rivalry for Arab affection (and oil and geography), we might for once risk taking a reasonable, compassionate line. We are not likely to be outbid in this field. The Arab governments do not love us, but they fear the proselytizing Communists more.

UNRWA has been a splendid mother-and-father and can serve the refugees as a guide to the

future. UNRWA's greatest contribution to the Arab world, and, indeed, to the education and health of its people, should receive more money than it now gets. UNRWA will be with us for a long time, and a kindly old folks' home for Arab propaganda purposes. Its work should not be supervised; none of its activities should be supervised; none of its personnel must keep them attached from the Arab-Israeli

THE Palestinian refugees, Arab politicians and apologists believe that the explosion of the Declaration to "view with interest in Palestine of a home. More likely, the explosion of time when the Romans drove one and only homeland, the history, the Bible. Nearly

future. UNRWA's greatest gift to the refugees, to the Arab world, and, indirectly, to us all is the education and health of its charges. UNRWA should receive more money and be considered primarily an educational institution. In my opinion, UNRWA will be with us for some time, an admirable training school for young Palestinians and a kindly old folks' home for aged Palestinians. But UNRWA too must be taken out of politics. Its work should not be subject to Arab political supervision; none of its activities should be used for Arab propaganda purposes; and its Western personnel must keep themselves rigorously detached from the Arab-Israel controversy.

THE Palestinian refugees are a chain reaction. Arab politicians and apologists would have us believe that the explosion began with the Balfour Declaration to "view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a home for the Jewish people." More likely, the explosion started in the depths of time when the Romans drove the Jews from their one and only homeland, the soil that grew their history, the Bible. Nearly two thousand years

later, Hitler and his followers committed such barbarous crimes against the Jews as all Christendom and all Islam, barbarous too, had never inflicted in the centuries of the Jewish dispersion. The Nazis and the gas chambers made the state of Israel inevitable: the Palestinian Arabs and the five invading Arab armies determined the boundaries of Israel.

The Palestinian refugees are unfortunate victims of a brief moment in history. It is forgotten that Jews are also victims in the same manner, of the same moment. The Arab-Israel war and its continuous aftermath produced a two-way flight of peoples. Nearly half a million Jews, leaving behind everything they owned, escaped from the Arab countries where they lived to start life again as refugees in Israel. Within one generation, if civilization lasts, Palestinian refugees will merge into the Arab nations, because the young will insist on real lives instead of endless waiting. If we can keep the peace, however troubled, the children of Palestinian refugees will make themselves at home among their own kind, in their ancestral lands. For the Jews there is no other ancestral land than Israel.

The United Nations General Assembly is again debating the question of the Palestine Refugees. The Palestine Conciliation Commission has submitted a report to the United Nations enclosing the findings and recommendations of Dr. JOSEPH E. JOHNSON, President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Dr. Johnson visited the Middle East in the Fall of 1961 at the request of The Palestine Conciliation Commission.

What is this problem? Why has it not been solved in 13 years? Is a solution possible? Is it near?

MARTHA GELLHORN, a noted authoress, both a correspondent and an analyst, decided to look into the problem. In her own words:

"the best way to consider this case is close-up, by looking at the Palestinian Refugees themselves, not as a problem, not as statistics, but as people. . . . they are individuals, like everyone else."

We thought that her findings would be a significant contribution to a deeper and more intelligent understanding of the problem and be of interest to Americans.

THE COUNCIL FOR MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS

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Arab Refugee Problem
TOWARDS A SOLUTION

STATEMENT

by

MRS. GOLDA MEIR

Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel

in the

SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE

SIXTEENTH SESSION

OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

on

15 December 1961

*in Phillips to
in Davidson to
file*

MR GOLDA

ISRAEL OFFICE OF INFORMATION

135



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134

THE PAST: Origins and Dimensions of the Arab Refugee Problem

The Committee has heard many hours of speeches from representatives of those member-States whose openly avowed purpose it is to destroy my country. In their speeches the representatives of the Arab countries have made no secret of the fact that this is their aim, and not the search for a practical, constructive and humanitarian solution to the refugee problem that is before us. My delegation deems it important, therefore, to put on record once more what we regard to have been the origin of the problem, as well as the attitude of the Government towards practical ways and means of solving it.

A People 4,000 Years Old

May I suggest that representatives of the Arab countries not lecture us on the question of whether we are a people or a race or a religion, but leave it to us to find our own way towards a secure future out of the hardships, sufferings and miseries that fate imposed upon us throughout the centuries. It is perhaps difficult for some to grasp this strange phenomenon of Jewish history. The Jewish people is four thousand years old. The origin of its history and of its spiritual creation are linked with the Land of the Bible. In it a State is established and later destroyed by powerful neighbors. The Jews go into exile, only to return centuries later and establish a State once more. Again, centuries later, the State is conquered by more powerful foes after long years of war and the Jews go into exile, this time a dispersion which takes them to all parts of the globe. In many countries their lot is one of suffering, discrimination, persecution, physical danger and even death, because they are Jews.

Yet during all these long generations Jews in their worldwide dispersion cling to the idea of returning one day to the land which is the one place on the globe that is associated with their history and with the spiritual heritage which they gave to the whole of mankind. Never for a day did the Jews cease to pray and dream about the return to the land from which their people had sprung, the land in which they had accepted the concept of one God; the land in which their Prophets had proclaimed the vision of the brotherhood of man, of justice and of universal peace. Throughout the generations Jews continued to live in Palestine. Over and over again Jews from various parts of the world

came back, some driven by anti-Semitism and persecution, and many impelled by their need for the renaissance of national life, dignity and self-expression. Throughout the ages, although Jews lived as minorities in many countries and were engulfed by the languages and culture of others, their Hebrew language never died. The people remained alive, their ancient language — the language of the Bible — was kept alive, and so was their faith in their ultimate return to the land of their fathers.

International Recognition

After World War I, this historic connection between the Jewish people and their land was formally recognized, first by Great Britain and later by international society as it was then organized in the League of Nations. The purpose of the Mandate for Palestine was clearly stated as being the reconstitution of the Jewish National Home in that country. The text of the Mandate recognizes and reaffirms the historic connection of the Jewish people with Palestine. The very term "Jewish National Home" denotes the recognition on the part of the League of Nations that the Jews have national rights in that country. Of course, it was realized that there was an Arab population living there, and we accepted the proviso that in re-establishing the Jewish National Home nothing should be done that might be injurious to the civil and religious rights of the non-Jewish population. A clear distinction was drawn between the national rights of the Jewish people in Palestine, on the one hand, and the civil and religious rights of the Arab population on the other. In that way Palestine was set aside for the Jewish National Home at a time when that same League of Nations decided that the major part of the area which we now call the Middle or Near East, would be advanced towards independence for the Arab peoples. At that time not a single Arab State existed in that area.

Arab representatives talk here as though the establishment of the Jewish National Home and of the State of Israel has deprived the Arab nation of national independence. In fact, what the League of Nations decided at that time, and what the United Nations later confirmed anew in 1947, was the concept that side by side with the Arab people achieving independence in the wide expanses of the Middle East, the Jewish people should be allowed to rebuild its own national future in the tiny land set aside for it. Has not this concept come to abundant fulfillment? How many peoples are there in this Organization that have independence in such vast areas and are represented here by eleven

independent national entities? In the presence of so many Arab representatives, it is really rather a mockery to state that the re-establishment of Jewish independence in a tiny corner of the Middle East has robbed the Arab nation of independence. It was considered just and fair, in international equity, that side by side with the independent Arab States that were to arise and did arise, there would arise also a Jewish State.

The UN Resolution of November 1947

As my colleague Ambassador Comay has shown, at the end of World War I the then Arab leadership accepted this plan and welcomed the return of the Jews to Palestine. If Arab leadership had remained faithful to the concept of good neighborliness between emerging Arab States in the Middle East and the State of Israel, then the world would have been spared all this misery, and the Arabs of Palestine would have lived with us in the National Home and in the State of Israel without any of the difficulties that arose.

But Arab leadership did not reconcile itself to the verdict of international society, and political strife in Palestine began. Finally, the problem was put to the United Nations, the successor of the League of Nations. Again the judgment of the international community was to confirm Jewish national rights in that country. By way of a compromise solution, the United Nations decided, after thorough investigation and prolonged discussion, to partition Palestine so that in one part of the country a Jewish State would arise and in the other part yet another Arab State would be created. This is the essence of the United Nations Resolution of November 1947.

Of course, we proceeded to organize our defensive capacity in the country. What else were we to do in the face of the decision taken by the Arab States to undo the United Nations Resolution by means of war? We appealed to the Arabs of Palestine and to the Arab States to accept the verdict of the United Nations. The Arab States, however, urged the Arabs of Palestine not to accept the United Nations Resolution, incited them to rise against the Jews in the country, sent to their aid irregular armed forces, and promised them that as soon as the British would leave the country, they would march in with their regular armies in order to crush the Jewish State. During the period between the adoption of the United Nations Resolution in November 1947 and the end of the British Mandate in May 1948, the Arabs of Palestine,

encouraged and militarily reinforced by the Arab States, began all-out attacks against Jewish towns and villages. There is not a shred of evidence in United Nations documents to substantiate the false charge made by the Representative of Iraq that it was the Jews who, on the morrow of the United Nations decision, proceeded to attack the Arab community and to take over the whole country. Precisely the contrary is true. We have shown how, immediately the decision was taken, the Arab States announced from the rostrum of the United Nations that they would never accept it and that they would fight it by every means at their disposal. We appealed for acceptance and peace. They decided on rejection and war, and thus hostilities in Palestine began. Naturally, we defended ourselves.

I must again quote what the United Nations Palestine Commission said on this point on 16 February 1948:

"Powerful Arab interests both inside and outside Palestine are defying the resolution of the General Assembly and are engaged in a deliberate effort to alter by force the settlement envisaged therein."

Arab Threats Made Good

On 15 May 1948, the British left and the Arab armies invaded the country. Already, by that time, hundreds of thousands of Palestine Arabs had left their homes and had become refugees as a result of the fighting that had taken place in the country, in consequence of the Arab onslaught on the Jewish community. When the regular Arab armies joined the fighting and full-scale war ensued, the number of refugees swelled. By the time the war was over and the Arab armies had been beaten back, the refugee problem had come about.

Every modern war creates a refugee problem. The responsibility, however, for the fact that Arabs ever became refugees must squarely lie with those who, instead of accepting the verdict of the United Nations, went to war to undo it and perpetrated the aggression of 15 May 1948 against the State of Israel. My colleague has given chapter and verse from Arab sources to show that large numbers of the refugees left the country at the call of the Arab leaders who told them to get out so that the Arab armies could get in.

Arab representatives stressed the tragedy of Deir Yassin, where civilian Arabs were murdered by a Jewish dissident group. This action was at once disavowed and condemned by the official Jewish leadership. Those who perpetrated these murders certainly sinned heavily against the standards of self-defense which the Jewish community had

set itself. Yet at the same time, it is historically incorrect to state that the exodus of the Arab refugees was due to this albeit tragic incident.

Without in any way detracting from the condemnation of what occurred at Deir Yassin, I cannot altogether pass in silence over some of the grave outrages perpetrated at that time by the other side. We cannot forget the assault on the medical convoy on its way to the Hadassah Hospital on Mount Scopus in Jerusalem, when seventy-seven doctors and nurses were killed in cold blood. We cannot forget how the period beginning twenty-four hours after the United Nations Resolution was characterized by the daily toll of innocent lives of Jews travelling in the country. The road to Jerusalem is still today flanked by burnt-out cars whose peaceful passengers fell victim to organized Arab ambush and terror. I shall not give a long list of such instances, but I would like to find one statement of responsible Arab leaders denouncing the massacre of medical personnel and other such occurrences.

Israel's Quarter-Million Arab Citizens

If the Arab States had accepted the United Nations Resolution and if they had urged the Arabs of Palestine to do likewise, instead of inciting them to fight in order to undo the resolution, there would have been no bloodshed and not a single refugee. The Jewish and Arab States in Palestine would have arisen in peace and co-operation and the subsequent history would have been different. Indeed, some 100,000 Arabs did not join the general fight and remained within Israel. Since then, their number has risen through natural increase and through the return of some refugees from beyond the frontiers, and today there are a quarter of a million Arabs in Israel.

Some of the stock allegations of the Arab representatives pertain to the situation of the Arab population of Israel. These allegations are as malicious as they are unfounded, and my colleagues and I have on many occasions refuted them. Suffice it to say, at this time, that the Arabs of Israel share to the fullest the rights of every citizen of the country. They take part in the elections along with all other citizens; they are represented in the Knesset (the Israel Parliament); they take an active part in all walks of life — they are judges and mayors, doctors and lawyers, teachers and social workers, and so on. They enjoy standards of living in health, welfare and education unequalled in any Arab State. We are proud of their important contribution to the development of the country.

Mr. Seif-el-Din Zu'abi, the Arab Mayor of Nazareth, when on a goodwill tour of Asian countries with the Jewish Mayor of Tel Aviv, stated a few days ago in a press interview in Bombay, India:

"Arabs and Jews lead a peaceful life in Israel and are good friends with a high standard of living . . . Israel's Arab population enjoys full civic rights equal with the rest of the population . . . The Israel Government is constantly improving the Arab standard of living . . ."

Mr. Zu'abi concludes by saying:

"The Jewish leaders and people harbor good will for their Arab neighbors and look forward to peace, the proof for which is the good faith with which Israel treats the Arab population and thousands of Arab refugees who were admitted to Israel and whose properties were restored. As an Arab, I appeal to the Arab leaders to open a clean page for the restoration of peace in the Middle East."

I think I need not add anything to these words of the Mayor of Nazareth.

Refugee Rehabilitation Blocked by Arab States

At this stage I wish to make a few comments on the Annual Report of the Director of UNRWA. The Report records a year of highly commendable activity in the field of international care and relief for the refugees. The effective execution of this important humanitarian task was made possible by the generous aid granted by a number of contributing countries as well as by the untiring devotion of the Director of UNRWA and his staff.

Much has been said in previous reports and in the discussion in past years in this Committee about the lack of willingness of the host countries to co-operate with the United Nations in constructive endeavors to solve the refugee question. Recent observers of the situation have noted again that the Arab Governments have not changed their attitude in this regard. They continue to obstruct the efforts of reintegration and social and economic rehabilitation which UNRWA was instructed to promote by numerous United Nations resolutions, such as those adopted in 1950, 1951 and others.

It is this attitude of the Arab Governments towards the refugee problem that has prevented any significant progress towards self-support and reintegration. Had the Arab Governments co-operated with UNRWA and supported resettlement programs, the bulk of the problem might no longer exist.

Various United Nations and other international missions have over the years reiterated their findings that the development of the land,

131
water and capital resources of the area would provide ample opportunities for the economic absorption of the refugees in the Arab countries. In this respect it is encouraging to note that, as the Director points out in his Report—

"The fact is that virtually every adult refugee who in 1948 had a skill needed in the Arab world found a job, and he and his family have been self-supporting ever since,"

and that all young refugees who have received specialized training have become self-supporting.

The extension of the activities of UNRWA in the field of vocational training, with the purpose of preparing the new generation for a fruitful and meaningful life, merits full support. We note with interest what Dr. Davis says in paragraph 86 of his Report on the question of self-support:

"There has at the same time been a steady and even increasing demand from individuals among the refugees for assistance of a sort which will enable them to achieve more immediate individual self-support without prejudice to their rights to repatriation or compensation."

This tendency should be fully supported by the Agency, and appropriate funds should be allocated by it to meet and encourage increasing refugee demands to earn their own living by means of productive work.

No 'Right of Repatriation' in Paragraph 11

The Director of UNRWA expresses the view that paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III) conferred on the refugees the right of choice between repatriation and compensation and goes on from there to say that the non-implementation of this alleged right has been an obstacle to the solution of the refugee problem. In the view of my delegation, this is an erroneous interpretation of paragraph 11, unwarranted by the very text of the paragraph in question. I wonder whether it would not be more helpful if the Director of UNRWA were to refrain from entering into such a controversial area. Paragraph 11 does not grant any such right of repatriation, as I shall show presently.

As in all previous Annual Reports, the Director deals also with the vexed question of the real number of refugees. The General Assembly has in the past urged UNRWA to rectify the incorrect refugee rolls. Yet the Agency has been frustrated in the execution of its mandate by the refusal of the Arab host countries to permit the holding of a census among the refugee population.

Padding the Refugee Rolls

We are told that the number of Arab refugees on UNRWA relief rolls is 1,200,000. It is our view that there are not and never were this number, or anything like it, of bona-fide refugees. On 31 December 1946, according to the figures supplied by the Government of Palestine to UNSCOP, the total number of Arabs in unpartitioned Palestine was 1,288,000. Of this number were resident in the former mandated territory, later annexed by Jordan, about 500,000. In the area later annexed by Egypt, namely the Gaza Strip, there were over 100,000. Furthermore, about 100,000 Arabs never left the area which is now Israel, and a further 40,000 returned to Israel. The total of Arabs, therefore, who left the area which is Israel could not have exceeded 540,000 to 550,000. (Incidentally, and I shall come back to this point later, this figure is equal to the figure of Jewish refugees who came to Israel from Arab countries.)

How did the figure become inflated? Of course, there has been a natural increase, but this accounts only for part of the answer. As to the rest, the answer is to be found in the "Report of Assistance to Palestine Refugees" submitted by the Secretary-General to the Assembly on 4 November 1949 (Document A/1060). The Secretary-General concluded:

"It cannot be doubted that in many cases individuals who could not qualify as being bona-fide refugees are in fact on relief rolls."

In the same year, the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East (the Glapp Report) estimated that at least 160,000 non-refugees had managed to get inscribed on the rolls.

Thus, the refugee rolls have increased from year to year, not only as a result of the natural increase of the refugee population, but also by the perpetuation of a faulty and uncontrolled system of registration. In this connection, I wish to draw the attention to paragraph 41 of the Director's Report, where he states that there are three major sources of inaccuracy:

- (a) a backlog of false registrations which occurred in the initial inscription of refugees and which have not been eliminated in spite of repeated efforts by the Agency;
- (b) a substantial accumulation of unreported deaths over the past eleven years;
- (c) persons who should be eliminated from the ration rolls on grounds of income.

Again, in the Statistical Annex to Part I of the Director's current Report, it is stated that —

"The above statistics are based on the Agency's registration records, which do not necessarily reflect the actual refugee population, owing to factors such as the high rate of unreported deaths and undetected false registration."

Furthermore, the Agency has no proper machinery for checking who of the refugees have become wholly or partly self-supporting. A measure of spontaneous absorption is taking place in all the host countries and in areas further afield, such as the oil-producing Arab countries. It has been estimated that some 200,000 are employed. This absorption too is not reflected in the UNRWA relief rolls. In this connection, also, there is a footnote tucked away in the Statistical Annex to the Report (page 14), which reads:

"In general it must be pointed out that the distribution of refugees by category of entitlement gives only a partial picture of the number of self-supporting refugees, owing to the limitations faced by the Agency in determining their actual income or degree of need."

Dr. Davis states:

"The Agency has, of course, attempted to undertake an investigation on several occasions in the past, but has been forced to desist because hostile reactions among the refugees and untoward development on the political plane caused the governmental authorities concerned to decide that the time was not opportune."

This is clear enough and does not require any further elaboration on my part. What is worth noting is Dr. Davis' estimate that at least 100,000 dead persons now figure on the Agency's rolls.

The Myth of 'A Nation Uprooted'

I have made these observations for a twofold purpose: Firstly, it is as well for the Committee to have some idea of the real dimension of the problem which has to be solved. It is much smaller than the UNRWA figure indicates.

Secondly, this analysis does not bear out the political contentions of Arab spokesmen. It is always a human tragedy when people are uprooted and displaced from their homes, for whatever reason, and all of us must view the problem of these refugees with compassion and a desire to help them. It is a different matter when the problem is presented to us in political terms as that of a whole nation which has been deprived of its national homeland. The great majority of the Arab inhabitants of what was formerly Palestine had remained within the former area

of the mandated territory. Part of them are Arabs whose former homes were within the present frontiers of Israel, and part of them are Arabs whose former homes were and still are in districts now occupied by Jordan, where they have become citizens, as well as in districts occupied by the United Arab Republic.

THE FUTURE: Towards a Solution

I now come to the question of United Nations resolutions on the subject of the future of the refugees. Arab representatives give to paragraph 11 of the 1948 Resolution an extraordinary interpretation of their own. They speak of it as though it granted every individual refugee an absolute right to enter Israel territory, and they demand that the United Nations enforce a mass repatriation. Indeed, the Palestine Conciliation Commission is severely reprimanded for not having performed this remarkable feat. There is nothing to discuss, say the Arab representatives — nothing to negotiate — nothing for Dr. Johnson to explore with the Governments concerned. Under the waving banner of paragraph 11, the United Nations has to march a million refugees into Israel, and that is all.

This concept of the General Assembly resolution of 1948 is totally fallacious. It is what the Arabs say, but not what the United Nations has ever said, and it would be inconceivable for the United Nations to endorse such a proposition.

Paragraph 11 — in Context

Firstly, paragraph 11 cannot be taken out of its context. It is part of the 1948 Resolution, which was designed to restore peaceful relations between Israel and the Arab States through a negotiated settlement of all outstanding questions between them. The distinguished representative of the Ivory Coast has rightly drawn attention to paragraphs 5 and 6, which read:

"The General Assembly

5. CALLS UPON the Governments and authorities concerned to extend the scope of the negotiations provided for in the Security Council's resolution of 16 November 1948, and to seek agreement by negotiations conducted either with the Conciliation Commission or directly, with a view to the final settlement of all questions outstanding between them.

6. INSTRUCTS the Conciliation Commission to take steps to assist the

12

Governments and authorities concerned to achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them."

The Arab representatives have been attacking the Conciliation Commission vehemently for not implementing paragraph 11. Why is it that they have not been attacking the Commission for the non-implementation of paragraphs 5 and 6? The answer is that it is they who have consistently obstructed the implementation of these paragraphs which speak of negotiations for a final settlement. In fact, only the implementation of paragraphs 5 and 6 could have made possible progress on the matter with which paragraph 11 deals.

The phrase "all questions outstanding between them" includes the refugee question, and paragraph 11 is inseparable from and governed by paragraphs 5 and 6. This has been recognized by the Conciliation Commission in a number of its reports, of which I quote just one:

"The clear emphasis of the Resolution is on the interdependence of the various elements of the Palestine problem. In the Chairman's statement it was noted that experience had shown that concentration on one or other isolated paragraph of the Resolution out of context had not helped in the promotion of peace . . . In considering its own proposals, the Commission had considered that any solution of the refugee question would involve important commitments by Israel. But it had also considered that Israel could not be expected to make such commitments unless, at the same time, she received reasonable assurances from her neighbors as to her national and economic security."

(Tenth Progress Report, paras. 19-21)

It is this same recognition — that the different aspects of the Arab-Israel conflict are interrelated — which is reflected in the Sixteen-Power Draft Resolution (A/SPC/L.80) that is before us. Any other view would not conform to reality or common sense. One cannot regard a single paragraph of a resolution as if it existed in outer space, and as if other paragraphs of the same resolution did not exist at all. As far as Israel's share in its solution is concerned, the refugee problem, like all other outstanding issues in this conflict, is a matter for negotiation with the Government of Israel, and not a matter for so-called implementation against the will of Israel.

The Phrase 'Should Be Permitted'

Secondly, paragraph 11 established no right of return but merely defines some of the conditions under which refugees might be permitted to return. The word "right" does not appear in the paragraph, only the phrase "should be permitted." This wording was deliberately chosen, in

13

deference to the sovereign right of every State to decide whom it will admit to its territory.

Thirdly, the return of the refugees is made contingent upon their willingness to live in peace with their neighbors. Owing to the hostile policies of the Arab States, and the hostile attitude which is harbored by the refugees themselves, this condition remains incapable of fulfillment. The Committee has heard the sentiments expressed here by the Arab delegations and by the refugee spokesmen themselves. There is not one of them who even accepts in principle that any refugee coming into Israel must be willing to become a loyal citizen of the State of Israel.

Fourthly, the paragraph contains a further qualification in the words "at the earliest practicable date." In 1948, when the Draft Resolution was being debated, this phrase was generally accepted to mean the restoration of normal conditions, as a prerequisite for any return of refugees. The original draft used the words "as soon as possible." Mr. Eban, the then Israel Representative, stressed that the return of the refugees was not possible until peace had been restored and asked that some such qualifying phrase might be inserted in the resolution. In response to this, the Representative of the United Kingdom, which was the sponsor of the Draft Resolution, replied that he —

"proposed replacing the word 'possible' by the word 'practicable' in accordance with the remarks of the Representative of Israel. He hoped this would make clearer the intention of the proposal."

PCC's Mandate: Dual Approach

Fifthly, Arab representatives gloss over the second sub-paragraph of paragraph 11, but it is this sub-paragraph which actually gives the Conciliation Commission its directive. It reads:

"INSTRUCTS the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation . . ."

Two questions arise here. How is the Commission to "facilitate"? It can only do so by promoting agreement between the parties, and this is what the Commission itself stated in a number of its Progress Reports, and again as recently as its Eighteenth Progress Report, dated 14 November 1960 (Document A/4573). Agreement about what? There are four elements listed here: repatriation, resettlement, economic and social rehabilitation, and compensation. From the very beginning, therefore, the text of paragraph 11 itself holds up resettlement as an alternative

14

128
to repatriation. This dual approach is spelled out in later resolutions, in the concept of economic integration in the Middle East region as a whole.

To sum up:

- (a) Paragraph 11 is an integral part of Resolution 194(III) which calls for a negotiated final settlement of all outstanding questions, including the refugee problem, which is one of the interrelated elements in such a settlement.
- (b) The primary task of the Conciliation Commission is to assist the parties to achieve an agreed settlement.
- (c) Paragraph 11 grants no rights, but merely indicates the conditions under which those refugees who wish to do so might be permitted to return. The conditions of peace and of practicability have never in fact been satisfied.

What the Arabs Mean by 'Return'

I am certain that after hearing the speeches of representatives of the Arab States and of the refugee spokesmen, no delegate here can have any doubt as to the real purpose of the Arab States — which is not to allow the creation of normal and peaceful conditions between themselves and Israel — or as to the real desires of the refugees, which is not to return to Israel as loyal citizens of the country. As I have said at the outset, the purpose of the Arab States is to achieve the destruction of Israel, and the immediate repatriation of hundreds of thousands of anti-Israelis into Israel is designed to soften up Israel, from within, towards her final elimination. There are dozens of speeches, dozens of broadcasts and dozens of articles by Arab leaders in every Arab country that say quite clearly that the repatriation of the refugees is a means towards the destruction of Israel. I give here but one example. In an interview on a German television service, reproduced in the Swiss newspaper "Zürcher Woche" of 1 September 1961, President Nasser of Egypt says: "When the Arabs return to Israel, Israel will cease to exist." Distinguished delegates will not be surprised that we are not prepared to co-operate in this scheme.

Is it not perfectly obvious that the representatives of the Arab States are not really searching for a solution of the refugee problem but for the dissolution of the State of Israel? They themselves say that they are trying to secure their return into Israel within the context of the proposition that Israel has no right to exist and must be eliminated.

15

Israel's Contribution

We in Israel are very sensitive to the fact that there are hundreds of thousands of people living the lives of refugees and subsisting on international charity. My people know what it is to be a refugee. We are concerned about the future of these people, and we believe that the United Nations and this Committee should address themselves to the question, what is the best way of securing a better future for every one of them. In fact, we have done certain things ourselves in this matter to alleviate the Arab refugee situation. Since the end of the fighting, about 40,000 Arabs have come back into the country and have been integrated with the community; several thousands of these came under the scheme providing for the reunion of families which had been broken up by the fighting.

Ever since 1949, we have declared our willingness to pay compensation for refugee property abandoned in Israel. We stated our readiness to pay such compensation even before a settlement of all other outstanding issues, provided, of course, that such funds be used as part of an overall plan for the solution of the refugee problem. If this has not yet been effectuated, it is due to the fact that the Arab countries have insisted on immediate repatriation and have spurned those offers. In any negotiations about compensation we reserve the right to bring up the question of compensation for the property of Israeli citizens which was confiscated when they left Arab countries, as well as for the property abandoned by Jews during the war of 1948 in parts of the country which was annexed by Jordan, such as the Jewish quarter of the Old City of Jerusalem, and elsewhere.

In response to requests made by the Conciliation Commission, the Government of Israel agreed to release all blocked bank accounts and safe deposits left behind by refugees in banks in Israel. In doing so, my Government desired to make a contribution of good will to alleviate the lot of a considerable number of refugees and to further the advance of peaceful relations between Israel and the Arab States. Under the first release scheme, a sum of 740,000 Pounds Sterling was transferred to their owners, residing in Arab countries or elsewhere. Under a second release scheme another 2,800,000 Pounds Sterling were transferred. This was mentioned in paragraph 15 of the Nineteenth Progress Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission. A sum total of more than three and a half million Pounds Sterling flowed from

121
Israel into the coffers of the Arab States, notwithstanding the fact that they were maintaining their practices of economic warfare and blockade in exercise of an alleged state of war, in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter.

The Conciliation Commission in its Twelfth Progress Report hailed that unilateral action of Israel on behalf of the refugees "as an important step towards the settlement of the differences existing between Israel and her neighbors." Yet, to our regret, this act, which was undertaken by Israel without any conditions and which, in the light of the prevailing circumstances, was a unique gesture, did in no instance evoke any pacific or constructive reaction on the part of the Arab Governments. Worse than that, they even put up obstacles to frustrate the implementation of this release scheme.

'Rejected for Political Reasons'

Let us now contrast this with the attitude of the Arab Governments towards creating a future for those who became refugees in the first place as a result of the disastrous decision of the Arab leaders to go to war. They have constantly rejected any plan which, if implemented, would have absorbed large numbers of refugees. They rejected the Clapp Report — the Report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East of 1949 — which recommended an economic approach to the problem and the gradual integration of the refugees in the expanding economy of the area.

In 1959 the late Secretary-General, Mr. Hammarskjöld, enlarged on this concept in his proposals to the General Assembly (Document A/4121), where he recommended a large-scale development plan for the Middle East, within which the refugees would find a constructive future. Can anyone doubt the need for such a project? His plan, if executed, would have brought about a far-reaching transformation of this underdeveloped area and would have resulted in the absorption of large numbers of refugees. The Arab States would not hear of such a plan. According to their book, nothing must be done, and the refugees must continue to linger in their camps in order to be kept as a permanent threat against Israel.

In 1953, the United States Government attempted to bring about the implementation of a regional irrigation project. Such a scheme would have been of enormous benefit to Jordan, to Israel and in part also to Syria. For two years, the Representative of President Eisenhower, Mr.

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Eric Johnston, negotiated with the Arab States, and with Israel and finally succeeded in working out a plan for water distribution that was agreed upon by both Arab and Israel experts. The Israel Government accepted the plan. The Arab politicians vetoed it. If implemented, it would have enabled about a quarter of a million refugees to resettle in homes on irrigated land and to lead a normal and productive existence. But again this was not to be. The overriding consideration is not what is good for the refugee but what is detrimental to Israel. On 19 October 1958, Mr. Johnston wrote in the *New York Times* Magazine:

"After two years of discussion, technical experts of Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria agreed upon every important detail of a unified Jordan plan. But in October 1955, it was rejected for political reasons at a meeting of the Arab League."

Similarly, Syria frustrated the efforts of UNRWA in 1951 and 1952 to develop rehabilitation projects in that country. Egypt withdrew her earlier agreement to a plan for the settlement of 70,000 refugees on lands to be irrigated in the Sinai Peninsula. These two instances are mentioned in the Report of the Director of UNRWA for the year 1954-1955.

Agreement — and Repudiation: Release of Bank Accounts

I have earlier made reference to the release and transfer by Israel of about three and a half million Pounds Sterling to Arab refugees. As an illustration of the obstructive policies conducted by the Arab Governments in all matters pertaining to the betterment of the lot of the refugees, I wish to relate very briefly the background history of the release of the refugee accounts. I let the record of the Palestine Conciliation Commission speak for itself.

The Eighth Progress Report states that in June 1949 Israel and the Arab Governments agreed to release mutually and in equal proportion assets blocked in their respective countries. A mixed Israel-Arab Committee of Experts was set up to work out the details of implementation. As the Report says:

"In this committee Arab and Israel representatives entered into direct contact for the first time."

They reached an agreement on the principle of unfreezing all blocked accounts, on a basis of equal and reciprocal compensation. A few months later the Arab Governments repudiated this agreement.

Upon the request of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, Israel agreed to carry out unilaterally the release scheme, waiving the

agreed stipulation of reciprocity. The Palestine Conciliation Commission lent its good offices for the implementation of the scheme. Its efforts, however, encountered obstacles put up by the Arab Governments. After lengthy negotiations the reluctant co-operation of the Governments of Jordan and Lebanon was obtained, while Syria and Egypt prevented the refugees residing in the areas under their control from applying for the release of their accounts and safe deposits.

Despite its disappointment at the lack of response to the scheme, the Government of Israel decided in 1954 to proceed with its full implementation. It was moved to do so in response to an approach made to it by representatives of the refugees themselves.

In a letter dated 1 November 1954, the Israel Government informed the Chairman of the Palestine Conciliation Commission that as a result of discussions between the representatives of the General Refugee Congress and representatives of the Government of Israel, an agreement was reached on the procedures for the complete release and transfer of all blocked accounts and safe deposits held in Israel banks, belonging to Arab refugees. The Palestine Conciliation Commission, reporting on this agreement in its Fourteenth Report, states with a fine touch of understatement:

"The Commission learned that Israel's agreement with the General Refugee Congress, when it had been made known in the area, was met with an unfavorable reaction on the part of the Government of Jordan, which voiced objections to negotiations entered into with the Government of Israel by individuals who were not authorized to undertake such negotiations on behalf of the refugees."

The Jordan authorities expressed their objection in plainer language and action. They accused the representatives of the refugees of having been in contact with the enemy, arrested them and put them into prison. The crime of these people was obvious. They had obtained from the Government of Israel an agreement to proceed with a scheme the sole objective of which was to alleviate the lot of the refugees.

Wealthy Refugees Call the Tune

Despite this frustrating experience, the Government of Israel complied with the request of the Palestine Conciliation Commission to carry out the full implementation of the scheme. Although this experiment in good will has not met with the hoped-for co-operation and response by the Arab Governments, we do not regret having undertaken it, since it surely must have helped to improve the situation of a

considerable number of refugees.

The underlying causes for these negative Arab policies were recently again depicted in a series of articles published in the noted Swiss daily, "Neue Zürcher Zeitung", by Arnold Hottinger, who is a prominent Swiss authority on Near Eastern Affairs. He says:

"The 'Palestine Specialists' who exist in all Arab countries, and who are always called upon when refugee problems are discussed on the political level, are well-to-do, well-established Palestinians . . . They have succeeded in asserting their opinions on Palestine questions as the only one acceptable, and they watch carefully lest any Arab deviate from this line and be it only by the breadth of a hair. The opinion of these 'specialists' who themselves do not suffer any personal hardship from their refugee status, is easy to summarize: The refugees are to be left in their miserable condition as a sort of pawn for Arab rights in Palestine; it is not desirable that they adapt themselves to the economic life of their Arab host countries, because that would mean the loss of the strongest lever by which the Arabs hope to move the world once more to put the Palestine question on the agenda."

This is the considered opinion of a neutral observer with long-standing experience in Near Eastern affairs. The best corroboration for these views are the speeches which we heard here from the Arab representatives.

Politics vs. Brotherhood

If only the forty million Arabs had done for their refugees what the 650,000 Jews who were in Israel in 1948 did for one million Jewish refugees — including half a million from Arab countries — who have been integrated with us since then! We shared with them our resources. We introduced severe rationing and strict austerity measures. Of course, we received aid from friendly Governments, as do all newly-emerging States, but aid came chiefly from Jews the world over, because there is Jewish brotherhood. Certainly, Jews in the United States and elsewhere have a deep affection for the State of Israel. This lessens to no degree their loyalty to and citizenship of the countries in which they reside. But Jews all over the world care what happens to their fellow-Jews who are refugees, and they organize in order to assist them to rebuild their lives in Israel. We cared for our refugees in such a way that they have now become builders of a modern, developing society.

The Arab refugees are not in strange and foreign lands. They are Arabs in Arab countries, amongst their own kith and kin, in a familiar environment of language, history, background, customs and religion.

18
Would it not have been the most natural thing in the world for the Arab countries to do as we did — namely, to take in their brethren and create a new life for them within their vast expanses, with international aid, including compensation for property from Israel, and within the framework of the economic development of those countries? In various parts of the world, tens of millions of people who became refugees as a result of fighting or political upheavals have been constructively resettled among their own kith and kin in neighboring lands, and the practical problem before us is in no way unique. Where is the brotherly care on the part of the Arab countries for the refugees? I am not referring to politics, but to simple human brotherhood.

The Question of Compensation

My delegation has already dealt with the Arab proposals that a United Nations custodian be appointed, or some sort of United Nations machinery be created or measures be taken, to deal with the alleged rights of the Arab refugees to properties that they abandoned in 1948. I shall explain again why this is quite unacceptable to my delegation.

In March 1950, when it became clear that the Arab States were unwilling to make peace with Israel, and that no large-scale repatriation of refugees was possible, the Knesset (Israel's Parliament) enacted the Absentees' Property Law, which vested the abandoned property in a State Custodian. In 1953 these properties were transferred to the Israel Development Authority. This was done in order to ensure the proper utilization of the abandoned property and its integration into the national economy and development. It is not only the right but the duty of Governments to ensure the productive use of the country's resources.

The vast revenues which the Israel Government is alleged by Arab spokesmen to be collecting from these properties are fictitious. They just do not exist, and the astronomic estimates by Arab spokesmen of monies which the Government of Israel is supposed to be receiving from these properties are a figment of their imagination. On the contrary, great sums have been expended on them, without any profit in the ordinary sense, though the investments may be justified from the point of view of the national economy.

While taking over these properties in the national interest, and in accordance with many precedents in other countries, my Government offered to pay compensation to their former owners, and we remain willing to negotiate an overall settlement of the compensation problem

124

in all its aspects. The specialist staff of the Conciliation Commission has received full co-operation from us since 1952 in the technical task of identification and valuation, which will facilitate a compensation agreement.

I have, in a few words, described the factual and legal situation. The issue which has been raised by the Arab proposals, however, is one of fundamental principle. The right of a sovereign State to regulate by its own laws any property within its own territory is unquestioned. Israel is a sovereign State, admitted as such to the United Nations, which is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of States. Israel is subject to exactly the same rights and obligations under the Charter as every member-State. It follows that since the United Nations has no competence with regard to internal property legislation in any other country, it also has no competence with regard to internal property legislation in Israel. There is no basis for such Arab proposals and not the slightest prospect that my Government would at any time permit a United Nations custodian or "machinery" to assume jurisdiction or control, or any United Nations organs to take measures, with regard to lands or other properties within our country. If any such proposal were to be endorsed, it would lead to reconsideration, on our part, of our compensation offer.

I have one further observation to make on this question. In putting up these proposals, proposals of a kind unprecedented in international relations, the Arab representatives are attempting to gain acceptance for their doctrine that Israel's sovereignty is somehow incomplete, limited or qualified. This they try to base on a provision of the 1947 Resolution. I must confess I am rather bewildered by these dialectical acrobatics. We are told that the 1947 Resolution is illegal and invalid — but that one simple paragraph in it is so potent that it curtails the sovereignty of a member-State! The reason is clear. The declaration on which the Arab representatives now build their case was contemplated by the Partition Resolution as one which the Jewish and the Arab States would make before they become independent. Matters took a different turn, because the Arab countries rejected the partition plan in its entirety and went to war against Israel, and because the Palestinian Arab State never came into existence at all. In these changed circumstances, no question of a declaration by Israel regarding these matters was raised in connection with Israel's admission to the United Nations. In fact, Israel was not at any time requested to make such a declaration.

22

124

In any case, the 1947 provisions were designed reciprocally to give reassurance to the Arab minority in the Jewish State and a Jewish minority in the Arab State, and they would have had no relevance to the property abandoned in the course of a war against Israel. This aspect of the matter is, however, academic, because the declaration attached to the 1947 Resolution was never made and never came into effect, and it is ridiculous to suggest that it should now be invoked as limiting the sovereignty of our State.

The Solution

We believe that the solution of the problem of the Arab refugees lies in the resettlement of the refugees in the Arab countries. This attitude of ours is not new, and it has been recently reiterated by the Government of Israel in the Knesset and was approved by a large majority. At the same time, we have never said that not a single refugee will ever in any circumstances be allowed to enter Israel. I have already mentioned how since 1949 about 40,000 refugees did in fact return.

When Dr. Joseph Johnson came to the area last summer in order to explore means of seeking progress on this problem, we readily co-operated, as we will co-operate in any sincere attempt to find a solution to this humanitarian problem. We did so in spite of our belief that as long as the active hostility on the part of our neighbors continues unabated, there is little hope for progress. While I am mentioning Dr. Johnson's mission, I wish to add that we have reservations concerning some parts of his report to the Palestine Conciliation Commission.

We continue to believe in negotiations between the Arab States and Israel, with or without the help of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, in order to resolve our differences.

Conciliation — and the Will to Conciliate

We have heard in the Committee criticism of the composition of the Palestine Conciliation Commission. I fail to appreciate the value of any proposal regarding a change in that composition so long as the will to conciliate is completely absent on the Arab side. That alone is what matters, and that is where the change is needed.

The representative of Iraq argued that the issue is not between the Arab States and Israel, but between Israel and the Arab refugees from Palestine. In the same breath he based himself on United Nations resolutions. Let it clearly be stated that all United Nations resolutions on

23

123

this subject recognize the Arab States and the State of Israel as parties to the dispute, and, as I have mentioned, many resolutions have called on these two parties to enter into negotiations and resolve their differences. This unfortunate conflict is between Israel and the Arab States who refuse to establish peaceful relations with her and who refuse to co-operate in solving the refugee problem within the context of the restoration of peace in the area.

It has been said here that negotiations are useless because the positions of the parties are firmly stated and they are far apart. That is precisely why negotiations are needed. Despite our disappointments and despite the venom and abuse hurled at us, we remain convinced that negotiations are the only way. Unfortunately, for the time being there is little hope that the Arab States will accept such an approach, for they have chosen in this very Committee to reject negotiations and have threatened to force their solution upon us by war.

Israel's Position Summarized

I should now like to sum up the position of my Government as follows:

- (1) We accepted the 1947 compromise resolution. Had the Arab States done likewise and urged the Arabs of Palestine to do so, there would have been a Jewish State and an Arab State living together in peace and co-operation.
- (2) The Arab States instead decided to launch war against Israel. The Arab refugee problem arose as a consequence of this war. Those responsible for that war are responsible for the existence of the refugee problem.
- (3) About 550,000 Arabs left the territory which is now Israel. A similar number of Jewish refugees from the Arab countries have since been integrated in Israel. There has thus been a de facto exchange of population.
- (4) No United Nations resolution demands immediate, total and unconditional repatriation of refugees into Israel. On the other hand, there are United Nations resolutions calling for negotiations on the peaceful settlement of all outstanding questions between Israel and the Arab States.
- (5) Israel believes that the future of the Arab refugees lies in their resettlement in the Arab countries, within the framework of the economic development of the Middle East.

- (6) Israel stands by its readiness to pay compensation for property abandoned by the refugees, even before a general peace settlement is concluded, provided these funds are used for the overall solution of the problem. Israel will demand compensation for property of its citizens that was confiscated by the Arab Governments.

A Seed That Will Grow

We welcome the initiative of the sixteen Powers who have put before this Committee a Draft Resolution which calls for negotiations between the parties and regards this as the only way towards progress on all outstanding issues, including the Arab refugee problem. We feel certain that despite the present hostility which prevents the solution of the refugee problem and of other problems outstanding between us and our neighbors, the day will come when Arab leadership will realize the futility of their present attitude. It is up to the United Nations to give expression to the desire of many Governments and peoples in many lands that this unfortunate conflict should now at last be moved towards solution. This is precisely the aim of this Draft Resolution. We are convinced that the co-sponsors, and all those who will support this Draft Resolution, are sowing a seed which will grow, perhaps only slowly, even in the barren soil of extreme hostility which at present bedevils this problem. This Draft Resolution is conceived in the best spirit and tradition of the United Nations.

My country remains ready at all times to put aside the rancors of the past and to work out with the Arab leaders a better future for the Middle East as a whole, where there will be development, freedom and happiness for the Arab States as well as for Israel, in which those who are now refugees will fully share.

122

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

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Published at LONDON.

Date 6 2 62

ISRAEL REFORMS IN
ARAB CENTRES

FROM OUR CORRESPONDENT

TEL AVIV, FEB. 5

The Cabinet has decided on modifications in military government in centres of Arab population. A Government spokesman declined to disclose details, and said that Mr. Ben-Gurion, the Prime Minister, would propose them in the Knesset soon.

The Government proposals are designed as alternatives to motions by five parties in the Knesset for the abolition of military rule, under which some 200,000 of the 240,000 Arabs in Israel are governed.

It is understood that the reforms to be proposed by the Government include relaxation of restrictions on travel to and from military zones and provisions for appeal against judgments by military courts.



Embassy,
AUSTRALIAN LEGATION
TEL AVIV.

120

In reply quote No. 230.5
Memorandum No. 40

16th January, 1962.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

MRS. MEIR'S LUNCHEON.

The Foreign Minister, Mrs. Meir, yesterday gave a luncheon for a number of Heads of Diplomatic Missions and their wives. As the Jerusalem Post states "the diplomats at the luncheon represented those nations that supported the 16-nation resolution for direct negotiations between Israel and the Arab States at the recent U.N. General Assembly debate on the Arab refugees".

2. At the end of the luncheon, Mrs. Meir addressed the guests, numbering about forty, on the attitudes of countries voting on issues in the United Nations. She expressed regret that matters were not always debated on their merits nor on the basis of morality and justice. She said that it took some courage sometimes to follow right courses, and Israel was grateful for the conduct of the countries whose representatives were present when the Arab refugee question was before the General Assembly last month.

3. Mrs. Meir drew attention to the statement of the Representative of Upper Volta who had pointed out that if directly-interested parties had not voted, the voting on either side would have been almost equal.

4. I am sending a copy of this memorandum to the Australian Mission to the United Nations, New York.

*dm 21/
In London
in Australia
File*

Mr G. L. ...

Copy to N. Branch

J.M. McMillan
(J.M. McMillan)
Ambassador.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD SAVINGGRAM

RESTRICTED

File 181/4/4.

0.837

Dated: 17th January, 1962.

To :

ALL POSTS

SAV. AP.8 RESTRICTED

Further to Savingram AP 187, this savingram summarises events at the Sixteenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly from 1st December up to the adjournment on 21st December, 1961, both in Plenary and in the Committees.

Ex. 187 Special Political Committee

18. The Committee took up the Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East on 5th December. Two draft resolutions came to the vote. The first, sponsored by the United States, supported the continuation of the Palestine Conciliation Commission and UNRWA and was designed to facilitate the continuation of the work of the present Director of UNRWA. The second draft, sponsored by 15 members (mainly European and Black African), called on the governments concerned to enter into direct negotiations, if so desired with the assistance of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, with a view to reaching an agreed solution to all outstanding questions including the Arab refugee problem. This resolution had the strong backing of Israel.

19. Afghanistan, Indonesia and Pakistan introduced amendments to the United States draft which called for a reconstituted Palestine Conciliation Commission to take measures to protect the rights, property and interests of the refugees. These amendments were adopted in Committee and the amended United States resolution was adopted by 74 (Australia) -1-23. In Plenary, on 20th December, the amendments were voted on separately and rejected for want of a two-thirds majority. The original United States draft was then adopted by 62-0-37. The 15 nation resolution was defeated in Committee, 34 (Australia) -44-20.



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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

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File No. 181/4/4

Published at LONDON.

Date 15/12/61

**FLOODS HIT ARAB
REFUGEE CAMPS**

FROM OUR CORRESPONDENT

AMMAN, Dec. 14
Flooding after 24 hours of heavy rain has left several hundred people homeless and caused great damage throughout Jordan, the Ministry of the Interior said this evening. The Arab-refugee camps in Palestine were among the worst hit. Calls for assistance were still being received from the camps, and it had not yet been possible to assess the extent of the damage.
The Army is helping in relief work in the town of Ahaba, in the south, where five people have been drowned. Many houses have been wrecked and cattle lost. Security forces were put on the alert after the heavy rain cut the Amman telephone link with Damascus and Beirut.

Name of Paper **TIMES.***The Israel Digest*

Published at LONDON.

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2

THE ISRAEL DIGEST VOLUME V No. 1


ARAB REFUGEES — UN 1961By **IVOR BAVELLE**

THE votes are in and now is the time for a brief summing-up of the results of this year's UN debate on the Arab refugees.

The Arab delegations must be contemplating the outcome with considerable dismay. They unleashed a sustained and prolonged verbal attack on Israel—more venomous, calumnious and abusive even than on previous occasions, and behind the scenes they tried hard to bully or to coax other delegations. They started off, as on previous occasions, with over thirty votes virtually automatically in their favor: Arab votes, Communist votes, some of the Moslem votes, and others. Yet they failed to achieve any of their declared objectives.

Their self-styled "Palestine Arab Delegation" was not recognized, and the tainted politicians composing it were heard only as individuals, in accordance with precedent. Their attempt to change the composition of the Palestine Conciliation Commission was defeated again.

They also tried once more to push through the idea of a foreign custodian of refugee property in Israel, bolstering this nonsensical proposal with scurrilous talk about some kind of "limited sovereignty" for Israel, but the proposal was rejected in the plenary on a vote which was appreciably less favorable for the Arabs than last year. Particularly important is the dismal failure of the Arabs to acquire a strong backing amongst the new delegations representing those countries, primarily in Africa, which have only recently achieved their independence. Realizing the ethical and logical frailty of their own case, the Arabs endeavored in vain to incite these delegations against Israel by wild and fantastically libellous accusations which tried to connect Israel somehow with racist policies and colonialism.



Dosh in Maariv

Attempt at Psychological Breakthrough

THIS insult to the Africans' intelligence and judgment duly boomeranged. A group of African countries formed, in fact, the majority of the sponsors of a resolution which was introduced into the debate for the purpose of laying the groundwork for a reorientation of thought, for a psychological breakthrough into the blind alley of hopelessness into which the UN Arab refugee debates have blundered, into which they have been forced by senseless but obstinate belligerency and aggressive designs of the Arab Governments against Israel and by the Arab UN delegations' destructive policy of hate for hate's sake.

This draft resolution, which was sponsored by sixteen African and Latin-American countries and by the Netherlands, read as follows:

The General Assembly,

Taking note of the Annual Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East,

Recognizing that the establishment of peaceful relations between the Arab States and Israel would do much to facilitate a solution of the problem of the Arab refugees,

Recalling that, under the Charter, it is the fundamental duty of all States Members of the United Nations to endeavor to settle all international disputes by peaceful means,

Confirming the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, and in particular General Assembly resolution 194 (3), calling upon Israel and the Arab States to settle the questions in dispute between them as soon as possible and by common agreement, so that peaceful relations may be established between them,

Considering that such peaceful relations would promote the well-being of all the peoples concerned and would make an important contribution to peace and security in the Middle East and in the whole world, *Renews its appeal to the Governments concerned to undertake direct negotiations—with the assistance of the Conciliation Commission for Palestine, if they so desire—with a view to finding a solution, acceptable to all the parties concerned, for all the questions in dispute between them, particularly the question of the Arab refugees.*

No one, of course, is naive enough to believe that this resolution, had it in fact been carried at the General Assembly in its sixteenth session, would thereby immediately have brought about a genuine change of heart amongst the Arab leaders. These men have defied both obligatory decisions of the UN Security Council and also, it goes without saying, basic provisions of the UN Charter.

Nevertheless, the adoption of such a resolution would have furnished the Arab rulers with some very valuable food for thought. To be formally reminded on this occasion by the Assembly as a whole, or even by a majority of the delegations, of their crystal-clear obligations under the Charter would, indeed, present the Arab Governments with a new situation.

This is precisely what the sixteen-power draft resolution implicitly set out to achieve, since it represented, in effect, a reiteration of UN principles on the settlement of international disputes by negotiation and peaceful means and a pointed and specialized restatement of repeated and unanimous General Assembly resolu-

tions on this central and predominant problem.

In applying to the Arab refugee issue the general principle which constitutes the United Nations' *raison d'être*, the sixteen-power draft resolution in no way prejudged the terms of an eventual solution of the controversy, as it dealt only with the method of bringing the solution about by reaching consent in a lawful and peaceful manner. It is highly revealing, therefore, that the Arab delegations forthwith embarked on an out-and-out struggle against the draft resolution, fighting it tooth and nail as if it threatened legitimate Arab interests.

The passage of the resolution in the Special Political Committee was, however, prevented primarily by the unwarranted attitude adopted towards it by the US delegation. Having discouraged the potential support of a considerable number of friendly delegations in the lobbying stage, the US delegation then actually voted against the sixteen-power resolution!

The news that the US delegation had gone beyond abstention and had voted against this resolution was received by many in Israel with shocked disbelief. In delivering its negative vote the US delegation found itself in company with the Arab and Soviet bloc. This formidable combination spread confusion amongst the delegations. Under the impact, many went over from support to abstention and a few followed the US lead and unexpectedly opposed the resolution.

Realism of Peace

IN the end, the resolution mustered 34 affirmative votes but failed to obtain a majority in committee. These 34 votes did not include any of the major powers. All continents, however, were represented, and there can be no doubt that the countries voting for the sixteen-power resolution not merely upheld the UN Charter but also pointed to the only realistic solution of the debated problem.

Clearly the people and the Governments of the US do believe in the solution of international disputes by negotiation and peaceful means. In departing from this

(continued on page 8)

THE ISRAEL Digest

OF PRESS AND EVENTS IN ISRAEL AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Vol. V No. 1

Published fortnightly by Israel Digest, P.O.B. 92, Jerusalem

January 5, 1962



The Prime Minister examining Scrolls of the Law during his visit to the Rangoon Synagogue (left), and with Premier U Nu at the graduation ceremony at Rangoon University

PREMIER'S VISIT CEMENTS BURMA-ISRAEL AMITY

THE "depth and sincerity of Burma-Israel friendship" was the chief impression carried away by Mr. David Ben-Gurion, the Prime Minister, as he left Burma on December 21 after a two-and-a-half-week official visit.

Before leaving Rangoon the Prime Minister and Premier U Nu of Burma published a joint statement, noting the ever-stronger good relations between Israel and Burma and announcing that the Burmese Government had accepted Israel's offer to send agricultural experts to cooperate in the development of Burma's arid zone.

"At their meetings the two Prime Ministers reviewed the development of friendly relations between their two governments and peoples," the statement says. "They took note, with great pleasure, that these mutually beneficial relations have grown steadily from year to year, both in scope and in spirit, on the basis of mutual trust and respect and in harmonious cooperation. They expressed their conviction that cooperation of this nature among nations large and small would be conducive to the attainment of a greater measure of peace and prosperity in the world.

"They affirmed their confident hope that these relations will continue to grow and

that Burmese-Israeli cooperation will continue to expand in the near future in the context of Burma's developing economy. They also emphasized their desire further to encourage cultural exchanges between their countries and their respective institutions of learning.

"The Prime Minister of Israel, as a token of his faith in the great potentialities of Burma's agriculture, offered to place at the disposal of the Government of the Union of Burma, at the Government of Israel's expense, the services of a team of suitable technicians to join in the development work of the dry zone for a period of two years. The Prime Minister of Burma has gratefully accepted this offer.

"The two Prime Ministers reaffirmed their full support of, and adherence to, the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations... They expressed the earnest hope that the Organization will continue to enjoy the support of all its members, so that it may fulfil the vital responsibilities which have been entrusted to it.

"The two Prime Ministers were happy to note the great strides being made in the emancipation of subjected peoples

from colonial rule. They also expressed their fervent hope that the total emancipation of all colonial peoples of the world will be achieved in the very near future. They reaffirmed their resolute opposition to all forms of domination and to all manifestations of racial discrimination.

"Viewing with great concern the continued world race in armaments and deeply concerned at the adverse effects on human beings of radioactive fallout resulting from nuclear weapons tests, and at the constant threat to the maintenance of international peace which the continuation of such tests constitutes, the two Prime Ministers expressed their firm support for complete and early world disarmament under effective supervision, and appeal to all the nuclear powers to work for an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests under effective inspection and control, and, pending the conclusion of such an agreement, to voluntarily suspend all such tests.

(Continued on page 8)

IN THIS ISSUE

Foreign Affairs

Prime Minister Ben-Gurion's visit to Burma ended with a reaffirmation of Israel-Burma friendship. . . . p. 1
The Arab Refugees—UN 1961, an article by Ivor Bavelle p. 2

Home News

Christmas and New Year were celebrated by Christian Israelis and tourists p. 3
Housing for immigrants is to be trebled during the next few months . . . p. 5

Education, Science and Culture

The Israel Philharmonic Orchestra is celebrating its 25th anniversary . . . p. 6
The Chamber Theater has opened its new hall in Tel Aviv p. 7
Prof. Martin Buber has been awarded the Bialik Prize p. 7
1961—A Year of Progress p. 4

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This material is filed with the Department of Justice where the required registration, under 22 U.S.C. 611 et seq., of the Jewish Agency for Israel is available.

from colonial
alien
THE MIDDLE EAST
January 5, 1962
Best
MB

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Paper TIMES:
The Israel Digest -
at LONDON.

File No. 181/4/4
Date 5. 1. 62

THE
Arab Refugees - UN 1961

(continued from page 2)

attitude, the UN delegation probably desired to balance its opposition to the Arab amendments by opposing a resolution eminently acceptable to Israel. Further, it was uneasy about the Soviet bloc's consistent voting alongside the Arabs.

In the long run, however, the US must maintain its position at the UN by loyalty to basic principles and consistency.

Nor will appeasement of the Arabs beyond reason pave the way for any constructive advance whatsoever towards a solution of the Arab refugee issue. The US delegation, therefore, erred again in deleting from its own draft resolution, at Arab insistence, the sentence "Reiterating its view that the Governments directly concerned have primary responsibility for reaching a settlement of their outstanding differences."

Having deviated thus far, however, the US delegation refused to move any further in response to Arab pressure. The US firmly opposed the amendments on the change of the composition of the PCC and on supervision of refugee property, and these amendments were defeated in the plenary.

Israel had stressed throughout that no contradiction existed between the un-amended US resolution and the sixteen-power resolution and had made it clear that she would support the US resolution as well, though she could not wholeheartedly approve of some of its details and wording. Accordingly Israel voted for the US resolution in the plenary and its passage by a very large vote and without opposition (the Arabs and the Soviets abstaining) gives cause for satisfaction.


In its essence the US resolution does afford a framework for further efforts at mediation, negotiation and compromise aimed at a reasonable solution for those refugees whose condition still remains genuinely unsettled.

Even so, it will only prove possible to take advantage of such a framework if a new spirit is made to prevail amongst the Arab leaders, a spirit of peaceful intent and of realism, the spirit, in fact, of the draft resolution of the sixteen powers.

Buber Awarded Bialik Prize

"I CAN think of no greater honor in the world" than to receive the Bialik Prize for Judaica, Prof. Martin Buber said on December 18 on receiving the prize from the Tel Aviv Municipality at Beit Bialik, the house in which Bialik, the Hebrew national poet, lived, and which today is maintained as a library and museum. The award was made for Prof. Buber's expanded edition of his collection of Hassidic tales, *Or Haganuz* ("The Hidden Light"), published by Schocken, and his two-volume philosophical work, *Teudah Ve'yeud* ("Mission and Ideal"), published by the Zionist Library.

At the same ceremony, the Bialik Prize for Belles Lettres was awarded to 77-year-old Mordechai Ben-Yehzekel, for his six-



Prof. Martin Buber

volume collection of Jewish lore of many centuries, including also many Hassidic tales, *Sefer Hama'asiyot* ("A Book of Tales") published by Dvir.

Although born in Vienna (8 February,

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD SAVINGRAM

MEH

RESTRICTED

I. 31057

FROM:

Dated: 18th December, 1961

Rec'd: 28th December, 1961

Australian Embassy,
TEL AVIV

SAV. 20 RESTRICTED

Repeated to Cairo, London, Washington, Moscow,
Monthly Political Savingram - November, 1961

1. Foreign Affairs.

(a) Relations with Arab States.

On 6th November, the Foreign Minister, Mrs. Meir, in a statement in the Knesset on the Government's policy on the Arab refugees said, inter alia :

- (i) the 1949 Israel policy to admit up to 100,000 refugees "was now withdrawn and no longer exists".
- (ii) "The entire mistake is this : there is no refugee problem; there is a problem of peace between the Arab countries and Israel. If there were peace, then the refugee problem would be almost automatically solved. There would be no need to make the gesture of returning an agreed number....."
- (iii) "the declared attitude of the State of Israel is that.... the refugee problem should be solved inside the Arab countries. The State of Israel cannot take back refugees and we are not prepared to enter into any discussion on the basis of free choice.... We are a sovereign nation".

The Knesset subsequently adopted by 68 votes to 7 a resolution which stated "that the Arab refugees should not be returned to Israel's territory and that the only solution to the problem is their settlement in the Arab countries".

The report by Dr. Johnson to the Palestine Conciliation Commission on "practical means of seeking progress on the Palestine Arab refugee problem" was, on the whole, fairly favourably received, despite official and press criticism of deletions of some of its historical sections following Arab representations.

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and

INWARD SAVINGRAM

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I. 31057

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Mr. Moshe Dayan, the Minister of Agriculture and a former Army Chief of Staff, was quoted as saying that he did not think President Nasser would launch into military or economic adventures against Israel to raise his prestige. Nasser remained, even after the Syrian Revolution, the top Arab leader, though he would now have to make greater efforts to maintain this position. The greatest danger to Israel's security would arise if the Arab States acquired superior arms to those possessed by the Israel Defence Forces.

On 29th November, the Prime Minister, Mr. Ben-Gurion, in a U.P. interview declared that "unless there is a relaxation of international tension and the Arab States become democracies, so that their governments will have to attend to the economic, education and social needs of their peoples, it is difficult to see good prospects for peace in the near future".

(b) Relations with the U.S.S.R.

Recent arrests of Jewish community leaders in the U.S.S.R. caused concern in Israel. On 15th November, in a statement on the official Israel attitude towards the U.S.S.R. and its Jewish citizens, the Foreign Minister, Mrs. Meir, said, inter alia :

- (i) "we seek paths to friendship with the Soviet Union as with all other countries;
- (ii) "what we demand and ask of all the countries of the world, we demand and ask of the Soviet Union: that the Jews living in that country should be given (a) the opportunity of a free national cultural life like any other nationality in the Soviet Union; (b) freedom to leave for every Jew who wishes to leave and join his family and his people in the State of Israel".

(c) Relations with South Africa.

In a defence of Israel's voting against South Africa on apartheid in the General Assembly, the Prime Minister, Mr. Ben-Gurion, said Israel would have been untrue to "our moral heritage" had it not raised its voice against that regime of racial discrimination which is harmful to the South African people itself and perhaps imperils its very existence". Additional reasons were that while the State of Israel speaks solely in the name of the population of Israel "it does not and must not disregard the fate of our people in other countries and we cannot afford to give any excuse to our many enemies, who impugn the rights and status, the liberties and the dignity, of the Jews in various countries. Nor is the State of Israel able or entitled to ignore the feelings of its friends in Africa, Asia and elsewhere, who would be quite unable to understand its failure to join in this protest".

3/...

INWARD SAVINGRAM

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I. 31057

3.

(d) Sale of Arms.

In a statement to the Knesset on 29th November, the Deputy Minister of Defence categorically stated that Israel would not sell arms to any country conducting military operations to preserve its colonial rule. Two requests by Portugal - one made to a Belgium firm manufacturing the Israel Uzzi sub-machine gun under licence, and another to purchase Israel arms - were refused this year.

(e) Visitors.

The Prime Minister of Norway, the Cyprus Minister of Justice and a party of Jamaican officials visited Israel.

2. Internal Affairs.

(a) New Government.

The Knesset approved the new government presented to it by the Prime Minister, Mr. Ben-Gurion. The new government is a coalition of Mapai, the National Religious Party and Achdut Ha'avoda (Unity of Labour), and is supported by Poalei Agudat Israel, Orthodox Labour and two Arab groups: in all, it can muster in the Knesset 68 votes out of 120. In the new Cabinet, Mapai now holds 11 out of the 16 portfolios, as compared to 8 out of 16 in the outgoing government.

(b) Israel Communist Party.

In a report to the Israel Communist Party on the 22nd Congress of the C.P.S.U., a former Knesset party member "was applauded even when he said (sic) that the Jews in the Soviet Union live better than in Israel". The Parliamentary leader, Dr. Sweh, became very incensed at a member who complained that the rank and file were not being given the background on the rift between Moscow and Peking. "How dare you speak about a dispute when Chou en-lai said there was none", Dr. Sweh was reported to have shouted.

Fourteen Arab residents of Acre, Haifa and Nazareth - nearly all Communists - were briefly detained by the police on 23rd November for questioning in connection with the distribution of anti-Israel pamphlets. The pamphlets apparently dealt with the shooting in September of five Israel Arabs who tried to cross into the Gaza Strip.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE

28th December, 1961

SEC A/Ss MR.LOOMES UN ER PAC&AM SA EAF&ME E AF
ME@ INF DL IC
G.
ACCRA LAGOS NEW YORK(UN) PARIS PRETORIA ROME WELLINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

Embassy,
AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
TEL AVIV.



In reply quote No. 230.5

Memorandum No. 494

22nd December, 1961.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

THE ARAB REFUGEE QUESTION.

The course followed by the debate and voting in the General Assembly of the United Nations on the Arab Refugee question has been closely followed in Israel and every speech and every vote has been gone over with a tooth comb.

2. At first the Government and the press were very suspicious of the American resolution and felt that the American Government had let them down, and there was a tendency here to expect that the Jewish vote in the United States would result in the American Government taking a firm pro-Israel stand on every issue. There was always disappointment when this did not happen. In the long run, however, it has now gradually become more widely realised that the outcome of the voting was the best that Israel could have reasonably expected at this stage.

3. Last week the Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who deputises for the Minister during her absences abroad, summoned a number of Heads of Mission to make representations to them on voting. A preliminary approach was made to ask me to see the Director-General, but I was out of the office at the time. No call came subsequently and Dr. Yahil told me that in the mean time he had had word from New York of the Australian attitude and saw no need to raise the matter with me. Some satisfaction has been expressed generally at the Australian position.

4. Israel will now have to take stock and see what the next stage is likely to be. Rather too sanguine hopes had been placed on obtaining the support of some of the African countries, which Israel has gone to a great deal of trouble to cultivate, and some confusion has been caused by the mercurial sliding of votes of African countries from one side to the other.

5. I am sending copies of this memorandum to the Senior External Affairs Representative, London, to the Australian Embassy, Washington, and to the Australian Mission to the United Nations, New York.

(J.M. McMillan)
Ambassador

Copy to U.N.
File R/4

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

LAS

I.30695

Dated: 20th December, 1961.
2200
Rec'd: 21st December, 1961.
1423

FROM:

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK.

UN1884 CONFIDENTIAL.

Washington for information, repeated Ottawa
1397, London Sav. 1434.

Palestine Refugees.

My telegram 1873.

Voting in Plenary session today was as follows -

- (i) Reconstitution of P.C.C. - 44-29(Australia) - 25
- (ii) Custodian measure - 40-37 (Australia) - 21
- (iii) Paragraph 1 of L.79 (separate vote requested by Morocco) - 64 (Australia) - 14-21.
- (iv) L.79as a whole unamended 62 (Australia) - 0-37.

2. We have spoken to both Arabs and Israelis since the vote. Israelis are gratified that positive vote of 34 in Committee in favour of direct negotiations was achieved. Arabs feel that full opportunity was given for statement of their case and appeal to be content that in the terms of the adopted resolution the Conciliation Commission should continue impartial efforts to bring about an accommodation of points of view. From what they have said to us the Arabs were mainly concerned with avoiding a specific directive to engage in direct negotiations with Israel, but their abstention on the final text of the United States resolution would suggest that they are not ultimately reluctant to talk further in the coming year with a representative of the P.C.C. whether Johnson or another.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT IMMIGRATION
TREASURER & TREASURY
P.M.'s

21st December, 1961.

SEC A/Ss MR LOOMES UN@ PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA EAF&ME
E AF ME INF IC
ROME WELLINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

:GS

I.30603

Sent: 19th December, 1961
1910

FROM:

Rec'd: 20th December, 1961
2024Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK.UN 1873 UNCLASSIFIEDWashington for information, Ottawa Sav.1389, London
Sav.1426.Palestine Refugees

My telegram 1844.

Special Political Committee voted today as follows -

- (1) Amendments to L79. First amendment 47 - 27 (Australia) -
24. Second amendment 42 - 36 (Australia) - 20.
- (2) L79 as amended 74 (Australia, United Kingdom, United States)
- 1 - 23.
- (3) L80, 34 (Australia) - 44 - 20.

MIN.&DEPT.E.A.
MIN.&DEPT.IMMIGRATION
TREASURY
P.M.'s

21st December, 1961

SEC A/Ss LA MR.LOOMES UN@ ER COMREL PAC&AM AM&SP
S&SEA SA EAF&ME E AF MB@ INF

CAIRO TEL AVIV

109

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

LAS

0.19144

Dated: 19th December, 1961.
1700

TO:

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK.....908

REPEATED:

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON....2073

SAVINGRAM:

Australian Embassy,
TEL AVIV...Sav.15

Australian High Commission,
OTTAWA....Sav.190

External Affairs Office,
LONDON....Sav. EA309.

Australia High Commission,
ACCRA....Sav.26

Australian High Commission,
WELLINGTON...Sav. 155

Australian Embassy,
CAIRO...Sav.39

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY

Palestine Refugees.

Our 903. Israeli Ambassador has on instructions renewed representations asking us to support L.80 even if L.79 is adopted first. He was informed that as you are aware we would prefer in that event to abstain on L.80, which if adopted could detract from the force of L.79. However we undertook to consider again and on reflection have concluded that you could vote affirmatively for L.80 if it has reasonable Western support. In reaching this conclusion we have taken into account fact that nearly all sponsoring countries took favourable positions on West New Guinea as did Israel.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT IMMIGRATION
TREASURER & TREASURY
P.M.'s

19th December, 1961.

SEC A/Ss MR LOOMES UN@ PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA
EAF&ME E AF ME INF IC
ROME

COPY

OF LETTER FROM
AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
750 THIRD AVENUE NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

108

13th December 1961

File No. 210/1/3

Memorandum No. 1330/61

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra A.C.T.

Palestine Refugees

....

Forwarded are two copies of the statement
delivered by the Australian Representative (Mr Hood)
during the general debate on the UNRWA item on 16th
December.

M. Jordan

Original on 8/5/12/60

R. H. ROBERTSON

RHR/fdb

2
1

for Delegation

File 181/4/4

Ry

PALESTINE REFUGEES

STATEMENT BY THE AUSTRALIAN REPRESENTATIVE IN THE
SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE IN CONNEXION
WITH AGENDA ITEM 25

Mr Chairman,

When Dr Davis, the Director of the Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees opened our general debate on 4th December with his customary frankness and lucidity, he again brought out the most distressing feature of this whole issue. While on the one hand little or no progress is being made towards a solution of the refugee problem, on the other hand the number of refugees grows year by year with virtually no improvement in the opportunities for the youthful component to develop their latent capacities. This is a thoroughly depressing outcome of the labours of so many people over the past thirteen or so years.

First, Sir, I should like to speak briefly to the humanitarian side of the problem, leaving until later what may be called the political side. As Dr Davis has pointed out, this division corresponds to that between the respective mandates of his Agency on the one hand and that of the Palestine Conciliation Commission on the other. So far as the Agency's work is concerned, the continuing failure of financial resources, from governmental sources or otherwise, to achieve the required level forces upon the agency the application of priorities. Whilst the efforts and local expenditure on the part of the host governments are in this and other respects commendable, a very large slice of available funds has to be devoted to relief, to the simple business of keeping the refugees alive. But, given the inevitability of this as a first priority, the Australian delegation must applaud the Agency's according an increased urgency to vocational training under its current three year programme. It is of vital importance that efforts should be made to arrest the current trend whereby, as Dr Davis put it the other day, a high percentage of the 300,000 young men and women who have come to maturity as refugees are more or less unemployable, as well as unemployed. We are therefore particularly glad to see from the Agency's report that the vocational training portion of the programme is even running somewhat ahead of schedule. In this connexion my delegation would like to pay a tribute to the close co-operation the Agency's report reflects between it and UNESCO, whereby twenty-one experts in the respective fields of vocational training have been made available by UNESCO on a secondment basis.

But, as I have said, the continuing shortfall of governmental contributions has forced, and will continue to force, upon the Agency a series of economies which can ill be afforded. We were glad that the Pledging Conference for the Agency on 6th December saw several notable increases in contributions and also saw a few new contributors. But the final figures did not give any ground for complacency, and one must hope that in the very near future those governments which have not seen fit to bear any proportion of the burden will revise their attitude. For our part, Australia was unfortunately unable to increase the level of its contribution, largely because of increasing expenditures in regard to the development of the territories of Papua and New Guinea. Nevertheless, we felt it our duty on humanitarian grounds to maintain our contribution at the current year's level, namely the equivalent of \$201,600.

However, despite all the admiration which we have for the efforts of Dr Davis and his staff to fulfil their mandate within the limits set by inadequate funds, and despite our acknowledgment of the outlay in goods and services by the four host governments in amelioration of the conditions of their Arab brothers in the camps, one may be excused for the feeling that the UNRWA operation is really not much more than an attempt to make the best of a bad situation.

All of us on humanitarian grounds and, on other grounds as well, those of us who represent contributing or host governments, must yearn for some equitable and realistic solution which will bring to an end the need for the Agency. As Dr Davis has said, the Agency's role is to deal with the situation as it is but it is for the Palestine Conciliation Commission under the terms of the oft-quoted resolution 194 (III) to seek a solution. Under that resolution, the Commission was given two functions which are principally relevant to the present item. In operative paragraph 6, it was instructed to take steps to assist the governments and authorities concerned to achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them. In operative paragraph 11, the Commission was instructed to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement, and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees, and the payment of compensation. Admittedly by 1950 the General Assembly in its resolution 194 had in effect recognized the unlikelihood of the Commission's achieving the objectives of operative paragraph 6 and had directed its attention

/more especially

more especially to operative paragraph 11. But resolution 394 certainly did not cancel that section of the Commission's mandate and one must hope that despite all evidence to the contrary the Commission will be able to play a part in moving this intractable problem towards a final settlement. But as I have said, the main stress of the Commission's activities over the last good many years has been on the functions laid down in operative paragraph 11 of resolution 194, and, indeed, resolution 512 (VI) acknowledged that the primary responsibility for reaching a settlement of their outstanding differences lay with the Governments concerned.

In its Nineteenth progress report which is now before us, the Commission has succinctly stated the achievements of its Technical Office in regard to the identification and evaluation of Arab refugee immovable properties in Israel as at 15th May 1948. These are solid achievements indeed, and it is fitting that due credit should be paid to the Technical Office for its painstaking efforts.

The Commission's report also refers, of course, to the action taken following the adoption of resolution 1604 (XVI), and, in particular, to its decision "to explore by means of a special representative the precise views of the parties as to what action might usefully be undertaken in the implementation of paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III)". We also have before us in the report by Dr Johnson the outcome of this decision. One cannot pretend that Dr Johnson's report in document A/4921/Add.1 contains any justification for wild optimism, but on the other hand it is the Australian delegation's opinion that it does not justify deep pessimism either. On the contrary, this exploratory series of discussions in Beirut, Aman, Cairo, Gaza, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv warrants the firm opinion that the Commission should follow up Dr Johnson's Mission and assign a special representative to enter, more deeply than time allowed Dr Johnson to do, into discussions with the relevant authorities with a view to finding practical means of bringing about progress on the Arab refugee problem under the terms of operative paragraph 11 of resolution 194.

In paragraph 53 of his report, Dr Johnson has himself to an extent discouraged unwarranted optimism as to the outcome of the Commission's new approach when he says that "to state the matter in the most negative way,

/the signs that no progress

the signs that no progress is possible are not so conclusive as to justify a decision not to try". But in paragraph 56 Dr Johnson points out that the Commission's new approach of appointing a special representative has not yet been given a thorough test and that, while, in the time available, he himself was unable conclusively to determine whether progress could be made in the implementation of paragraph 11 of resolution 194 by this approach, such a determination should be possible in a year. In these circumstances, and upon the basis of Dr Johnson's rather heavily qualified and cautious optimism, the Australian delegation will gladly support a recommendation to the Commission that it pursue its new approach for one more year and report to the Seventeenth Session. Indeed, the Australian delegation considers that after thirteen rather negative years the General Assembly would be most ill-advised if it were not to support this particular approach, which just may contain the seeds of the constructive outcome which we all must desire. I may say, in concluding these general remarks, that we do not share the opinion expressed by the distinguished representative of Syria on 8th December and by other Arab representatives that Dr Johnson's activities have been ultra vires the General Assembly resolutions. It is quite clear from his own report that Dr Johnson fully accepted the basic limitation of his mandate to the content of operative paragraph 11 of resolution 194. But we for our part are more than ready to accept his observation in paragraph 39 that "such is the inter-relationship of the various aspects of the Palestine Question....that one or more of the other aspects were referred to, and often heavily emphasized, in virtually all the conversations I engaged in".

PH

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

0.19101

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

Sent: 18th December, 1961.
2110

TO:

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK. 903

REPEATED:

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON. 2066

Australian External Affairs Office,
LONDON. SAV. EA 306

Australian High Commission,
OTTAWA. SAV. 188

Australian High Commission,
WELLINGTON. SAV. 154

Australian High Commission,
ACCRA. SAV. 25

Australian Embassy,
CAIRO. SA.V 38

Australian Embassy,
TEL AVIV. SAV. 14.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Palestine Refugees. Your UN1844.

We agree that you should have discretion you request in paragraph 4, though as you know we do not ourselves favour amendments in L.81. We assume vote on L.80 will be taken after voting on L.79 and L.81. In that event (a) if L.79 were defeated or amended in such a way that you could not vote for whole amended resolution you have discretion to vote in favour of L.80; but (b) if L.79 were adopted we should prefer that you abstain on L.80 rather than oppose. If assumption above proved incorrect and L.80 were taken first you should oppose in order to secure passage of L.79 if possible.

MIN & DEPT. E.A. (852/12/10)
MIN & DEPT. IMMIGRATION
TREASURER & TREASURY
P.M.:S

19th December, 1961.

SEC A/Ss MR LOOMES UN@ PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA
E.AF&ME E AF ME INF IC

103

CONFIDENTIAL

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102

File No.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Record of Conversation with H.E. Mr. M. Yuval, Ambassador of Israel
 on 18th December, 1961.
 Officers Present: Mr. H.D. Anderson

MAIN SUBJECT(S):

PALESTINE REFUGEES

File 181/4/4

Mr. Yuval called to request Australian support for the 15-power draft resolution on Agenda Item 25 (U.N.R.W.A.) which calls for direct negotiations between the Governments concerned - "if so desired with the assistance of the Palestine Conciliation Commission". (This resolution was, in fact, inspired by Israel which doubts whether the Conciliation Commission can make effective progress).

2. I told Mr. Yuval that we preferred the American draft resolution because it concentrated on the continuance of recent conciliation efforts and also because we thought it had better prospects of adoption by the Assembly. The delegation had therefore been instructed to support the American draft. If, however, it were defeated or so amended as to make it unacceptable, we would be disposed to vote in favour of the 15-power resolution.

3. Mr. Yuval then said he hoped we would vote in favour of the 15-power resolution even if the American resolution were taken first (as seemed most likely) and then passed in its present form or in a form substantially acceptable to us. The 15-power resolution called for direct negotiations between the parties concerned "in accordance with the Charter" and "by peaceful means". There was a tendency at the United Nations to-day to ignore the Charter and the emphasis which it placed on settling international disputes by peaceful means: he hoped that countries such as Australia would support resolutions which called for direct negotiations on this basis. Mr. Yuval also claimed that there was no inconsistency between the American and the 15-power resolutions; they could be seen as calling for different, but complementary courses of action.

4. I said that Mr. Yuval's representations would be given careful consideration. If the American resolution were adopted, however, subsequent adoption of the 15-power resolution might appear to detract from the emphasis given to the role of the Commission in the American draft. Mr. Yuval maintained his view that no inconsistency at all would be involved.

5. I later telephoned Mr. Yuval to say it had been decided that the delegation should abstain on the 15-power resolution in the contingency outlined in paragraph 3 above.

DISTRIBUTION:

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 Inf. Br.

Ex. Comms. Br.
 Melbourne Office
 Antarctic Division

U.N. New York
 Tel Aviv

FOLLOWING POSTS:

ACTION:

7748/60.

Report prepared by

(H.D. Anderson)

CONFIDENTIAL

101
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

KFH

I. 30302

Dated: 15th December, 1961.

1830

FROM:

Rec'd: 17th December, 1961.

1325

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK

UN1830. UNCLASSIFIED.

Washington for information, repeated Ottawa Sav. 1357,
London Sav. 1391, Cairo Sav. 103, Tel Aviv 30.

Palestine Refugees.

Afghanistan, Ghana, Indonesia and Pakistan have
tabled amendment (L. 81) which would insert following into Amer-
ican Draft Resolution -

"3. Decides that the Conciliation Commission
shall be composed of five members and requests the President of
the General Assembly to present, before the end of the present
session for the approval of the General Assembly, a proposal
concerning the new composition of the Commission,

4. Requests the reconstituted Conciliation
Commission to take measures for the protection of the rights,
property and interests of the Palestine Arab Refugees".

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT IMMIGRATION
TREASURER & TREASURY
P.M.'s

18th December, 1961.

SEC A/Ss UNO ER PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA EAF&ME E AF ME
INF
ACCRA LAGOS PRETORIA ROME TEL AVIV WELLINGTON

160
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

:JM

INWARD CABLEGRAM

I. 30283

Dated: 16th December, 1961
1525

Rec'd: 17th December, 1961
1118

FROM:

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK.

UN.1844 CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY

Washington for information, Ottawa Bag Sav.
1366, London Sav.1401, Cairo Sav.106, Tel Aviv Sav.31.

Palestine Refugee.

Your telegram 893.

You will have received our 1830 specifying proposed amendments (in Document L81) to the United States Draft Resolution. We have since learned that Ghana has withdrawn its sponsorship of the amendments.

2. As indicated in our telegram 1814 Arab States seem particularly anxious to press amendment concerning reconstitution of the P.C.C. new composition they have in mind would comprise besides the United States; Sweden, Yugoslavia, one Latin American and one Asian.

3. General debate on the U.N.R.R.A. item will probably continue through Monday and the voting situation on the two Draft Resolutions and the abovementioned amendments has not yet taken final shape. In our general debate statement this morning we outlined broad support for ideas in the United States draft, particularly as regards continuation of the Johnson efforts, but did not indicate any final position on any of the proposals before the Committee. Largely on account of United States tactics in handling the item this year there seems no prospect of evolving a more or less uniform contributors position in regard to the resolutions and amendments. Positions range from United States (which will vote against Resolution L80 and against both amendments in L81) to New Zealand (which has recommended votes in favour of L80 and probably of first paragraph of L81 and against second paragraph of L81) and Italy (against L80 but in favour of second paragraph of L81 and possibly also of first paragraph). United Kingdom position is against second paragraph of L81 but still fluid as between negative and abstention on L80 and first paragraph of L81. Canadian delegation expects to abstain on L80 vote against second paragraph of L81 and either abstain or vote in favour of first paragraph of L81 depending on French attitude to that paragraph. France itself though in favour of L80 and against second paragraph of L81 is likely to abstain on the first paragraph of L81 on the ground that as a member of P.C.C. it should not adopt a position.

JM INWARD CABLEGRAM I. 30283
2.

4. In these circumstances our best course would seem to be to try to keep in step with the United Kingdom which this morning made statement in general debate in similar terms to ours. While keeping in mind guidance in your 893 we would thus appreciate a margin of discretion between negative and abstention in the final voting stage now likely on Monday night.

MIN.&DEPT. E.A.
MIN.&DEPT. IMMIGRATION.
TREASURER & TREASURY.
P.M.'s.

17th December, 1961

SEC A/Ss MR LOOMES UN@ PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA
E.A.F&ME E AF ME INF IC

ROME WELLINGTON

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

KW

0.19029

Sent: 16th December, 1961
2108

TO:

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK...893.

Repeated:

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON...2057.

Australian Embassy,
TEL AVIV...99.

Australian High Commission,
OTTAWA... SAV. 187

Australian High Commission,
KARACHI... SAV. 112.

Australian High Commission,
WELLINGTON... SAV. 153.

Australian Embassy,
CAIRO... SAV. 37.

External Affairs Office,
LONDON SAV. E.A. 305.

Australian High Commission,
ACCRA... SAV. 24.

Australian Embassy,
DJAKARTA... SAV. 141.

CONFIDENTIAL.

PRIORITY.

U.N.R.W.A.

Israel Ambassador advises Afghanistan, Ghana, Indonesia, and Pakistan have tabled amendments to United States Draft which would:

- (1) Decide that P.C.C. should be reconstituted with 5 Members and,
- (2) Request reconstitute P.C.C. to take measures to protect Arab refugee property.

2. If this is correct our inclination is to oppose both proposals. Former appears to imply criticism of existing Commission which we consider unwarranted. Moreover we have grave doubts that any reconstituted Commission would be satisfactory from point of view of contributors. Latter proposal is variant of previous Custodian proposals and is open to some objections. (see brief).

Israel raises objection that infringement of sovereignty is implicit in it.

3. You should be guided by foregoing, subject to our information still being valid. We should in any event welcome your comments.

MTN. & DEPT E.A.

P.M'S

18th December, 1961

97

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

MEH

C O N F I D E N T I A L

I. 30120

FROM:

Dated: 14th December, 1961
1815

Rec'd: 15th December, 1961
2126

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK

UN 1814 CONFIDENTIAL

Washington for Information.

Ottawa Sav. 1347, London Sav. 1380,
Cairo Sav. 102, Tel Aviv Sav. 29.

Palestine Refugees.

Arab speakers both before and since tabling of draft resolution L80 (see paragraph 2 of our 1794) have strongly attacked it in its entirety principally arguing that the resolution ignores the rights of refugees and particularly terms of operative paragraph 11 of resolution 194. In the process, Arabs have succeeded in patronising and insulting the French African sponsors particularly Upper Volta and Ivory Coast as in fact stooges of Israel. Reactions of African delegations have been spirited.

2. U.A.R. (which did not participate in this performance) had told the United Kingdom and United States delegations that Arabs will this year not pursue attempts to obtain specific reference to appointment of custodian, but would be satisfied if Americans would agree to inclusion in operative part of their draft of specific reference to operative paragraph 2 (c) of Resolution 394 V. However, Arabs suspect (wrongly as far as we know) that the French delegation is behind Res. L80 and are therefore confirmed in their determination to modify composition of Palestine Conciliation Commission. U.A.R. Delegation told the United States that they would be content to have new Commission of five members appointed by the President of the General Assembly. They would demand exclusion of France, would expect Turkey not to wish to serve, would not demand Eastern European representation and would agree to United States continuing as a member. Finally, United States delegation was told that the Arabs would go along with a continuation of Johnson-type mission, but did not expect any result therefrom. United States has referred both Arab proposals to Washington. Afghan Mission has confirmed the

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96

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

1. 30120

2.

foregoing, having been this morning asked by the Arabs to co-sponsor two amendments to United States draft inserting operative references to paragraph 2(c) of Resolution 394 V and to reconstitution of P.C.C. Afghans are rather reluctant as proposed amendments would leave unaffected the whole present text and Afghanistan has difficulties with any implication of acceptance of present operative paragraph 3.

3. Present instructions of United States delegation are to vote against L80 on the ground that it runs counter to continuation of Johnson mission United Kingdom will abstain on present instructions.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT IMMIGRATION
TREASURY
P.M's

16th December, 1961

SEC	A/Ss	UN@	ER	PAC&AM	AM&SP	S&SEA	SA	EA&ME
E	AF	ME	INF	C&P				

PH

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

I.30061

INWARD CABLEGRAM

Dated: 12th December, 1961.
1820
Rec'd: 14th December, 1961.
1834

FROM:

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK.

UN1794 UNCLASSIFIED.

Washington for information, Ottawa Sav. 1335,
London Sav. 1368, Cairo Sav. 101, Tel Aviv Sav. 28.

Palestine Refugees.

The United States last night tabled draft resolution (L79). Following are changes made from text as in our telegram 1731 (and correction in telegram 1732).

(a) First preambular paragraph has additional references to Resolutions 394 V and 512 VI.

(b) Second and third preambular paragraphs are identical but fourth preambular paragraph is deleted.

(c) From operative paragraph 1 words "its basic mandate in General Assembly Resolution 194 III and "are deleted.

(d) Operative paragraph 1A now reads "Requests the Commission to intensify its efforts for the implementation of paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 III and urges the Arab host Governments and Israel to co-operate with the Commission in this regard".

(e) Sub paragraphs (b) and (d) are retained intact but sub paragraph (c) is deleted.

(f) Operative paragraph 2 is deleted and operative paragraphs 3 and 4 while otherwise unchanged are renumbered 2 and 3.

2. Group including French Africans, Latin Americans, Netherlands, Liberia and Sierra Leone have also tabled draft resolution (L80). Whole operative paragraph reads

"Renews its appeal to the Governments concerned to undertake direct negotiations - with the assistance of the Conciliation Commission for Palestine if they so desire - with a view to finding a solution acceptable to all the parties concerned for all the questions in dispute between them including the question of the Arab refugees".

MIN & DEPT. E.A.
MIN & DEPT. IMMIGRATION
TREASURY
P.M.'S

15th December, 1961.

94

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

15th December, 1961.

SEC A/Ss UN@ ER COMREL PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA
E.AF&ME E AF ME INF C&P

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS 26 181/4/4 93
INWARD CABLEGRAM **CONFIDENTIAL**

:GS

I.29115

Sent: 2nd December, 1961
1600

Rec'd: 3rd December, 1961
1556

FROM:

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK.

UN 1731 CONFIDENTIAL

Repeated Washington, Ottawa Sav.1289, London
Sav.1321 (for External), Cairo Sav.94, Tel Aviv Sav.22.

Our 1713.

2. Following is full text of United States draft
resolution :-

The General Assembly

Recalling its resolutions 194(III) of 11th
September, 1948, 302(IV) of 8th December, 1949, 393(V) of
2nd December, 1950, 513(VI) of 26th January, 1952, 614(VII)
of 6th November, 1952, 720(VIII) of 27th November, 1953,
818(IX) of 4th December, 1954, 916(X) of 3rd December, 1955,
1018(XI) of 28th February, 1957, 1191(XII) of 12th December,
1957, 1315(XIII) of 12th December, 1958, 1456(XIV) of 9th
December, and 1604(XV).

Noting the annual report of the Director of
the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East, covering the period 1st July,
1960 - 30th June, 1961;

Noting with deep regret that repatriation or
compensation of the refugees as provided for in paragraph 11
of General Assembly Resolution 194(III) has not been
affected, that no substantial progress has been made in the
programme endorsed in paragraph 2 of Resolution 513(VI) for
the reintegration of refugees either by repatriation or
settlement and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees
continues to be a matter of serious concern;

Reiterating its view that the Governments
directly concerned have the primary responsibility for
reaching a settlement of their outstanding differences;

1. Takes note of the efforts of the Conciliation
Commission for Palestine pursuant to its basic
mandate under General Assembly Resolution 194(III)
and the request contained in General Assembly
Resolutions 1456(XIV) and 1604(XV), to assure the
implementation of paragraph 11 of Resolution 194
(III), and in this connection :-

- (a) Requests the Commission to continue its efforts
to achieve progress on the Palestine refugee
problem -

CONFIDENTIAL

.../2

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92

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

I.29115

- 2 -

- (b) Further requests the Commission to intensify its work on the identification and evaluation of Arab refugee immovable properties in Palestine as of 15th May, 1948, and to make every effort to complete this work by September 1st, 1962 -
 - (c) Urges the Arab host Governments and Israel to co-operate with the U.N.C.C.P. in the development of practical means to advance towards a peaceful and expeditious solution of the Palestine refugee problem.
 - (d) Requests the Secretary-General to make available to the Commission such additional staff and administrative facilities as may be required.
2. Decides to extend the mandate of the U.N.R.W.A. for Palestine refugees in the Near East until 30th June, 1964.
3. Directs attention to the precarious financial position of the U.N.R.W.A. for Palestine refugees in the Near East and urges non-contributing Governments to consider increasing their contributions, so that the Agency can carry out its essential programmes.
4. Expresses its thanks to the Director and the staff of the Agency for their continued faithful efforts to provide essential services for the Palestine refugees, and to the specialized Agencies and private organizations for their valuable work in assisting the refugees.
- Ends.
3. The United States delegation intends to restrict sponsorship of this draft to those of the major contributors who have been relatively uncommitted between the Arabs and Israel. They therefore exclude France and the Netherlands who will be told in General terms of the nature of the resolution but will not be given the text until it has been cleared by potential co-sponsors whom the United States now sees as New Zealand, Canada and Australia. Text of draft has therefore been given only to these three delegations and the United Kingdom. It has of course been shown to neither the Arabs nor Israel.
4. Although Monday and Tuesday's meetings will doubtless be taken up with completion of Oman item and debate on seating of 'the Palestine Arab delegation' and Wednesday has been pre-empted by Shukairy we should appreciate your earliest comment both on the content of the resolution and the proposed co-sponsorship. On the latter point we mentioned to the United States delegation our feeling that you might prefer a wider sponsorship to include a suitable Latin and a European, perhaps Denmark.

CONFIDENTIAL

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91

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS **CONFIDENTIAL**
INWARD CABLEGRAM

I.29115

- 3 -

5. From both United States and Israeli delegations we have heard the nature of Mr. Rusk's talk yesterday with Mrs. Meir. After the former had expounded United State intentions as in paragraphs two and three of our telegram Mrs. Meir expressed scepticism as to tactical soundness but agreed not to proceed with Israeli inspired draft unless Arabs tabled this draft. United States understands that Arabs are awaiting tabling of United States draft before tabling theirs.

MIN.&DEPT.E.A.
MIN.&DEPT.IMMIGRATION
P.M.'s

4th December, 1961.

SEC	A/Gs	LA	UN@	ER	PACNAM	AM&SP	S&SEA	SA	EAT&ME	E
AF	ME	INF	C&P							

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DEPARTMENT OF
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

12 DEC 1961

181/4/4

CANBERRA

CONFIDENTIAL

Embassy,
AUSTRALIAN LEGATION
TEL AVIV.

In reply quote No. 230.5

Memorandum No. 472

1st December, 1961.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

THE ARAB REFUGEE QUESTION.

In continuation of my memorandum No. 443 of 10th November, 1961, and with reference to the recent publication of Dr. Johnson's report following his visit to the Middle East in the framework of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, I am obliged to report growing anxiety in Israel as to the outcome of the forthcoming debate in the General Assembly on the Arab refugee question.

2. Considerable division of opinion has become evident as a result of Dr. Johnson's agreement to eliminate from his report certain statements of historical fact damaging to the Arab side of the argument. The Israel Foreign Ministry is criticised for failing to react as promptly and effectively as the Arabs, and demand modifications of unsatisfactory (to Israel) aspects of the report.

3. In fact, I have noticed among officials and others mounting pessimism as to how the outcome will affect Israel. This is in contrast to the characteristic blithe optimism of people in this country that they can overcome any political obstacle. They are now becoming more and more aware that they cannot hope for an outcome completely on their own terms, and that they will have to make certain concessions in face of pressure, even from their past friends.

4. I am sending copies of this memorandum to the Senior External Affairs Officer, London, to the Australian Embassy, Washington, and to the Australian Mission to the United Nations, New York.

J.M. McMillan
(J.M. McMillan)
Ambassador

in Phillips
in Rowland

mk

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

File 181/4/4

KFH

I.29151

FROM:

Dated: 1st December, 1961.
1700
Rec'd: 4th December, 1961.
0920

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK.

UN1715. UNCLASSIFIED.

Washington for information, Ottawa Sav.1278, London
Sav.1307.

Coming Week in the United Nations.

Chances are growing that this session of the Assembly
will be able to finish by Christmas.

2. Plenary will be considering Chinese representation
all next week. The Angola item is likely to be next.

3. First Committee yesterday agreed without objection
to Libyan suggestion that the Algerian item should be deferred
until 14th December. After some argument the Committee de-
cided to take up Outer Space on Monday and to consider the
Korean item after Outer Space.

4. Special Political Committee begins the Palestine
item (its last) on Monday.

5. Second Committee should finish the resolution stage
of its first group of items by the middle of the week and
will then take up the World Food Programme.

6. Third Committee will continue discussion of Eco.Soc.
report. The only other item likely to be taken before Christ-
mas is the draft convention on Freedom of Information though
the Committee may possibly revert to "The Marriage Convention"
to discuss its enabling clauses.

7. Fourth Committee will continue South-West Africa.

8. The Fifth Committee will spend most of next week
cleaning up various matters. It could take up the financing
of the Congo operations the week after next.

9. Sixth Committee will continue discussing future
work of the I.L.C.

MIN.&DEPT E.A.
P.M's

4th December, 1961.

SEC A/Ss UNO TA ER COMREL PAC&AM EA AM&SP S&SEA
SA SEA EAF&ME E AF ME INF DL MT IC C&P ADMIN

P.H.
12

CONFIDENTIAL 82

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

.../JS

Dated: 30th November, 1961.
2030
Recd: 2nd December, 1961.
0932

FROM:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

UN1713. CONFIDENTIAL.

Washington for information.

Repeated Ottawa Sav. 1276, London Sav. 1305,
Tel Aviv Sav. 21, Cairo Sav. 92.

Palestine Refugees.

In anticipation that this item may come up Friday
and at latest Monday, the Israeli Delegation (Comay) discussed
with us at length today following aspects -

(a) Question of "Palestine Arab Delegation".

In view particularly of Committee's admission of
hearing to Omani "Delegation", Israelis expect strong Arab
effort to gain some recognition for the Palestine "Delegation"
as such, in terms of request already sent in by Arab delegat-
ion. They say Chairman may suggest simple adoption of former
procedure i.e. to give a hearing to one or two spokesmen for
the refugees, but in case this does not happen, or does not
work anyway, they are looking for someone to put in an actual
proposal to such effect. They have not asked us to do so, but
Canadians subsequently told us that they have been so requested.
The Canadians however, will not do so, though they would
naturally vote against the Arab request if the occasion arises.
Recognition of "The Palestine Arab Delegation", or something
like it would of course be a highly troublesome new departure
but Israeli fears that it will happen may prove to be exaggerated.

(b) U.N.R.W.A. report itself.

Israelis do not consider that any purpose would be
served by trying to use continuation of mandate of U.N.R.W.A.
(and thus of contributions) as a bargaining point to induce
host Governments to so move for resettlement etc. Arabs simply
assume that contributions will continue and start from there.
The specific U.N.R.W.A. aspect should therefore be dealt with
quite separately.

(c) Israeli-Arab Relationships.

It being obviously impossible to keep this aspect
out of the debate this year, in view of the P.C.C. and Johnson
reports, Israelis are looking for means to fend off objection-
able Arab proposals interpreting the 1948 Resolution, such as
custody of property and the like. Americans believe (Mrs.
Meir had discussion with Stevenson this morning) that such can
be found in continuance of P.C.C. efforts and in particular of

CONFIDENTIAL 72

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87

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
CONFIDENTIAL
INWARD CABLEGRAM

-2- I. 29008

activities pursued by Johnson on behalf of P.C.C. (We have been shown, not by Israelis, United States draft of resolution to this effect). However, Israelis say that Arabs have decided the Johnson report is hostile to them and will not go along with any attempt to build on it. In these circumstances Israelis are suggesting that only effective counter-move to extreme Arab proposals is to go back to the idea of appealing to both parties to enter into direct negotiations with a view to settling all questions outstanding between them, including the refugee question. Comay said that several African delegations (Brazzaville Group, Sierra Leone, Liberia) and "some" Latin Americans had shown interest in such a proposal, and Israelis would now request that the major contributing countries, excluding for the moment United States, United Kingdom and France, consider whether they could lend it their support at an appropriate stage. Intention would be to "float" such a resolution for the time being, leaving it to later decision by the sponsors how far to take it.

2. Subsequent to foregoing conversation the United States Delegation told us their present position on handling of the item. In United States view the Johnson mission represented first hopeful development in Arab-Israeli situation in ten years. Accordingly continuation of Johnson's mandate should be central to contributors' tactics and any move likely to prejudice this should be discouraged. The United States hoped to speak second in debate and to introduce a draft resolution. The State Department had prepared bland draft along general lines mentioned in paragraph 1 (c) above. The Delegation told us that in order to postpone one possible source of controversy the American draft would include paragraph renewing U.N.R.W.A. mandate for one more years (until June 1964) and postponing review of the mandate until next year. The Delegation hoped to be able to give us a copy of the draft tomorrow by which time the State Department's reactions to the Delegation's suggestions should have been received. The United States hoped that Australia and New Zealand would be prepared to cosponsor their draft but they thought it unlikely that the United Kingdom would be willing to do so. Furthermore they did not intend to seek cosponsorship of contributing delegations which were too closely identified with the Israeli position namely France and the Netherlands.

3. The United States did not like the draft which the Israelis had inspired the French Africans to produce because they felt that the debate on it would prejudice the chances of Johnson's making progress. If the draft were brought to the vote they might even vote against it. Still less of course did they like the Arab draft which is in course of preparation and which will revive the custodian proposal. Finally the United States intends in two respects to depart from the tactics adopted at the Fifteenth Session. They will avoid negotiating with the Arabs and they are not proposing this year to work through the contributors' group.

4. We are not transmitting at the moment texts of either of above proposals, as situation obviously requires further consultation here before we can usefully inform you further.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT IMMIGRATION.
P.M.'s.

2nd December, 1961.

CONFIDENTIAL

Name of Paper

Israel Digest

File No.

181/4/4

Published at

Date

24 11 61

THE ISRAEL DIGEST VOLUME IV No. 24

Knesset Approves Refugee Policy

BY an overwhelming majority the Knesset on November 6 approved the Government's policy on the Arab refugee problem. The House passed by 68 votes to 7 a resolution submitted on behalf of the Herut and Liberal opposition parties, as well as those represented in the Cabinet, which reads as follows:

"The Knesset takes note of the Government's position on the question of the Arab refugees, as expressed in the Prime Minister's statement in the Knesset on October 11, 1961, and in the Foreign Minister's speech in the Knesset debate on November 6, 1961, which will serve as a basic guide for the Israel delegation to the United Nations in the discussions on the problem of the Arab refugees. The Knesset resolves that the Arab refugees should not be returned to Israeli territory and that the only solution to the problem is their settlement in the Arab countries."

In replying to the debate, Mrs. Golda Meir, the Foreign Minister, recalled that in 1949, mention was made of admitting up to a hundred thousand refugees. "As all the members of the Knesset are aware," she continued, "this made no impression on anyone. Not a single Arab leader spoke up and said: 'If that is the way you talk, let us sit down and make peace.' This proposal was in force for

some time, but it was withdrawn and no longer exists."

Mrs. Meir explained that things had changed since then. For instance, she said, "an Arab refugee child who left the country in 1948 would now return aged 18 to 20, having absorbed at home and at school, from his leaders and in the Press, poisonous hatred against the State of Israel, and having only one ideal in mind: to destroy the State and throw its people into the sea. Now he would return a soldier, an enemy soldier..."

"Since then," she went on, "we have said only one thing. We have said: We are prepared to enter into negotiations with the Arab countries on the refugee question; we are prepared to discuss with them, to conduct negotiations on compensation—and we have always said mutual compensation, as the Prime Minister recalled in his statement—, even if there is no peace, but on condition that it is a question of a solution for the refugee problem within the Arab States..."

"To this offer too, there has been no positive response. I have not yet found a single statesman who has visited the Arab countries who could come and tell us that he had found anyone who said that if Israel agreed to return a certain number of refugees, they would make peace with us."

remained! Who remembers now—although we recall it every year—who remembers the important part of this resolution?"

After quoting her Assembly statement on the refugee problem, Mrs. Meir went on: "And the fact is that the Arabs left this territory at the demand of the Arab leaders... There is evidence from Arabs, from the former Secretary of the Higher Arab Committee. The Mufti himself says so."

"The declared attitude of the State of Israel is that... the refugee problem should be solved inside the Arab countries. The State of Israel cannot take back refugees and we are not prepared to enter into any discussion on the basis of free choice... We are a sovereign State. No one can choose to enter another State. The State must permit it. It can choose whom to admit and whom not to admit... Exactly in the same way as no one can sit down in any corner of the world and exercise a free choice to enter the United States or the Soviet Union, so no one can choose to enter the State of Israel..."

Peace Will Come

"We want peace with our neighbors. We need it, our neighbors need it, and we know that the refugees need it. We know that many of them would be delighted at the first opportunity to return to normal life, to bring up their children as children who love something and not as children who hate something..."

"In any case, not an iota of blame attaches to us. We did not want war then; we wanted peace immediately after the war, and we have continued to want it to this day. And I believe that peace between us and the Arab countries will come and the refugees will settle in the Arab countries. That will be a great day for us, when we shall be able to send—not to distant countries, but immediately across the border—our people who are expert in the absorption of refugees, to train them for work, for agriculture, and everything that is needed to create a good, progressive, civilized society."

Referring to the attitudes of other nations, especially those in Africa and Asia, the Foreign Minister said: "In the last analysis, in one respect all peoples are equal, large and small, in Africa and Asia, in North America and South America, without any distinction; the people living in its country is first of all responsible for its own security and survival. And it commits a sin if it listens to advice from others who tell it the opposite. No one expects the State of Israel to be the first and only country in the world to accept the opinions of others in matters vital to its existence. We shall try to influence other nations, but in the last analysis only the people of Israel will decide what is necessary for the State of Israel's survival. The people of Israel will decide, and its decision will be final."

The Problem Is: Israel-Arab Peace

THE Foreign Minister declared, "The entire mistake is this: there is no refugee problem; there is a problem of peace between the Arab countries and Israel. If there were peace, then the refugee problem would be almost automatically solved. There would be no need to make the gesture of returning an agreed number..."

"Not we, but objective committees composed of non-Jews, have travelled, investigated and studied the problem, and arrived at the conclusion that there has never yet been a refugee problem that can be solved so easily as that of the Arab refugees. There is no problem to solve except one: the fact that the refugee problem is needed by the Arab leaders as one of their weapons against the survival of Israel."

Replying to the Mapam suggestion that Israel should declare now that she would consider returning "an agreed number" of refugees at a later date, Mrs. Meir asked: "What good would it do? Whom would it influence? The fate of this proposal would be the same as that of UN resolution No. 194, which was adopted in 1948. It is a long resolution, the greater part of which refers to the functions of the Conciliation Commission, which was to bring the parties to direct negotiations for peace. There

is one section—which does not speak of free choice—there is no such term—but which says that the problem should be solved by the return of the refugees, by their resettlement in other countries, or by compensation..."

"What has remained of this beautiful resolution? Section 11—even that distorted, not even accurately quoted—that has

Distinguished Americans
On the Refugee Problem

Senator H. H. Humphrey, testifying before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the US Senate, 1 July, 1957:

"The return of the Arab refugees to Israel—all of them or an appreciable part of them—is no longer possible. It would be witting self-destruction on the part of Israel, surrounded by countries which claim belligerent rights against her, to agree to take back and absorb refugees whose whole education during the past decade has been to hate Israel. To behave in that way would mean to introduce a fifth column into the heart of Israel."

Bishop A. Pike, in the *New York Times*, May 14, 1957:

"Israel's population now numbers 1,900,000. No nation... can concure in the entry of a fifth column, and on such a scale (800,000 refugees)... Just imagine for a moment that the United States agreed to open its gates to 71,000,000 sworn enemies!"

THE ISRAEL Digest

OF PRESS AND EVENTS IN ISRAEL AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Vol. IV No. 24

Published fortnightly by Israel Digest, P.O.B. 92, Jerusalem

November 24, 1961

Housing, Jobs and Training Being Prepared for Newcomers

A VARIETY of measures are being taken by Government and Jewish Agency departments to build thousands of homes, find suitable employment, and provide intensive courses in Hebrew, for the greatly increased numbers of new immigrants who have been arriving recently.

Some 18,000 housing units for new immigrants will be built in 1961/2—15,000 of them permanent dwellings and the rest asbestos-walled huts. This was stated on November 1 by Mr. David Tanne, Director of the Ministry of Labor's Housing Division (now Ministry of Housing) at a meeting of the Finance Committee of the Zionist General Council. The Government and the Jewish Agency would spend IL238m. on housing in 1961/2, Mr. Tanne said, of which the Government would supply IL151m. and the Agency IL52m., while the rest will be obtained from various other sources.

Dr. Ra'anana Weitz, Director of the Jewish Agency's Settlement Department, presented to the Agency Executive on November 13 his Department's plan for absorbing immigrant families in existing moshavim (smallholders' settlements). Dr. Weitz mentioned several of the difficulties

involved: new families would disturb the stability that had been achieved in many of the settlements, and many moshavim wanted to save the available places for the sons of the settlers. Nevertheless, special efforts would be made to settle 1,000 picked families in the moshavim.

Helping Professional Men to Settle

Particulars of the special efforts being made to find employment for the large number of professional men among recent immigrants were given recently by Mr. A. Cygel, Director of the Agency's Absorption Department. Immigrants of this category make up some 16 per cent of the total. Of the 6,000 professional men who had arrived in the past five years, 1,266 were physicians, 1,200 engineers, and 600 lawyers and economists.

Of the physicians, 1,087 had found employment. The remainder were mainly specialists who had arrived in the past year. A IL1m. fund would be established shortly by the Government, the Jewish Agency and the Labor Federation for granting loans to physicians, and to medical institutions to enable them to employ more doctors.

Engineers of all kinds, particularly in construction, civil and mechanical engineering and road-building, had had no difficulty in finding employment.

Only a small number of the lawyers and economists had been absorbed in their own professions, since these were overfull, Mr. Cygel said, and efforts had been made to train them for various administrative jobs. Of the 100 pharmacists who arrived in the country during the past year, only 20 had found employment, and IL250,000 was needed to acquire equipment for the creation of 25 full-time or 50 half-time posts. About 10 secondary school teachers arrived monthly, and their dependants received financial aid from the Absorption Department while they themselves studied Hebrew and attended a one-year course

(continued on page 8)

IN THIS ISSUE

Immigration

Homes, jobs and training facilities are being prepared by the Government and the Jewish Agency to meet the increase in immigration . . . p. 1

Foreign Affairs

Government policy on the Arab refugees has been almost unanimously approved by the Knesset . . . p. 2

The arrests of Jewish leaders in the USSR have aroused grave concern . . . p. 3

Mr. Einar Gerhardsen, the Norwegian Prime Minister, has been visiting Israel . . . p. 4

Home News

A plan for the activities of the Histadrut, the General Federation of Labor, has been presented by Mr. Aharon Becker, its Secretary-General . . . p. 5

Education, Science and Culture

Ancient Negev agricultural methods are being investigated by Prof. Evenari of the Hebrew University, with the aid of a Rockefeller Foundation grant . . . p. 7

Communications on subscriptions —
In the U.S.A. and Canada to: ISRAEL DIGEST, 515 Park Ave., New York 22, N.Y. In other countries to local Jewish Agency or Zionist offices.
All other communications to: ISRAEL DIGEST, P.O.B. 92, Jerusalem, Israel.



Immigrants arrive by sea and air, while the Government and the Jewish Agency prepare to house them, find them jobs and teach them the language.

This material is filed with the Department of Justice where the required registration, under 22 U.S.C. 611 et seq., of the Jewish Agency for Israel is available.

COPY

OF LETTER FROM
AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
750 THIRD AVENUE NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

CONFIDENTIAL

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File 181/4/4

13th November 1961

File No. *210/1/3*

Memorandum No. 1185/61

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra A.C.T.

United Nations Conciliation Commission
for Palestine

.....
The United States Mission has given us on a confidential basis an advance copy of Dr Johnson's Report on his recent mission to the Middle East. Two copies of the report are attached to this memorandum.

2. You will note that paragraphs 35 and 36 were omitted from the copy given to us by the United States Delegation. So far as we are aware this omission was inadvertent.

3. The report is to be generally circulated next week.

Mr. Gifford

Original on 88/1/10

24/8
"

R. H. ROBERTSON

Permanent Representative

RHR/fdb

CONFIDENTIAL

P-A

CONFIDENTIAL:

14 November 1961

UNITED NATIONS CONCILIATION COMMISSION FOR PALESTINE

REPORT BY THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE

DR. JOSEPH E. JOHNSON

I. NATURE AND PURPOSE OF MISSION

1. On 21 August 1961 the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine appointed me "to be its Special Representative to undertake a visit to the Middle East to explore with the host Governments and with Israel practical means of seeking progress on the Palestine Arab refugee problem, pursuant to resolution 1604 (XV) of the United Nations General Assembly."

2. The reference was to operative paragraph 1 of resolution 1604 (XV) which reads as follows:

"1. Notes with regret that the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine has not yet been able to report progress on carrying out the task entrusted to it in paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 1456 (XIV), and again requests the Commission to make efforts to secure the implementation of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) and report thereon not later than 15 October 1961;"

Paragraph 4 of the resolution 1456 (XIV) requested the Conciliation Commission "to make further efforts to secure the implementation of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III)".

3. Paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III), adopted on 11 December 1948, reads:

"The General Assembly ...

"11. Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live in peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;

"Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation, and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations:"

4. This resolution provided, among other things, for the establishment of the Conciliation Commission for Palestine and charged it with carrying out "the specific functions and directives given to it by the present resolution and such additional functions and such additional functions and directives as may be given to it by the General Assembly or by the Security Council".

5. While the Conciliation Commission has under resolution 194 (III) a number of functions with respect to the Palestine question, the task that the Commission assigned to me as its Special Representative related solely to the refugee problem. I had no mandate and no authority in relation to any other of the Commission's responsibilities.

6. The Secretary-General of the United Nations on 22 August 1961 informed the Foreign Ministers of the three Arab host countries - Jordan, Lebanon and the United Arab Republic - and of Israel of my appointment and on behalf of the Conciliation Commission asked that they receive me as its Special Representative in accordance with the terms of my appointment. The Secretary-General also designated Mr. Sherwood G. Moe, Director of Liaison for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) at New York, to accompany me as my assistant.

7. I left the Headquarters of the United Nations, accompanied by Mr. Moe, on 31 August 1961 and returned on 20 September. Without the excellent support given by members of the United Nations Secretariat in New York and officials of the United Nations in the field it would have been impossible to accomplish so much as I was able to do in such a short time. In less than three weeks I visited Beirut and Amman twice, and Cairo, Gaza, Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv. Conversations took place at the highest level and with senior officials and experts of the host countries and Israel.

8. Since my return from the Middle East I have held further conversations with representatives of the host countries, including members of the Delegation of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations, and of Israel.

All the officials with whom I have talked throughout my mission have received me in a most friendly manner, have manifested a deep interest in seeking progress and have given me their views freely and frankly. I desire to record my great appreciation of their courtesy and kindness.

9. The present report must be understood as relating solely to practical means of bringing about progress on the Palestine Arab refugee problem pursuant to the instructions of the Conciliation Commission for Palestine and the relevant General Assembly resolutions cited above.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION

A. Political

10. It is necessary to recall here briefly some of the factual background of the refugee problem up to the time of my appointment. Fortunately there have recently been issued two extensive working papers prepared by the Secretariat for the Conciliation Commission on the history of the Commission's efforts to secure the implementation of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III): they are entitled "Question of Compensation" ^{1/} and "The Question of Reintegration by Repatriation or Resettlement" ^{1/}. These papers not only give the facts of United Nations action and attempted action but present careful summaries of the positions of the Commission and of the attitudes of the interested parties.

11. As these documents, as well as the records of the General Assembly and Security Council, make all too clear, bitter disputes and flat contradictions characterize the whole of the unhappy history. There is no agreement on what happened or why it happened, or on the interpretation, significance or validity of the basic United Nations resolutions and other United Nations documents.

^{1/} These working papers, documents A/AC.25/W.81/Rev.2 and A/AC.25/W.82/Rev.1 respectively are available to delegations upon request in English and French, the working languages of the Commission.

12. Both because a full account is unnecessary and because a thorough historical treatment would be unlikely at this stage to contribute to progress on the refugee problem, the following is a very abbreviated narrative.

13. The problem of the Palestine Arab refugees arose after the adoption by the United Nations General Assembly on 29 November 1947 of resolution 181(II) providing for the partition of Palestine into a Jewish State, an Arab State and an international territory of the City of Jerusalem, within the framework of an economic union embracing all three. During the debate over the resolution the representatives of the Jewish Agency made it clear that they would accept the plan. The ^{representatives} ~~representatives~~ of the Arab States and the spokesmen of the Arab Higher Committee made it equally clear that they would not accept it and would not consider themselves bound by the resolution.^{2/}

They at once began to organize forceful resistance to it. As the United Nations Mediator on Palestine, Count Folke Bernadotte, later stated in his report of 16 September 1948, "the chain of unfortunate events which began in Palestine almost immediately after the adoption of the resolution of 29 November demonstrated conclusively not only that the necessary Arab willingness to co-operate was lacking, but that a dangerous antagonism existed which was provoking virtual civil war even before the termination of the Mandate on 15 May 1948."^{3/}

14. On 14 May the Jews proclaimed the existence of the State of Israel and on 15 May the armies of the Arab States entered Palestine and "became involved in conflict with the Jewish forces".^{4/}

^{2/} For a convenient although unofficial summary account of the report of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine and the subsequent discussion of the "Question of Palestine" at the second session of the General Assembly, see Yearbook of the United Nations, 1947-48, pp 227-257.

^{3/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Third Session, Supplement no. 11 (A/648), Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine, section II, para. 3.

15. Some Palestinian Arabs began fleeing from their homes soon after the adoption of the Partition resolution, and thousands of others followed them into the neighbouring Arab countries in the spring so that, according to one estimate, some 200,000 had abandoned their homes by the time the Mandate ended. The exodus of an even larger number took place as a result of the large-scale hostilities begun on 15 May 1948. ^{5/} From the beginning, sharp and irreconcilable views have been expressed on the cause of the exodus. The Government of Israel places the blame upon the neighbouring Arab States and upon the leaders of the Palestine Arabs themselves. The Arabs, in flat contradiction, place the blame upon the terroristic activities of Jewish organizations and upon the subsequent policies of the Government of Israel. All that can be said with assurance here, without detailed historical study, is that in a time of upheaval and rampant rumour many factors operated, in different combinations, to cause the flight of the refugees. At in its simplest and most general terms, the exodus was, as the United Nations Mediator reported in 1948, "a result of the conflict in Palestine". ^{6/}

16. There is no need here to go into the history of the Security Council and General Assembly debates and resolutions on the Palestine question in the summer of 1948. ^{7/} In so far as the refugees and United Nations action with respect to them are concerned, the next important event was the submission, by Count Bernadotte, of the "Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine" dated 16 September 1948, the day before his assassination. The report was in three parts which dealt respectively with the "Mediation Effort", and "Supervision of the Two Truces" and "Assistance to Refugees". The last dealt primarily with the humanitarian ^{5/} A/AC.25/W.81/Rev.2, paras. 13-15

^{6/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Third Session, Supplement No. 11 (A/648) part THREE, Section I, para. 1.

^{7/} For a convenient although unofficial summary account see Yearbook of the United Nations, 1947-1948, pp. 259-281, 304-313, and 403-451.

and social aspects of the refugee question, the political aspects being covered in part one. In the Conclusions to part one ^{8/}the Mediator stated that, while he did not consider it "within (his) province to recommend to the Members of the United Nations a proposed course of action on the Palestine question", he did consider it his duty to inform the Members of certain conclusions that he had reached. These conclusions were based upon seven basic premises, the fifth of which related to the refugees. It read as follows:

"Right of repatriation"

(e) The right of innocent people, uprooted from their homes by the present terror and ravages of war, to return to their homes, should be affirmed and made effective, with assurance of adequate compensation for the property of those who may choose to return."

He then went on to state his specific conclusions, of which two related to the refugees as follows:

"(i) The right of the Arab refugees to return to their homes in Jewish-controlled territory at the earliest possible date should be affirmed by the United Nations, and their repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation, and payment of adequate compensation for the property of those choosing not to return, should be supervised and assisted by the United Nations conciliation commission described in paragraph (k) below.

"(j) The political, economic, social and religious rights of all Arabs in the Jewish territory of Palestine and of all Jews in the Arab territory of Palestine should be fully guaranteed and respected by the authorities. The conciliation commission provided for in the following paragraph should supervise the observance of this guarantee. It should also lend its good offices, on the invitation of the parties, to any efforts toward exchanges of populations with a view to eliminating troublesome minority problems, and on the basis of adequate compensation for property owned."

He then recommended the establishment by the United Nations of a Palestine conciliation commission.

17. When the General Assembly considered the Palestine question at its ~~third~~ session in the autumn of 1948, ^{2/} the report of the Mediator was

^{8/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Third Session, Supplement No. 11 (A/648) part ONE, section VIII Conclusions, paras. 2-4.

^{2/} For a convenient although unofficial summary account see Yearbook of the United Nations, 1948-1949, pp. 166-176.

one of the principal documents before it, and it gave careful consideration to his recommendations. The results of its deliberations are contained in resolution 194 (III) adopted on 11 December, the full text of which is given in the appendix. As will be seen from a comparison of this text with the conclusions of the Mediator quoted above, the General Assembly did not fully accept all his conclusions with respect to the refugees. Its views on this subject were embodied in paragraph 11, already quoted in full in paragraph 3 above.

18. The United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine established by resolution 194 (III) proceeded quickly to its task and from the beginning addressed itself urgently to the question of the refugees as well as to the other problems that fell within its responsibilities. ^{10/} After initial consideration of the question in the winter of 1948 and early spring of 1949, the Commission on 12 May 1949 in Lausanne obtained the agreement of the representatives of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and of Israel to a document that has become known as the "protocol of Lausanne" which reads as follows:

"The United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, anxious to achieve as quickly as possible the objectives of the General Assembly resolution of 11 December 1948, regarding refugees, the respect for their rights and the preservation of their property, as well as territorial and other questions, has proposed to the delegations of the Arab States and to the delegation of Israel that the working document attached hereto be taken as a basis for discussions with the Commission.

"The interested delegations have accepted this proposal with the understanding that the exchanges of views which will be carried on by the Commission with the two parties will bear upon the territorial adjustments necessary to the above-indicated objectives". ^{11/}

(N.B. To this Protocol was attached the map of Palestine annexed to

^{10/} For the Commission's progress reports covering the period to 22 September 1949 (documents A/819, A/838, A/927 and A/922) see Official Records of General Assembly, Fourth Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, Annex to the Summary Records of Meetings, vol.II, 1949

^{11/} *ibid*, Third progress report, A/927, Annex A.

General Assembly resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947 (the Partition resolution) showing the territory attributed to the Arab and Jewish States respectively).

19. This Protocol has, like everything else associated with the Palestine Arab refugee question, itself become a source of contention. It is not appropriate for me to attempt to give an opinion on its status but it is important to note that the meaning and that status of the Protocol are in dispute.

20. Although the Protocol did not lead to any advance on the refugee question, the Conciliation Commission continued actively to concern itself with that question. In 1951 in Paris the Commission submitted to the parties at separate meetings a comprehensive pattern of proposals on all aspects of the Palestine question, including, of course, that of refugees.^{12/} After extended discussion of this set of proposals, the Commission was obliged to report that it had "been unable to conciliate (the) points of view" ^{13/} of the Arab States and of Israel on the refugee question.

21. It accordingly concluded that "the present unwillingness of the parties fully to implement the General Assembly resolutions under which the Commission is operating, as well as the changes which have occurred in Palestine during the past three years, have made it impossible for the Commission to carry out its mandate, and this fact should be taken into consideration in any further approach to the Palestine problem." ^{14/}

^{12/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, Supplement 18. (A/1985), Tenth Progress Report covering the period from 23 January to 19 November 1951, paras. 23-61.

^{13/} ibid, para. 31

^{14/} ibid, para. 87.

22. This report of the Commission was considered by the General Assembly in January 1952. Following debate, the Assembly adopted resolution 512 (VI) on 27 January 1952. In this resolution the Assembly expressed its appreciation to the Commission, noted with regret that the latter "has been unable to fulfil its mandate," stated that the Assembly considered that the "governments concerned have the primary responsibility for reaching a settlement of their outstanding differences in conformity with the resolutions of the General Assembly on Palestine", urged them "to seek agreement with a view to an early settlement" of those differences, and considered that the Conciliation Commission "should continue its efforts to secure the implementation" of those resolutions and "accordingly should be available to the parties to assist them in reaching agreement on outstanding questions". In subsequent years the Assembly for the most part limited itself to the question of assistance to refugees, although in its resolutions on that subject it did refer regularly to resolution 194 (III).

23. Pursuant to resolution 512 (VI) the Commission between 1952 and 1959, while remaining at the disposal of the Governments concerned for any assistance it could render, concentrated on efforts, ultimately successful, to obtain the release of Arab refugee bank accounts and safe deposits blocked in Israel, and on identification and valuation of Arab refugee immovable property holdings in Israel. It is now evident that the latter work can ultimately be of great use not only in determining the amount of compensation, but also in relation to the issues of repatriation and resettlement. The Commission continued throughout this period to submit reports to the Secretary-General.

15/ For the latest information on these topics, see the Conciliation Commission's nineteenth progress report, A/4921, paras. 8-17.

16/ Eighteenth progress report, A/4573, para. 2.

24. In 1959, in connexion with the discussion of the report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, the Assembly in paragraph 4 of resolution 1456 (XIV) again asked the Conciliation Commission "to make further efforts to secure the implementation of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III)". This paragraph, which marks the beginning of renewed efforts to seek progress on the refugee problem, was supported by the Arab States and opposed by Israel.

25. The Conciliation Commission reported to the Secretary-General in November 1960 that since the passage of resolution 1456 (XIV) it had "been exploring ... possible ways by which it might contribute to the implementation of the principles enunciated in paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III)".^{16/} but was unable to report any progress in response to resolution 1456 (XIV).

26. When the General Assembly at its fifteenth session came to consider the question of the Palestine Arab refugees, there were expressions of disappointment at the Commission's lack of progress and these led to the inclusion in resolution 1604 (XV) of the previously quoted first operative paragraph.

27. Subsequent steps leading up to my appointment as special representative are outlined in the Commission's nineteenth progress report.

^{16/} Eighteenth progress report, A/4573, para. 2

^{17/} A/4573/Rev.1, paras. 77-103.

B. Assistance to Refugees

28. Although the Conciliation Commission for Palestine has no direct responsibility for assistance to the refugees, there is necessarily a close relationship between the task of the Commission under paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III) and the provision of assistance. This relationship has been repeatedly stressed by the General Assembly. Balance and completeness therefore call for a brief resume of United Nations assistance over the years. The full story has been told in the successive annual reports of the UNRWA Directors and in certain special reports of the Secretary-General and others, and has been summarized in the Commission's own working paper on "The Question of Reintegration by Repatriation or Resettlement". ^{17/}

^{17/} A/Ac.25/W.32/Rev.1, paras. 77-108.

29. United Nations assistance to the refugees was begun by the United Nations Mediator on Palestine on an emergency basis. In his Progress Report of 16 September 1948, referred to above, he expressed the belief that responsibility for the relief of therefugees "should be assumed by the United Nations in conjunction with the neighbouring Arab States, the Provisional Government of Israel, the specialized agencies, and also all the voluntary bodies or organizations of a humanitarian and non-political character." ^{13/} The General Assembly, taking cognisance of the Mediator's recommendations, adopted on 19 November 1948 resolution 212 (III) on "Assistance to Palestine Refugees", under which it assumed responsibility and asked the Secretary-General, among other things, to appoint a Director of United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees.

30. On 23 August 1949 the Conciliation Commission for Palestine decided to establish immediately, pursuant to paragraph 12 of resolution 194 (III), an Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East charged with examining the economic situation in the countries affected by the hostilities in Palestine and with making recommendations for an integrated programme designed to help the Governments overcome the economic dislocations created by the hostilities, to facilitate repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation pursuant to paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III), and to promote economic conditions conducive to the maintenance of peace and stability in the area.

31. In its first interim report, dated 6 November 1949, the Mission recommended, inter alia, the continuation of emergency relief to refugees, at least through the winter months, a programme of public works calculated to improve the productivity of the area and the establishment of an agency

^{17/} A/AC.25/W.32/Rev.1, paras. 77-103

^{18/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Third Session, Supplement No.11, part Three, section VI, g.

to organize and direct programmes of relief and public works. ^{19/} Pursuant to the last proposal the General Assembly created, by its resolution 302(IV) of 8 December 1949, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), which began operations in April 1950.

32. The Director of UNRWA reported to the General Assembly at its fifth session that, despite the works programme, the number of refugees employed was far below the high targets set by the Economic Survey Mission. He accordingly proposed, in conjunction with the Agency's Advisory Commission, that the works programme be continued but gradually transferred into a programme specifically directed towards improvement of the refugees' living conditions, current and future. As for the huge task of rehabilitation, it was proposed that the United Nations authorize contributions to a fund that could be available for projects of refugee integration, for surveys and for technical assistance connected therewith which Near Eastern Governments might propose.

33. In response to the above suggestions, the General Assembly adopted, with the support of the Arab host Governments and Israel, resolution 393 (V) of 2 December 1950, according to which it considered that "without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 11" of resolution 194 (III), "The reintegration of the refugees into the economic life of the Near East, either by repatriation or resettlement, is essential in preparation for the time when international assistance is no longer available, and for the realization of conditions of peace and stability in the area", and instructed the Agency to work toward that end.

34. After four years of effort, the Director of the Agency was in 1954 compelled to report lack of progress toward the rehabilitation goal, citing the following among the most serious obstacles:

^{19/} United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East, 1949.
United Nations publication: II B.5, Final Report, Part I, Appendix IA,
pp. 16-17.

37. As to the question of how reintegration should be sought, the report quoted paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) and stated that the stand thus taken by the General Assembly would involve the integration of the refugees into the productive life of Israel as well as of the Arab countries in accordance with the choice of the refugees themselves. The report concluded that the perspective was not a discouraging one provided that the world was willing to assist the region in its economic development and provided, further, that step by step and as economic conditions permitted, progress regarding the political and psychological obstacles was sought in a constructive spirit and with a sense of justice and realism.

38. The Israel Government generally accepted the Secretary-General's thesis on reintegration. The Arab States, while endorsing the Secretary-General's recommendation for the continuation of UNRWA, stated that the economic part of the report should not be taken into account; they reiterated their support for the demand of the refugees to return to their homes and their rejection of every project which might be, even indirectly, aimed at the settlement of refugees outside their country.^{22/}

39. Except for greater emphasis on vocational training, there have been no new developments in the field of assistance to the refugees since the General Assembly at its fourteenth session extended the life of UNRWA for three years to 30 June 1963.

III. FINDING AND CONCLUSIONS

A. Underlying considerations

40. The members of the Commission will wish to know how I conceived the scope, and particularly the limitations, of my assignment, as these conceptions determined my conduct of my mission and underlie this report. In the first place, as noted above in paragraphs 5 and 9, I considered myself

^{22/} Letter dated 6 October 1959 from the representatives of Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab Republic and Yemen addressed to the Secretary-General transmitting report of the League of Arab States, (A/4236), paragraph 55.

bound by paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III) and therefore limited to exploration of the possibilities of progress with respect to the Palestine Arab refugee question and to suggestions in relation to such progress. Such is the inter-relationship of the various aspects of the Palestine question, however, particularly as seen by the Governments concerned and by the refugees themselves, that one or more of the other aspects were referred to, and often heavily emphasized, in virtually all the conversations I engaged in. I felt obliged in each case to explain my understanding of my assignment and endeavoured to make it clear that any suggestions I might make would therefore necessarily be confined to the refugee question.

41. Secondly, my specific instructions were to explore the question with the Governments of the host countries and of Israel. I was given complete freedom^{to} receive any relevant proposals from them and to make such suggestions and proposals as I should deem appropriate within the limitations set forth in the preceding paragraph.

42. I did not interpret the reference to the four (now five) Governments concerned as exclusive. I felt it important to talk with other informed persons and to visit refugee camps and other installations of UNRWA in order to gain first-hand impressions of present conditions and to hear the views of refugees spokesmen. I let it be known that I was willing to hear the views of officials of other interested Governments and of the Arab League, and to receive comments and suggestions from persons who held no official position. Under this interpretation of my instructions, I held conversations with officials of the Arab League, including its Secretary-General, and with other interested persons. I also sought the views of responsible United Nations officials, especially the Director of UNRWA and senior members of his staff.

43. A fourth consideration has particular bearing on the content of this report. As has already been suggested, the Palestine question as a whole and all aspects of it, but perhaps most notably the refugee problem, relate

directly to fundamental policies and conceptions of national interest in all the host countries and in Israel, and, beyond that, stir very deeply the emotions of all involved. This means that everything said and almost everything done in relation to the issue is likely to be the subject of controversy. The history of the Palestine question over the years has demonstrated all too clearly that - in this case at least - controversy is not conducive to understanding, to accommodation, to eventual agreement or even to the slightest progress. Were this report to go into detail on the views expressed to me, it would risk misinterpretation, at least in nuance, and thereby almost certainly add fuel to the flames of controversy. Moreover, any attempt even to analyse, much less to pass judgment upon, differences of interpretation of historical events or of the meaning of documents would also lead to fruitless and even destructive challenge and debate. Whatever purpose might be served by a full expose at some other time, at present it could do nothing but harm to any prospects that may exist for the progress on the refugee question that the United Nations seeks.

44. There is one final and very basic premise. The people of the United Nations, according to the preamble to the Charter, have expressed their determination to "live together in peace with one another as good neighbours" and all Members of the United Nations have undertaken to "settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered". In keeping with the intent of these provisions of the Charter, the organs of the United Nations have, as Mr Hammarskjöld wrote in the Introduction to his last Annual Report, "consistently maintained that the use of force, contrary to the Charter as interpreted by those organs, cannot be permitted to yield results which could be accepted as valid by the Organization, and as establishing new rights" 23/23/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Supplement No. 1A (A/4800/Add.1), page 3

A special representative of a United Nations commission is as bound by the fundamental principles of the Organisation as are the Members themselves and the officials of the Secretariat.

B. General observations and findings

45. The following paragraphs are based in part on the observations made to me by responsible statesmen and officials and by other individuals, in part on my reading of the record of the past, and in part on my own estimate and analysis of the situation as it is today.

46. Despite all too frequent appearances of intransigence and even bellicosity, I believe that responsible statesmen on both sides want peace in a general way and as a long-term goal.

47. Unhappily, however, these statesmen have not yet been able or willing to translate that generalized desire into a sufficiently strong and active search for peace with the "other side" to make certain adjustments that would seem to be necessary for true peace in the area. Indeed the public record, as can be seen very clearly from the summaries of the position of the Governments in the two recent working papers of the Commission, reveals a consistency of obdurate determination on both sides. There is even evidence that the passage of time has witnessed a hardening of public positions on some issues.

48. No-one who has had an opportunity to confer at length with responsible statesmen in the area can fail to conclude that there is a large degree not only of mistrust and suspicion but of active fear on both sides. Whether these fears are justified - and each side believes that its own are and finds it hard to understand the fears of the other - the fact of the mutual fear is undeniable. It underlies, and to a certain extent probably explains, governmental policies on both sides. It thus constitutes a serious barrier to progress on any issue that divides the parties. Any measures designed to

lead to progress on the refugee question must take account of these fears or they will not be accepted. Moreover, the measures should be so cast as to contribute to allaying the fears.

49. A fourth general observation is that both sides, though for different reasons, tend to view the refugee problem as an inextricable part of the Palestine question as a whole. While, because of the expressly limited nature of my assignment, I did not seek, and was not presented with, a full expression of the views of any party on the whole Palestine question, enough was said about aspects of the question other than the refugee problem to make this conclusion inescapable.

50. Despite this common insistence on the intertwined nature of the issues, both sides expressed a willingness - though with much reservation and scepticism - to consider a step-by-step process that might lead to progress on the refugee issue without prejudice to the positions of the respective Governments on the other related issues.

51. A fifth general observation relates to the ways in which people regard the present plight and the future of the refugees. As suggested earlier, responsible Ministers and government officials inevitably start from a premise based upon a conception of the national interest and upon governmental policies. All, however, Arab and Israeli alike, have expressed humanitarian interest in the refugees and have recognized the need to focus attention on the interests and welfare of these unfortunate fellow human beings. This, of course, does not imply a willingness to surrender national interests, but it does indicate a conscientious desire to harmonize the two.

52. A final observation stems from my analysis of the total situation with respect to the refugees and the difficulties involved in converting them from unfortunate objects of international charity into useful and active members

of the human family. Even under the most optimistic assumptions with regard to moving the refugees out of the camps and rehabilitating them, it is clear that there will be a need for assistance for a long time to come. It would be unwise to plan United Nations or national policies on any other assumption than that there will be Palestine Arab Refugees for at least a decade. It will indeed be essential to continue basic relief for a very large, even though, hopefully, a declining number of refugees. An increasing number should also receive training and almost all will need help to become effectively reintegrated into society, whatever that may be. It is difficult to conceive of this assistance not requiring a large measure of international participation, both financially and otherwise.

C. Conclusion

53. It is clear that as matters now stand there is no prospect of an early resolution of the Palestine question as a whole and, as can be seen from the preceding section, there are many indications that no progress can be made on the Palestine Arab refugee question apart from, or in advance of, an overall settlement.

54. However, the willingness that the parties expressed to me (paragraph 50 above) to consider the possibility of a step-by-step process without prejudice to positions on the other related issues, leads me to believe that it is worthwhile continuing the effort that the Commission has now begun. Whether progress will be possible no one can now say for certain, but, to state the matter in the most negative way, the signs that no progress is possible are not so conclusive as to justify a decision not to try.

55. There are certain fundamental considerations that must underlie any continuing effort. The first is that the focus should be upon the refugees. The General Assembly in resolution 194 (III) spoke of their wishes and has repeatedly reaffirmed the humanitarian concern of the international community

66

for these unfortunate people. The second is theneed to obtain the cooperation of the Governments directly concerned. The third is to recognize that, even if there is some prospect of progress, there can be no early end to the refugee problem. It can only be dealt with on a step-by-step basis with emphasis upon the need for parallel and co-ordinated action by all those involved, not only the Governments concerned but the United Nations itself. A fourth consideration is the need for appropriate machinery, procedures and financial assistance.

56. Moreover, as has been suggested above, there will be a continuing need for international assistance. I hope this will be determined, imaginative and generous. Unless there is such continued assistance, the cautious hopes here expressed cannot be fulfilled. On the other hand, if the international community is to go on carrying most of the financial burden, it is entitled to expect that those immediately concerned - Israel, the Arab host countries and the refugees themselves will co-operate with equal determination and willingness in bringing about real progress on this tragic issue.

57. The speed of the reintegration of the refugees, whether by repatriation resettlement, or both, with compensation where appropriate, into a useful life in the Near East - and perhaps even the possibility of any substantial reintegration - will depend upon the rate of economic development of the area as a whole.

58. In the last thirteen years a number of approaches to the problem of the Palestine Arab Refugees have been tried. That of appointing a special representative of the Conciliation Commission is new and has not yet been given a thorough test. In the time available to me I could not explore all possible avenues intensively enough to determine with certainty whether progress in the implementation of paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III) can be made by this approach. Such a determination should be possible in a year. Provided, therefore, that the qualified and cautious optimism expressed in this report

continues to be justified, careful consideration should be given to the appointment as Special Representative, to serve until the autumn of 1962, of an individual who should have the confidence not only of the Commission but of the States directly concerned. This individual should understand from the start that the odds will not be in his favour. He should be prepared for the real possibility that even though at the time of his appointment there may be ground for hope, that hope could be destroyed at any moment.

59. The considerations set forth in these Conclusions, particularly those in paragraph 5,, will almost certainly have to form the basis of the Special Representative's endeavours.

60. The essentially preliminary explorations undertaken in the last two months have revealed that there is a need for careful analysis and for special studies in connexion with the work of the Special Representative if he is to be successful in advancing towards the goal of returning the refugees to a useful and worthwhile life. Such studies, for example, are needed to give specific meaning, in concrete circumstances, to terms like repatriation, compensation and resettlement in a way that is likely to make progress possible. Provision should therefore be made to authorize such studies as may appear useful.

61. These conclusions may well close with a passage from the Introduction to the last Annual Report of Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld: "... A failure to gain respect for decisions or actions of the Organization within the terms of the Charter is often called a failure for the Organization. It would seem more correct to regard it as a failure of the world community, through its Member nations and in particular those most directly concerned, to co-operate in order, step by step, to make the Charter a living reality in practical political action as it is already in law. ^{24/}

24/ Ibid., page 4



CONFIDENTIAL

63



Embassy,
AUSTRALIAN LEGATION
TEL AVIV.

In reply quote No. 230.5

Memorandum No. 143

10th November, 1961.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

THE ARAB REFUGEE QUESTION.

During ^athe discussion yesterday of current events with Mr. Arazi, Head of the British Commonwealth Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I asked him whether it was possible ~~that~~ the Israel attitude on the refugee question, as defined by the Prime Minister in his address to the Knesset on 11th October, 1961 (please see my memorandum No. 401 of 17th October, 1961), and as confirmed by the Knesset on 6th November, 1961 (please see my memorandum No. 432 of 7th November, 1961), was not perhaps too downright and abrupt to ensure that Israel would receive sympathetic consideration by a number of Governments, members of the United Nations, in the forthcoming debate in the General Assembly on the Arab refugee question.

2. Mr. Arazi said that the Israel view was that only good could come of a clear and definitive statement. This would deprive the Arabs of the force of keeping the refugees in a state of suspense as to whether they might or might not be able to return to their former properties, and would give undecided nations a clear issue on which to make up their minds.

3. This may be all very well as far as Israel is concerned, but it is a further illustration of the incapacity of the leaders of Israel to compromise and their inability to judge the reactions of people whose minds are not attuned to their own processes.

4. I am sending copies of this memorandum to the Senior External Affairs Officer, London, to the Australian Embassy, Washington, and to the Australian Mission to the United Nations, New York.

J. M. McMillan
(J. M. McMillan)
Ambassador.

*Mr. McMillan's
to see 1*

Full

CONFIDENTIAL

*Copy to
Mr. McMillan*

TEMPLE

In reply quote No.



CONFIDENTIAL 62

Memo No. 1963

AUSTRALIAN EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICE,
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,
AUSTRALIA HOUSE,
STRAND,
LONDON, W.C.2.

14th November, 1961

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA

Israel

You no doubt will have direct reports of Ben-Gurions address to officers of the Israeli Armoured Corps at a ceremony on 29th October (5th anniversary of the Sinai campaign)

2. Two recent reports of possible interest from Tel Aviv to the Foreign Office are:

(a) Arab Refugees (Unclassified - 7th November)

"Israel Parliament last night passed by 68 votes to 7 a resolution declaring that Arab refugees should not be returned to Israel territory. Only the Communists and extreme left Mapam opposed.

The text of the resolution was as follows:

'The Knesset takes note of the Government's position on the Arab refugee question as expressed in the statement of the Prime Minister on October 11, 1961 and in the speech of the Foreign Minister in the Knesset on November 6, 1961 (see below), which will serve as a basis and a guide for the Israel delegation at the United Nations. The Knesset resolves that the Arab refugees should not be returned to Israel territory and that the sole solution to the problem is their settlement in the Arab countries.'

A Mapam resolution stating that Israel would be prepared as part of a peace settlement to take back a certain agreed number of refugees was defeated by 60 votes to 4. A Communist resolution declaring that refugees should be given a free choice of returning to Israel received only 2 Communist votes.

Israel Foreign Minister told the Knesset that Israel was willing even in the absence of an overall peace settlement to negotiate with the Arabs on a solution to the refugee problem by their re-settlement in the Arab states and on the question of mutual compensation. If the Arab states wished, she said, Israel would be happy to make its experience available to help them re-settle the refugees. Israel's offer in 1949 to take back up to 100,000 refugees had been ignored and it no longer stood. The situation had changed since then. Refugee children had grown up indoctrinated with hatred for Israel and they would return as soldiers. As a sovereign state, it was for Israel to decide who might enter the country. No-one else had the right to decide that question. Israel's position was: 'Not a single refugee'. The solution was the re-settlement of the refugees in the Arab countries."

[Can 181/4/4]

CONFIDENTIAL ..2

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

(b) New Government - (Confidential 7th November)

"Decision of Achdut Ha'avoda to join the Coalition without Mapam is contrary to the accustomed alignment of the Israel Labour movement. Achdut Ha'avoda's desire to keep two portfolios open for Mapam, in case latter decided to join subsequently, was overborne by Mapai. But a redistribution of work between Ministries would in fact make it possible to give Mapam the Ministries of Health and Development which are in fact the Ministries held by that party in the last Government.

Doctrinal differences between Mapai and Achdut Ha'avoda are slight. Mr. Ben Gurion, disappointed in his hope of consolidating parties by means of electoral reform, is said to hope for a merger and thus the development of a labour party which might even attract some of the support at present given to the left-wing Mapam.

Policy of the new Government is to rest on the basic principles of the previous Government except for more detailed agreement on Coalition discipline. Legislation is to be introduced in the Israel Parliament accordingly. Arising out of the Lavon dispute, agreement has also been reached on a Ministerial Defence Committee.

New Government is essentially a Labour Government (this applies also to National Religious Front) and it will be in closer touch with Histadrut than was previous Government. Relegation to opposition of Liberal Party means shelving of plans for a National Health Scheme, which Histadrut oppose.

Mapai has a proportionately larger representation in the present than in the previous Coalition. But the position of the new Government in Parliament is more vulnerable, since the defection of either Achdut Ha'avoda or the National Religious Front would deprive the Government of its majority. Moreover right-wing opposition is now stronger.

Israel public opinion is relieved that Mr. Eshkol's 49 days of Cabinet building are over. But otherwise there is a general lack of enthusiasm. The comment most frequently heard is that, in so far as the new Government differs from the old, it is less satisfactory.

3. Copy of this memorandum is being sent to Washington and Tel Aviv for information.

(H. Marshall)
for Acting Senior External Affairs Representative.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper

London Times

File No.

181/4/4

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10.11.61

ROCKET DIPLOMACY

It must have been quite an effort for Israelis to refrain from open applause when the United Arab Republic broke up. They have always taken PRESIDENT NASSER as the symbol of active Arab hostility to their state, and when his authority collapsed in Syria one claw of the grip in which he held them seemed to drop off. The change, however, has as yet made no difference to the postures adopted by both sides, which are more rigidly suspicious, if possible, than ever. Reports that Egypt has been testing rockets of west German origin are not unexpected, but are a grim reminder of the competition in arms going on all the time in the Middle East. When Israel fired her home-made rocket fifty miles into the ionosphere last July the Arabs could hardly be blamed for thinking that this was not a piece of disinterested research into the weather. It was, in fact, an example of Israel's search for a deterrent with which to offset her disadvantages of size and numbers. Egypt has predictably responded by trying to catch up.

That Israel's attitude towards the Arabs is still dominated by considerations of defence is nowhere more clearly shown than by her policy over the refugees. On Monday the Knesset approved almost unanimously a resolution that the Arab refugees should not return to Israel but should be resettled elsewhere. The reason for keeping the door firmly shut is security. If the present Arab minority is considered a bad security risk, then its numbers must not be increased. This argument is at least logical, but it tends to be covered up with a lot of special pleading. The war created millions of refugees everywhere. MR. BEN-GURION told the Knesset earlier this month, and the clock cannot be put back in Palestine alone.

The Arabs were egged on to leave Palestine by their own leaders, and Israel has had to absorb as many refugees from Arab countries. "If an Arab refugee problem still exists", said MR. BEN-GURION, "this is entirely a result of the violation of the United Nations Charter by the Arab rulers and their callous treatment of members of their own people. The Arab rulers

Admittedly the problem, involving more than a million men, women, and children, would take years to solve even if good will was present on all sides, instead of being conspicuously lacking. But Israel's policy of toughness, whether with rockets or refugees, brings no nearer the break in the Middle East deadlock which she needs more than anyone else. The immediate reply is in other rockets.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

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8-11-61

**NO RETURN OF ARAB
M.E. REFUGEES**

TIMES 8-11-61

ISRAEL ADAMANT

FROM OUR CORRESPONDENT

TEL AVIV, Nov. 7

With the approach of the United Nations General Assembly debate on the Arab refugee problem, the Knesset last night resolved unequivocally that the Arab refugees should not be returned to Israel territory. The resolution appears to have been aimed at delegations in the United Nations which are said to favour according the refugees a free choice between repatriation to Israel or reparations for their abandoned property.

The uncompromising resolution was backed by the coalition, and most of the Opposition parties, representing in aggregate 104 of the 120 members of the Knesset. The left-wing Mapam Party, representing nine members, also opposed offering the Arabs freedom of choice but advocated an undertaking to admit an agreed number of refugees within the framework of a general peace settlement. Only the communists supported the principle of free choice.

NO COMPROMISE

"So clear and unanimous an attitude in Israel will help end the illusion that may still exist in some quarters that pressure could be exerted on Israel to compromise in this matter", the *Jerusalem Post* said today in a leading article.

Mrs. Golda Meir, the Foreign Minister, who is to represent Israel in the General Assembly debate, said that Israel's position is not that "no single Arab shall return", but that the solution to the problem is resettlement in the Arab countries. She said that the Government was willing to discuss compensation and the resettlement of the Arabs in the neighbouring countries even in the absence of an overall peace settlement.

The consensus in the Knesset was that the admission of refugees would undermine Israel's security. The problem was seen not as a barrier to Israel-Arab peace, but as an Arab instrument to undermine Israel.

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EJ 1822/2

Foreign Office Distribution

JORDAN
April 18, 1961
Section 1

THE ARAB REFUGEE PROBLEM IN JORDAN

Mr. Henniker-Major to Lord Home. (Received April 18)

(No. 20. Confidential)

*Amman,
April 13, 1961.*

CORRIGENDUM

Page 2, line 2, delete "difficult" and substitute "different".

19433—186 272—44

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EJ 1822/2

Foreign Office Distribution

JORDAN
April 18, 1961
Section 1

THE ARAB REFUGEE PROBLEM IN JORDAN

Mr. Henniker-Major to Lord Home. (Received April 18)

SUMMARY

Although Arab leaders talk of the refugee problem in terms of 1948, it has changed radically in nature and extent.

2. There has been considerable absorption of refugees into the economic life of Jordan.

3. On the other hand, no political solution could answer the problem as it exists to-day. There is a hard core of refugees consisting of:

- (a) The older ones who are probably unemployable and who will live out their lives as refugees.
- (b) The younger able-bodied, who have grown to maturity as refugees and have not found employment. These are the dangerous element politically.

4. The work of U.N.R.W.A. is distorted by the freezing of the ration rolls 10 years ago. For various reasons, it is desirable that U.N.R.W.A. should succeed in getting relief put back on the basis of need.

5. The refugee problem, in spite of the changes over the years, is still beyond the capacity of Jordan to solve.

(No. 20. Confidential)

Amman,

My Lord,

April 13, 1961.

Approximately one-third of the population of Jordan are Palestinian Arabs or the children of Palestinian Arabs who until 1948 lived in territory which is now part of Israel, a fact of major significance in any appraisal of the internal affairs of Jordan. Most of these are classified as refugees and receive some support from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (U.N.R.W.A.); but the extent and nature of the refugee problem is a matter of some controversy. I have the honour to enclose with this despatch a memorandum⁽¹⁾ by Mr. W. Morris, Counsellor of this Embassy, which tries to set out the factual background to this problem.

2. Arab leaders are in the habit of speaking of the refugee problem in terms of 1948;

of the people who made a mass exodus under the impulsion of a political upheaval, who eke out a bare existence on international charity, whose position has changed only by the increase of their numbers, and whose wrongs can only be righted by a political solution which would give them the choice of returning to their homes or being compensated for their losses. This memorandum shows how the problem has in fact changed radically in extent and nature.

3. The numbers needing relief (as opposed to those in receipt of it) are considerably smaller than the figures of refugee population suggest; those registered refugees who are still dependent on relief are adequately cared for; and there has been considerable absorption of refugees into local economic life. It would be more accurate to say that refugees have participated with non-refugee

(¹) Not printed.

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Palestinians and Transjordanians in building up the very difficult economy which the two component parts of Jordan have had to create since 1948. Foreign economic aid to the Jordan Government has, by assisting economic development in Jordan, contributed towards a partial solution of the refugee problem. Conversely, the refugees themselves, and the various services—medical, educational, housing—which U.N.R.W.A. has performed have contributed towards this economic development. More than anywhere else, except for the relatively small numbers in Syria, refugees in Jordan have been able to integrate themselves into the life of their host country. In addition, remittances to relatives remaining in Jordan from Palestinian emigrants have become a significant factor in the Jordanian economy.

4. On the other hand, no political solution could by itself answer the real refugee problem as it exists to-day. The adult refugees who came from Palestine in 1948 and have not succeeded in creating a new life for themselves are in the main the peasants, the unskilled labourers, and the less enterprising. The homes from which they came no longer exist, and after 13 years of idleness they are less qualified than ever to start any new life in an area where the market is overstocked with unskilled labour. These are part of the hard core of refugees, who must be expected to continue to be dependent on international charity until in the course of nature they dwindle away.

5. The other part of the hard core is made up of refugees who have reached maturity since 1948 and have not found employment. (More than half the total number of refugees are under 30 and the proportion is constantly increasing.) Their links with Palestine are at most childhood memories; they have been fed, sheltered and educated, but they have neither past, present nor apparent future except as refugees. The choice of a "return" or of compensation would not answer the economic problem of fitting them into the pattern of economic life somewhere; and it is certain that the Jordan economy cannot absorb them all.

6. In one sense, they are not different from the unemployed youth of all Middle Eastern countries—of which Jordan has a share amongst her non-refugee population—except that U.N.R.W.A. provides for their basic wants. But they differ in that they have grown to maturity as refugees, and mostly in refugee camps, with all the con-

sequent frustrations and rootlessness. They are the most dangerous element politically, the obvious prey for extremist agitation. U.N.R.W.A.'s vocational training programme is intended to give school-leavers the skills which will enable them to avoid entering this blind alley; but even its expanding programme can give hope to only a minority.

7. The politics of the refugees as a whole do not differ from those of Jordanians of Palestinian origin as a whole. These can be summed up as Arab nationalism sharpened by the sense of defeat and injustice over the Palestine causes; this underlies a degree of acceptance of the *status quo* which varies with the degree of settlement in their new country. The presence of the refugee problem helps to keep alive the sense of grievance; and disaffection inevitably is intenser amongst the unsettled than the settled. The refugee camps (housing just under 200,000 of the refugees) are naturally the biggest danger spots politically.

8. As the memorandum explains, it is unfortunately impossible to do more than guess at the numbers of the various categories of refugees. Resistance to U.N.R.W.A.'s efforts to investigate refugee needs led to the "freezing" of ration rolls 10 years ago; this in turn has led to the growth of the idea that refugee relief is a matter of right, an adjunct of refugee status. In spite of pressure from the United States Government, the Agency has not yet been able to secure the essential co-operation of the Jordan Government for the rectification of refugee rolls. I have been reporting separately on protracted negotiations to this end over the last six months. They have reached a quite promising stage, though a change of Government might send them back to first base again.

9. The policy of Her Majesty's Government, the second largest contributor to U.N.R.W.A., has in the past been somewhat *laissez-faire* on this matter. Recognising the Jordan Government's political difficulties, we have deprecated attempts to force their hand, and argued that by putting a ceiling on the rolls U.N.R.W.A. has assured a rough sort of justice, and limited our commitments. I suggest that we should modify these views; and if necessary join with the Americans in supporting discreetly the efforts of U.N.R.W.A. to get refugee relief put back on the basis of need. There are several reasons for doing so.

CONFIDENTIAL

56
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10. Distortions have increased with the years. The trend is towards an absurd situation in which the dead would draw more rations than the living; and U.N.R.W.A. increasingly maintains a relief programme for the benefit of those who do not need, whilst being unable to help many others whose needs are clear and urgent. Justice and morality seem to require that our money should not be spent in this way; and in any case it seems likely that if things continue as they are, the United States Government will feel bound to take some drastic, and politically less desirable, action.

11. There is also a financial consideration. Such facts as are available seem to show that the swings and roundabouts no longer balance, and that relief on the present scale is greater than would be needed to relieve those genuinely in need. It looks as if U.N.R.W.A. will have to cut their educational and vocational training programmes in order to continue relief on the present scale with their existing resources. It would be tragic if, for the sake of an unnecessarily inflated holding operation, the constructive side of the Agency's work had to be curtailed.

12. Lastly, a cautious and progressive tidying up operation by U.N.R.W.A. seems to be one of the few ways in which some movement can be made towards a solution of the refugee problem without coming up against insuperable political difficulties. U.N.R.W.A.'s renewed mandate has two more years to run. If by then the ration rolls in Jordan had been rectified to the

point of showing roughly the numbers of refugees in genuine need, and their division between the unemployable who must remain a charge on the international community and the younger able-bodied unemployed, then it might be possible to tackle the problem of the latter. At least it would be possible to get a measure of the problem.

13. In the last analysis, however, it remains true that the refugee problem, even in its present form, is beyond the capacity of Jordan to solve without outside help; that a solution must involve the export of some of the refugee population; and that the practicability of such a solution depends on economic development in the Middle East unrelated directly to the refugee question. The earlier paragraphs of this despatch may, in correcting false impressions, have given the equally false impression that the refugees are on a balance of positive economic asset to Jordan. To correct this, it should be noted that of Jordan's estimated adult male labour force of 600,000, about one-third may be unemployed; this should be set on the other side of the account when considering the extent of refugee absorption.

14. I am sending a copy of this despatch with its enclosure to Her Majesty's Representatives at Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Beirut, Cairo, Baghdad, the United Kingdom Mission, New York, Washington and to the Political Officer with the Near East Command (Cyprus).

I have, &c.

J. P. E. C. HENNIKER-MAJOR.

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The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

THE ARAB REFUGEE QUESTION.

The Israel Knesset last night adopted a resolution to the effect that the Arab refugees should not be returned to Israel territories. Only Mapam and Communist representatives opposed the resolution, which was supported by all other parties. The resolution reads as follows :

"The Knesset takes note of the Government's position on the Arab refugee question, as expressed in the statement of the Prime Minister on October 11, 1961, and in the speech of the Foreign Minister in the Knesset on November 6, 1961, and which will serve as a basis and a guide for the Israel delegation at the U.N."

"The Knesset resolves that the Arab refugees should not be returned to Israel territory, and that the sole solution to the problem is their settlement in the Arab countries".

For the text of the Prime Minister's statement, please see my memorandum No. 401 of 17th October, 1961.

2. It may also interest you to have the text of the report in the "Jerusalem Post" of the statement made by the Foreign Minister, Mrs. Meir, winding up the debate on the Arab refugee question. This is attached hereto.

....

3. I am sending copies of this memorandum to the Senior External Affairs Representative, London, the Australian Embassy, Washington, and to the Australian Mission to the United Nations, New York.

J.M. McMillan
(J.M. McMillan)
Ambassador.

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M. Phillips
File *P.7+1*

com to you
branch
mbk

7th November, 1961.

"MEIR : RESETTLEMENT ONLY SOLUTION".

"Foreign Minister Golda Meir declared last night that, as a sovereign state, it was for Israel to decide who may enter the country; no one else had the right to decide that question. Mrs. Meir was winding up the debate on the Arab refugees, which occupied the Knesset at both of its sessions yesterday.

She said that Israel was willing, even in the absence of an overall peace settlement, to negotiate with the Arabs; on a solution to the refugee problem by their resettlement in the Arab states; and on the question of mutual compensation. If the Arab states wished, Israel would be happy to make its experience available to help them resettle the refugees.

Mrs. Meir said that no Arab leader has ever stated that if Israel would take back any number of refugees, the Arabs would make peace. Actually it was the lack of peace that was the problem, not the refugees.

Objective bodies have come to the conclusion that there is no refugee problem in the world that could be so easily solved as this one, Mrs. Meir said. But the Arab leaders do not want to solve it; it is too valuable a weapon for them. Two years ago they even turned down a proposal by Dag Hammarskjöld for the establishment of a fund for the development of the Arab states; they were afraid it might be used to solve the refugee problem.

Mrs. Meir said that Israel's offer in 1949 to take back up to 100,000 refugees had been ignored, and it no longer stood. The situation had changed since then. Refugee children had since grown up indoctrinated with hatred for Israel, and they would return as soldiers.

Replying to Mr. Barzilai, the Foreign Minister said that if all the conditions he mentioned should come about, the refugee problem would be solved almost automatically, and there would be no need for a gesture of taking back some refugees.

Our position is not 'not a single refugee'. Our position is that the solution is the resettlement of the refugees in the Arab countries, Mrs. Meir said."



File No. 181/4/4

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Record of Conversation with His Excellency Mr. M. Ruval, Ambassador of Israel

on 31st October, 1961

Officers Present Mr. R. L. Harry

- (i) Mail Bags;
(ii) CAO - CCP;
(iii) United Nations General Assembly - Palestine Refugees;
(iv) Dutch New Guinea.

MAIN SUBJECT(S):

Mr. Ruval called at his request to inform Mr. Harry that he was leaving for a two weeks visit to New Zealand on 1st November. In his absence Mr. O. Sharer, the Commercial Attache in Sydney, would be in charge of the Mission.

(i) Mail Bags.

2. Mr. Harry said that there was little that he could add to what he had told Mr. Ruval when he called on 24th October. The terms of a communication to the U.N. were still being considered. The legal aspects had required close study. As to the methods that the Australian postal authorities would adopt in shipping surface mail to Israel he said that he was sure the Ambassador would not expect to be given details particularly if mails could use the Suez route only by "surreptitious" methods. Australia would not expect to be told how mails from e.g. Burma reached Israel. Mr. Ruval said that they were carried by Israel ships which sailed direct from Elat to Burma. He said that he thought that a direct shipping line between Australia and Israel would not be in operation until August 1962.

(ii) CAO - CCP.

3. Mr. Ruval again mentioned the question of Israel's candidature for a position on the Committee on Commodity Problems. Mr. Harry said that we were awaiting information on the full slate of candidates.

(iii) United Nations General Assembly - Palestine Refugees.

4. The Ambassador referred to the discussion on this item which would soon take place in the General Assembly. He thought that the time was opportune for a bold approach with a call on all the interested parties to get together and negotiate. The least that could be done was to maintain the status quo and the present mandate but countries contributing money and personnel were naturally anxious that this state of affairs should cease as soon as possible. Mr. Harry referred to Mr. Johnson's examination of the problem and his report. Mr. Ruval viewed it optimistically and thought that it represented a step forward in that the countries concerned recognised that they could no longer ignore the problem and must work for its solution.

(iv) Dutch New Guinea.

5. In reply to Mr. Harry's question Mr. Ruval said he did little reporting to Head Office apart from sending back official statements on the subject. He agreed that the Netherlands proposal to place Dutch New Guinea under United Nations Trusteeship would fulfil the demand for self determination for the territory's inhabitants. It would not suit the Indonesians who maintained their unreasonable argument that the territory should be surrendered to them. Mr. Ruval referred to the period following the admission of Israel and Indonesia to the United Nations when relations between them were amicable. Since Israel's support of the Netherlands these good relations with Indonesia had deteriorated.

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PREMIER'S STATEMENT ON ARAB REFUGEE PROBLEM

THERE is only one practical and fair solution for the problem of the Arab refugees: to settle them among their own people, in countries having plenty of good land and water and which are in need of additional manpower, the Prime Minister, Mr. David Ben-Gurion, said in the Knesset on October 11. If the Arab rulers entered into direct talks with Israel for a peace settlement, Israel would give all possible aid towards the settlement of the refugees among their own people, Mr. Ben-Gurion added. He was replying to a motion by Mr. Hayim Landau, of the Herut Movement, for a debate on the subject. The following is the text of the Prime Minister's statement:

1. The Second World War resulted in a tremendous movement of refugees from one country to another, totalling almost 20 million souls: from India to Pakistan and from Pakistan to India; from East European countries to Germany and from Eastern Germany to Western Germany; from one East European country to another; and it would not occur to anyone to put back the clock and repatriate all the refugees to their pre-war homes.

2. Almost all the Arab refugees from Israel left the country before the establishment of the State, immediately after the publication of the UN resolution. After the establishment of the State, the number of refugees was very small.

3. Almost all the Arabs who lived in Israel on the day the State was established are here today, and they have been joined

by some 30,000 refugees whose return was permitted by the Government of Israel for family or other reasons, and the inhabitants of the "Triangle" area added as a result of the Armistice Agreement.

4. The departure from the country of the Arabs referred to as refugees began immediately after the UN Resolution from the areas allocated to the Jewish State. We have clear documentary evidence of the fact that they left the country at the orders of the Arab leaders, headed by the Mufti, on the assumption that the invasion of the Arab armies after the departure of the Mandatory Government's forces would destroy the Jewish State, and throw all the Jews, alive or dead, into the sea.

5. Immediately after the establishment of the State, while the invasion of the Arab armies was still in progress, large-scale Jewish immigration began—from the DP camps in Germany, from Cyprus and, especially, from the Arab countries: Iraq, Yemen, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Syria and Lebanon.

6. The number of the Arabs who before the UN Resolution lived in the area allocated to the Jewish State by the UN, and who left it voluntarily or at the orders of their leaders, is not larger than the number of the Jewish refugees from the Arab countries, so that what has taken place is an unplanned, but *de facto* exchange of populations, and there is no practical possibility or moral justification for putting the clock back.

7. There are also Jewish refugees in the State of Israel from areas of Palestine which were settled by Jews before and during the Mandatory period: the Old City of Jerusalem, the Etzion bloc of settlements, Neveh Yaakov, Atarot and so forth.


8. In assessing the property of the Arabs

who left Israel, it would be inconceivable not to take into account the property of the Jewish refugees from the Arab countries, and from Palestine itself.

9. If compensation is to be paid—and we are not opposed to compensation if the question as a whole is solved—the Jewish refugees are just as entitled to compensation as the Arab refugees.

10. If an Arab refugee problem still exists, this is entirely a result of the violation of the UN Charter by the Arab rulers and their callous treatment of members of their own people. Israel did not wait until the Arab rulers should return the property of the Jewish refugees, but, regarding them as human beings and brothers, saw to their absorption, housing, employment, health and the education of their children. The Arab rulers treated the Arab refugees not as human beings and members of their own people, but as a weapon with which to strike at Israel. Some of the neighboring Arab countries are under-populated, and they

(continued on page 3)



The Prime Minister Meets Arab and Druze notables

IN THIS ISSUE

Foreign Affairs

Israel's attitude on the Arab refugee problem was clarified by the Prime Minister in a Knesset statement p. 1

Mrs. Golda Meir, the Foreign Minister, speaking in the UN Assembly, reiterated Israel's proposals for a relaxation of Middle East tension p. 2

Chief Akintola, of Western Nigeria, and Dr. Charles Hill, of the UK, paid tribute to the spirit of Israel p. 4

A Memorable Poem, an article by Ivor Bavelle on the significance of the Yevtushenko controversy p. 6

Israel and World Jewry

More funds for immigrant housing have been allocated by the Knesset and the Jewish Agency p. 4

Economic Affairs

The expansion of Israel's mining industries has been discussed by the Ministry of Development's Technological Advisory Board p. 5

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Foreign Minister Calls For Solutions by Negotiation

"NO Israel-Arab issue can be solved without negotiations; every one of the issues can be solved by negotiation," Mrs. Golda Meir, the Foreign Minister, declared in her address to the United Nations Assembly on October 9. In a comprehensive review of world and Middle East problems during the General Debate, she laid special emphasis on the duty of the smaller nations in general, and those of the Middle East in particular, to set an example to the world by settling all their disputes by peaceful negotiation. She reiterated the Israel Government's proposal that Israel and the Arab States should take steps to mitigate the present tension and should seek agreement on regional disarmament, with mutual inspection and control.

Mrs. Meir began her address by stressing the importance of the principle of negotiation as a means of settling international disputes at a time when "the monster of war is drawing closer." "However," Mrs. Meir said, "it is not for us, the smaller countries, merely to exhort the major powers to negotiate, while we ourselves sit back and do nothing. More is expected of us by way of a practical contribution to international peace.

"The major conflicts are not the only ones besetting the international scene," the Foreign Minister continued. "In various parts of the world there are disputes between neighbours, unresolved problems, lack of peaceful relations, fears of aggression and competitive rearmament. We must recall that in our age both peace and war are even more indivisible than they were when this phrase was first coined. None of us can feel certain that local conflicts anywhere will not spread or bring about the involvement of the major powers.

"We have a duty, therefore, to practise ourselves what we say to the larger countries. It is up to us to enlarge the areas of peace, tranquillity and international amity, by dedicating ourselves to the mitigation of local tensions, to the halting of local arms build-up and to the solution, through direct and patient negotiations, of any conflicts in which we, the smaller nations, may be involved."

Mrs. Meir recalled that the United Nations General Assembly had, during the years, adopted resolutions reaffirming principles for maintaining peaceful relations between States, such as "respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference in one another's internal affairs, the settlement of disputes by peaceful means, and the condemnation of all forms of propaganda or incitement which might provoke a threat to or breach of the peace."

These resolutions had not been translated into practice by all the Governments which voted for them, Mrs. Meir went on, and the time had come for the principles to be "reaffirmed and revitalized in a manner that would have binding force upon Member States." The Foreign Minister called on delegates to refrain from using "bellicose and abusive language" about other States.

"It appears to me that the vilification of another State and the incitement to war and the destruction of another member country are definitely a transgression of our Charter and a contradiction of everything this organization stands for."

Mrs. Meir expressed Israel's support for "complete disarmament under a system of effective control and inspection," and welcomed the set of agreed principles on disarmament presented to the Assembly by the US and the USSR.

"We propose that, simultaneously with the search for a general agreement on disarmament, we should seek to reach agreement also on disarmament with mutual inspection and control for speci-



Mrs. Meir and Mr. Michael Comay, Israel's Permanent Representative to the UN, at their places in the Assembly Hall

fic zones or situations of international tension," she said.

"Such a scheme could serve as a pilot project for the solution of the overall problem. Israel is prepared to elaborate a program to that end, and we call upon the Arab States to cooperate with us in this venture."

Mrs. Meir described as "a somber and grievous day" the date of the resumption of nuclear testing by the Soviet Union.

Mrs. Meir Condemns Racial Discrimination

DISCUSSING "the great process of decolonization," the Foreign Minister described it as "the practical application in international life of the basic human concept that all men are created equal, that the classification of mankind into superior and inferior races is evil and ungodly. The assumption that color, race or religion can be a reason for discrimination is immoral," she declared.

Mrs. Meir offered her congratulations to Sierra Leone on becoming a member of the United Nations, and expressed the hope that all the peoples of the African continent would shortly be welcomed into the UN. She called for "speedy self-determination" for the Angolan people, and for the implementation of the proposal of the Netherlands Foreign Minister for the decolonization of New Guinea. She reiterated Israel's stand regarding the Congo, summed up in the phrase "Congo for the Congolese," and reaffirmed Israel's favorable attitude towards the enlargement of the UN Security Council and Economic and Social Council "to enable representatives of the newly independent States to make their contribution to the task of these Councils."

Discussing the need for international cooperation in aiding the economic, sci-

entific and cultural development of new States, Mrs. Meir cited the Conference on the Role of Science in the Advancement of New States, held in Israel in 1960, and welcomed the proposal that the United Nations call a similar conference. "We have long been convinced that, in the field of assistance for development and the transmission of skills, the developing countries themselves can play an important role," Mrs. Meir said.

"We have been trying, to the best of our ability, to put this principle into practice. Ours is a small country, poor in natural resources. But we are willing to share the two assets which have been of most decisive importance in our own development: our experience in building a progressive modern society and our resources of trained manpower. In the past year our ties of cooperation with other developing countries have expanded, and today fifty-two countries have joined with Israel in a wide range of activities in the economic, social and scientific fields."

Mrs. Meir went on to eulogize the late UN Secretary-General, the impact of whose death had been felt "in the hearts and minds of people everywhere, who saw in him the personal symbol of their hopes for a secure and decent world."

Ben-Gurion Statement

(continued from page 1)

have plentiful resources of fertile soil and water, as well as a shortage of manpower, but for the purpose of destroying Israel—with the aid of the refugees as well—they are behaving callously to their own people and treating them as nothing more than a political and military weapon with which to undermine and destroy Israel.

11. Israel categorically rejects the insidious proposal for freedom of choice for the refugees, for she is convinced that this proposal is designed and calculated only to destroy Israel. There is only one practical and fair solution for the problem of the refugees: to settle them among their own people in countries having plenty of good land and water and which are in need of additional manpower.

12. If the Arab rulers comply with the Assembly decision and the principles of the UN Charter and enter into direct talks with Israel for a peace settlement, Israel will give all possible assistance towards the settlement of the refugees among their own people, utilizing her own great experience in the settlement of refugees under conditions much more difficult than those prevalent in neighboring countries.

I have not been able to submit this reply to the Cabinet, but I know that it reflects the attitude of the entire Government, although there are various nuances in regard to unimportant details.

After the Prime Minister's statement it was agreed that the Knesset should debate the question when the Foreign Minister returns from the UN Assembly.



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File 181/4/4
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AUSTRALIAN LEGATION,
TEL AVIV. XXXXXX

In reply quote No. 230.5

Memorandum No. 409

23rd October, 1961.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

THE ARAB REFUGEE PROBLEM.

Although as reported in my memorandum No. 354 of 18th September, 1961, Israel has again come off second-best in criticisms contained in the latest UNWRA report, it has been able to derive a little satisfaction from the 19th Progress Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine. There is some suspicion, however, of Dr. Johnson's conclusions that there is a general tendency towards more conciliatory attitudes on both sides. In Israel there is considerable doubt that the Arabs have in any way modified their unyielding attitude.

2. In the light of this report, however, the Government must obviously now take stock of its position in case negotiations should really become possible. At this point the question is closely tied up with the situation of Arabs in Israel. In one respect, the recent shooting of five young Arabs seeking to enter the Gaza Strip has caused a great deal of soul-searching as to why Arabs want to leave Israel. Secondly, Arab dissatisfaction with the Military Rule is reviving itself as an element in Israel domestic politics, and part of the role played by Mapam in the continuing negotiations to form a new Cabinet derives from Mapam's fostering of the Arab cause in this respect.

3. Accordingly, the Prime Minister has asked his chief advisers on minority questions to re-examine the question of Military Rule, the degree of its intensity and possibilities of modification, though not of abolition.

4. I am sending copies of this memorandum to the Senior External Affairs Representative, London, the Australian Embassy, Washington and the Australian Mission to the United Nations, New York.

M. G. McMillan

Original on 852/18/60

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(J. M. McMillan)
Ambassador.

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Embassy
AUSTRALIAN LEGATION
TEL AVIV XXXXXX

In reply quote No. 230.5
Memorandum No. 401

17th October, 1961.


The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

ARAB REFUGEES.

On 11th October, the Prime Minister, Mr. Ben-Gurion, intervening in a debate in the Knesset with a statement which appears to have been prepared with some care, said that it was not possible for Israel to offer Arab refugees an open choice as between return to Israel and compensation for lost property. I attach a copy of Mr. Ben-Gurion's statement as it was made on that occasion.

2. You will note that in the penultimate paragraph of the statement, Mr. Ben-Gurion said that he had not had time to consult the Cabinet on all the details of his statement, but that he was sure that it met with general agreement except in minor matters of detail. This comment could only be interpreted as indicating that in certain respects he would not have received the support of members of the Mapam party, who remained in the caretaker Cabinet pending the formation of a new Government. Confirmation of this suspicion is to be found in subsequent press reports that the Minister of Health in the outgoing Cabinet, Mr. Barzilai, who is a Mapam member, has expressed dissatisfaction with Mr. Ben-Gurion's statement and with the attitudes it represents.

3. I am sending copies of this memorandum to the Senior External Affairs Representative, London, the Australian Mission to the United Nations, New York, and the Australian Embassies, Washington and Cairo.


(J.M. McMillan)
Ambassador.

*On v.v. Bell
d. 2/12/10*

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PRESS BULLETIN

Jerusalem, 11 October, 1961

REPLY BY THE PRIME MINISTER, MR. DAVID BEN-GURION, IN THE KNESSET,
OCTOBER 11, 1961, TO MOTION BY MR. H. LANDAU, OF MERUT, TO DEBATE
POLICY ON THE QUESTION OF THE ARAB REFUGEES

1. The Second World War resulted in a tremendous movement of refugees from one country to another, totalling almost 20 million souls: from India to Pakistan and from Pakistan to India; from East European countries to Germany and from Eastern Germany to Western Germany; from one East European country to another; and it would not occur to anyone to put back the clock and repatriate all the refugees to their pre-war homes.
2. Almost all the Arab refugees from Israel left the country before the establishment of the State, immediately after the publication of the UN resolution. After the establishment of the State, the number of refugees was very small.
3. Almost all the Arabs who lived in Israel on the day the State was established are here today, and they have been joined by some 30,000 refugees whose return was permitted by the Government of Israel for family or other reasons, and the inhabitants of the "Triangle" area who were added as a result of the Armistice Agreement.
4. The departure from the country of the Arabs referred to as refugees began immediately after the UN Resolution from the areas allocated to the Jewish State. We have clear documentary evidence of the fact that they left the country at the orders of the Arab leaders, headed by the Mufti, on the assumption that the invasion of the Arab armies after the departure of the Mandatory Government forces would destroy the Jewish State, and throw all the Jews, alive or dead, into the sea.
5. Immediately after the establishment of the State, while the invasion of the Arab armies was still in progress, large-scale Jewish immigration began - from the DP camps in Germany; from Cyprus - where the immigrants who were not prepared to be slaughtered by the Nazis were detained by the Mandatory Government -; and, especially, from the Arab countries: Iraq, Yemen, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Syria and Lebanon.
6. The number of the Arabs who before the UN Resolution lived in the area allocated to the Jewish State by the UN, and who left it voluntarily or at the orders of their leaders, is not larger than the number of the Jewish refugees from the Arab countries, so that what has taken place is an unplanned, but effective, exchange of populations, and there is no practical possibility or moral justification for putting the clock back.
7. There are also Jewish refugees in the State of Israel from areas of Palestine which were settled by Jews before and during the Mandatory period: the Old City of Jerusalem, the Etzion bloc of settlements, Neveh Yessov, Ilatot and so forth.
8. In assessing the property of the Arabs who left Israel, it would be inconceivable not to take into account the property of the Jewish refugees from the Arab countries, and from Palestine itself.
9. If compensation is to be paid - and we are not opposed to compensation if the question as a whole is solved - the Jewish refugees are just as entitled to compensation as the Arab refugees.

10. If an Arab refugee problem still exists, this is entirely a result of the violation of the UN Charter by the Arab rulers and their callous treatment of members of their own people. Israel did not wait until the Arab rulers should return the property of the Jewish refugees, but, regarding them as human beings and brothers, saw to their absorption, housing, employment, health and the education of their children. The Arab rulers treated the Arab refugees not as human beings and members of their own people but as a weapon with which to strike at Israel. Some of the neighbouring Arab countries are under-populated, and they have plentiful resources of fertile soil and water, as well as a shortage of manpower, but for the purpose of destroying Israel - with the aid of the refugees as well - they are behaving callously to their own people and treating them as nothing more than a political and military weapon with which to undermine and destroy Israel.

11. Israel categorically rejects the insidious proposal for freedom of choice for the refugees, for she is convinced that this proposal is designed and calculated only to destroy Israel. There is only one practical and fair solution for the problem of the refugees: to settle them among their own people in countries having plenty of good land and water and which are in need of additional manpower.

12. If the Arab rulers comply with the Assembly decision and the principles of the UN Charter and enter into direct talks with Israel for a peace settlement, Israel will give all possible assistance towards the settlement of the refugees among their own people through her own great experience in the settlement of refugees under conditions much more difficult than those prevalent in the neighbouring countries.

I have not been able to submit this reply to the Cabinet, but I know that it reflects the attitude of the entire Government, although there are various nuances in regard to unimportant details.

I do not object to a debate on this question, and it is desirable that this should take place immediately after the Foreign Minister's return from the UN Assembly, which, as far as I know, will be in the next few days.

Mr. H. Landau accepted the Prime Minister's suggestion that a debate should take place shortly after the return of the Foreign Minister, and a motion to that effect was carried by a large majority.

Mr. I. Harari, of the Liberal Party, proposed that, since the entire country was united in its attitude on this question, there should be no debate, but the matter should be referred to the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee. This motion was rejected by a large majority.

A motion to debate Government policy on the Arab refugee question, proposed by Mrs. E. Wilenska, of the Communist Party, was voted on separately and rejected by a large majority.

ML/RS

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS. File No. 181/4/4

Published at B.B.C.

Date 13 10 61

ME/767/N/7

Syrian-Jordanian relations The railway service between Amman and Damascus will be resumed on 12th October. The border was reopened on 11th October (Amman 11.10.61). (Text) The Premier, Bahjat at-Talhuni, replied to the following question put to him by Journalists: The Syrian Arab Republic announced its readiness to enter into a federation with any Arab State. Since Jordan was the first country to recognise the Syrian regime after the liberation uprising, what is your Excellency's opinion about this Syrian call? His Excellency replied: Every Jordanian citizen sees in Arab unity his ideal, wish and aim. It is a holy relation between the Arab peoples imposed by common language, history, relations, and heavenly teachings, which have made the Arabs brothers and their countries and peoples one homeland and one nation. As regards the Syrian call, which has had a good effect, it is not possible for any official to give an immediate answer to it. The reply should come from the Chambers of Deputies or advisory councils in the light of the principles which the Syrian call has specified. This needs time, study and discussion (Amman 11.10.61).

F-M Amir and Nahlawi Muhammad Uruq said in a "Voice of the Arabs" commentary that Abd al-Karim Nahlawi, one of the leaders of the Syrian camp, had exploited F-M Amir's confidence in him to create a gap between Amir and army officers and that he had conveyed a false picture of Amir to the officers and vice versa. (Cairo "Voice of the Arabs" 11.10.61)

Ben Gurion on the Arab Refugee Problem

Israel home service 11.30 GMT 11.10.61

Excerpt of report:

Israel's stand with regard to Arab refugees was explained today in the Knesset by Premier David Ben Gurion who rejected any possibility of putting the clock back regarding the refugees. Mr. Ben Gurion said that Israel strongly rejects the proposal calling on the refugees to choose between return or acceptance of compensation, and it is certain that this proposal only aims at destroying Israel. The Premier added that the refugee problem has only one practical and logical solution and that is their settlement among their fellow countrymen in the countries with an abundance of land and water and which lack manpower.

Regarding the compensation, Mr. Ben Gurion said that taking into consideration the refugee property of those who left Israel it is impossible not to take into account the property of Jewish refugees from Arab countries and Palestine as well. If compensation has to be made, the Premier said, we are not opposed to compensation if the question will be solved completely, then compensation is also due to Jewish refugees no less than to Arab refugees. He added that there are Jewish refugees, not only from Arab countries, but from areas in Palestine which were settled by Jews before the mandatory period and during it, such as the old city of Jerusalem, Nebi Yakov, Gosh Etzion, (Asharot) etc. He said that the number of Jews who emigrated to Israel from Arab countries is not less than the number of Arab refugees now present in Arab countries. The Premier said that if Arab rulers will comply with UN decisions and will act in accordance with the UN Charter and will talk peace with Israel, then Israel will give all its help for the settlement of the refugees as it did for the settlement of Jewish refugees in Israel in much harder conditions than those existing in the neighbouring countries.

In explaining the background to the refugee problem, the Premier noted that the second world war gave birth to a gigantic movement of refugees from one country to another which has amounted to 20,000,000 people. No one thinks of putting the clock back with regard to these refugees. Mr. Ben Gurion said that nearly all the Arab refugees left the country before the establishment of the State immediately after the resolutions of the UN were known, and that the number of refugees who left after that was very small. Mr. Ben Gurion said that there are documents to prove that the refugees left the country in accordance with the instructions of Arab leaders headed by the Mufti of Jerusalem with the assumption that an Arab States' invasion would destroy

the Jewish State and that the Jews would... that Israel absorbed 30,000 refugees within the framework of the union of families, apart from Arabs who lived in the triangle and who were returned to Israel in accordance with the cease-fire agreement. The Premier described the exchange of populations between Arab refugees and immigrants from Arab countries as an unplanned but practical exchange of population, but there is no practical possibility or conscientious basis for turning back the clock. The Premier noted in concluding his speech that he had no possibility to bring his reply to the Government but that he knows that this is the Government's attitude if not in insignificant details [words indistinct].

The Iraqi Oil Talks

(a) Baghdad home service 22.00 GMT 11.10.61

Text of report:

At 17.00 hours on Wednesday 11th October 1961, HE the faithful leader Abd al-Karim Qasim, Premier and C-in-C of the Armed Forces, received at his Defence Ministry office members of the Iraqi delegation and the delegation of the oil companies operating in Iraq, to resume oil discussions for the purpose of attaining satisfactory results in the interests of Iraq. Despite the prolongation of the negotiations and the lapse of a long period of time, the oil companies' delegation still persists in refusing to respond to Iraq's just claims, particularly in regard to the main issues. The companies' delegation refused to recognise Iraq's legitimate rights. The meeting ended without achieving any results.

For this reason, the Iraqi Government finds itself compelled to adopt legitimate measures to ensure the safeguarding of the people's interests in accordance with the law, without harming the interests of the companies concerned. The meeting lasted over five and a half hours.

(b) Baghdad home service 06.00 GMT (press review) 12.10.61

Text of account of 'Al-Bilad' article:

Discussing the oil negotiations, 'Al-Bilad' says: The monopolistic oil companies imagined that they can apply to the revolutionary regime the same policy they applied to the defunct regime. However, the revolutionary regime, which is supported by the people, has risen in the face of these companies in order to extract the people's rights which the companies have usurped and abused for many years. This had led to the negotiations between the delegations of the Iraqi Government and the companies, in which the companies resorted to evasiveness and procrastination. These methods were of no avail to the companies in view of the Iraqi people's determination and their adherence to their legitimate rights. This is because the stand of the Iraqi negotiator is inspired by the people's interest and enjoys their support.

In conclusion, the paper stresses that the oil companies must submit to right and says that any attitude to the contrary will be of no avail to them and, on the contrary, will be harmful to them; because the Iraqi people are bound to triumph in their oil battle, which is the battle of their freedom.

Iraq and Kuwait

(a) Baghdad home service 11.30 GMT 11.10.61

Preels of report:

London: the BBC's diplomatic correspondent yesterday reported that, despite the fact that certain British invasion forces have been withdrawn from Kuwait, some other forces will remain there as technicians. Observers in London do not find any reason why these technicians should remain other than the fact they will serve as a screen for the continuation of the British occupation of Kuwait.

Name of Paper TIMES.

File No.

181/4/4

Published at LONDON.

Date

13.10.61

MR. BEN-GURION DENIES SECRET COMMITMENT

NO DEAL ON ARAB REPATRIATION

FROM OUR CORRESPONDENT

TEL AVIV, Oct. 12

Mr. Ben-Gurion, the Israel Prime Minister, has ruled out the return of Arab refugees to Israel and reaffirmed his offer of technical assistance in their resettlement in Arab countries. He thus tacitly refuted reports here that he had made a secret commitment to repatriate some Palestine Arabs during a private meeting in New York with President Kennedy in May. The reports arose from a statement by Mr. Ben-Gurion to the press in New York that he had reached "a measure of agreement" with the American President.

This alarmed many Israelis because Mr. Kennedy was said to have expressed recognition of the refugees' right for "repatriation or reparations" and Mr. Dean Rusk, the Secretary of State, was reported to have expressed himself in favour of giving the refugees "a free choice".

CALL FOR DEBATE

When Mr. Ben-Gurion returned to Israel in June he declined to give his Cabinet colleagues details of his talks with Mr. Kennedy. Consequently rivals in the recent parliamentary elections claimed that the Prime Minister intended to open the gates of Israel to "hordes of Arab fifth columnists".

The question was raised in the Knesset by Mr. Haim Landau of the Herut Party, who called for a full-dress debate and an unequivocal resolution which would nullify any commitment that Mr. Ben-Gurion may have made. Mr. Ben-Gurion said he would agree to a debate after the return of Mrs. Golda Meir, the Foreign Minister, from the United Nations General Assembly.

The Prime Minister did not allude to his meeting with President Kennedy but he dispelled suspicions when he said categorically: "There is only one practical and fair solution for the problem of the refugees: to settle them among their own people in countries having plenty of good land and water and which need additional manpower."

In fact he seemed to be stiffening the Government's position when he said: "If the Arab rulers comply with the General Assembly decision and the principles of the United Nations Charter and enter into direct talks with Israel for a peace settlement, Israel will give all possible assistance towards the settlement of the refugees among their own people through her own great experience in the resettlement of refugees."

Mrs. Meir had earlier expressed readiness for direct negotiations on the refugee question, not necessarily within the framework of a general peace settlement.

COMPENSATION CLAIMS

Mr. Ben-Gurion also asked for a *quid pro quo* for the compensation Israel had agreed to pay refugees for property they abandoned. He said these claims should be set against the claims of Jewish refugees from Arab countries.

He claimed that Jewish refugees from Iraq, Yemen, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Syria, and Lebanon were at least as many as the Arabs who fled from Israel territory. There had been an "unplanned but effective exchange of population."

Mr. Ben-Gurion attacked the Arab rulers for their "callous treatment" of their own people. He said they did not regard them as human beings but as weapons to strike against Israel.



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File 181/4/4

Embassy,
AUSTRALIAN LEGATION,
TEL AVIV.

In reply quote No. 230.5.1

Memorandum No. 386

9th October, 1961.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

U.N.W.R.A. REPORTS.

Once again Israel appears to come out in an unfavourable light in the latest Davis report of U.N.W.R.A. There is a tendency here to attribute this to the fact that the Agency works in Arab countries and does not, therefore, have the opportunity to see the Israel side of the picture. This remains a constant source of grievance, and Israel may therefore be expected to attack the validity of the contents of the Report.


(J.M. McMillan)
Ambassador.

c.c. Australian Delegation to U.N., New York.

In Original on 85/12/10
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[Signature]



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44

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Embassy,
AUSTRALIAN LEGATION
TEL AVIV.

DEPARTMENT OF
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
In reply quote No. 230+5
Memorandum No. 354
18th September, 1961.
CANBERRA

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

*Records
re 181/4/14 and
R/S
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4/10*

ARAB REFUGEES.

Dr. Joseph Johnson visited Israel briefly last week as part of his mission to ascertain conditions in the countries affected by the Arab refugee problem, with a view to seeking ways and means which might lead to a solution.

2. The only occasion on which I met Dr. Johnson was at a dinner party given by the American Ambassador, and as an after-dinner discussion of Dr. Johnson's mission was participated in by the Chargés d'Affaires of both France and Turkey, as well as by my United Kingdom colleague and other members of the American Embassy, the group was rather too large for Dr. Johnson to be entirely free in his expressions of opinion.

3. From what he said, I gathered that Dr. Johnson has devoted his main attention to questions of relief and rehabilitation and if he has gone in for serious discussions on the political aspects of the question he did not reveal it. I suspect that his interest in the humanitarian side may have led him to think that there could be possibilities for development of the humanitarian theme, whereas it is my opinion that nothing matters to the Arab countries except the political issue. Dr. Johnson told us of the degree of work which is going on to create useful work for refugees in certain areas. He did not seem impressed with the argument that if receiving countries used refugees in their armed forces they are in fact integrating them to a degree. He admitted, however, that there seemed to be some gap among refugees of young men of military age who were not with the other age groups in the camps.

*Copy to
J.W. Brown
RD*

4. When asked whether it would be desirable for proper statistics of refugees to be established before any other step were taken, Dr. Johnson said that statistics were already being taken, although there was a good deal of concealment in cases of death or departure from camps for gainful employment. Dr. Johnson clearly regards all children born of refugees as capable of being included in the number of refugees.

5. Dr. Johnson understands the practical difficulties of ensuring restitution of property rights to Arabs who choose to return to Israel, and I think that most of those who took part in the discussion felt that this point required to be brought fully home to Dr. Johnson.

6. Despite press reports from Jordan that Dr. Johnson's visit had been a failure, there was nothing in what he said to suggest confirmation.

*mailed
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43

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7. While not in the immediate context of Dr. Johnson's visit, it is of note to report a statement made at a press conference by the Foreign Minister, Mrs. Meir, after seeing Dr. Johnson and while on the point of leaving for New York. She said that, while in New York she would appeal to the Arab leaders to discuss peace with Israel without preliminary conditions. She said that Israel was confident that the problem of Arab refugees could be solved by direct talks.

8. I am sending copies of this memorandum to the Senior External Affairs Representative, London, the Australian Embassy, Washington and the Australian Delegation to the United Nations, New York.


(J.M. McMillan)
Ambassador.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper TIMES.

File No. 181/4/4

Published at LONDON.

Date 21-9-61

**JORDAN UNYIELDING
ON ARAB REFUGEES**

**DISCUSSION ONLY WITH
PALESTINE QUESTION**

FROM OUR CORRESPONDENT

AMMAN, SEPT. 20

Bahjat Talhouni, the Jordan Prime Minister, has said his Government will not agree to discuss the problem of the Palestine Arab refugees separately, but it is prepared to discuss the Palestine question as a whole. He was speaking at a press conference here which he held to tell the public about talks he has had with Mr. Joseph Johnson, the special representative of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine. The two men met here twice recently during Mr. Johnson's tour of the capitals of the refugees' host countries (Jordan, the U.A.R. and Lebanon).

The Jordan Prime Minister said he had told Mr. Johnson that any discussion not based on the main issue of Palestine and partition would be a waste of time. Nor could any power on earth impose a settlement not founded on justice and the preservation of Arab rights in Palestine.

U.N. RESOLUTION

He said he had explained to Mr. Johnson that in the United Nations 1948 resolution, calling for a return of the Palestine Arab refugees to their homes and the compensation of those who did not wish to return, "return" meant a return to the areas assigned to the Arabs in the United Nations 1947 partition scheme. These areas—for example, Jaffa, Ramla, Lydda, and Galilee—should be wholly Arab and under Arab rule.

The Prime Minister said he had consulted the U.A.R. and Lebanon Governments, through their charges d'affaires here before making these statements to Mr. Johnson.

Extract from Digest of Despatches

No. 13 of 219.61

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File 181/4/4

ISRAEL AND THE ARAB REFUGEES

A debate is expected to take place in the General Assembly of the United Nations this year on the question of the Arab Refugees. It might be of use to have some local colour as a background to the details of the rights and wrongs of the matter and of the prevailing views of Governments, which are already sufficiently well known to obviate the necessity of restating them here.

It is important to take account of the many changes, some more quiet and subtle than others, which have been taking place ever since 1948, the date of the mass exodus of Arabs from the Jewish-occupied part of Palestine. Until then, the population, both rural and urban, was still predominantly Arab, with the notable exception of Tel Aviv, which was completely Jewish. The Jewish agricultural settlements were surrounded by largely unfriendly Arabs, though there were some instances of co-operation between Jews and Arabs to the benefit of both. In some cases, Arabs who tried to forestall the inevitable conclusion still harassed the Jewish farmers with theft, sabotage, destruction of property and resort to arms. In Trans-Jordan, King Abdullah appreciated the benefits which Jewish genius and skills could bring to the region if only harmonious relations could be established, but his reasonableness was not shared by other Arab leaders and his consequent assassination in 1951 put an end to hopes for a negotiated basis for co-existence and mutual tolerance between the two peoples. The Jews hung on grimly to their gains, took up more and more land and homeless refugees poured in, whether legally or illegally, in their last hope for a decent life in the land of their forefathers and of their holy shrines.

Then, in 1948, the Arabs streamed out and the Arab armies tried to come in and lead them back in triumph to a land swept clean of Jews. Their success was only fractional, however, and the floodgates of Jewish immigration lay open. Some 200,000 Arabs remained, but they were now a minority in their native land. Many of them stayed because they counted on Jewish good faith and there are many who have continued ever since to have cause for satisfaction that they did. Yet in the circumstances of Israel's encirclement, they posed a grave security risk and were therefore subjected to a gamut of harassing restrictions, many of which are still in force today. Thrust aside by the drive and bustle of the newcomers, their old-world manners and courtly palaver soon looked dusty and obsolete. There is no denying that they are now second-class citizens. Though the sense of Arab brotherhood is strong, they are also divided among themselves into a Moslem majority and a Christian minority.

The Arabs inside Israel are too numerous to be treated entirely back-handedly and for various reasons efforts have been made to cultivate their participation in the life of the Jewish State. Political parties needed their votes, entrepreneurs needed their labour, so did agriculture, Communists exploited their grievances and found most of their membership among them, reformers pricked the Jewish conscience and they had to be brought into the administrative apparatus. Even as second-class citizens in Israel, they may be better off than they would be as first-class citizens on the other side of the border. They have inevitably benefited, even if to a

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40
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lesser degree than the Jews, from Israel's rapidly rising living standards, its improved agriculture, its health services and social security programmes, electrification, water supply and improved communications. A good deal of their backwardness is due to their resistance to twentieth-century change, particularly with respect to education and the status of women.

To obtain a vivid impression of the contrast between conditions in Israel and those across the borders, it is only necessary to drive along one of the frontier roads. Anyone can tell at a glance where the border lies, for on the Israel side the country is richly green by day and a pincushion of electric lights by night, while, on the Jordan and Syrian side, although there is habitation everywhere, it is brown by day and black at night. The Arabs looking down across the frontier on to the Plain of Sharen can witness the dramatic transformation produced by Jewish agricultural methods. Many Arab families along the border are divided by it and as there is a good deal of infiltration both ways the differences between conditions on each side must be the subject of long debate. Not only have the established cities of Israel become busy centres of industry, but here and there completely new towns have sprung up, some within sight of the borders, with a wide range of industrial plants to absorb the labour of new immigrants.

The Arabs of Israel are still scattered fairly wide-spread in the country, but mainly, in the framework of the restrictions on their movements, they live in a few particular areas. The urban Arabs now live mostly in Nazareth, though many of them travel daily to Haifa for their work. There are also Arab quarters in the towns of Acre, Lydda and Ramle. The rural Arabs may be divided into the farmers and villagers of Galilee and the "Triangle" area, where the boundary of Jordan comes closest to the sea, and the Beduin of the south, who roam at large in the Negev and whose focal point is Beersheba. The nearest to a wide-spread mingling of Jew and Arab is in Jaffa, once the parent of Tel Aviv, but now decrepit in its old age and taken over more and more by the penetration of new Jewish apartments. The Jaffa Arabs and the poor Moroccan and Tunisian Jews are the labourers in Tel Aviv. So unless he goes to Nazareth, which he has little reason to do, the Jew who came to Israel after 1948 sees nothing very creditable about the Arab, whom he despises for his much lower cultural level and whom he fears as a source of internal danger. As for the Arab, he might well be pardoned from feeling strong personal antipathy for the noisy and assertive Israeli of today.

At first, the majority of the Jewish population was European in character, first Russo-Polish, then Central European, with its spiritual home in the cafes of old Vienna, then South-Eastern European. Since 1948, however, there has been a great influx of oriental Jews, particularly Yemenites and North Africans, with substantial numbers of Iraqis, Iranians, Kurds and South Indians. Assimilation of these Orientals to the Western pattern has been difficult. In fact, it is being resisted by many and made into a grievance. In some respects there are closer potential cultural links between these people and the Arabs than with their brother Jews of European origin. At the same time, as refugees from Arab countries, their integration into the community serves Israel as a demonstration of absorption which she has effected and which she maintains the

CONFIDENTIAL

39
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Arab countries should match. The current trend of Israeli propaganda is towards stressing the importance of this substantial offset, not country by country, of course, but as between Israel and the Arab states as a group. It is now even being argued that so many Jewish refugees from Arab countries have been received in Israel that the balance is complete and there is now no obligation on Israel to take account of any Arab refugees at all.

The Arab refugees are scattered, but most of them are in two main areas, the Gaza strip and Jordan, especially near Amman and Jericho. The Gaza Strip is a special case and there can be little change except in the increasing demoralisation of its inhabitants. In Jordan, the main change took place in 1948, when an old-fashioned desert community suddenly found itself swamped by a mass of newcomers of higher educational standards and sophistication, who rapidly inflated the cities and severely strained the economy and the civil services. While many of the newcomers were simple farmers and shepherds or the makings of an urban proletariat, there were others with high professional qualifications or who had been substantial property-owners. Such people have inevitably overcome their initial immersion into poverty and have established themselves in the economy, even if only as cafe-owners or tourist guides. Throughout the whole period, however, the Trans-Jordanians have kept a monopoly of public office and the fruits thereof, have remained socially aloof and have in general resisted integration of the refugees into the body of the State and the economy. There is thus on the Jordan side an attempt to preserve the status quo of 1948. Inevitably, however, this cannot succeed over a prolonged period and it seems that a blurring of the lines is now beginning to take place.

There are bound to be many of the refugees, especially those who used to own property now in Jewish hands, who will refuse to accommodate themselves to the historical changes that have taken place and will talk in terms of returning if Israel will agree to their repatriation. Few of them will realise the difficulties they would face in reintegrating themselves into a social order they will not understand and in securing access to their former possessions. Houses and farms may still be there, but most of them will have changed in character and environment. A few may attempt to struggle, but very few indeed will be a match for the bureaucratic quicksands which will confront them. They would be wiser to accept compensation and stay away. Another factor is that, in proportion to the number of Arabs who returned, military rule and other restrictions on the Arab population would inevitably be tightened up to meet the added security risk.

The political leaders on both sides stand firm on 1948 positions, but to do so is quite unreal. The Jews have seized what was not theirs. By doing so, they have created a livelihood for themselves and have inflicted poverty on others. Yet when most of the Arabs fled, the Jews claim that they did so although they were begged to stay. The rights and wrongs of this are not yet clear. Yet in another sense, the Jews have made Israel a remarkable creation and as each year goes by, their new prescriptive right to the land grows stronger. In a land where peoples have come and gone for thousands of years, this has always been the ultimate law.

CONFIDENTIAL

38
CONFIDENTIAL

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The foregoing, I realise, is not helpful in clarifying what should be done to set matters right. All I can suggest is that it demonstrates the unreality of proposals that the Arab refugees should return. At the present time, Israel is hard put to the task of absorbing the present flow of Jewish migrants and, while there is still a strong demand for labour, the Jewish Agency is running out of funds for housing them. Besides, there is always the possibility, though dim just now, that the Russian Jews may be allowed to come, not all three million of them, to be sure, but enough to pose grave dangers to the delicate economic equilibrium of the State and to cause a drastic fall in the standard of living.

Tel Aviv Despatch No. 3 of 20th July, 1961
from the Australian Ambassador, J.M. McMillan Esq.

CONFIDENTIAL

37
file 181/4/4

AIDE MEMOIRE

The agenda of the 16th Session of the United Nations General Assembly includes as in previous years an item entitled "Report of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East".

In connection with the forthcoming consideration of this item the Embassy of Israel desires to summarize the position of the Government of Israel.

1. The Arab refugee problem arose as a direct consequence of the armed aggression against the State of Israel by seven Arab States in flagrant violation of their obligations under the United Nations Charter and in an unconcealed attempt to frustrate by force the implementation of the General Assembly Resolution of 1947 for the establishment of a Jewish and^{an} Arab State. In an atmosphere of panic, deliberately fostered by their leaders and at their direct behest, about half a million Arabs left their homes. Their departure was part of the Arab strategy to clear the Arab civilian population out of the paths of the invading Arab armies, so as not to hamper the Arab military onslaught against Israel. The Arab leaders proposed to bring the evacuees back after the occupation by the invading Arab armies.

2. At the conclusion of the fighting, these Arabs found themselves outside the borders of Israel, most of them in those parts of Palestine which were occupied by the armed forces of Egypt and Jordan, and which were subsequently annexed by them. About 150,000 Arabs who had not left their homes continued to reside undisturbed in Israel.

3. Since 1948, the national policy, declared and practised, of the Arab States is to refuse to recognize in any way the existence of Israel or even its right to exist. Despite frequent professions of loyalty to the principals and purposes of the Charter and to the principles of the peaceful

W. L. ...

*Original sent to U.N.
P.O. Box 2000
1/1x Israeli
Embassy
Cairo*

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co-existence of States, the Arab Governments have, in regard to Israel, consistently violated each and every one of those principals and pursued relentlessly a policy of armed threats, economic and political warfare, and acts of military aggression. The Government of Israel would be failing in its most elementary responsibilities were it to disregard these policies.

4. In furtherance of that declared policy the Arab Governments have persistently exploited the existence of the Arab refugee problem. They have done all in their power to prevent the refugees from becoming integrated in the countries where they reside or to find new homes overseas. They have thwarted all United Nations efforts to resettle the refugees. They have even concealed the fact that despite official obstruction, a substantial number of refugees have been absorbed into the social, economic and political life of the countries in which they reside.

5. The demand voiced by the Arab Governments for the return of the Arab refugees to Israel, is not motivated by any desire to solve the refugee problem. It is part of a master-plan to erase Israel from the map of the Middle East. It is designed as a first step to undermine from within through the influx of alien and hostile masses the very foundations on which the economic, social and political structure of the State, the national unity of its people, its economy and security are built. Israel overwhelmed by these economic, social and security burdens would then be an easy prey to invading Arab armies.

6. The Arab leaders do not conceal the true purpose of such a "solution". They continue to proclaim that even if Israel were to admit the refugees, the Arab Governments would not change their basic policies towards Israel and would not establish peaceful relations with her. The fundamental difference between the Arab position and that of Israel is that Israel believes that the return of peace would solve the refugee problem, while the Arab States seek the return of the refugees in order to dissolve Israel. This unbridgeable gap in aims cannot be reconciled by gestures or unilateral action. It requires a complete change of policy by the Arab Governments so as to make it conform with their obligations under the United Nations Charter.

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7. The transfer of the refugees to Israel is neither a solution of the human problem nor conducive to peace. On the other hand, if peace were to be established, the Arab refugee problem could be solved speedily and satisfactorily, just as other refugee problems of much wider dimensions and greater complexity have been solved since the end of World War II. Israel has, in fact, solved the problem of Jewish refugees from the Arab countries by absorbing half a million Jews who were compelled to leave by menace and deprivations. Hence, what has in fact taken place in the Middle East is a balanced two-way migratory movement, an event not unusual in the wake of war or civil strife.

8. Among the ideas which have at various times been advanced, there has been the proposal to allow the Arab refugees to exercise a "free choice" in regard to their settling in Israel. In the conditions prevailing in the Arab countries where the refugees reside, no real freedom exists for the refugee to express his true preference in regard to his future. In addition to being subjected to pressure and duress, the refugees have been constantly exposed to indoctrination that it is their sacred duty to go to Israel in order to establish an Arab state on her ruins. Moreover, to recognise that the refugees have the right to determine by themselves whether they will enter Israel, is incompatible with the concept of the sovereignty of States.

9. Reliance is sometimes placed on paragraph 11 of the United Nations Resolution 194 of December 1948, in order to justify the demand for the exercise of "free choice" by the Arab refugees. Firstly, it should be noted that paragraph 11 cannot be taken out of its context. It is part of a resolution which was designed to restore peaceful relations between Israel and the Arab States through a negotiated settlement of all outstanding questions. Secondly, paragraph 11 establishes no right of return but merely defines some of the conditions under which refugees might be permitted to do so. Thus, it states that the refugees should be permitted to return. This wording was deliberately chosen, in deference to the sovereign right of any State to decide whom to admit to its territory. Furthermore, the return of the refugees is made contingent upon their willingness to live in peace with their neighbours. The hostile policies of the Arab States and, especially, their refusal to establish peaceful and good neighbourly relations with Israel, make this condition impossible of fulfilment. Finally, the resolution recommends that

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the return should be effected at "the earliest practicable date". The nature of the relationship between Israel and the Arab States and the circumstances prevailing at the time when the return of refugees is contemplated, determine whether and when the date is practicable. During the thirteen years which have passed since the adoption in 1948 of Resolution 194 the then newly emerging State of Israel has consolidated its social, ethnic, economic, cultural and political structure, and its people have established their way of life. The character and outlook of Israel in 1961 is completely different from the country which the Arabs left in 1948. It would be easy, to say the least, utterly "impracticable" to transplant Arab refugees from their present congenial surroundings amid their own kith and kin into the completely unfamiliar environment of Israel.

10. The hope is expressed that Governments desirous of assisting the solution of the refugee problem will refrain from giving support to any attempt, whether open or disguised, to obtain United Nations endorsement of spurious claims and unrealistic proposals. The support by the United Nations of Arab hostile policies, presented under cover of either legal or humanitarian considerations, directed against the very existence of a member State, would not bring the refugee problem any nearer to a solution, but would instead renew and deepen tensions in the Middle East by encouraging false hopes, creating new frustrations and promoting Arab aggressive designs. At a time when the world community is beset with international problems of momentous and fateful import for the peace of the world, it would be particularly ill-advised to support policies which are liable to extend the area of existing tensions.

11. The Government of Israel is confident that all peace-loving nations will support at the forthcoming General Assembly such policies and proposals which are designed to make the parties resort to direct negotiations in order to settle all outstanding issues and establish peaceful and good-neighbourly relations among them. The first step must be the cessation of the policy of active hostility towards Israel of the Arab Governments. As soon as the Arab Governments abandon their avowed policy of denying Israel's right of existence and adopt a policy of co-existence with Israel, the refugee problem will find its swift and constructive solution with Israel's full participation. It remains the declared policy of Israel to make every effort to establish peaceful relations with her neighbours.

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Any infringement of her independence and sovereign rights would gravely jeopardize the attainment of this goal.

CANBERRA, A.C.T.

13th September 1961.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper TIMES.

File No.

Published at LONDON.

Date

PUZZLE OF THE PALESTINE REFUGEE

FRUSTRATION FOR U.N. OBSERVER

FROM OUR MIDDLE EAST CORRESPONDENT
BEIRUT, SEPT. 10

The question of what is to be done finally about Palestine refugees living in countries around Israel is baffling one more official observer sent to study it. Mr. Joseph Johnson, an American who is special representative of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, has been in Lebanon this weekend after visiting Jordan, and is as baulked of any new line of action on behalf of the refugees as when he arrived in the Middle East from the United States nine days ago.

Little is heard now of the conciliation commission, whose members are the United States, France, and Turkey, and which was appointed by the United Nations Assembly in December, 1948. This was after Israel had become a full accomplish and about 750,000 Arabs had fled their Palestine homes.

COMMISSION'S TASK

Last April, however, the United Nations Assembly asked the commission to try to give effect to the resolution which the Assembly adopted also in December, 1948. It stipulated that refugees wishing to return to their homes should be allowed to do so, and that those not returning should be compensated.

Mr. Johnson, who is president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, was thereupon chosen to sound out the governments of Arab countries, and Israel. He is working separately from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees, which for 11 years has been feeding refugees and trying to find work for some.

The number now registered as refugees has risen through births to more than 1,150,000, and the majority are in Jordan. There Mr. Johnson was told that nothing could be discussed until Israel had first returned to the Arabs those towns and land earmarked as Arab by the United Nations in 1947, when it proposed that Palestine be partitioned. This done, discussions could begin on refugees from those parts allocated to the Jews in 1947.

IN LEBANON

In Lebanon Mr. Johnson has heard much the same thing, the official public argument being that the refugees cannot be discussed separately from the whole Palestine question. The same, too, was implied in the paragraph on Palestine adopted by the non-aligned countries last week in Belgrade. This demanded that United Nations resolutions on Palestine, which must include those on partition and the return or compensation of refugees, should be implemented.

After Mr. Johnson has been to Cairo and Israel and reported in New York, the subject will arrive once more at the next meeting of the United Nations Assembly.

The report of the director of Unrwa for the year ending June 30, 1961, will be tabled, but it is unlikely to contain fresh hope for the refugees beyond an account of redoubled efforts to give some of the younger ones vocational training through new scholarships.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD SAVINGRAM

I. 21574

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Sent: 7th September, 1961
Rec'd: 9th September, 1961

FROM:

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.

-Valentine
Refugees
- para 10, p 3

SAV. 1040. UNCLASSIFIED.

Copies to Austunat, Ottawa.

Belgrade Conference - Your 1408.

Final declaration adopted on 6th September (full text airmailed 7th September) consists of general introduction of some thirty paragraphs and twenty-seven numbered sections on specific subjects. As colonialism and self-determination are mentioned throughout, following is summary of complete declaration with special attention to those two subjects. Sections on Chinese representation and Berlin are verbatim. Text by leased-line of separate appeal addressed to Khrushchev and Kennedy.

Summary begins@

The Conference met at a time when world peace is seriously threatened. No Government can abandon its responsibilities to safeguard world peace. The participants having examined the situation in an atmosphere of equality, sincerity and mutual confidence make the following declaration:

Noting that processes and forms of social change often result in or represent conflict between the old-established and the new emerging nationalist forces, and considering that lasting peace can be achieved only if this confrontation leads to a world where the domination of colonialism and imperialism and neo-colonialism in all their manifestations is radically eliminated. Recognising that big power rivalry likely to result in world conflagration cannot be excluded; that to "eradicate basically the source of conflict is to eradicate colonialism in all its manifestations and to accept and practise a policy of peaceful co-existence in the world"; and that guided by these principles, periods of transitions and conflict can lay a firm foundation of co-operation and brotherhood between nations, the conference states the following:

War has never threatened graver consequences than today, yet there are stronger forces for eliminating war as an instrument of policy than before. Imperialism is weakening. Colonial empires and other forms of Foreign oppression of peoples in Asia, Africa and Latin America are gradually disappearing from a stage of history. The vast majority of people are becoming increasingly conscious that war is an anachronism and a crime and this is a great moral force. The Conference rejects the view that war including the cold war is inevitable but the existing military blocs which are growing into more and more powerful military and economic groupings necessarily provoke periodical aggravations of international relations.

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74

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
I. 21574
INWARD₂ SAVINGRAM

We do not consider that existence of different social systems constitutes an insurmountable obstacle for the stabilisation of peace, provided attempts at domination and interference in the internal developments of other people and nations are ruled out. All peoples and nations have to solve the problems of their own political, economic, social and cultural systems in accordance with their own conditions, needs and potentialities. Any attempt to impose a social or political system by force and from the outside is a direct threat to world peace.

Under such conditions the principles of peaceful co-existence are the only alternative to the cold war and a possible general nuclear catastrophe. "These principles which include the right of peoples to self-determination, to independence and to the free determination of the forms and methods of economic, social and cultural development, must be the only basis of international relations. The policy of co-existence amounts to an active effort toward the elimination of historical injustices and the liquidation of national oppression, guaranteeing at the same time to every people their independent development". Ideological differences are necessarily a part of the growth of human society and governments shall refrain from the use of ideologies for the purpose of waging cold war, exercising pressure or imposing their will.

The conference is not making concrete proposals for the solution of all international disputes and particularly disputes between the two blocs. It wishes to draw attention to acute problems which must be solved rapidly and the need for realism and responsibility in solving problem resulting from differences in social systems. Great powers must take more determined action for solutions through negotiation.

Non-aligned countries are an important factor in safeguarding world peace and should participate in solving outstanding international issues. The further extension of the non-committed area constitutes the only possible and indispensable alternative to the policy of total division of the world into blocs and intensification of cold war policies. The non-aligned countries provide encouragement and support to all peoples fighting for their independence and equality.

1. The conference solemnly reaffirms support of the anti-colonial resolution adopted by the 15th General Assembly and "recommends the immediate unconditional total and final abolition of colonialism and imperialist domination in all its forms and manifestations".

2. Conference demands an immediate stop to "armed action and repressive measures of any kind directed against dependent peoples to enable them to exercise peacefully and freely their right to complete independence and that the integrity of their national territory should be respected. Any aid given by any countries to a colonial power in such suppression is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations. The participating countries respecting scrupulously territorial integrity of all states oppose by all means any aims of annexation by other countries".

3. The struggle of Algeria for Freedom, self-determination and independence "and for the integrity of its national territory including the Sahara" is considered to be just and necessary. The conference therefore is determined to extend

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INWARD SAVINGRAM

to the people of Algeria all possible support and aid. Algerian representation at the conference by its rightful representative is welcomed.

The conference drew attention with great concern to the developments in Angola and the intolerable oppression of the Portuguese and demands an immediate end to further shedding of blood and that Angola be assisted by peace-loving countries to establish a free and independent state without delay.

5. "The participants in the conference demand the immediate termination of all colonial occupation and the restoration of the territorial integrity to the rightful people in countries in which it has been violated in Asia, Africa and Latin America as well as the withdrawal of foreign forces from their national soil."

6. "The participating countries demand the immediate evacuation of French armed forces from the whole of the Tunisian territory in accordance with the legitimate right of Tunisia to the exercise of its full national sovereignty."

7. The tragic events in the Congo must not be repeated. The world community must prevent any further foreign intervention and enable the Congo to embark freely on the road of its independent development based on respect for its sovereignty unity and territorial integrity.

8. Conference resolutely condemns the policy of apartheid practised by South Africa and demands its immediate abandonment which constitutes a grave violation of the Charter and the declaration of human rights.

9. "The participating countries declare solemnly the absolute respect of the rights of the ethnic or religious minorities to be protected in particular against crimes of genocide or any other violation of their fundamental human rights."

10. Conference condemns the imperialist policies pursued in the Middle East and supports the full restoration of all the rights of the Arab people of Palestine in conformity with the Charter and U.N. resolutions.

The establishment and maintenance of foreign military bases in other countries particularly against their expressed will is a gross violation of sovereignty. The conference declares full support to countries endeavouring to secure the vacation of bases and calls upon countries maintaining bases to consider seriously their abolition.

12. "They also acknowledge that the North American military base at Guantanamo, Cuba, to the permanence of which the Government and people of Cuba have expressed their opposition, affects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of that country."

13. The participants in the conference reaffirm their conviction that:

- (a) "All nations have the right of unity self-determination and independence by virtue of which right they can determined their political status and freely pursue their economic social and

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cultural developments without intimidation or hindrance";

- (b) All peoples may freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation; and
- (c) "The participating countries believe that the right of Cuba as that of any other nation to freely choose their political and social systems in accordance with their own conditions needs and possibilities should be respected."

14. "The participating countries express their determination that no intimidation interference or intervention should be brought to bear in the exercise of the right of self-determination of peoples, including their right to pursue constructive of independent policies for the attainment and preservation of their sovereignty."

15. Disarmament is an imperative need and urgent task. It can be achieved only by means of a general complete and strictly and internationally controlled disarmament.

16. Complete disarmament should include the elimination of armed forces, armaments, foreign bases, manufacture of arms as well as elimination of institutions and installations for military training except for internal security, and the total prohibition of production possession and utilisation of nuclear and thermo-nuclear arms bacteriological and chemical weapons for the delivery and placement and operational use of weapons of mass destruction.

17. All states should undertake to use outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes. Conference hopes an international agency will be established to promote the peaceful uses of outer space.

18. Conference urges the great powers to sign without delay a treaty for general and complete disarmament and also considers that :

- (a) The non-aligned nations should be represented at all future world conferences on disarmament.
- (b) All disarmament discussions should be held under the auspices of the U.N.
- (c) General and complete disarmament should be guaranteed by an effective system of inspection and control, the teams of which should include members of non-aligned nations.

19. It is essential that an agreement on prohibition of all nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests should be urgently concluded. With this aim in view it is necessary that negotiations on general disarmament. In the meantime the moratorium on the testing of all nuclear weapons should be resumed and observed by all countries.

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INWARD SAVINGRAM

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20. The Conference recommends that the forthcoming General Assembly decide on the convening either of a special session of the Assembly devoted to discussion of disarmament or on the convening of a World Disarmament Conference under U.N. auspices with a view to setting in motion the process of general disarmament.

21. Efforts should be made to remove economic imbalance inherited from colonialism and imperialism. It is necessary through accelerated development to close the widening gap in standards of living. The immediate establishment and operation of a United Nations Capital Development Fund is recommended. The conference demands just terms of trade for economically less developed countries and efforts to eliminate excessive fluctuations in primary commodity trade and restrictive measures and practices which adversely affect trade and revenues of newly developed countries. The fruits of the technological revolution must be applied in all fields to hasten international social justice.

22. All countries are invited to co-operate in economic and commercial fields to face the policies of pressure in the economic sphere as well as the harmful results which may be created by economic blocs of the individual countries. All countries are invited to consider convening as soon as possible an international conference to discuss common problems and agree on ways of repelling damage hindering their development and to discuss the most effective measures to ensure realisation of their economic and social development.

23. Recipient countries must be free to determine the use of economic and technical assistance which they receive and to draw up their own plans and assign priorities in accordance with their needs.

24. It is essential that the U.N. General Assembly through revision of the Charter find a solution to expanding the membership of the Security Council and Eco. Soc. to harmonize the composition and work of these organs with the needs of the UNO and with the expanded membership of the U.N.

25. The unity of the world organisation and the efficiency of its work make it absolutely necessary to evolve a more appropriate structure for the Secretariat of the U.N. bearing in mind equitable regional distribution.

26. "Those of the countries participating in the Conference who recognise the Government and the Peoples Republic of China recommend that the General Assembly in its forthcoming session should accept the representatives of the Government of the Peoples Republic of China as the only legitimate representatives of that country in the United Nations."

27. "The countries participating in the Conference consider that the German problem is not merely a regional problem but liable to exercise a decisive influence on the course of future developments in international relations. Concerned at the developments which have led to the present acute aggravation of the situation in regard to Germany and Berlin the participating countries call upon all parties

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

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concerned not to resort to or threaten the use of force to solve the German question or the problem of Berlin, in accordance with the appeal made by the Heads of States or Governments on 5th September, 1961.

The Heads of States or Governments of non-aligned countries resolve that this declaration be forwarded to the U.N. and brought to the attention of all the members of the world organisation. The present declaration will also be forwarded to all other states.

9th September, 1961.

MIN & DEPT E.A.
MIN & DEPT DEFENCE
J.I.C.
MIN & DEPT SUPPLY
MIN & DEPT TRADE (C)
A/G TREASURER & TREASURY
MIN & DEPT TERRITORIES

SEC A/Ss MR LOOMES UN TA ER COMREL PAC&AM EA
AM&SP S&SEA SA SEA E.AF&ME E AF ME INF DL
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ALL OVERSEAS DIPLOMATIC POSTS

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Embassy,
AUSTRALIAN LEGATION
TEL AVIV.

In reply quote No. 230.5

Memorandum No. 326

4th September, 1961.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

THE ARAB REFUGEE QUESTION.

The news of the appointment of Dr. Joseph Johnson as representative of the Palestine Conciliation Commission for the purpose of visiting the Middle East was publicly welcomed by the Foreign Minister, Mrs. Meir. It has come to notice, however, that the news of Dr. Johnson's appointment was announced in Israel at a date earlier than that on which the first public announcement was to be made. The announcement was therefore made in Israel before the acceptance of Dr. Johnson and his mission at the meeting by some of the Arab countries concerned.

2. Pending the visit, Israel has adopted an air of moderation over the apparent diversion of some of the waters of the Yarmuk River to new irrigation projects in Jordan. The Israel water authorities have stated that at this time of the year they see no great urgency about the question, but if there is an appreciable fall in water becoming available to Israel they can easily use the new works recently completed to take more water from Lake Tiberias.


(J.M. McMillan)
Ambassador.

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UNGA 16/Item 25.

PALESTINE REFUGEES

- (a) Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine.
- (b) Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.

Documents:

Report of the Australian Delegation on Fifteenth United Nations General Assembly.

- (a) Resolution 194 (III)
394 (V)
512 (VI)
1456 (XIV)
1604 (XV)

Report of the U.N.C.C.P. (not yet received)

- (b) Resolution 194 (III), 212 (III), 302 (IV),
393 (V), 513 (VI), 614 (VII),
720 (VIII), 818 (IX), 916 (X),
1018 (XI), 1191 (XII), 1315 (XIII),
1456 (XIV), 1604 (XV).

Report of the Director of U.N.R.W.A.P.R.N.E. (not yet received.)
A/4782 U.N.R.W.A.P.R.N.E. Accounts for 1960 and Audit Report.

- (a) Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine.

Background:

The United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine was established by Resolution 194 (III) with the following functions:-

- (i) To assume, in so far as it considers necessary in existing circumstances, the functions given to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine by Resolution 186 (S-2) of the General Assembly;
- (ii) To carry out the specific functions and directives given to it elsewhere in the resolution and also any additional functions given to it by the General Assembly or by the Security Council; and
- (iii) To assume, on request of the Security Council, any functions which that organ had assigned to the United Nations Mediator or to the United Nations Truce Commission.

Specific instructions to the Conciliation Commission contained in Resolution 194 included the following:-

- (i) "To take steps to assist the Governments and authorities concerned to achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them"; (Operative paragraph 6)
- (ii) "To facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees

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24
CONFIDENTIAL

UNGA 16/Item 25.

- 2 -

and the payment of compensation, and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees" (U.N.R.P.R. - the predecessor of U.N.R.W.A.P.R.N.E.). This instruction formed the second part of operative paragraph 11, of which the first part resolved "that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible".

- (iii) "To render progress reports periodically to the Secretary-General for transmission to the Security Council and to the Members of the United Nations".

2. The Commission had little success in its attempts to assist the agreement on a final settlement and, in its tenth report, submitted at the end of 1951, expressed the belief that neither side was ready to seek the achievement of stability in Palestine through the full implementation of the Assembly's resolutions and stated that in consequence it could not carry out its mandate. The Assembly had already, in its Resolution 394 (V) of 14th December, 1950, recognised the unlikelihood of achieving the objectives of paragraph 6 of Resolution 194 (a final settlement) by directing the Commission's attention more especially to paragraph 11 (repatriation, resettlement and compensation of refugees). At the Sixth Session, the Assembly accepted the conclusions of the Committee's Tenth Report in Resolution 512 (VI) which considered that primary responsibility for a final settlement lay with the governments concerned and simply expressed the opinion that the Commission should continue its efforts and submit periodic reports.

3. For a number of years thereafter the Assembly paid little attention to the Commission and the Commission devoted itself, through officials appointed by the Secretary-General, to the identification and valuation of refugee property. No reference to the Commission was made in the resolutions adopted at the Seventh and Eighth Sessions while the only reference in those from the Ninth to Thirteenth Sessions was the request that U.N.R.W.A. continue its consultation with the Commission "in the best interests of their respective tasks, with particular reference to paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III)".

4. However the Assembly became concerned at the slow progress being made by the Commission in this field. Resolution 1456 (XIV) of 9th December, 1959, requested the Commission to make further efforts to secure the implementation of paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III), and Resolution 1604 (XV) noted with regret that the Commission had not yet been able to report progress and called upon it to report not later than 15th October, 1961. It is the consideration of this report which forms the first part of

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

23

UNGA 16/Item 25.

- 3 -

this item.

5. The identification of Arab refugee property was completed some time ago and we have been informed that the valuation of this property is also virtually completed. Earlier estimates which placed total value at about £100 million Sterling are understood to have been proved extremely conservative and a figure of £300 million Sterling seems nearer the mark. We have been further informed that only about 30% of refugee bread winners will be entitled to substantial compensation. The legal nature of the majority of former Arab holdings in Palestine and the then undeveloped character of those holdings was such that between 30 and 40% of the Arab refugees would be entitled to no compensation whatever and the remaining 30% would receive less than £50 Sterling each.

6. We have received reports since July that the United States is contemplating a new initiative by the Conciliation Commission. Although exact information has been hard to come by, we understand that they have in mind the despatch of a Mission, probably consisting of a single representative of ambassadorial rank, to make contact with the governments of the region with a view to ascertaining whether there were any unexplored avenues which might lead to a solution. In view of the exploratory nature of the mission, its terms of reference have deliberately not been spelt out. We understand that the other Members of the Commission, Turkey and France, are in agreement with this proposed course of action.

7. During the debate at the Fifteenth Session on the Report of the Director of U.N.R.W.A. the Arab Delegations proposed the expansion of the Commission as a means of reactivating it. At the time the proposal seemed to many Delegations to be outside the terms of reference of the Item then under discussion (the Report of the Director of U.N.R.W.A.). This year, however, the proposal could well be renewed in the context of the report of the Conciliation Commission.

Australian Attitude:

8. There would seem to be little hope of finding a solution to the refugee problem through compensation even if the Israeli demand that compensation be tied to resettlement were met. It would clearly take Israel at least a generation to pay off a sum of this order and it would still leave the lot of two thirds of the refugees little or no better than before. The refugee problem will therefore remain and, in consequence, the need for U.N.R.W.A. will continue (see Part (b) below). Further efforts to settle outstanding differences between the parties are clearly necessary if the problem as a whole is to be solved and stability in the Middle East achieved.

9. In principle we commend the American initiative although we are not sanguine of its chances of success. So long as the Arab States refuse to accept the existence of Israel (and, in so doing, refuse to accept a resolution of the General Assembly) there seems no prospect of a permanent solution. At the same time attempts to apportion blame between

/the parties

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

UNGA 16/Item 25.

- 4 -

the parties for the existence of the problem will not help solve it. Neither Israel nor the Arab States are without their share of responsibility.

10. If anything is to be gained from this initiative the choice of representative could be important. We understand that Dr. Lindt of Switzerland, whom the Americans originally had in mind, is unlikely to accept. The only other name we have heard canvassed is Spinelli. We are inclined to share the view that he may be too closely associated with other United Nations Operations in the area to be fully acceptable to all parties.

11. We see little merit in the proposal for the expansion of the Commission. In particular we are strongly opposed to the Saudi Arabian variant which is clearly a form of "Troika" (the addition of 3 East Europeans and three neutrals). We do not see in what way an expanded Commission would be better equipped to achieve a solution. On the contrary, we think it likely that the Commission would be transformed into a debating forum into which the wrangling of the annual debate in the Assembly would be carried over with a corresponding loss of efficiency and exacerbation of the already formidable difficulties.

12. Nevertheless support for the expansion of the Commission may build up at this Session. It is of interest that Ireland recommended its enlargement mainly by the addition of small states outside the military alliances. The Delegation should report by cable indications of support for such proposals as well as details of the proposals themselves.

(b) Report of the Director of U.N.R.W.A.P.N.E.

Background: The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (U.N.R.W.A. for short) was established by Resolution 302 (IV) of 8th December, 1949, which, in its preamble recalled Resolutions 212 (III) and 194 (III) and affirmed in particular the provisions of paragraph 11 of the latter Resolution. Resolution 212 had established a relief programme for Palestine refugees, setting up a fund and requesting the Secretary-General to appoint a Director of United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees (U.N.R.P.R.). By the terms of Resolution 302 U.N.R.W.A. replaced U.N.R.P.R., taking over both its responsibilities and its assets.

14. The Agency was established in recognition of the need for continued assistance for the relief of the Palestine Refugees and for constructive measures to be undertaken at an early date with a view to the termination of international assistance for relief. Its purpose was to organize both direct relief and works programmes, and the resolution considered that the former "should be terminated not later than 31st December, 1950, unless otherwise determined by the General Assembly at its Fifth Regular Session". The Resolution also provided that the Agency's programme would be financed from voluntary contributions.

* Footnote: See paragraph 1 above.

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CONFIDENTIAL

21
CONFIDENTIAL

- 5 -

UNGA 16/Item 25.

15. By the next Session of the Assembly the scale of the undertaking had become apparent. Resolution 393 (V) recognised that direct relief could not be terminated by the end of 1950 and made provision for its continuation up to 30th June, 1952. The Resolution also instructed the Agency to establish a reintegration fund to be used on projects for the permanent reestablishment of refugees and their removal from relief. The following year Resolution 513 (VI) endorsed a three-year programme of relief and reintegration. Resolution 720 (VIII) extended the programme until 30th June, 1955 and decided to review it at the next Session. At that Session Resolution 818 (IX) extended the Agency's mandate for a further five years, until 30th June, 1960, and requested the Agency to study and report on the problem of assistance which should be given to other claimants for relief, particularly children and needy inhabitants of villages along the demarcation lines. The Agency reported to the Tenth Session the serious need for relief of the frontier villages in Jordan, the non-refugee population of the Gaza strip, a number of the refugees in Egypt and certain of the Beduin. The Assembly took note of this report in Resolution 916 (X) and appealed to private organizations to help these categories to the extent that local governments could not do so. The following year the Assembly, in Resolution 1018 (XI) requested the host governments to plan and carry out projects capable of supporting substantial numbers of refugees and authorized the Agency to disburse monies to the host governments for general economic development projects subject to agreement by those governments that, within a fixed period of time, they would assume financial responsibility for an agreed number of refugees, such number to be commensurate with the cost of the projects. These proposals were carefully qualified as being without prejudice to paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III). It was now becoming clear that, not only was little progress being made in solving the refugee problem, but the extent of the problem was, in fact, increasing. There was a natural increase in the number of refugees due to an excess of births over deaths; and to the problem of reintegrating the original refugees was added that of the maturing of their offspring who were, to a great extent, uneducated, untrained and therefore unemployable. Resolution 1315 (XIII) therefore requested the Agency to plan and carry out, in particular, programmes relating to education and vocational training. At the Fourteenth Session the mandate of the Agency again came up for review and was extended for three years with review after two. The continuation of the mandate is therefore a subject for discussion and decision at this Session.

16. The debate on this issue at the Fifteenth Session is summarized in the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization: 16 June, 1960-15 June, 1961, (A/4800) on pages 74-6 and in the Report of the Delegation (First and Second Parts). There were two points of particular interest. One was an Arab request that a so-called Palestinian-Arab Delegation should be allowed to make statements before the Special Political Committee. This seemed to many Delegations to have political implications which went beyond the limits of a debate on the report of the Director of U.N.R.W.A. The request was not pressed and the Committee did not recognise the Delegation although two of its members made statements as individuals before the Committee.

CONFIDENTIAL

/17. The other

20

CONFIDENTIAL

UNGA 16/Item 25.

- 6 -

17. The other point was the Arabs' move to have the Assembly incorporate in its resolution its recognition of the need to safeguard the property rights of refugees and an instruction that the Agency take appropriate and effective action, to that end. This proposal was bitterly debated with Israel ranged with the main contributing Members in opposing a move to make the United Nations in some sense formally responsible for the refugees. These proposals were narrowly adopted in Committee but failed in plenary to obtain a two-thirds majority and so were deleted from the resolution finally adopted by the Assembly.

18. The scope of the programmes which the Agency can undertake has been severely limited by the funds available. An early plan, adopted by Resolution 513 (VI), which envisaged the expenditure of US\$ 200,000,000 on works programmes in the three years beginning on 1st July, 1951, had repeatedly to be amended to spread the expenditure over a progressively longer period. Income regularly falls short of the budgetted programme of expenditure. For the past several years the Assembly in its resolutions has directed attention to the precarious financial position of the Agency and urged Governments to consider to what extent they could contribute or increase their contributions so that the Agency could carry out its programmes. Nevertheless, Resolution 1604 (XV) directed the Agency to continue its programme of relief for the refugees and, insofar as was financially possible, expand its programme of self-support and vocational training.

19. In his annual report for the year ending 30th June, 1960, considered at the Fifteenth Session of the General Assembly, the Director of U.N.R.W.A. submitted a three-year programme of activity covering the period of the Agency's mandate (1961-3). This programme envisages the contribution of the Agency's relief services and its education programme. Under the former, the Agency provides food, shelter, medical care and minimum welfare services and under the latter it provides elementary education to all qualified refugee children and secondary education to a gradually increasing number of qualified students. In addition the programme incorporates a measure designed to help a growing number of refugee youth become employable. This measure proposes a four fold expansion of technical training as well as some improvements and expansion in elementary and secondary education which are essential as a base for technical training.

20. In financial terms the cumulative requirements of the programme described above are as follows:-

- (a) Some \$34 million per year for present relief and education programmes, i.e. a continuation of the present level of annual contributions;
- (b) An additional \$16.3 million spread over the three years to be used as follows:-
 - (i) \$8.1 million to expand technical training;
 - (ii) \$3.7 million

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

UNGA 16/Item 25.

- 7 -

- (ii) \$3.7 million to improve and expand elementary and secondary education; and
- (iii) \$4.5 million to meet inevitable increases in the regular relief services and rising costs.

Of this additional \$16.3 million, \$4 million has been obtained from World Refugee Year contributions. The balance of \$12.3 million will have to be found from other sources, principally increased contributions from members. The \$4 million from the W.R.Y. will approximately cover that part of the expanded programme planned for 1961. However the Director has pointed out that it will be difficult if not impossible to continue this constructive programme unless financing for the whole 1962 budget can be assured. A strong plea has therefore been made to Members to contribute the additional \$6.7 million needed to finance the 1962 portion of the expanded programme. The Secretary-General has announced that a pledging Conference of the Ad Hoc Committee of the whole Assembly will be held on 21st November, 1961.

21. The Agency's budget for 1961 is \$40,600,000. At last year's pledging Conference approximately \$17.9 million was pledged by 29 Governments, for the 1961 programme. On the assumption that governments which at that time (October, 1960) were not able to pledge for 1961 or for the latter half of 1961 would in due course do so at the same rates as in the past, the Director estimates that the Agency's income from normal governmental sources for 1961 will continue at the level of previous years, i.e. about \$34 million. The W.R.Y. contribution will bring this up to \$38 million and casual contributions may close the remaining gap.

22. The estimated budget for 1962 is \$39,334,000.

Australian Attitude:

(i) Mandate

23. Australia recognizes that the Agency is making an important contribution to the stability of the Near East and regards its continuation as essential until the problem of the Arab refugees has been eliminated. The Delegation should therefore support proposals for the extension of its mandate for any reasonable period.

(ii) Recognition of Palestinian-Arab Delegation

24. We consider that the request referred to in paragraph 16 above has unacceptable political overtones and if a similar request is made at the Sixteenth Session the Delegation should oppose it.

(iii) Safeguards for the property of Refugees

25. We do not consider that the United Nations should assume or acknowledge any responsibility in this direction. The Delegation should oppose the inclusion of any reference or recommendation in this regard in draft resolutions submitted to the Assembly.

(iv) Contributions
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL 18

UNGA 16/Item 25.

- 8 -

(iv) Contributions

26. Australia has pledged and paid £A.90,000 (£201,600) for the year 1960-1, of which one half (£100,800) represents a contribution to the Agency's financial year 1961. We have sought approval for a similar contribution in 1961-2. The Delegation will be informed when the necessary appropriation has been approved by Parliament. At the Pledging Conference the Delegation should announce Australia's intention to contribute £A.90,000 in 1961-2. If the appropriation has not been approved by that time, it should add the qualification that the contribution is subject to Parliamentary approval.

27. In explanation of the decision not to increase our contribution, the Delegation may state that the Government considers its primary responsibility in the field of assistance is to push ahead rigorously with the development of the Territories of Papua and New Guinea whose needs represent a prior claim on available resources. In pursuit of this policy the Government has this year made a substantial increase (£2.4 million) in its grant to these territories (£17,465,400 as against £15,094,400 last year). Nevertheless the Government has decided that on humanitarian and economic grounds our contribution to other programmes including U.N.R.W.A. should not be reduced, despite the additional burden on our resources. Australia is already the fifth largest contributor to the Agency, coming after the United States, United Kingdom, Canada and West Germany.

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Name of Paper *The Israel Digest*

File No.

181/4/4 17

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1.9.61

THE ISRAEL DIGEST VOLUME IV No. 17

THE NEED TO NEGOTIATE

Tackling the Arab Refugee Problem

By IVOR BAVELLE

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This applies with particular force to
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ency at that.

Pernicious Pattern

The Arab refugee situation unfortunately
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It is kept in existence by Arab determina-
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Today the hard core of the Arab re-
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concentration of genuine Arab refugees,
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Foreign policy remains the art of the
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No objective observer can seriously enter-
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The process of absorbing former Arab
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It cannot be stressed too strongly that any
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In December 1948 the UN General
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then voted against the resolution and all
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Now their spokesmen tear a single para-

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refugee issue—out of its essential context,
pretend that the essential reservations in
it do not exist, and claim that the dis-
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sents an Israeli obligation towards the
Arabs; at the same time they, on their
part, refuse to accept any obligation
whatsoever towards Israel arising from
the resolution in its totality, from any of
its parts or, of course, from the UN Char-
ter itself.

Where UN resolutions are concerned no
one has the right to make any requests
whatsoever of Israel in relation to para-
graph eleven of Resolution 194 without
insisting on the implementation by the
Arabs of all paragraphs of the Resolution
and of their obligations under the Char-
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to terminate their state of war against a
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Unfortunately, there are as yet no in-
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among the Arab leaders which might
make it possible to consider realistically
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structive solution of either the core of the
Israeli-Arab conflict or any one of its
aspects, including the refugee issue. Pres-
ident Kennedy has addressed letters to
Arab heads of State. Press reports and
quotations indicate that the President of
the United States touched in these letters
upon the Arab refugee problem with con-
siderable caution and moderation, very
tentatively and with careful deference to
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Nasser's Brazen Formula

The Iraqi ruler declared with scorn
that he would not reply at all. Abdel
Nasser referred to President Kennedy's let-
ter in the course of his speech on the oc-
casion of a military parade commemo-
rating his revolution. He said, in effect,
that he would reply in order to explain
the necessity "to undo the wrong com-
mitted in Palestine." This was Nasser's
formula in his speech at the last UN As-
sembly, when he brazenly advocated from
the UN rostrum the "undoing of the
wrong in Palestine" by turning the clock
back to 1917, before the Balfour Declara-
tion. Hussein and Saud seem to have
made similar replies.

At the same time the Arabs utter wild
threats of impending military action
against Israel this autumn. These threats
may be mainly intended to intimidate
certain countries in order to extort con-
cessions to the Arabs in the forthcoming
UN debate on the Arab refugees,
but there is ample evidence of hectic
military preparation in the UAR aimed
at aggressive action against Israel a year
or two from now.

Thus one cannot envisage at present
a forthcoming removal of the Arab re-
fugee item from the UN General As-
sembly agenda, and it becomes ever more
important to direct the UN debate on

(Continued on page 5)

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

M. East.

Name of Paper The ISRAEL DIGEST

File No.

16

Published at

Date 1.9.61

NEED FOR NEGOTIATIONS

(Continued from page 4)

this problem towards a constructive end. The policy of politely ignoring Arab warlike propaganda and threats against Israel during the UN debates has merely encouraged Arab aggressiveness. On the other hand, the idea of solving international conflicts by peaceful means, by direct negotiation without threats of force, is anchored in the very foundations of the United Nations.

Surely the time has come for the General Assembly to call upon Israel and the Arab States to engage in such negotiations in order to solve the Arab refugee problem once and for all. Simultaneously, the practical futility of Arab warlike planning and preparation against Israel should be brought home unmistakably to the Arab Governments by major powers. Thus a new Middle East situation would be created conducive to the emergence of more pacific and constructive Arab attitudes.

A less determined and unequivocal Western policy may well embolden reckless Arab extremism, thereby heightening peril and danger in our area at a time when grave tensions elsewhere remain unresolved and would unfortunately appear to be increasing.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper NEW YORK TIMES.

File No.

181/4/4

Published at PARIS.

Date 25.8.61

**TWO ARAB LEADERS
REPLY TO KENNEDY**

Special to The New York Times
BEIRUT, Lebanon, Aug. 24—
President Gamal Abdel Nasser
of the United Arab Republic
and King Hussein of Jordan
have replied to President Ken-
nedy's letter of May 11 that
proposed a new attempt to
solve the Palestine problem.

President Nasser in effect
challenged President Kennedy
to create an atmosphere of
confidence necessary for the
solution of the problems by
showing that United States pol-
icy in the Middle East was in-
spired solely by United States
interest and not by world Zion-
ism.

King Hussein urged the Pres-
ident to seek the application of
the principle of self-determina-
tion for Arab refugees from
Palestine.

While indicating strong
doubts as to whether the Pale-
stine problem was in fact solu-
ble at this time, both answered
the President in a serious and
friendly vein.

President Kennedy's letter of
May 11 was sent shortly before
the visit of Premier David Ben-
Gurion of Israel to the United
States, to the heads of Iraq,
Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia,
Yemen and the United Arab
Republic.

Name of Paper *The Israel Digest*File No. *181/4/4*

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wrong in Palestine" by turning the clock
back to 1917, before the Balfour Decla-
ration. Hussein and Saud seem to have
made similar replies.

At the same time the Arabs utter
threats of impending military action
against Israel this autumn. These threats
may be mainly intended to intimidate
certain countries in order to extort
cessions to the Arabs in the forthcoming
UN debate on the Arab refugee
but there is ample evidence of
military preparation in the UAR
at aggressive action against Israel
or two from now.

Thus one cannot envisage at
a forthcoming removal of the Arab
refugee item from the UN General
Assembly agenda, and it becomes even
important to direct the UN del-

(Continued on page 5)

NEED FOR NEGOTIATIONS

(Continued from page 4)

this problem towards a constructive end. The policy of politely ignoring Arab warlike propaganda and threats against Israel during the UN debates has merely encouraged Arab aggressiveness. On the other hand, the idea of solving international conflicts by peaceful means, by direct negotiation without threats of force, is anchored in the very foundations of the United Nations.

Surely the time has come for the General Assembly to call upon Israel and the Arab States to engage in such negotiations in order to solve the Arab refugee problem once and for all. Simultaneously, the practical futility of Arab warlike planning and preparation against Israel should be brought home unmistakably to the Arab Governments by major powers. Thus a new Middle East situation would be created conducive to the emergence of more pacific and constructive Arab attitudes.

A less determined and unequivocal Western policy may well embolden reckless Arab extremism, thereby heightening peril and danger in our area at a time when grave tensions elsewhere remain unresolved and would unfortunately appear to be increasing.

The Other Exodus

By ERSKINE B. CHILDERS

THE Palestine Arab refugees wait, and multiply, and are debated at the United Nations. In thirteen years, their numbers have increased from 650,000 to 1,145,000. Most of them survive only on rations from the UN agency, UNRWA. Their subsistence has already cost £110,000,000. Each year, UNRWA has to plead at New York for the funds to carry on, against widespread and especially Western lack of sympathy. There is one reason for this impatience: the attitude created towards these refugees by Israeli argument. For over ten years, Israeli spokesmen have claimed that

Unless we understand how this problem was caused, we cannot rightly judge how it should be solved. . . . The responsibility of the Arab Government is threefold. There is the initiative for its creation. There is the onus for its endurance. Above all—theirs is the capacity for its solution [Abba Eban to the UN, 1957].

In this inquiry, I propose only briefly to examine the last two of these three claims. The last, about a 'solution,' is that if the Arab host governments were willing, they could resettle the refugees quite easily outside Palestine—where, as Israeli claims and as President Kennedy's 1960 election platform also had it, 'there is room and opportunity for them.' This is not even remotely true. UNRWA's new chief, Dr. John Davis, has now bluntly and bravely warned against 'facile assumptions that it rests with the host governments to solve the problem. . . . the simple truth is that the jobs . . . do not exist today within the host countries. Nor can the jobs be created, Dr. Davis reports, because most of the refugees are unskilled peasants—precisely the host countries' worst problem among their own rapidly expanding populations.

These Arabs, in short, are displaced persons in the fullest, most tragic meaning of the term—an economic truth cruelly different from the myth. But there is also the political myth, and it too has been soothing our highly pragmatic Western conscience for thirteen years. This is the Israeli charge, solemnly made every year and then reproduced around the world, that these refugees are—to quote a character in Leon Uris's *Exodus*—'kept caged like animals in suffering as a deliberate political weapon.'

This, again, Dr. Davis has now bravely called a 'misconception.' The reality here is that the refugees themselves fanatically oppose any resettlement outside Palestine. UNRWA even had to persuade them that concrete huts, even in the UN camps, replacing their squalid tents and hovels, would not be the thin end of a resettlement wedge. Unlike other refugees, these refuse to move; they insist on going home.

Why? The answer, I believe, lies in the third of the three issues Israel argues—in the cause itself of the mass exodus. The very fact that cause is argued by both sides is significant. Israel claims that the Arabs left because they were ordered to, and deliberately incited into panic, by their own leaders who wanted the field cleared for the 1948 war. It is also argued that there would today be no Arab refugees if the Arab States had not attacked the new Jewish

State on May 15, 1948 (though 300,000 had already fled before that date). The Arabs charge that their people were evicted at bayonet point and by panic deliberately incited by the Zionists.

Examining every official Israeli statement about the Arab exodus, I was struck by the fact that no primary evidence of evacuation orders was ever produced. The charge, Israel claimed, was 'documented'; but where were the documents? There had allegedly been Arab radio broadcasts ordering the evacuation; but no dates, names of stations, or texts of messages were ever cited. In Israel in 1958, as a guest of the Foreign Office and therefore doubly hopeful of serious assistance, I asked to be shown the proofs. I was assured they existed, and was promised them. None had been offered when I left, but I was again assured, I asked to have the material sent on to me. I am still waiting.

While in Israel, however, I met Dr. Leon Kohn, professor of political science at Hebrew University and an ambassador-rank adviser to the Israeli Foreign Office. He had written one of the first official pamphlets on the Arab refugees. I asked him for concrete evidence of the Arab evacuation orders. Agitatedly, Dr. Kohn replied: 'Evidence? Evidence? What more could you want than this?' and he took up his own pamphlet. 'Look at this *Economist* report,' and he pointed to a quotation. 'You will surely not suggest that the *Economist* is a Zionist journal?'

The quotation is one of about five that appear in every Israeli speech and pamphlet, and are in turn used by every sympathetic analysis. It seemed very impressive: it referred to the exodus from Haifa, and to an Arab broadcast order as one major reason for that exodus.

I decided to turn up the relevant (October 2) 1948 issue of the *Economist*. The passage that has literally gone around the world was certainly there, but I had already noticed one curious word in it. This was a description of the massacre at Deir Yassin as an 'incident.' No impartial observer of Palestine in 1948 calls what happened at this avowedly non-belligerent, unarmed Arab village in April, 1948, an 'incident.'—any more than Lidice is called an 'incident.' Over 350 old men, women and children were deliberately butchered, stripped and mutilated or thrown into a well, by men of the Zionist Irgun Zvai Leumi.

Seen in its place in the full *Economist* article, it was at once clear that Dr. Kohn's quotation was a second-hand account, inserted as that of

St. Helena Prisoners

With only a very short time left for sufficient funds to be collected to enable the Bahraini prisoners on St. Helena to proceed with their defence, the Appeal Committee (Woodrow Wyatt, MP, Jeremy Thorpe, MP, John Stonehouse, MP, Donald Morrison, MP, and Bernard Levin, MP) has asked readers of the *Spectator* for their generous response, but urgently ask for further contributions, of any sum, to be sent to Mr. Levin at the *Spectator*, 99 Gower Street, London WC1.

THE SPECTATOR MAY 12 1961

...witness at Haifa, by the journal's own correspondent who had not been in that city at the time. And in the rest of the same article, written by the *Economist* correspondent himself, but never quoted by Israel, the second great wave of refugees were described as 'all destitute, as the British troops gave them an hour in which to pack, but simultaneously requisitioned all transport.'

It was now essential to check all other, even secondary, Israeli 'evidence.' Another stock quotation down the years has been that, supposedly, of the Greek-Catholic Archbishop of Galilee. For example, Israel's Abba Eban told the 1948 Special Political Committee in 1957 that the Archbishop had 'fully confirmed that the Arabs were urged to flee by their own leaders.'

I wrote to His Grace, asking for his evidence of such orders. I held signed letters from him, with permission to publish, in which he has categorically denied ever alleging Arab evacuation orders; he states that no such orders were ever given. He says that his name has been abused for years, and that the Arabs fled through panic and forcible eviction by Jewish troops.

As none of the other stock quotations in Israeli propaganda are worth comment, I next decided to test the undocumented charge that the Arab evacuation orders were broadcast by Arab radio, which could be done thoroughly because the BBC monitored all Middle Eastern broadcasts throughout 1948. The records, and comparison ones by a US monitoring unit, can be seen at the British Museum.

There was not a single order, or appeal, or suggestion about evacuation from Palestine from any Arab radio station, inside or outside Palestine, in 1948. There is repeated monitored record of Arab appeals, even flat orders, to the Muslims of Palestine to stay put. To select only two examples: on April 4, as the first great wave of flight began, Damascus Radio broadcast an appeal to everyone to stay at their homes and jobs. On April 24, with the exodus now a flood, Palestine Arab leaders warned that

Certain elements and Jewish agents are spreading defeatist news to create chaos and panic among the peaceful population. Some cowards are deserting their houses, villages or cities. . . . Zionist agents and corrupt cowards will be severely punished [Al-Inqaz, the Arab Liberation Radio, at 1200 hours].

Even Jewish broadcasts (in Hebrew) mentioned such Arab appeals to stay put. Zionist newspapers in Palestine reported the same: none so much as hinted at any Arab evacuation orders.

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The fact is that Israel's official charges, which have vitally influenced the last ten years of Western thought about the refugees, are demonstrably and totally hollow. And from this alone, suspicion is justified. Why make such charges at all? On the face of it, this mass exodus might have been entirely the result of 'normal' panic and wartime displacement.

We need not even touch upon Arab evidence. It was quite deliberately incited: The trouble is there, on the Zionist record. For example, on March 27, four days before the big offensive against Arab centres by the official Zionist Haganah forces, the Irgun's radio unit broadcast a notice. Irgun, a terrorist organ-



THE SPECTATOR, MAY 12, 1961

isation like the Stern Gang, was officially disowned by Ben-Gurion and the Haganah. Yet just four days before the Haganah offensive Irgun warned 'Arabs in urban agglomerations' that typhus, cholera and similar diseases would break out 'heavily' among them 'in April and May.'

The effect may be imagined. Two weeks later, it was this same Irgun, apparently so solicitous of Arab welfare, that butchered the people of Deir Yassin. Irgun then called a press conference to announce the deed; paraded other captured Arabs through Jewish quarters of Jerusalem to be spat upon; then released them to tell their kin of the experience. Arthur Koestler called the 'bloodbath' of Deir Yassin 'the psychologically decisive factor in this spectacular exodus.' But this was only Irgun, it may be said. Is there evidence that official Zionist forces—the Haganah under Ben-Gurion and the Jewish Agency—were inciting panic? An Israeli Government pamphlet of 1958 states that 'the Jews tried, by every means open to them, to stop the Arab evacuation' (this same 1958 pamphlet has diluted Deir Yassin to 'the one and only instance of Jewish high-handed [sic] action in this war').

There is one recorded instance of such an appeal. It is beyond dispute, even by Arabs, that in Haifa the late gentle Mayor, Shabetai Levi with the tears streaming down his face, implored the city's Arabs to stay. But elsewhere in Haifa other Zionists were terrorising Arabs. Arthur Koestler wrote in his book that Haganah loud-speaker vans and the Haganah radio promised the city's Arabs escape to Arab territory, and hinted at terrible consequences if their warnings were disregarded. They are many witnesses of

this loudspeaker method elsewhere. In Jerusalem the Arabic warning from the vans was, 'The road to Jericho is open! Fly from Jerusalem before you are all killed!' (Meyer Levin in *Jerusalem Unbattled*). Bertha Vester, a Christian missionary, reported that another theme was, 'Unless you leave your homes, the fate of Deir Yassin will be your fate.' The Haganah radio station also broadcast, in Arabic, repeated news of Arabs fleeing 'in terror and fear' from named places.

Still, however, we have plumbed this exodus only so far as panic is concerned. There are UN and *Economist* reports of forcible expulsion, which is some thing else. How much evidence is there for this? And were only the unofficial Irgun and Stern forces responsible? This is what Nathan Chofshi, one of the original Jewish pioneers in Palestine, wrote in an ashamed rebuttal of an American Zionist rabbi's charges of evacuation orders:

If Rabbi Kaplan really wanted to know what happened, we old Jewish settlers in Palestine who witnessed the fight could tell him how and in what manner we Jews forced the Arabs to leave cities and villages... some of them were driven out by force of arms; others were made to leave by deceit, lying and false promises. It is enough to cite the cities of Jaffa, Lydda, Ramle, Beersheba, Acre from among numberless others [in *Jewish Newsletter*, New York, February 9, 1956].

Were official Zionist troops involved at any of these places? I propose to select, for the sake of brevity, only the Lydda-Ramle area. It was about the exodus from this area, among others, that the *Economist* reported, 'Jewish troops gave them an hour to quit.'

In their latest book, which has been publicly

endorsed by Ben-Gurion, Jon Kimche and his brother devoted considerable detail to the Zionist offensive against Lydda and Ramle. It was approved by Ben-Gurion; it was undertaken by official Israeli forces under Yigael Alon. And the immediate responsible officer was Moshe Dayan, commander of the 1956 Sinai attack, now a Cabinet Minister. Kimche has described how, on July 11, 1948, Dayan with his column

drove at full speed into Lydda, shooting up the town and creating confusion and a degree of terror among the population... its Arab population of 30,000 either fled or were herded on the road to Ramallah. The next day Ramle also surrendered and its Arab population suffered the same fate. Both towns were sacked by the victorious Israelis.

Ramallah, on the road to which these particular Arabs—numbering over 60,000 from this one area alone—were herded, was up in the Judean hills, outside Zionist-held territory. The 'road to Jericho,' which Arabs in Jerusalem were warned to take, brought them into the Jordan Valley. Some 85,000 are still there in one UN camp alone, under the Mount of Temptation. The Arab population of Acre, mentioned by Chofshi, exceeded 45,000. Acre was attacked by official Zionist troops.

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From this analysis of only some of the sources of the Arab exodus, then, it is clear beyond all doubt that official Zionist forces were responsible for expulsion of thousands upon thousands of Arabs, and for deliberate incitement to panic. Seen from the viewpoint of the Arab refugees themselves, little more would need to be said.

INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION

And needless to say, even those who fled through 'unofficial' channels can hardly be asked to look down on the Israeli Government today. It has its legitimists and Sternists the same as the former Hagana troops; its denial of expulsion is total.

But is it conceivable that Ben-Gurion and his colleagues could have deliberately contemplated an 'emptying' of Palestine? That a native existed is beyond doubt. The UN partition scheme had in no way solved the 'Arab problem' that a Jewish State would face. It would have given Zionism what its leaders publicly called the 'irreducible minimum' of territory in a Palestine they claimed should entirely belong to them. And we know that the official Zionist movement had in fact no intention of accepting the UN territorial award. Six weeks before the British Mandate ended, before the Israeli State was proclaimed, and before the Arab States sent in their armies, an all-out Zionist military offensive was launched. Later, Ben-Gurion publicly said of this offensive:

As fighting spread, the [Arab] exodus was joined by Bedouin and fellahin [peasants], but not the remotest Jewish homestead was abandoned and nothing a tottering [British] administration could unkindly do stopped us from reaching our goal on May 14, 1948, in a State made larger and Jewish by the Hagana [cf. *Rebirth and Destiny of Israel*].

The Jewish State envisaged by the UN would have contained a 45 per cent. Arab population: the extra territory attacked by the Zionists before May 14 would have increased that ratio—for example, by more than 80,000 Arabs in Jaffa alone. But it was not just a question of numbers. The Arabs owned and occupied far too much of the territory's productive and social facilities to enable anything like the mass Jewish immigration of which Zionists dreamed.

What this meant in terms of motive can be seen in the statistics that followed the Arab exodus. More than 80 per cent. of the entire land area of Israel is land abandoned by the Arab refugees. Nearly a quarter of all the standing buildings in Israel had been occupied by those Arabs. Ten thousand shops, stores and other firms inside new Israel had been Arab. Half of all the citrus fruit holdings in the new State had belonged to the Arabs now made refugees. By 1954, more than one-third of the entire Jewish population of Israel was living on 'absentee property'—most of it now 'absorbed' into the Israeli economy, and unilaterally sequestered by Israeli legislation against a 'global' compensation offer.

It is, then, little wonder that old Chaim Weizmann, Israel's first President, described the Arab exodus as 'a miraculous simplification of Israel's tasks.' But was it 'miraculous'? Un-expected? In no way part of the combined military and economic planning of Zionist Israel's leaders?

We come to perhaps the most grave evidence of all. The mass exodus began in April 1948. By June, the UN Mediator was fully seized of it. He formally demanded a state of affairs from the new Israeli Government. He asked the refugees. At first, he could get no answer. Then, in an official letter dated June 1948, Israel's Foreign Minister replied:

It was only four months since the first waves of flight; only eleven weeks since Israel had been proclaimed, ostensibly calling on the Arabs to 'play their part in the development of the State.' And it was at this time that a Government since claiming that this whole exodus was unexpected and despite its implorings, formally denied the refugees the right of return. Israel did not merely plead 'security,' but told the United Nations:

On the economic side, the reintegration of the returning Arabs into normal life, and even their mere sustenance, would present an insuperable problem. The difficulties of accommodation, employment, and ordinary livelihood would be insuperable.

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The case rests. This is not the place to discuss a 'solution,' and no summary conclusion is needed, save perhaps to recall the words of an

official Israeli spokesman, though in rather different import:

Unless we understand how this problem was caused, we cannot rightly judge how it should be solved.

The Arabs of Palestine now enter their fourteenth year of exile. If you go among them in the hills of Judea, they will take you by the arm to a crest of land and point downwards, across the rusty skeins of barbed wire. 'Can you see it—over there beside those trees? That is my home.'

It is shaming beyond all brief descriptions to move among these million people, as a Westerner. It is shaming for many Jews, and some speak out, as Nathan Chofshi has bravely done:

We came and turned the native Arabs into tragic refugees. And still we dare to slander and malign them, to besmirch their name. Instead of being deeply ashamed of what we did and trying to undo some of the evil we committed . . . we justify our terrible acts and even attempt to glorify them.

Training Centres

By SIR BASIL HENRIQUES

THE debate on the Criminal Justice Bill in the House of Lords on May 1 showed how greatly perturbed the nation is by the continued increase in delinquency, especially by those under the age of twenty-one. From the reports in nearly all the newspapers it seemed as though the only suggestion made to meet the grave problem was the introduction of corporal punishment so ably advocated by the Lord Chief Justice. This was not so. Lord Parker himself in the first part of his speech, as well as several other Peers, warmly commended the Training Centre Scheme which Lord Longford, in opening the debate, had described as 'the most constructive solution for many years. . . . A new and far more hopeful approach can be made to the crime problem if we can establish training outside prison as a new and ever-powerful element in our penal system. . . . the Scheme . . . represents the germ of a whole new penal philosophy. . . .

At present there is a vicious circle. There are many youths who require something more than straightforward probation, but who do not seem to need the very expensive, long period of training in Borstal or an Approved School. The only alternative—apart from a fine, which is scarcely even an inconvenience to the working boy of today—is three months in a Detention Centre. There are nothing near enough of these Centres, all of which are overflowing full. The Benches therefore commit these young people to serve a short sentence in prison. The prisons are so full that 7,000 prisoners are sleeping three in a cell and in the Wormwood Scrubs Boys' Prison in March 162 boys under twenty-one were sleeping three in a cell in which they are incarcerated for far too many hours every day owing to the shortage of prison officers. Quite obviously these young people deteriorate in such conditions, where they are bound to compare notes on past crimes and to plan future ones. It is absurd to be horrified by the increase in delinquency when it is clearly partly caused by these conditions!

Most Benches try where possible to avoid ordering residential training. It is extremely expensive—Approved Schools and Borstals cost over £10

a week for each inmate. It breaks up the home, and parents shelve on to the staff of the Institution their responsibility of training their children. Working boys lose their jobs, which may ruin their careers. For these and other reasons Benches will, as long as possible, order supervision on probation. There is a serious shortage of probation officers, who are disgracefully overworked and underpaid. They cannot do their work as thoroughly as they want to do it, with the result that the number of successes are less than they used to be. Furthermore, at no time are the probation officers, through the method of visiting and reporting, able to study the probationer when he is thoroughly relaxed and off his guard in association with others of his own age.

The proposed Training Centre Scheme which is based upon, but is by no means the same as the Centre which has worked well for twenty-five

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21 AUG 1961
181/4/4
CANBERRA

Embassy,
AUSTRALIAN ~~EMBASSY~~
TEL AVIV.

In reply quote No. 230/5
223/3/11
Memorandum No. 294

11th August, 1961

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA.


ARAB REFUGEES

In my memorandum No. 293 of 7th August, 1961, I reported that I had not yet been called to Jerusalem by Mr Liveran to hear his exposition of Israel's position on the question of Arab refugees.

2. The American Ambassador has subsequently told me from his own knowledge that the Government of Israel does not intend to formulate its policy until after the elections.

3. I am sending a copy of this memorandum to the Senior External Affairs Representative, London, the Australian Embassy, Washington and the Australian Delegation to the United Nations, New York.

Can 181/4/4 Branch


(J.M. McMillan)
Ambassador

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL TIMES.

File No.

Mideast Mirror
Published at SYDNEY.

Date

181/4/4
26. 8. 61

Mideast Mirror

12

August 26, 1961

HELPING REFUGEES TO BECOME
SELF-SUPPORTING

UNRWA Plans for Coming Year

AMMAN -- Dr. John Davis, Director of UNRWA, visiting Jordan, announced on August 22 that the organisation's budget for the coming financial year amounted to about 39,500,000 dollars, nearly half of which was to be spent in Jordan. Dr. Davis added that in addition to principal services, UNRWA's programme would concentrate on expanding vocational and secondary education. Work would be resumed on individual schemes aimed at helping refugees to become self-supporting. These would be financed from a fund of 470,000 dollars available for this purpose. The greatest part would be spent in cooperation with the Jordanian Ministry of Development and Reconstruction.

Dr. Davis added that the question of extending UNRWA's mandate would be discussed at the coming ordinary session of the U.N. General Assembly next month. He would report to the assembly on UNRWA's activities and its new budget.

An armed infiltrator was shot dead on August 18 by a frontier patrol in an incident in central Israel close to the Jordanian border, an Israeli army spokesman said in Tel Aviv on August 20.

The spokesman said a patrol of border police came across a person acting suspiciously in the area south of Tayibah village. When challenged, the man opened fire on the patrol, which fired back, killing him, the spokesman said. He added that a sub-machine gun and ammunition were found near the body. Israel had reported the incident to the Jordan-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission, the spokesman said.

The Arab Higher Committee for Palestine announced in Baghdad on August 22 that it would send a delegation to the next regular meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, and also to the meeting of non-aligned nations in Belgrade next month. The delegation to the U.N. will comprise Dr. Izzat Tannous, Emile el-Ghuri, Issa Nakhle, Omar el-Azzouni and Youssef Ghannam.

A delegation will also visit Central and Southern American countries to propagate the Palestine cause and win support from the governments and peoples of these regions.

Solving Refugee Problem

The United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine on August 24 named Dr. Joseph Johnson an American, as its special representative to visit the Middle East to seek means of solving the Arab refugee problem.

Dr. Johnson, appointed in pursuance of a resolution of the General Assembly adopted last April, will explore with the Arab governments and Israel practical means of making progress.

Dr. Johnson is president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, which has its headquarters in New York, and a former chief of the State Department's division of international security affairs. He is 55.

The resolution which led to Dr. Johnson's appointment was adopted by the Assembly last April 21 by 37 votes to 17 with 30 abstentions. It requested the Conciliation Commission to make efforts to secure the implementation of a paragraph adopted by the Assembly in 1948 calling for repatriation of the refugees to Israel or payment of compensation to them. The commission was directed to report back to the assembly before October 15.

The problem of the one million refugees who fled from Israel during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war and now live in camps mainly in Jordan and the United Arab Republic will again be a big question at the forthcoming regular session of the General Assembly.

-:-:-



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Embassy,
AUSTRALIAN LEGATION
TEL AVIV.

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In reply quote No. 223/3/11

Memorandum No. 293

7th August, 1961

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA.

ARAB REFUGEES

In my memorandum No. 285 of 26th July, 1961, I mentioned that Mr Liveran, Director of the International Organisations Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs intended to summon me to Jerusalem to advise me on the latest position of the Israel Government regarding the Arab refugee problem.

2. It is significant that after this lapse of time I have not yet been summoned for this interview. This indicates that the Government of Israel has found it necessary to undertake a serious review of its position.

3. I am sending copies of this memorandum to the Senior External Affairs Representative, London, the Australian Embassy, Washington and the Australian Delegation to the United Nations, New York.

(J.W. McMillen)
Ambassador

Mr Phillips

Original on 85/12/10

8.

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OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA

TEMPLE BAR 2435

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE,
AUSTRALIA HOUSE,
STRAND,
LONDON, W.C.2.

In reply quote No.

Memo No. 1335.

31st July, 1961

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRAU.N.G.A. XVI - Palestine Refugees

Reference our memorandum No. 1285 of 21st July about Items before the forthcoming U.N. General Assembly.

2. We followed up the Item on Palestine refugees direct with the Foreign Office today when we saw Maynard of the Eastern Department. He said that the Item was not likely to be included in those in the U.K. "lobbying brief" as the report of the Director General of the UNRWA would not appear until after the session opened. However, a general position was being prepared in readiness in the Foreign Office.
3. Both sides - Arabs and Israelis - were regarded by the Foreign Office as "intractable". The U.K. approach to the Item would be governed by three principles, viz: (i) keeping the cold war element out as much as possible; (ii) demonstrating that the U.N. was not ignoring the problem; (iii) supporting action that could not be regarded as unreasonable to either side.
4. Action at the Assembly Maynard indicated, would depend on such factors as the Director General's report, the outcome of the current "U.S. initiative", and U.K. intelligence on Arab intentions. We had (in paragraph 31 of our memorandum 1140 of 3rd July on the Cleveland talks) made passing reference to Dr. Lindt's association with this U.S. initiative. Maynard said (cf. New York's memoranda 706 and 686 of 19th and 13th July) that despite difficulties personally with Lindt the United States still intended to proceed with the move for him to make a mission to both sides. If this proves abortive, White House pressure will probably force the State Department to find a last-minute substitute. Maynard himself thought that Dr. Lindt was most definitely not a starter. As to a possible substitute, he said Spinelli had been mentioned though he had the disadvantage of being too closely involved with various other U.N. endeavours.
5. Maynard has made the point that it is important for the U.K. to obtain maximum support among the "neutrals" (by which term he included also those not directly involved in the dispute such as the U.K. itself). The aim would be to bring as many neutral countries as possible to support U.N. action, and U.K. lobbying should be directed to this end. They would hope to persuade the U.S. to lobby likewise. The number of votes on the side of reason was of greater importance, in Maynard's view, than the precise details of any reasonable proposal.

*Mr Phillips**Original on 88/12/10*

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6. Although Maynard mentioned that the U.K. was "neutral" on this issue, he has stressed the keen U.K. concern with it - e.g. their contribution is much higher (just under \$2 million annually to UNRWA) than a "proportionate" (undefined) rate would be. The Foreign Office would moreover expect consideration of the refugees item, on past form, to develop into discussion of the whole Palestine question. The basic aim, in the Foreign Office view, remains a peaceful settlement between Arabs and Israelis. They cannot see that settlement of the refugees aspect can be achieved except as part of such a general settlement. Further, the first requirement for any settlement would be a sufficient period of reduced tension in the Middle East. The Foreign Office would wish other countries to see the advantage, therefore, of judging any proposal from the point of view of political reasonableness as well as from that of practical benefit to refugees.

7. The above has been cleared at Head of Branch level as Foreign Office views, and is likely to be approved.

8. We told Maynard that we had no detailed views from you as yet, but that we would regard ourselves as being as much "neutral" in the sense he mentioned as the U.K. Like the U.K., Australia was also not an insignificant contributor to the Agency. Also we expected the United States to make the running. We suggested further personally that the Foreign Office views as he had given them to us would probably find general acceptance in Canberra and that we would expect our respective Delegations in New York to keep in close touch.

9. Copy of this memorandum is being sent to Washington, New York and Tel Aviv for information.

(H. Marshall)
for Senior External Affairs Representative.

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Telephone Nos. 28190
28663



Australian Embassy
35, Sharia el Kasr el Aali,
Garden City,
Cairo.

In reply quote No. 223/36

Memorandum No. 429

21st July, 1961.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA.

ARAB HEADS OF STATE REPLY TO KENNEDY'S LETTER

Please refer to our memorandum No. 344 of 16th June, 1961.

2. It was reported on 10th July by the Cairo weekly newspaper, Rose El-Youssef, that the Palestine Experts Conference has approved the points which will be contained in the replies to be sent by Arab Heads of State to the messages they received from President Kennedy concerning the Palestine question. The points are said to be:-

- The Arab countries adhere to the U.N. Charter and seek to maintain security and peace in the Middle East.
- The Arab countries are prepared to shoulder all their responsibilities in regard to Palestine.
- Israel's existence in the area constitutes a permanent threat to the security and peace of the Arab world.
- Israel's existence is based on religious, racial and imperialistic foundations.
- The Arab refugees have the right to return to their homeland.
- U.N. resolutions on the refugees should be implemented.

Copy to UN Branch

W. Mayne Wilson

(W. Mayne Wilson)
Secretary.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

File No. 210/1/3

Memorandum No. 706/61

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra A.C.T.

Palestine Refugees

I refer to our memorandum No. 696 of 13th July in which we reported the substance of a conversation with Mr Christopher Theron of the United States Mission concerning the Palestine Conciliation Commission's new initiative.

2. On 19th July Mr Colin Crowe (Deputy Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom) told us that he had ascertained from Mr Plimpton of the United States Mission that the appointment was originally offered to Mr Auguste Lindt of Switzerland. It is of interest that we gathered from Mr Crowe that the United States was in this regard showing in conversation with his Mission the same reticence as they were showing in conversation with us.

3. Copies of this memorandum are being sent to the Australian Embassy, Washington; the High Commission, Ottawa; External Affairs Office, London; the Australian Embassy, Tel Aviv and the Australian Embassy in Cairo.

Acting Permanent Representative

RHR/fdb

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY
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OF LETTER FROM
AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
750 THIRD AVENUE NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

CONFIDENTIAL

13th July 1961

File No. 210/1/3

Memorandum No. 686/61

EAME - To remain.

Orig. on 852/12/10

18/7.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra A.C.T.

Palestine Refugees

I refer to our telegram No. 340 of 11th July in which we passed on to you information obtained from Mr Jarvis of the Palestine Conciliation Commission Secretariat concerning the new initiative which we had known the Commission had decided to take in May, but upon which we had previously been unable to obtain any information from the United States Mission.

2. On 12th July we spoke again to Mr Christopher Thoron of the United States Mission, and enquired whether he was yet in a position to inform us of what the Commission had in mind. Mr Thoron replied by asking just how much we knew, explaining that, as he had indicated on the previous occasion, he was reluctant to lay his Mission open to the charge that it had divulged confidential material; this was not to say that he was confident that either his colleagues on the Commission or the Secretariat were being equally reticent. We told Mr Thoron the substance of what Mr Jarvis had said, but of course without attribution. Mr Thoron confirmed that the version which we had was correct in all respects but one: there had been no difference of opinion within the Commission concerning the level of the representative to be appointed. Mr Thoron said that it was indeed correct that there had been no more precise definition of the representative's terms of reference than that he should talk to the parties with a view to ascertaining whether there were any unexplored avenues towards a solution. In his view, to frame at this point more precise terms of reference would be putting the cart before the horse.

3. Beyond a reluctant admission that the individual to whom the appointment was offered came from a European neutral country, Mr Thoron would not give us any hint as to his identity. However, since the appointment has been declined, this is only of academic interest. The Commission had decided that the first step in the operation would be to seek the agreement of the individual and of his government to the appointment; only after that had been done would the Arab and Israeli Governments be approached. Nevertheless, although no official advice had been conveyed to those governments, Mr Thoron had no doubt that they would by now have got wind of the idea.

4. Mr Thoron asked whether we had any ideas as to the next step. We replied that it seemed to us that the decision reached by the Commission in May had as much or as little prospect of success as any other initiative which the Commission could take at this time. Therefore, particularly as the nature of the initiative seemed to be known in general terms to a fairly wide group of delegations, it seemed logical for the Commission to offer the appointment to somebody else. In reply to a question, Mr Thoron said that the Commission was likely to meet again next week, and would probably consider another appointment.

5. Copies of this memorandum are being forwarded to the Australian Embassy, Washington; the High Commission, Ottawa; External Affairs Office London; the Australian Legation, Cairo and the Australian Embassy in Tel Aviv.

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY

OF LETTER FROM
AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
750 THIRD AVENUE NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

CONFIDENTIAL

12th July 1961

File No. 210/1/3

Memorandum No. 632/51

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra A.C.T.

CONFIDENTIAL

Palestine Refugees

I refer to our telegram No. 840, in which we reported on one aspect of a conversation with Mr Jarvis, who is the Senior Land Valuer attached to the Secretariat of the Palestine Conciliation Commission. An additional point made by Mr Jarvis in connexion with the Palestine Conciliation Commission's new initiative was that he had formed the impression that the United States representative (Mr Plimpton) had favoured the despatch of a relatively more junior representative, on the ground that at this stage low-level talks were more likely to yield results. However, the French and Turkish representatives had insisted on the appointment of a mediator of Ambassador rank.

2. We also discussed in a general way the progress made in the valuation of Arab refugee property. It will be recalled from previous memoranda that the identification of refugee property was completed some time ago and that the Palestine Conciliation Commission has instructed that the valuation itself be completed early next year. On the basis of comparative sales and other relevant data, this process is virtually complete. Mr Jarvis said that it was already very clear that his predecessor's estimate of £100,000,000 sterling as the total value of former Arab refugee properties in Israel for the purposes of compensation was extremely conservative; a total figure in the region of £300,000,000 sterling now seemed much more probable. As to the recipients of such compensation, Mr Jarvis said that only about 30 per cent of refugee bread-winners would be expected to receive substantial payments. The legal nature of the majority of these holdings in Palestine and the then undeveloped character of these holdings was such that between 30 and 40 per cent of the Arab refugees would be entitled to no compensation whatever, and another 30 per cent to less than £50 sterling.

R. H. ROBERTSON

Acting Permanent Representative

RHR/fab

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM **CONFIDENTIAL**

../JS

I. 17337

Dated: 11th July, 1961.

1715

Recd: 12th July, 1961.

1330

FROM:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

UN840. CONFIDENTIAL.

Repeated Washington for information, Ottawa
Sav. 606, London Sav. 600, Cairo Sav. 35, Tel Aviv Sav. 13.

Paragraph 2 of Plimsoll's Saving 75 from Ottawa.

United States Mission were reluctant to indicate lines of any new initiative envisaged by Palestine Conciliation Commission when we discussed this with them after P.C.C.'s Meeting in May. However yesterday Jarvis (P.C.C. Secretariat) told us that Commission had at that meeting accepted United States suggestion that it send a Representative to the Middle East in an endeavour by conversations with the parties to advance towards a solution (there seemed to be no more precise definition of his terms of reference). Appointment was offered to an individual of Ambassador rank but was last week declined. We shall pursue this with United States Mission. Memorandum follows.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'s.

12th July, 1961.

SEC I/Ss LA UNO BR CIREL PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA
SA T.A.P.M.E E AF MEO JEF IC

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